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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines contemporary challenges within “natural” disaster risk, vulnerability, 
resettlement and disaster management in Cameroon. Its empirical focus is on the 
experiences of the Lake Nyos and Lake Monoum gas disasters which occurred in the mid-
1980s, and on the processes that surrounded resettlement and subsequent relocation of 
affected populations. The underlying aim is to understand the social context of risk and 
vulnerability, and consider how such knowledge can be integrated in the development 
planning process of Cameroon. The research adopts the position, now common in the 
political ecology of hazards, that disasters occur due to the interaction between human and 
physical factors, and that disaster risk reduction measures should incorporate socio-
economic and socio-cultural problems. The thesis combines evidence from questionnaire 
surveys, interviews, documents and field observations, in order to produce a detailed 
understanding of the processes at work.  
 Results are presented in study populations; three that were affected by the gas 
disasters (the displaced victims of the Lake Nyos disaster presently living in resettlement 
camps, former displaced victims of the Lake Nyos disaster who have moved back to the 
disaster zone and the residents in and around Lake Monoum who were not resettled and 
have not moved from the disaster area) and a set of key stakeholders involved in disaster 
management in Cameroon.  
 Most disaster research in Cameroon focuses on the technical aspects of natural 
hazards/disasters. There is conspicuous lack of research or published materials that 
addresses the social aspects of natural disasters. Research findings show that Cameroon’s 
disaster management framework has been oriented to address mostly the crisis phase of 
natural disasters. This view is confirmed by the case study results, which reveal that the 
management of the Lake Nyos disaster focused on the immediate aftermath of the disaster, 
without contingency planning for the displaced survivors. Results also reveal that the 
resettlement of disaster survivors has created social conditions that have led to their 
relocation back to the disaster zone.  
 Results regarding several risk-related themes strongly indicate that disaster 
managers in the government sector generally perceive risk from a technical, scientific or 
physical perspective. Past experience and socio-cultural factors appear to be more 
responsible for risk perception and attitudes to risk in the disaster affected populations. The 
relocation of the Lake Nyos disaster survivors back to the disaster area and the non-
relocation of Njindoum residents within the vicinity of Lake Monoum indicate that both 
lakes are not considered to be a prohibitively serious threat. Analysis of relocation 
decisions shows that motivations for relocation are caused mainly by social, economic and 
cultural factors, which arise from resettlement.  
 Based on the research findings, a new disaster model is presented that shows 
the linkages, influences and interaction between Relocation Decisions and Disaster 
Management, Risk Perception and Vulnerability. 
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1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THESIS  
This thesis examines contemporary challenges within “natural” disaster risk, vulnerability, 
resettlement and disaster management in Cameroon. Its empirical focus is on the ongoing 
post-disaster experiences of survivors of the Lake Nyos and Lake Monoum gas disasters, 
which occurred in the mid-1980s. The central aim is to understand the social context of 
risk, vulnerability and relocation decisions for the affected populations. In a more general 
sense, the thesis also sets out to consider how social perspectives on risk can be integrated 
more effectively in the planning process of Cameroon. This case study research is a 
product of the largest catastrophic disaster that Cameroon has experienced (Lockwood and 
Meyer, 1989; Kusakabe, 1989). This was the forceful release of poisonous gases from the 
Lake Monoum and Nyos volcanic crater lakes in North Western Cameroon (Figure 1.1) in 
1984 and 1986 respectively, commonly referred to as the Lake Nyos and Monoum (LNM) 
gas disasters.  
 
1.2  LAKE NYOS AND LAKE MONOUM DISASTER EVENTS AND THEIR 
CONTEXT 
At about 9 p.m. on Thursday August 21st 1986, forcefully ejected poisonous gases from 
Lake Nyos flowed northwards, covering an area about 20 km long by 15 km wide (Figure 
1.2) (Baxter and Kapila, 1989) and affected about 10,000-20,000 people. The gas 
asphyxiated and suffocated1 1746 people in four villages (Lower Nyos, Subum, Cha and 
Fang) and displaced 4,430 more (Freeth and Kay, 1987; Kling et al, 1987; Kusakabe et al., 
1989: Tazief, 1989).  
In Nyos village, more than 90 percent of the population died, in Subum 30 percent 
and in Fang 6 percent (Othman-Chande, 1987). About 8,300 livestock and domestic 
animals were also killed, of which 55 percent were cattle (Shanklin, 1988). Medical, 
chemical and isotopic evidence from the Lake Nyos disaster (LND) suggested that the bulk 
of gas released was carbon-dioxide that had been stored in the lake and the victims 
exposed to the gas cloud died of carbon dioxide asphyxiation. Subsequent clinical findings 
on 845 survivors admitted to the Nkambe and Wum government hospitals after the disaster 
revealed that they suffered mostly from musculoskeletal, respiratory, skin lesions, 
neuromuscular and eye problems (Othman-Chande, 1987; Baxter et al., 1989 and Baxter 
and Kapila, 1989). This disaster rapidly drew international attention to this little known 
                                                 
1
 CO2 is denser than air and can be dangerous when it collect in low lying places, and may cause death by 
suffocation. 
 
 lake in North West Cameroon.  The Cameroonian authorities with substantial a
assistance from the international community experienced for the first time the challenges 
involved in the management of a large scale disaster.
Figure 1.1: Location of disaster sites in Cameroon. 
Two years earlier, on 15th August, 1984, a similar sudden gas discharge from Lake 
Monoum killed 37 people in the low lying areas near the lake 
Freeth and Kay, 1987; Shey, 1987; Kusakabe, 1989).
was not taken to be such a serious event when it occurred and not much attention was 
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given to it, probably because the risk of the lake to a larger population was not known then.  
It was only after the LND two years later that all the sectors of the community started to 
reflect on the LMD, especially when the causes of death in both cases was established to 
be similar. The LNM disasters, which are the basis of this research, are given more in-
depth analysis in subsequent Chapters, particularly Chapter six, which examines the 
management of the disasters.  
Figure 1.2: Direction of flow of gas (arrows; stippled area) from Lake Nyos into adjacent  
valleys showing location of Cha, Nyos and Subum villages.  Source: Baxter et al. (1989). 
  
Natural hazards are not a recent phenomenon in Cameroon; they have been 
happening even before the Carthaginian, Hanno, saw Mount Cameroon erupting in the fifth 
century BC and called it “Chariot of Gods”. Since this earliest recorded event, sudden 
onset natural hazards have become more numerous and disastrous, affecting livelihood 
assets in the country related to human, social, financial, natural and physical capital. 
Cameroon is vulnerable to many disasters, including epidemics, insect infestations, 
droughts and famine. However, geophysical and hydro-meteorological hazards, which 
include volcanic eruptions, toxic gas emissions, earthquakes or earth tremors, floods and 
landslides, are the most conspicuous. These hazards are concentrated in the western 
highlands region of Cameroon, which has the highest topographic features in the country, 
also known as the Cameroon Volcanic Line (CVL)2 (Belinga, E., 1984). The frequency of 
these disasters is increasing, resulting in heavy loss of life, property and human suffering. 
                                                 
2
  The Cameroon Volcanic Line (CVL) is  a geologic feature expressed externally as 1600km Y-
shaped SW - NE trending chains of Volcanoes stretching from the Atlantic Island of Pagalu through the Gulf 
of Guinea and the massifs of Mount Cameroon, Manengouba, Bamboutus, Oku, Bamenda, into the outcrops 
of Adamawa plateau, the Mandara and  Kapsiki mountains 
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While floods have thehighest frequency of occurrence in the country, the largest numbers 
of fatalities are related to volcanic processes. More details of Cameroon’s tectonic history 
that is largely responsible for the geologic and structural features which make the country 
prone to natural hazards is discussed in Appendix one (Page 271).   
Even though the impact of individual disasters on the national economy is not 
conspicuous, they affect the local economy and their cumulative effects on the national 
economy can be tremendous. In Cameroon, just as in many other developing countries, the 
impact of small-scale disasters on the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable communities, 
whose economy is largely in the informal or subsistence sectors, is rarely documented. 
This is often not recognized because disaster statistics collected and calculated at the 
provincial and national levels; capture only the formal and well-defined sectors of the 
economy. Such statistics often do not indicate the impact on local communities and their 
livelihoods although they are often most vulnerable to these disasters. There is growing 
international recognition that proneness to natural disasters has a debilitating effect on 
small or local level economies.  There is therefore a need to properly investigate the impact 
of disasters on vulnerable communities and their long lasting effects, especially 
considering that many developing countries like Cameroon have fragile economies that 
make them incapable of absorbing and spreading the burden of impacts.  
While disaster events have been unfolding, several national social and economic 
changes have also been taking place during recent decades making life in Cameroon even 
more difficult for ordinary Cameroonians. These changes include: globalisation, the 
economic crisis of the 1980s, devaluation of the CFA Franc in January 1994, political 
instability due to the introduction of multi-party politics in 1990, increased social tensions 
due to migration and land conflicts, crime and violence and the fast spreading HIV-AIDS 
epidemic. Cameroon’s macro-economic environment makes the people even more 
vulnerable to disasters, just as it limits the ability of the poor to tap into economic 
opportunities that can get them out of poverty. Many analyses that recognize the 
relationship between poverty and vulnerability to hazards attribute the vulnerability to 
disasters of individuals, families, or communities to their social, cultural, political and 
economic environment (Wisner et al., 2004; Bankoff et al., 2004:2). A more critical 
analysis of Cameroon’s weak macroeconomic situation within the last two decades, which 
is exacerbated by natural disasters, is presented in Chapter seven (from Page 144).  
Natural hazards are a phenomenon that will continue to affect human civilization. 
But their transformation into disasters depends on the extent of societal vulnerability and 
risk, which can be determined by the effectiveness or efficiency in disaster management 
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(DM). Disasters in Africa pose a major obstacle to the African continent’s efforts to 
achieve sustainable development, especially in view of the region’s insufficient capacity to 
predict, monitor, deal with and mitigate disasters (WCDR 2005). Factors contributing to 
increased vulnerability to natural disasters in developing countries comprise widespread 
poverty, high unemployment, distributional inequalities, high population growth, and lack 
of strong national and local institutions for dealing with disasters (Anderson, 1995:45; 
Smith, 2001). These factors also contribute to natural disaster vulnerability in Cameroon.  
Despite the propensity for natural hazards in Cameroon, especially the frequent 
volcanic eruptions, the country is arguably still ill-prepared to cope with their management 
and impacts. Natural hazards/disasters in Cameroon are jointly managed together with 
technological hazards and biological hazards as well as those caused by human induced 
hazards (Bang, 2008). These risks have been placed under civil protection and managed 
under the auspices of the Department of Civil Protection (DCP) in the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MTAD). However, as this thesis will 
show, an implementation gap remains in many locations and circumstances around the 
world between the ideals of effective DM and the realization of actual policies – and 
Cameroon is certainly no exception.  
 In January 2005, the necessity to mainstream Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) into 
sustainable development practices and socio-cultural values was highlighted during the 
World Conference in Natural Disaster Reduction in Japan (WCDR, 2005). 
Recommendations in Chapter 10 attempt to set a framework for mainstreaming DRR and 
DM programs into the development process of the country. This thesis is situated within 
this context. 
 
1.3 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
Natural hazards/disasters remain a common phenomenon around the world, and their 
effects tend to fall hardest on poor communities that have the least resources to cope 
(Amin et al., 2008). Disasters are commonly considered as stalling development (see 
Section 2.3.1) or setting it on a backwards trajectory for months, years or decades, but the 
link between disasters and development has a more fundamental basis (Collins, 2009).  
It is now widely acknowledged that vulnerability to hazards is a key element of 
underdevelopment and a major barrier to achieving the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (see Appendix 2). Due to the reliance on economic variables and 
physical factors as indicators of vulnerability, most vulnerability reduction strategies tend 
to provide measures that improve the functioning of systems but fail to address changes to 
6 
 
their structure (Jessamy, 2002). As a result, emphasis has generally been placed on 
physical risk reduction and mitigation. The LND triggered a number of scientific articles 
on the disasters with recommendations that emphasized structural mitigation measures to 
mitigate subsequent risks. Volume 348 of the journal “Nature” devoted its 1990 edition on 
the causes of the LNM disasters and the strategy for reducing the risk by gas removal.   
Such publications, together with the influence of scientists (Geologists, Geophysicists, 
Geochemists etc) in Cameroon’s Universities and the National Institute of Geological and 
Mining Research in the country, have greatly influenced government policy on the 
management of the LNM disasters. It will be shown later in Chapter six that Government 
policy on the management of the LNM disasters has been skewed towards technical 
mitigation measures dominated by the Nyos and Monoum Degassing Project (NMDP).  
It is now known that the degree to which populations are vulnerable to hazards is 
not solely dependent upon proximity to the source of the threat or the physical nature and 
severity of the hazard. Recent paradigm shifts during the last two decades have 
increasingly viewed disasters as unmanaged development risks and unresolved problems of 
the development process (see Section 2.2.1). This recognition has prompted a reorientation 
of DM thinking and a call for broader DRR strategies. One of them is the need to integrate 
natural disaster mitigation with development programs-a recommendation during the 1987 
conference on the management of the LND, which the government is yet to implement. It 
is now recognized that risk management approaches should focus on reducing the 
vulnerability of affected people by increasing their capacity to cope, and, in theory at least, 
to tackling the root social, economic, institutional and political causes of vulnerability 
(refer to Section 2.3.2). According to Abramovitz (2001:137) “While we cannot do away 
with natural hazards, we can eliminate those we cause, minimize those we exacerbate and 
reduce our vulnerability to most”. Reducing the vulnerability of the African people to 
hazards is necessary for poverty reduction, and also to protect past development gains (WCDR, 
2005). The practical application of DRR programs to improve the resilience of 
communities has to take account of the multi-faceted drivers of vulnerability, especially in 
developing countries. This has not been the case in Cameroon, where DM measures have 
been skewed towards technical measures while the socio-cultural and economic problems 
caused by the post-disaster resettlement of survivors persist. Problems with survivor 
resettlement and reintegration are increasing their vulnerability while the risk still persists 
as discussed in Section 6.3.2 of Chapter six and Chapter seven.  
One of the widespread effects of disaster events is displacement and resettlement of 
disaster victims. However, resettlement itself can create deep-seated socio-economic 
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problems as experienced by the LND survivors who were resettled in seven camps (Bang 
et al., 2009). The vulnerability of the LND survivors is therefore one line of enquiry in this 
thesis (Section 1.4.1).  According to the World Bank (2006), one way of coping with post-
disaster social risks emanating from resettlement is relocation or return migration back to 
the former sites of displacement. It will be shown later in Chapter nine that the populations 
that have relocated back to the disaster zone in Nyos and the residents in Njindoum close 
to Lake Monoum (LM) are more vulnerable to subsequent risks from the Lakes. It has been 
a painful process for such populations to secure livelihoods in risky environments and 
under difficult socio-economic conditions, often through trial and error, with uncertain 
outcomes (Bohle, 2007:23).  
Motivation for relocations of potentially affected people is still an under-researched 
area of disaster and is yet to be properly understood. This research seeks to fill this gap by 
investigating the relocation decisions (RD) of disaster survivors following the LNM 
disasters. The behaviour of people, which is reflected in their decisions to locate in risky 
areas shows that individuals and their communities are not ignorant of the existence of 
these threats. Choices are made and decisions taken on the benefits of occupying hazardous 
environments as reviewed in Section 2.5 (Page 43). This decision-making is based on risk 
perception, which can be expected to vary between the individual/household level and the 
organizational level (Smith, 2001). There is therefore an urgent need to evaluate 
perceptions of risk.   
By unveiling the social context of risk that has evolved in the disaster areas, it is 
hoped that the risk management decision-making process will be revealed and the 
influence of hazard risk perception and motivations for relocations can be understood. It is 
hypothesized that the existing social knowledge on the impact of the LNM disasters is not 
well developed, has not been widely shared amongst disaster managers and also, has not 
been incorporated into mainstream development decisions in the country. Some of the 
possible reasons could be: a poor understanding of social risk and vulnerability in the area; 
a perception that risk management is the sole responsibility of the government rather than a 
shared responsibility involving the affected communities; low public demand for social 
risk management measures; a lack of understanding of the risks involved; and a lack of 
effective management of the risks. Therefore, this research particularly seeks to advance 
our theoretical and conceptual understandings of how DM practices, social vulnerability 
and risk perception inter-relate with relocation decisions.  
The LND and its management could be viewed as a wakeup call that should give a 
new orientation to disaster research in Cameroon and place risk mitigation and 
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vulnerability assessment higher up the political agenda, especially considering that there 
are more than 70 crater lakes in Cameroon that possess a similar threat. 
 
1.4 AIMS AND APPROACH  
The main aim of this study is to understand the social context of risk, vulnerability and 
relocation decisions for the populations that were affected by the LNM gas disasters. In a 
more general sense, the thesis also sets out to consider how social perspectives on risk can 
be integrated more effectively in the planning process of Cameroon.  
 
1.4.1 CASE STUDY 
This case study has been chosen for various reasons. Apart from these lethal gas releases 
from volcanic crater lakes, the North West Province is one of the areas in Cameroon that is 
most subjected to natural hazards, including landslides and flash floods. Of the sudden 
onset disasters that have occurred in Cameroon, the LND have caused the greatest disaster 
fatalities and displaced the greatest number of people from their homes.  It is also easy to 
identify and locate the disaster survivors from the Nyos incident who live in resettlement 
camps up to this day. Another reason for choosing these two sites is that, although the two 
hazards were similar, their scale of impacts and management was different. While the 
Nyos survivors were resettled in far-off places and some of them are already returning to 
the disaster site, the Monoum survivors were not displaced and in their livelihoods, they 
continue to interact with the deadly lake. A comparative analysis in these two situations 
aims to improve our understanding of people’s choices whether to relocate, which is 
important for disaster policy especially at the local level. It is also important to note that 
this is one of the most widely studied disasters in Cameroon although most publications 
have concentrated on technical analyses and structural mitigation measures. However, 
some preliminary social studies in the area were conducted after the LND in February 1987 
under the auspices of MESRES (Shanklin, 1988). The background information available 
on these disasters also contributed to the choice of this case study.  
 
1.4.2  OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This empirical research recognizes the causation of risk and vulnerability through social 
processes and seeks to adopt a technical as well as social science perspective in the 
research process. Following the gaps and problems mentioned earlier, the objectives 
logically lead to four research questions. The questions are: 
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1. What strategies have been adopted for the affected people to cope with and recover 
from the Lake Nyos and Monoum disasters? The objective is to investigate the process 
of DM in Cameroon following the LNM disasters. 
2. How can we understand the vulnerability of individuals and their households to the 
present risk at Lake Nyos and Monoum? This question aims to investigate the 
vulnerability drivers in the Nyos and Monoum areas. 
3. How do people perceive and respond to the risk that still exists in the disaster areas? 
This question seeks to explore how risk perception, knowledge and communication 
influence disaster mitigation and preparedness, and attitudes to risk. 
4. What makes people settle or move away from the risky areas? The objective is to 
explore and gain an understanding of the reasons behind the choice of where people 
decide to settle and/or resettle after the disasters. 
How these research questions relate to specific research tasks and study populations is 
explained in Section 4.4 (also see Table 4.2) from Page 66.   
More than two decades after these disasters occurred, research into social 
vulnerability and risk perception will provide a better insight into their level of societal 
reintegration. It is also envisaged that an analysis of the experiences from the LNM 
disasters will provide an understanding of the enabling mechanisms and procedures, which 
are necessary to meet the challenges of DM and DRR in Cameroon.  
 
1.5 MAJOR THEORETICAL INFLUENCES ON THE RESEARCH 
APPROACH 
 
1.5.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIETY-NATURE  
The relationship between society-nature is relevant to understand the occurrence of 
disasters as revealed by the mutuality paradigm (see Section 2.2.1). This relationship is 
important to answer research question two, which concerns the interaction between the 
affected population and a physical event (the LNM disasters), or potential physical risks in 
the disaster area. Oliver-Smith (2004:16) explains this relationship as “one of the 
fundamental if often unexamined pillars of any ideological system”. Former constructions 
of the relationship between society and nature reveal society’s domination over and control 
of nature. Some discourses on disasters emphasized the social construction of nature 
(Ingold, 1992); while others explain that the enlightenment ideal of human emancipation 
and self-realisation was closely linked to the idea of control and use of nature (Harvey, 
1996). Oliver-Smith (2004) reveals that in the west, nature has been constructed as a fund 
of resources into which human beings, regardless of social context, have not only a right to 
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dip, but to dominate in a way they deem fit. The implications of these assertions in disaster 
studies express the dominance of human rationality over nature and summarized that 
humans are: “Capable of manipulating, domesticating, remolding, reconstructing and 
harvesting nature” (Murphy, 1994:5)    
However, Oliver-Smith (2004) argues that these positions are flawed in that they 
are constructed from a perspective in which the environment has been reduced to the status 
of ensuring human well-being. Such a conceptualisation will not contribute to our 
understanding of the causes of disasters, and can therefore not fit into the conceptual realm 
of this research. It has been shown that many cultures do not construct a clear dichotomy 
between nature and culture as western societies do (Escobar, 2001:151).  Scientific and 
philosophical discourses that had seen humans as ontologically distinct from nature have  
provided a contrasting category against which human identity could be defined as cultural 
rather than natural (Horigan, 1988). The epistemological position of this thesis is therefore 
similar to that of Oliver-Smith (2004), that a proper understanding of both vulnerability 
and disasters must include the mutual interaction of the agencies of nature and society, 
recognizing that the society can express itself through influence on the environment with 
positive and negative consequences. This position is central to the alternative conceptual 
framework adopted for this research (see Section 3.2 on Page 55).  
 
1.5.2 POLITICAL ECOLOGY 
Political ecology is a terminology that cuts across a number of established disciplines from 
the natural and social sciences and also brings with them their dominant epistemologies 
and methodologies (Blaikie, 1999:143). Political ecology blends a focus on the relationship 
that people have with their environment with close attention to the political economic 
forces characteristic of the society in which they live, that shape and condition that 
relationship (Oliver-Smith, 2004:10). While the human ecology which determines 
settlement patterns is influenced by physical and environmental factors, the political 
economy considered as historical and socio-cultural patterns, economic and political 
factors (such as social status, access to resources and power relations) also influences 
location choices. This means that political and economic forces equally place people at risk 
and limit adjustments to natural hazards, thus making some people more vulnerable to 
disasters than others (Hewitt, 1983; Palm, 1990; Blaikie et al., 1994). The effect of the 
political economy in the creation of natural disasters are clearly explained through the 
disaster-pressure-release model (Blaikie et al, 1994) presented in Section 2.2.3. Hewitt 
(1997:205) also links low socioeconomic status and losses due to earthquakes to the human 
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ecology of earthquake risk and argues that this should be the main focus of risk mitigation 
and disaster reduction measures. This is the premise in which DM is considered in the 
conceptual framework adopted for this thesis as explained in Section 3.2.  
The implications of the political ecology are relevant to our understanding of this 
research because government DM strategies (research question 1) and practices can 
mitigate social vulnerability, or vulnerability to physical risks. The political ecology that 
influences human society is assumed to be affecting the meso and micro levels within 
Cameroon society, and also has implications for research question two. This is because as 
will be seen in Chapter six, the poor social management of the LND is responsible for the 
dire social conditions of the survivors (analysed in Chapter seven). The context of this 
research adopts the position that social characteristics that structure people’s role in a 
society and influences their understanding and interpretation of disasters are determined by 
the political ecology. These social-structuralist interpretations hold the assumption that 
political economy directs location decisions and therefore, influences social vulnerability 
(analysed in Chapter seven). Political and economic structure limits societal coping 
strategies and adjustments to environmental hazards. It establishes risk as a social construct 
and influences the adoption of mitigation measures by decision makers and individuals at 
the meso-and micro-levels. Thus the combination of the features of a hazard event, 
political ecology and mitigation measures results in the construction of risk. These 
attributes, which have been built into the conceptual framework of this research (see 
Section 3.2) determines the vulnerability of a population to the impacts from a natural 
hazard and/or the severity of a disaster.  
 
1.5.3 SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOOD APPROACHES  
The livelihoods approach underpins this contemporary disaster research because the 
primary and secondary effects of the LNM disasters impacted the livelihoods of the 
affected populations. All the research questions have implications for the livelihood of the 
affected populations. The concept of ‘a livelihood’ seeks to bring together the critical 
factors that affect the vulnerability or strength of individual or family survival strategies. 
These are thought to comprise, chiefly, the assets possessed by people, the activities in 
which they engage in order to generate an adequate standard of living and to satisfy other 
goals such as risk reduction, and the factors that facilitate or inhibit different people from 
gaining access to assets and activities (Ellis, 2000).  According to DFID (1999/2000):  
 “A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material 
and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A 
livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses 
12 
 
and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now 
and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base” 
(DFID 1999/2000).  
 
Sustainable Livelihood Approaches (SLAs) consider vulnerability of all kinds as part of 
the context in which livelihoods are shaped. The theory brings the thinking and practice of 
poverty reduction strategies, sustainable development and participation, and empowerment 
processes into a framework for policy analysis and programming (Twig, 2001). 
Livelihoods are relevant in this study because the impacts of the LNM disasters have 
limited or changed the way the affected populations gained access to assets, causing socio-
economic problems. This is examined in greater details in Chapter seven.  
SLAs have been employed by researchers and development professionals. Some of 
the prominent donor agencies that have utilized SLAs include UNDP (Wanmali, 1999; 
Hoon et al., 1997), GTZ (Albert, 2000; AusAID (AusAID, 2000), Oxfam (Neefjes, 2000), 
CARE (Sanderson, 1999) and USAID (USAID, 2001). Most of the SLAs and theories 
developed are broadly similar and draw upon each other (Twigg, 2001). SLAs start from a 
developmental standpoint and put livelihoods at the centre of the discussion. Two 
approaches that relate to disasters and are relevant to this research will be mentioned here. 
These are the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) (Ashley and Carney, 1999) and 
UNDP Sustainable Livelihoods and Vulnerability (Hoon et al., 1997). CARE’s application 
of the approach to the disaster context (Sanderson, 1999) is mentioned on Page 37.  
 
Sustainable Livelihood Frameworks 
The sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) is designed to help understand and analyse 
poor people’s livelihoods (Ashley and Carney, 1999).   This framework has been explained 
by a series of “sustainable livelihood guidance sheets” (DFID 1999/2000). This framework 
(see Appendix 3 on Page 276) is relevant to this research because the main themes relate to 
the research objectives and questions. The concept of vulnerability context and livelihood 
assets have implications for research questions two and four while the transforming 
structures and processes, and livelihood strategies have implications in question one that 
seeks to address DM strategies in Cameroon.  
The livelihoods approach centers on the links between individual or household 
assets, the activities in which households can engage with a given asset profile, and the 
mediating processes (institutions, regulations etc.) that govern access to assets and to 
alternative activities. The framework starts with the vulnerability context in which people 
live their lives and livelihood assets that they posses. It then looks at how transforming 
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structures and processes generate livelihood strategies that lead to livelihood outcomes. 
The applications of the SLF in disaster research have been recognised (Twigg, 2001).  
The SLF divides livelihood outcomes into five broad categories to make the 
framework more manageable. These include more income and more economically 
sustainable livelihoods; increased well-being (non-material goods such as self esteem, 
sense of control and inclusion, physical security, health, access to services, political 
enfranchisement and maintenance of culture heritage); reduced vulnerability to external 
trends, shocks and seasonality; improved food security and more sustainable use of the 
natural resource base. Within the context of this research, the Nyos disaster victims have 
resorted to various livelihood strategies that do involve not only alternative livelihood 
activities, but also some relocation back to the disaster site to benefit from the fertile soils 
that are not available at the resettlement camps.  
 
UNDP Sustainable Livelihoods and Vulnerability 
This approach is relevant to understand the response measures necessary to sustain or 
maintain the livelihoods of the study populations that were affected by the LNM disasters. 
This is addressed in Chapter six, which tackles the social and technical management 
aspects of the LNM disasters. The analytical framework used by the UNDP consists of a 
livelihood system that comprises three distinct processes. This conceptual framework is 
described by Hoon et al. (1997), and can be represented by a triangle as shown and 
explained in Appendix three. The triangle represents UNDP’s conclusion after considering 
different theories and models. In the context of livelihoods, this sees vulnerability and 
sustainability as two ends of a continuum. The properties of a vulnerable livelihood system 
are contrary to those of a sustainable livelihood system, notably in terms of the risk of 
exposure to crises, stresses and shocks and capacity to cope. Livelihoods systems can be 
located at certain points on the continuum. However, sustainability and vulnerability are 
processes and not events and livelihood systems and groups on the vulnerability-
sustainability continuum are dynamic in nature (Twigg, 2001). The vulnerability 
assessment model recognizes that not everybody is equally at risk and therefore takes 
coping and adaptive strategies as the entry points for developing strategies. The sustainable 
livelihood response is to reduce exposure, enhance coping capacity, strengthen recovery 
potential and finally create, maintain and enhance an enabling environment within which 
people can realize their livelihood aspirations. The existence of such response measures is 
crucial in shaping the recovery process of disaster victims, as will be revealed in later 
Chapters of this thesis.  
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1.5.4 VULNERABILITY 
‘Vulnerability’ is the key to an understanding of risk and is one of the terms that seem to 
defy a consensus on its usage as it is used very differently throughout the literature 
(Hewitt, 1983; Few, 2003). Vulnerability links social, economic structures, cultural norms 
and values and environmental hazards and disasters. It is also relevant to the formulation of 
a coherent theoretical framework for disaster causation, which encompasses both natural 
and social scientific perspectives (Cutter, 1996; Downing et al., 1999; Pelling, 2003; 
Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2004).   
There is no simplistic notion in understanding vulnerability, just as its complex 
nature may defy simple solutions. The definition of vulnerability has been conceptualized 
along disciplinary approaches. Some schools of thought of vulnerability definitions can be 
differentiated: 
 One, referred to as physical vulnerability focuses on exposure to bio/geophysical 
hazards or risk/hazard exposure, including the analysis of distribution of hazardous 
conditions, human occupancy of hazardous zones, degree of loss due to hazardous 
events and the analysis of characteristics and impacts of hazardous events. This 
approach tends to be concerned with the features of the hazard event; degree of loss 
(life and property), with emphasis on forecasting, warning systems and vulnerability 
reduction of the built environment (Heyman et al., 1991; Alexander 1993; Burton et al., 
1993). Part of question one seeks to investigate measures to mitigate physical 
vulnerability. This is analysed in Chapter six when strategies to mitigate subsequent 
physical risks in the disaster zone are discussed (see Section 6.3.1)  
 The second school of thought views the social context of hazards and relates ‘social’ 
vulnerability to coping responses of communities, including societal resistance and 
resilience to hazards (Berke et al., 1993; Watts, 1993; Bohle et al., 1994; Blaike et al., 
1994; Adger, 1996; Adger, 2000; Wisner et al., 2004). Sociological and development 
studies approaches are used to study the nature of the hazard event where the focus is 
placed on people’s access to resources, equity, poverty and power. Social vulnerability 
analyses are central to the investigations in this thesis. Part of question two probes into 
measures to mitigate social vulnerability while Chapter seven fully investigates the 
social vulnerability drivers.  
 The third school combines both approaches and defines vulnerability as a hazard of 
place which encompasses biophysical risks as well as social response and action 
(Tavakoli and Tavakoli, 1993; Cutter, 1996, 2001). This is applicable in the case of 
disaster survivors who have relocated to the disaster site in Nyos or living very close to 
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LM, thus being vulnerable to the new risks in these regions as will be shown in Chapter 
nine.  
 Vulnerability of state or nations is distinguished from vulnerability of individuals and 
applies to the entire region or country based on change in the flow of goods and 
services before and after disasters usually measured as Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
Economics is often used to assess the vulnerability of states in terms of their economic 
vulnerability to external shock, expressed as output volatility index, trade 
diversification and per capita GDP (UN-DRO, 1982; Bender, 1994; World Bank, 1998; 
Crowards, 2000). This does not have any application in this research.  
 Vulnerability of ecosystems is ascribed to the integrity of ecosystems and their 
response to environmental fluctuations or disturbance regulation and expressed as the 
length of relaxation time, which increases with increased degradation. Ecological 
studies focus on storm protection, flood control, drought recovery and other aspects of 
habitat response to environmental variability (Lugo, 1995, 2000; Dale et al., 2000). 
This research does not also consider the vulnerability of the ecosystem.  
 Despite the different conceptualizations of vulnerability and its application, one of 
the most widely recognized definitions is that of the (United Nations International Strategy 
for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) which defines Vulnerability as: “The conditions 
determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes, which 
increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards” (UN-ISDR, 2004a). 
This definition partially embraces the conceptualization of vulnerability in this research, 
with the first three vulnerability approaches having a strong application in this research. 
Vulnerability is further examined within different disaster models in Chapter two (refer to 
Section 2.2.3). 
 
1.5.5 POST MODERNISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
This research challenges the privileged status of scientific claims to knowledge because 
different people, scientist and non-scientist alike, including local people claim different 
truths about the environment. This is important in understanding the findings of question 
three on risk perception, as analysed in Chapter eight because indigenous knowledge as 
revealed by the LND survivors, plays a crucial role in their interpretation and 
understanding of the LND.  
How society influences the environment is now examined within the contemporary 
post- modern era. Blaikie (1996:81) affirms that post-modernism has not only invaded the 
social sciences, but is now engaged in the foundations of the natural sciences, policy 
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making and development studies. The teleological positions on the environment that used 
to be transmitted in the form of ‘meta-narratives’ and embraced worldwide is now being 
challenged:  
“The role of environmental scientists in policy making as talking truth to 
power and as the only rational and legitimate brokers between the real 
environment and the rest of us is rejected” (Blaikie, 1996:81). 
  
The teleological scientific stance does not consider the knowledge of less powerful 
groups (also see Section 2.4) such as the local and indigenous people in whose context this 
research is situated. Some survivors of the LND used indigenous knowledge to survive the 
release of poisonous gasses during the LND. Risk and its perceptions, including mitigation 
measures against subsequent gas risks in Nyos village is still influenced by local 
knowledge in the area as will be shown in Chapter eight. An approach that neglects 
indigenous local knowledge will therefore not provide a suitable conceptual and 
epistemological stance for this study.  
 
1.6  THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter one briefly introduces the thesis, presents the LNM disaster events and their 
context, explains the rationale for the study or research problematic, aims and approach of 
the study including case study, working objectives and research questions. It further 
examines the major theoretical influences on the research approach, which include Society-
Nature relationship, Political Ecology, Sustainable Livelihood Frameworks and Post 
modernism and the Environment.  
Chapter two then provides a review of the main research themes that underpin this 
study. The main themes reviewed are disasters studies (paradigms in disaster studies, key 
disaster terms like hazards, disaster, risk and vulnerability); disasters and development 
(hazards/disasters and development, disaster management); risk perception and migration 
and environmental hazards.  
The third Chapter draws on the review to explore the basic principles, possible 
practical applications and the key elements that have guided this research. It presents the 
elements used to frame the conceptual framework which guides the research process.  
Chapter four outlines the research design, approach, techniques and data processing 
for this study. It explains how a case study research approach is employed to understand 
the questions under enquiry, using mixed qualitative and quantitative data gathering 
methods, and discusses aspects of field logistics and ethical considerations.  
The fifth and sixth Chapters address the first research question: what strategies 
have been adopted to cope with and recover from the LNM disasters? Chapter five 
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provides a comprehensive analysis of the legislative, administrative and institutional 
framework of natural DM in Cameroon, to show how the process has been designed to 
function in the country.  
Chapter six completes the answers to the first research question by analysing how 
the LNM disasters were managed. More detailed analysis of the management of the LND 
has been provided, since it drew national and international attention due to the huge 
logistical operations involved in the emergency response and the high death toll. This 
Chapter examines the disaster impact, the DM during the immediate aftermaths of the 
disaster, over the long term and some contemporary DM issues. The physical risk that 
exists in the disaster site is also examined in this Chapter, thereby providing answers to 
part of question two that seeks to understand vulnerability in the study populations.  
Chapter seven seeks to answer part of the second research question: how can we 
understand the vulnerability of individuals and their households to the present risk at Lake 
Nyos and Monoum? The main thrust of this Chapter is analysis of the socio-economic and 
socio-cultural conditions in the study area and the study populations. Initially, a brief 
analysis of Cameroon’s increasingly weak economy from the 1980s is presented to 
complement government arguments for having limited funds to assist disaster victims. The 
ramification of the post-disaster resettlement in the LN survivors is based on Cernea’s 
(1997) Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Model. This addresses social 
vulnerability while the technical vulnerability based on the present physical threat in Lake 
Nyos is addressed in Chapter six.  
Chapter eight discusses risk and its perceptions and answers the third question: how 
do people perceive and respond to the risk that still exists in the disaster areas? This 
Chapter analysis the risk perception of disaster affected case study populations and the 
main actors in DM through revealed and expressed perception of risk. An analysis of 
revealed perception of risk is also performed by examining the DM framework of the 
country and the management of the LNM disasters. The disaster survivor’s revealed 
perception of risk is also analysed based on factors affecting their decisions to relocate 
back to the disaster zone or settle in close proximity with the risk source.  
Chapter nine provides answers to the fourth research question: what makes people 
settle or move away from risky areas?  It brings together findings from previous Chapters 
to form the analytical core of this thesis. It explores the reasons behind the post-disaster 
relocation decisions of the survivors. The analysis on relocation decisions is based on four 
themes generated from empirical information obtained from disaster survivors. The four 
themes addressed are motives for relocation back to the disaster zone, motives for non-
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relocation to the disaster zone, intention to relocate from present location and preferred 
relocation area. Findings from these four themes provide a major contribution to the 
knowledge and understanding of post-disaster relocation decisions, which is still an under 
researched area of disaster research.  
Chapter ten presents a summary and the main findings from the analytical 
Chapters. The results from Chapters Five to Nine are presented along with a new disaster 
model based on the main research themes in this thesis. This model, known as the Disaster 
Management, Risk Perception and Vulnerability (DRV) model for RD establishes the 
linkages and relationships between the central research theme (RD) and the other themes. 
This Chapter sums up the thesis by presenting some policy recommendations based on the 
major themes and theoretical expositions generated from the key findings.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
DISASTER, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter reviews four themes relevant to this research. It begins by providing an 
overview of contemporary understanding on disaster by examining paradigms and key 
terminologies in disaster studies and disaster models. It then tackles disasters and 
development by examining the relationship between hazards/disaster and development, 
including an examination of contemporary approaches to DM. Risk perception and 
migration with emphasis on displacement/resettlement/population movement constitute the 
last two themes examined in this review. These review themes are important not only 
because they provide a better understanding of the subject under study but also because 
they provide the basis of a theoretical/conceptual framework that will be used to underpin 
the overall study.  
 
2.2 DISASTER STUDIES 
2.2.1 PARADIGMS IN DISASTER STUDIES 
Knowledge of the various paradigms in disaster studies is relevant to understand the right 
approach in tackling the research questions outlined in Section 1.4.2. Disaster studies have 
been characterized in terms of their underlying paradigms. A technocratic paradigm 
dominated early disaster studies. This approach was pioneered by natural and physical 
scientists including geologists, seismologists, meteorologists and other scientists who can 
monitor and predict hazards. Emphasis was placed on the geophysical processes that 
caused disasters, and on predicting and forecasting natural hazard events and reducing their 
impacts on infrastructural development. This resulted in an increase in technology and 
engineering science, with the aim of strengthening physical infrastructure development in 
areas known for the recurrence of extreme natural phenomena. However, these approaches 
gave no consideration to the structure of systems, particularly human systems and the role 
of human behavior in modifying the environment and creating conditions that lead to 
natural disasters (Kates, 1971; Smith, 1999; Oliver-Smith, 1996). 
Towards the 1980s, social scientists increasingly began to challenge the 
technocratic hazard-centered approach to disasters. A series of disasters that occurred in 
the 1980s, and at the end of the 1990s led to the realization that mitigating losses through 
technological and engineering solutions dealt with the symptoms rather than the actual 
causes of disasters. Social scientists then began to interpret disasters from the viewpoint of 
human and political ecology. They argued that disasters were not primarily the outcome of 
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geophysical or technocratic processes, but as a result of socio-economic processes that 
accounted for people and societies’ vulnerability to disasters. The emergence of the 
anthropological and sociological approaches began to probe into human behaviour and 
focused on the role of human systems in creating natural disasters. They began to explain 
people’s behaviour in response to risk and disaster, and sought to explain how individuals 
and their actions and decision-making create vulnerable social and environmental 
conditions, the precursors of disasters (Kates, 1971; Blaikie et al., 1994). This is the main 
approach adopted in this research as flaws in the LNM DM could be linked to the Human 
Use System as will be shown in the conceptual framework for this thesis (see Section 3.2 
on Page 56).  
A new paradigm, known as the ‘Mutuality’ paradigm emerged in the 1990s due to 
increased attention to environmental processes and human-induced climate change.  This 
paradigm emphasizes the mutuality of hazard and vulnerability to disasters due to complex 
interactions between nature and society. While structural theory largely turned to society to 
explain people’s vulnerability to disasters, the mutuality paradigm looks at the mutual 
constitution of society and environment. People in this view are not just vulnerable to 
hazards; but hazards are increasingly the result of human activity3. This has the important 
implication that vulnerability might not just be understood as how people are susceptible to 
hazards, but can also be considered as a measure of the impact of society on the 
environment (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999; Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2004). This 
paradigm does not have any application in this research because the affected communities 
were not responsible for the discharge of the poisonous gases from the lakes that caused 
the disasters.   
 
2.2.2 KEY TERMS AND THEIR MEANINGS: HAZARDS, DISASTER AND RISKS 
Natural Hazards 
Natural hazards are threatening events to humans and their welfare, capable of producing 
damage to the physical and social space where they take place not only at the moment of 
their occurrence, but on a long-term basis due to their associated consequences (Ayala, 
2002; Keith 2001). The United Nations International Strategy for Natural Disaster 
Reduction (ISDR) defines natural hazards as: 
“Natural processes or phenomena (geological, hydro-meteorological or 
biological) occurring in the biosphere that may constitute a damaging 
event.” (UN-ISDR, 2004a) 
 
                                                 
3
  An example is how environmental degradation and human-induced climate change can alter 
meteorological and hydrological processes, leading to more frequent and more devastating hazards. 
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Despite different conceptualizations, the concept of ‘hazard’ is now generally used to refer 
to a latent danger or an external risk factor of a system or exposed subject, which can be 
expressed in mathematical form as the probability of the occurrence of an event of certain 
intensity in a specific site and during a determined period of exposure (Cardona, 2004:38). 
In this research, the principal focus is on geophysical, hydrologic and atmospheric 
phenomena that have the potential to affect human society. Other hazards that are not 
directly related to physical processes like disease, epidemics, and contamination by 
chemicals are not discussed in detail. Some important defining characteristics of natural 
hazards regardless of their source or origin include their intensity; the suddenness of the 
onset and duration; the frequency of occurrence; and the space or area in which the event 
occur (Kates, 1962, 1971; Burton, et al., 1993; Alexander, 1993, 1995; Smith, 2001). 
 
‘Natural’ Disasters  
Disasters have been defined in several ways but a more detailed definition considers both 
the natural and socio-economic factors that lead to disasters. Not all natural 
bio/geophysical phenomenon give rise to disasters. Natural disasters occur when the 
threshold of the natural phenomenon combined with the status of human-ecological 
systems is such that their ability to respond and recover from the direct and indirect 
impacts is overwhelmed and often rendered inadequate (Westgate and O’keefe, 1976; 
IDNDR, 1992; Alexander, 1993; Quarantelli, 1998; Keith, 2001).  
 Cannon (1994) argues that while hazards are ‘natural’, disasters are not because 
social processes generate unequal exposure to risk by making some people more prone to 
disasters than others. He argues that the term ‘natural’ in disasters is inappropriate. In 
compliance with his argument, I will refer subsequently to disasters and not ‘natural’ 
disasters. Tobin and Montz (1997) argue that disasters may not lead to death, but may 
disrupt the workings of society and have severe economic impacts. This view is supported 
by Alexander (1995; 1997) who suggests that disasters are often reflected as a change in 
the flow of energy/mass, goods and services between human and ecological systems and 
consequent transitory or long-term changes in the functions and structure of systems. The 
conceptualisation of disasters in this thesis reflects the definition by the United Nations 
ISDR:  
 “A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society 
causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses 
which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope 
using its own resources” (UN-ISDR, 2004a).  
 
 A disaster therefore results from the combinations of hazards, conditions of vulnerability 
and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the potential negative consequences of risk.  
Two common elements of disasters are their high degree of loss and damage and the 
incapacity of affected people, regions or countries to cope with the impacts (Rettberg and 
Ungthum, 2003).  
Disasters usually comprise a set of crises resulting from the disruption of socio
economic activities, damage to the environment, property and natural resources, injury and 
deaths. The impacts caused by natural hazards are varied and often cla
and indirect impacts (Ward, 
2001). While the ‘direct’ impacts are caused by physical contact of the hazard event with 
humans and/or with property, the ‘indirect’ impacts are cau
physical contact. The direct and indirect impacts have been further divided into ‘tangible’ 
or ‘intangible’ impacts (Figure 2.1). Tangible impacts are usually described as those that 
can be measured in monetary terms while 
measured in monetary terms or impact in such a way that monetary estimates are 
considered undesirable and unacceptable (Tobin and Montz, 1997). Tangible and 
intangible impacts have also been further subdivided in
categories as shown in F
these terminologies have been used to describe the disaster impacts in the thesis. 
Figure 2.1: The impact of natural disasters. 
                                        
4
  Primary impacts are considered to be the immediate impacts associated with a disaster and 
constitute the losses resulting from the event itself. These impacts usually lead to further impacts, termed 
secondary impacts. E.g. cr
secondary impact. 
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Risk 
Risk has different conceptualizations, at times often inter-changed with hazards. Risk has 
been defined as the ‘probability of an adverse event and the magnitude of its 
consequences’ (Rayner and Cantor, 1987). Crichton (1999) developed a risk triangle, 
which he used to describe risk as the probability of a loss that depends on three elements, 
hazard, vulnerability and exposure. If any of these three elements in risk increases or 
decreases, then risk increases or decreases respectively. Sarewitz et al. (2003) divides risk 
into ‘event risk’ (the probability of an event happening) and ‘outcome risk’ (the probability 
of a particular outcome). The UN-ISDR (2004a) defines risk as: 
 “The probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, 
injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activity, disrupted or 
environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural or 
human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions”.  
 
This implies that risk is both a descriptive and normative concept which includes the 
analysis of cause-effect relationships, which may be scientific, anecdotal, religious or 
magical (Renn, 1992). Recent definitions of risk have shifted from explicitly mentioning 
probability. Rosa (2003:56) considers risk as a situation or an event where things valued by 
humans including humans themselves are at stake and where the outcome is uncertain.  
The focus here is on uncertainty but has the limitation that the emphasis is on the outcome 
and not the event itself.  The Royal Society questioned the distinction between objective 
and perceived risk and although they accepted that the outcomes of risk were objective, 
they asserted that assessments of risk, whether they are based upon individual attitudes, the 
wider beliefs within a culture, or on models of mathematical risk assessment, depends 
upon human judgments (Royal Society, 1992).   
The conceptualisation of risk in the social sciences has a common principle that the 
causes and consequences of risk are mediated through social processes (Renn, 1992:61). 
These risk concepts include psychological, sociological, economic and cultural 
perspectives. Thus social risk focuses on the evaluation of risk and tries to link objective 
and socially constructed risk. In this research, risk is viewed as both a physical and social 
attribute.  
 
2.2.3 DISASTER MODELS 
This section looks in more detail at a series of models that attempt to represent the 
interaction of human/social systems with natural hazards to produce disasters. Four models 
presented here that adopt integrated approaches are:  
 Human Adjustment to Natural Hazards (Kates, 1971)  
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 Disaster and Pressure Release (Blaikie et al., 1994)  
 Hazard of Place (Cutter, 1996) 
 BBC framework for measuring vulnerability 
 
Human Adjustment to Natural Hazards: a general systems model 
This model was developed by Kates (1971) and employs a general systems mode with 
subsystems within the model that show its internal process-response system (Figure 2.2). It 
was the first to bring in the social dimension of hazards/disasters and recognizes that 
humanity and nature, in the form of a human use system and a natural system, interact to 
produce natural hazards. A model which utilizes principles of control systems is employed. 
This model greatly informs the final conceptual framework for this research and the 
diagrammatic representation of the Human Use System and the Bio-geophysical system, 
which explains it (see Page 56-60).  It also incorporates key concepts and hypotheses on 
human behaviour in response to natural hazards such as perception, preferences, evaluation 
and adoption choice, which are explored in more detail in Chapters eight and nine. This 
model represents the most comprehensive approach to modeling the human-natural hazard 
interaction. 
 
Figure 2.2: Human adjustment to natural hazards. Source: Kates (1971) 
 
 
 
 
 Disaster and Pressure Release Model
This model is useful in this thesis to understand the social vulnerability of the LND 
survivors resettled in 
the livelihood problems acting as push factors for relocation from the resettlement camps, 
which is discussed in Chapter nine. This model expresses the cause of disasters as related 
to socio-economic and political factors that determine societies’ access to resources and 
power, inequity due to race, class, and poverty and gender roles. In this model, Blaikie et 
al. (1994) explain the progression of vulnerability (see Section 1.5.4; Page 
causes, through dynamic pressures, resulting in local unsafe conditions that combine with 
natural hazards to produce disasters (Figure 2.3). Government policies and programs are 
considered the result of unequal power relations that create vul
conditions at the local level. This model is useful in this thesis because of its focus on 
political ecological factors considered to be responsible for the socio
of the LND survivors. This approach suggests that dis
societies where there is lack of resources, basic needs and freedom, oppressive ideologies, 
rapid population growth and/or a fragile economy. The main limitation of the model for 
this research is that it does not have any
attempt to represent adjustments that are made to reduce vulnerability and increase the 
adaptive capacity of humans to learn and improve their situation.
Figure 2.3: Disaster and Pressure Release Model.
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camps that is analysed in Chapter seven. It further enlightens some of 
asters are more likely to occur in 
 feedback mechanism and therefore does not 
 
 Source: Blaikie et al. (1994)
14) from root 
nerability and unsafe 
-economic problems 
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Hazard of Place Model of Vulnerability 
The Hazard of Place vulnerability model developed by Cutter (1996) combines the 
traditional view of biophysical risk of vulnerability with the recent ideas of social 
vulnerability (Figure 2.4). This model seeks to integrate the underlying social and 
biophysical elements that contribute to vulnerability into the vulnerability of place. Risk 
and mitigation interact to produce the hazard potential. The hazard potential is filtered 
through a geographic context to produce biophysical vulnerability and through the social 
fabric to create social vulnerability. The biophysical and social vulnerability then interacts 
to create the place vulnerability. The interactions and feedback loops in the model attempts 
to link the major components of disasters in a cause-effect chain. This model is applied in 
this research to understand the vulnerability of the LND survivors who have relocated to 
the disaster site in Nyos in defiance of government orders, or the Njindoum residents living 
in close proximity to Lake Monoum (detail analysis in Chapter 9). These populations 
experience a vulnerability of place due to their new location or position, which puts them 
at higher risk from any subsequent impact from the Lakes. This model differs from the 
Disaster and Pressure Release Model in that the latter does not have any feedback loops 
through which disasters can be mitigated or prevented.    
 
Figure 2.4:  Hazard of place model of vulnerability. Source: Cutter et al. (2000) 
 
The BBC-Framework for Measuring Vulnerability  
The BBC-framework is the work of Bogardi and Birkmann (2004) and Cardona (1999; 
2001) (see Figure 2.5). This framework addresses various vulnerabilities in the social, 
economic and environmental sphere, which have been defined as the three main pillars of 
sustainable development. By linking sustainable development and vulnerability reduction, 
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the BBC conceptual framework stresses the importance of giving due account to 
environmental considerations (Birkmann, 2006). This framework encourages analyses of 
probable losses and deficiencies of various elements at risk as well as the coping capacities 
and potential intervention measures incorporating the three thematic spheres. It stresses 
that vulnerability should be considered within a dynamic process involving focusing 
simultaneously on vulnerabilities, coping capacities, and a potential feedback system 
which intervenes to reduce vulnerabilities. It is therefore more proactive and promotes a 
problem solving perspective in order to reduce vulnerability before a hazard occurs 
(Birkmann, 2006; Birkmann et al., 2007), which does not exist in the Disaster and Pressure 
Release Model. This is relevant in this contemporary disaster research, which considers 
vulnerability within the social sphere and DM strategies (used as control mechanisms in 
the Human Use System in Section 3.2) that can mitigate the social vulnerability of the 
LND survivors resettled in camps as will be seen in Chapter seven. The need to 
mainstream DRR reduction within the development process in Cameroon underpins the 
long term strategy for vulnerability reduction that can also be drawn from this framework. 
 
Figure 2.5: The BBC conceptual framework. Source: Birkmann et al. (2007) 
 
The objectives and setting of this study do not suit an approach that relies on any 
single research method or model. In Chapter three, insights that have been obtained from 
the models will be integrated to build an alternative conceptual framework for this 
research. In particular, the Human Use System in the systems model of Kates (1971), the 
processes in the generation of vulnerability and risk in the Disaster Pressure and Release 
Model, the social and biophysical factors that interact to contribute to the vulnerability of 
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place in the Hazards of Place model, and the BBC framework for measuring vulnerability 
are used to build an alternative model for this thesis.  The models can be visualized as 
operating within a development framework. It suffices therefore, to examine the 
relationship between disasters and development. 
 
2.3 DISASTERS AND DEVELOPMENT 
2.3.1 HAZARD/DISASTERS-DEVELOPMENT LINKAGES 
This research is being conducted in the School of International Development because 
disaster risk is intimately connected to processes of development. The Human 
Development Index (HDI)5 has been used to predict the number of deaths due to extreme 
natural events (IFRC, 2001a). It shows high deaths for low HDI countries with the lowest 
cost per disaster, and low deaths for high HDI countries with high cost of material damages 
(Table 2.1).  Although there has been a general increase in the frequency and intensity of 
natural disasters worldwide, disaster risk and losses vary disproportionately in different 
regions of the world (IFRC, 2003; UNDP, 2004a).  According to White et al. (2004:8), 
only one in every hundred people affected by natural disasters lives in high human 
development countries. 
A recent UNDP study found that whilst only 11 percent of people exposed to 
natural hazards live in countries with low human development, they account for 53 percent 
of disaster deaths (UNDP, 2004a:1). This shows that natural disaster risk is intimately 
connected to the process of human development, and that development processes intervene 
in the translation of physical exposure into disaster events (UNDP, 2004b; White et al., 
2004). Cameroon has a low HDI of 0.505 and is ranked 125th out of 162 countries. This 
implies that the death toll from disasters is likely to be higher. 
 
Table 2.1: Level of human development and disaster impacts 
    Deaths per disaster     
 
Low HDI   1,051     79 
Medium HDI     145     209 
High HDI       23     636 
Source: IFRC (2001a: 162,164) 
                                                 
5
 The HDI is a summary composite index that measures a country's average achievements in three basic 
aspects of human development: longevity, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Longevity is 
measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge is measured by a combination of the adult literacy rate and 
the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment ratio; and standard of living by GDP per 
capita (PPP US$). 
Cost per disaster 
(US$m) 
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Development has been viewed as an economic, social and political process, which 
results in a cumulative rise in the perceived standard of living for an increasing proportion 
of the population (UNDP, 2004a; UN-ISDR, 2004a). Although the link between disaster 
and development has been recognized (Dickens, 1996; Escobar, 1996, Anderson and 
Woodrow, 1999; World Bank 2001, White et al., 2004), it is not well understood (UNDP, 
1994; Pelling, 2003:201). There are negative and positive aspects to the relationship (refer 
to Figure 2.6). Disasters do not only impact negatively on development, but development 
failures can create risk by increasing societal susceptibility to natural hazards and reducing 
coping strategies. Some forms of development can also generate new hazards. Conversely, 
well planed risk reduction programs can lead to development (Sirleaf, 1993; UNDP, 1994; 
White et al., 2004; UNDP, 2004). An understanding of these relationships is crucial for this 
research, which is development oriented. This also has policy implications for disaster 
management, since proactive measures are recommended for mitigating disasters through 
their integration into the development processes of countries.  
 
Figure 2.6: The relationship between development and vulnerability to disasters.  
Source: UNDP-DHA (1994:8) 
 
Economic and social development work directly or indirectly to decrease or increase 
disaster risk (UNDP, 2004b:20). The United Nations General Assembly designated the 
1990s the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). The declaration 
of the IDNDR raised the profile of discussions surrounding the social and economic causes 
of disaster risk (IDNDR, 1999). Table 2.2 shows the ways in which social and economic 
development interact with disasters. Each row in the table is dealt with after.  
 
 
 DEVELOPMENT REALM 
DISASTER REALM 
NEGATIVE REALM POSITIVE REALM 
Development can 
increase vulnerability 
Development can 
reduce vulnerability 
Disasters can 
set back 
development 
Disasters can  
provide development  
opportunities 
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Table 2.2: Relation between disaster and economic-social development 
 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
DISASTER LIMITS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Destruction of fixed assets. Loss of 
production capacity, market access or 
material inputs. Damage to transport, 
communications or energy infrastructure. 
Erosion of livelihoods, savings and 
physical capital. 
Destruction of health or education 
infrastructure and personnel. Death, 
disablement or migration of key 
social actors leading to an erosion 
of social capital. 
 
DEVELOPMENT 
CAUSES 
DISASTER RISK 
 
Unsustainable development practices that 
create wealth for some at the expense of 
unsafe working or living conditions for 
others or degrade the environment. 
Development paths generating 
cultural norms that promote social 
isolation or political exclusion. 
 
. 
DEVELOPMENT 
REDUCES 
DISASTER RISK 
 
Access to adequate drinking water, food, 
waste management and a secure dwelling 
increases people’s resiliency. Trade and 
technology can reduce poverty. Investing in 
financial mechanisms and social security 
can cushion against vulnerability. 
 
Building community cohesion, 
recognizing excluded individuals or 
social groups (such as women), and 
providing opportunities for greater 
involvement in decision-making, 
enhanced educational and health 
capacity increases resiliency 
Source: UNDP, 2004:20 
 
 
Disasters Retard Development 
Disasters exert an enormous toll on development and in doing so; pose a significant threat 
to prospects for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs (see 
Appendix 2) aim to reduce poverty by directing development planning towards priority 
goals. These interact with disaster risk. Direct disaster impacts that severely challenge the 
MDGs include destruction of infrastructure, erosion of livelihoods, damage to ecosystems 
and architectural heritage, injury, illness and death.  Indirect impacts have wider effects on 
the economy and society through the diversion of development funds for emergency relief 
and reconstruction (UNDP, 2004; White et al., 2004). Economically, the burden of 
disasters is proportionally much higher in poorer countries (World Bank, 2006; UN-ISDR, 
2004b). Between 1990 and 1998, 94 percent of the world’s major natural disasters and 97 
percent of all natural disaster related deaths occurred in developing countries (World Bank, 
2001). Although the absolute economic loss is greater in wealthier countries, the losses as a 
share of gross national income affect the poorest countries most profoundly. Hurricane 
Katrina caused damages amounting to US$ 125 billion in the United States, which 
represents only 0.1 percent of the country’s GDP (Goyet, 2008), while losses in developing 
countries in recent decades have been between 134 and 138 percent of GDP (UN-ISDR, 
2004b). Although the LNM disasters did not affect physical capital, which can be 
quantified in financial terms, financial resources that are used to mitigate the physical risk 
in the Lake (See Section 6.3.1) could have been used for other development projects in the 
country.  
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Development Can Lead To Disaster 
Development can create vulnerability to disasters through increase in hazard exposure and 
susceptibility. Technological hazards caused by industrial atmospheric pollution have been 
recognized as a major factor contributing to climate change, with the resulting prospect of 
weather-related hazards such as tropical storms and drought growing in severity and 
impact (White et al., 2004:26). Adams (1990) discusses how anthropogenic activities such 
as land degradation, and deforestation or desertification create environmental change, 
which in turn can increase vulnerability to natural hazards such as droughts or flooding or 
can even create new hazards. White et al. (2004:27-28) and UNDP, (2004:22) use 
examples in Turkey, Guyana and Malawi  to show how patterns and policies of economic 
and social development have caused new vulnerabilities to hazards and undermined 
people’s capacity to cope with hazards or recover from disasters. Appendix 4A (see Page 
279) explores this subject further and shows ‘vicious spirals’ of failed development and 
disaster risk according to White et al. (2004).  
In Cameroon, anthropogenic activities6 in search for agrarian livelihoods 
exacerbate landslides and floods on the fragile slopes of the CVL. In 2001, heavy rains 
triggered flash floods, mudflows and landslides on the slopes of Mt. Cameroon in Limbe 
that resulted to 24 deaths, rendered over 1500 people homeless and left a vast trail of 
destruction to infrastructure. In July and August of  2003 following heavy storms, floods 
and landslides affected several villages in the Bamboutous plateau and destroyed 309 
houses, killed 46 people and displaced more than 1700 others (IFRC  2001b; Par Bleu, 
2004; Ayonghe et al., 2004; Zogning et al., 2007).   
 
Development Can Reduce Disaster Risk 
The third aspect of development disaster linkage noted in Table 2.2 is that economic and 
social development can reduce disaster risk. Access to basic societal facilities, greater 
engagement in business, building community cohesion, and greater involvement in 
decision-making can all increase resilience. The possibility for ‘virtuous spirals’ of 
development and disaster risk reduction backed up by timely and appropriate disaster 
response has also been examined (see Appendix 4B). How development can reduce 
disaster risk has huge relevance for this interdisciplinary research, which stresses the role 
of political ecological processes to mitigate disaster risks during development programs 
and processes.  
                                                 
6
 Houses are dug into hillside, cattle tracts terrace the hillside and poor farming techniques increase 
deforestation and soil erosion and assist the natural factors in destabilising slopes facilitating landslides.  
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The World Bank and the regional development banks have been active with issues 
surrounding the relationship between disaster risk and economic development. Many 
international humanitarian agencies have also joined in moving the agenda of managing 
disasters on from mitigation and preparedness towards a deeper integration with 
development processes (UNDP, 2004a:18).  
 
2.3.2 DISASTER MANAGEMENT  
Disaster management (DM) is central to disaster prevention, risk and/or vulnerability 
mitigation but adequate DM strategies in Cameroon are still lacking (See Section 6.3.2 that 
deals with the social management of the LNM disasters on Page 136). DM aims to reduce, 
or avoid the potential losses from hazards, assure prompt and appropriate assistance to 
victims of disaster, and achieve rapid and effective recovery. According to UN-ISDR 
(2002), this usually involves five phases (prediction, warning, emergency relief, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction), with the essential activities being mitigation and 
preparedness, response and recovery (see also Moe and Pathranarakul, 2006). Box 2.1 sets 
these phases and activities out in detail. The DM phases do not always occur in a precise 
order and often, phases of the DM cycle overlap; the length of each phase greatly depends 
on the severity of the disaster (Warfield, 2008).  
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Developmental considerations play a key role in contributing to the mitigation and preparation 
of a community to confront a disaster effectively. Khan et al. (2008) present a slightly 
different view of the key stages of activities that are taken up within DM (see Figure 2.7). 
Box 2.1: MAIN PHASES/ESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES OF DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT 
Prediction: In this phase, mitigation and preparedness activities are conducted in the 
prediction phase. This includes structural measures undertaken to limit the adverse impact 
of natural hazards, environmental degradation and technological hazards and non-
structural measures taken in advance to ensure effective response to the impact of hazards, 
including the issuance of timely and effective early warnings and temporary evacuation of 
people and property from threatened locations. 
Warning: This phase refers to the provision of timely and effective information, through 
identified institutions, that allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid 
or reduce their risk and prepare effective response. 
Emergency relief: The provision of assistance or intervention during or immediately after 
a disaster to meet the life preservation and basic subsistence needs of those people 
affected. It can be of immediate, short-term, or protracted duration. 
Rehabilitation: This phase includes decisions and actions taken after a disaster with a 
view to restoring or improving the pre-disaster living conditions of the stricken 
community, while encouraging and facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce disaster 
risk. 
Reconstruction: This phase includes the essential activities conducted are mitigation, 
preparedness activities in prediction phase; response activities in warning and emergency 
relief phases; and recovery activities in rehabilitation and reconstruction phases. 
Essential Activities in Disaster Management 
Mitigation activities include structural and non-structural measures undertaken to limit 
the adverse impact of natural hazards, environmental degradation and technological 
hazards. 
Preparedness include activities and measures taken in advance to ensure effective 
response to the impact of hazards, including the issuance of timely and effective early 
warnings and the temporary evacuation of people and properly from threatened locations. 
Response includes the provision of assistance or intervention during or immediately after 
a disaster to meet the life preservation and basic subsistence needs of those people 
affected. It can be of an immediate, short-term, or protracted duration. 
Recovery includes decisions and actions taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or 
improving the pre-disaster living conditions of the stricken community, while encouraging 
and facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk. 
Source: Adapted from UN-ISDR (2002) 
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Figure 2.7: Main activities of disaster management. Source: Khan et al. (2008) 
 
Managing the post-disaster crises and the long term recovery phases remains the primary 
task of governments, DM and humanitarian officials. However, there is no homogeneous 
way of designing risk-reduction strategies. They vary and take into account the particular 
social, economic, cultural and political conditions prevailing in different risk zones. 
 Former DM programs focused on pre-crisis and the immediate aftermaths of 
disasters. The progressive increase in loss of life, property and deleterious effect on 
environment due to disasters moved the international and disaster community to look at 
DM in a new perspective. The IDNDR was initiated during the 1990s to serve as a catalyst 
for disaster reduction. The IDNDR adopted a concerted strategy towards disaster reduction 
within a framework that places disaster reduction in the perspective of sustainable 
development. The UN urged countries to view development programs and projects from 
their potential to reduce vulnerability and hazards, in order to prevent disaster risks 
(IDNDR, 1999; ISNDR, 2001; WSSD, 2002).  
In the disaster cycle, problems are examined as smaller entities and aid agencies 
usually specialize on one of the entities, independent from each other. But most 
communities perceive those entities as an integral part of their survival and development 
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process (White et al., 2004; Heijmens, 2004).  The new approach to a complete DM cycle 
(Figure 2.8) includes the shaping of public policies and plans that either modify the causes 
of disasters or mitigate their effects on people, property, and infrastructure. Therefore, the 
DM process illustrates the ongoing process by which governments, businesses, and civil 
 
Figure 2.8: Revised disaster management cycle.  Source: Khan et al. (2008) 
 
society plan for and reduce the impact of disasters, react during and immediately following 
a disaster, and take steps to recover after a disaster has occurred. Appropriate actions at all 
points in the cycle should lead to greater preparedness, better warnings, reduced 
vulnerability or the prevention of disasters during the next iteration of the cycle (Khan et 
al., 2008). 
   
Disaster Risk Management  
It had been recommended that response should be evaluated for all stages in the disaster 
cycle in order to design disaster mitigation strategies that could coincide with development 
(UNDP, 1994; Quarantelli, 1999; Pelling, 2003). Since it has been acknowledged that 
disasters act as impediments to the MDG, the necessity to mainstream DRR into 
sustainable development practices and planning process has been acknowledged (UNDP, 
2004a; WCDR, 2005). As a result, development practices that inculcate risk management 
are a new concept that has been incorporated into the DM cycle. DRM therefore refers to a 
continuous and integrated multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary process of planning and 
implementation of measures aimed at (1) preventing or reducing the risk of disasters; (2) 
mitigating the severity or consequences of disasters; (3) emergency preparedness (4) a 
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rapid and effective response to disasters; and (5) post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation 
(National Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002: Chapter 1). 
 
Disaster Risk Assessment  
An important advance in DM and risk assessment has been recognition of the link between 
vulnerability and coping capacity. The original equation used to describe disasters in the 
1990s (Disaster (D) = Hazard (H) x Vulnerability (V)) has changed to D = H x C/V (where 
C stands for capacity) (Davis, 2004:131). Preconceived intervention packages after 
disasters tend to be the task of risk professionals and technicians, and many times deny the 
social heterogeneity and capacity of populations at risk throughout the world (Maskrey, 
1999).  
According to Davis (2004), the vast majority of disaster managers in the risk 
assessment field still hold the simplistic notion that disaster risk assessment (DRA)  is 
synonymous with scientifically generated ‘hazard mapping’. He explains that DRA still 
favours the physical sciences since societies still have optimistic expectations that 
technology is a panacea for their problems. This view grows from a technocratic and 
fundamentally false assumption that once hazards are mapped in terms of their location, 
duration, frequency, severity and impact characteristics, and then the risk assessment 
process is complete (Davis, 2004). Although recent debates about risk have shifted from 
the position that hazard analysis can give an objective measurement of risk, such analysis 
are still influential with regard to risk management. This is because technical risk 
assessments carry much weight in terms of policy implementation. Rosa (2003) points out 
that, although ‘risk’ is essentially a matter of social construction, to deny that risks exist is 
very dangerous.  
Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment (VCA) is now routinely undertaken as an 
essential part of disaster assistance and development planning, as set out in the World 
Disaster Report of 2002: “Assessing vulnerabilities and capacities during peace and war” 
(IFRC, 2002b). A main limitation to VCA identified by Davis (2004) is that pre-disaster 
VCA are speculative, comprising projections concerning likely damage and casualties; 
while post-disaster needs and damage assessments are the acid test of vulnerability and 
capacity. He then recommends that both processes should be merged within an integrated 
Disaster Management Information System (Davis, 2004:130). It has also been 
recommended that scientists and disaster managers should recognize the value of local 
people’s perception while that of outsiders should be complementary. This is because if 
vulnerability has to be addressed efficiently, then people’s participation should be made 
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part of the empowerment process (also see Section 2.4.7; and best practices for a 
resettlement plan on Page 53). The Disaster Pressure Release model (Wisner et al., 2004) 
has been recognized as a very effective instrument to encourage local people as well as 
outsiders “co produced” risk assessment to analyse their condition, and to discover root 
causes of why they endure hardship (Davis, 2004; Heijmans, 2004). 
 
Care International UK’s Application of Sustainable Livelihood Approach  
CARE has been a front runner in developing SLAs (see Section 1.5.3; Page 11), and also 
considers how the approach can be applied to the disaster context, especially in the 
immediate-post DM rescue and relief phase (Sanderson, 1999). It does this by linking 
sustainable livelihood perspectives to different stages in the relief to development 
continuum. In the relief stage, the emphasis is on livelihood provisioning. Such activities 
focus on meeting basic needs such as shelter, food and water. In the relief to rehabilitation 
stage, the aim is to prevent further erosion of productive assets or coping strategies and to 
help households re-establish their livelihoods. This post-disaster relief effort is essential for 
disaster victims to regain their livelihood and re-engage in building their social and 
financial capital. The next stage involves moving from medium to long term rehabilitation 
to development activities that aim to build up assets and improve household production, 
consumption and exchange activities. Livelihood promotion strategies are focused on 
longer-term asset building to improve access to resources and mitigate future shocks and 
stresses. CARE’S SLA has implications for the conceptual framework of this research, and 
the immediate post-disaster and long term management of the LND survivors as will be 
seen in Chapter six. 
 
2.4 PERCEPTIONS OF RISK  
Risk perception (RP) could be defined as cognition, a personality trait, or behavior 
(Wahlberg, 2001) while Power (2004:14) describes the concept as ‘elusive, contested and 
inherently controversial.’ Slovic (1999) posits that public conceptions of risk are related to 
a broad range of categories, whilst ‘expert’ conceptions of risk are based on likelihood of 
harm. The notion of risk perception refers to the intuitive risk judgments of individuals and 
social groups in the context of limited and uncertain information (Slovic, 1992).  
How risk is understood depends partly upon theoretical perspectives from which 
risk is studied and paradigms on the study of human behaviour. There is a division between 
approaches and conceptions to risk between the realist and constructionist continuum and 
also at the level of the individual or the wider social level (Renn, 1998, Renn and Klinke, 
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2001; Kemp et al., 2002) as shown in Figure 2.9 below (also refer to Section 1.5.5; Page 
15). RP (analysed in Chapter 8) is important in this study because it influences the criteria 
that are appropriate for dealing with natural hazards, DM policy on risk mitigation and also 
influences decisions taken by disaster affected populations to relocate in risky areas. 
   
Figure 2.9: Perspectives on risk. Source:  Adapted from Renn (1998) 
 
2.4.1 REALISM 
Traditionally, engineers, health physicists, statisticians and epidemiologists defined risk 
probabilistically according to ‘real’ risk, determined scientifically and ‘objectively’, versus 
‘perceived’ risk by the public (Liebow, 1993; Liebow and Wolfe, 1993). The premise of 
the realist position is that scientific knowledge is essentially rational, neutral, 
unproblematic and concerned with truth about the physical world as defined by experts 
(Weyman and Kelly, 1999). The realist perspective asserts that there is an objective reality 
that is knowable through empirical investigation: objective risks are seen as properties of 
the environment that can be identified and measured (Williamson and Weyman, 2005).  
Under this perspective, the nature of perceived risk has been considered a critical factor in 
prompting people to avoid physical threats of disasters as well as to prepare for them. The 
assumption is that the greater the perceived risk, the more likely preparations will be made 
to ameliorate the harm (Burns and Sullivan, 2000; Mamun, 1996; Epstein, 1994). This 
interpretation of perceived risk has been sustained and nurtured by government agencies 
that dominate DM (Kirshenbaum, 2003).     
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2.4.2 CONSTRUCTIVISM 
The constructionist position is underpinned by the strong recognition of the need for social 
explanations of RP. According to this position, judgments of risk are relative and socially 
constructed, arising from the culture in which they are situated, and reflect the values and 
social organisation of that culture. Cultural variables play an important part in how people 
understand risk and differences in public evaluations of risk might consider the social and 
cultural context in which those exposed to a risk are located (Pidgeon et al., 1992). 
Weyman and Kelly (1999) also concluded that in order to understand people’s reactions to 
risk, it is necessary to consider the social and cultural contexts in which hazards arise, and 
the manner in which these variables shape people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviour. 
According to Slovic (1999) people’s perception of the society and natural events like 
disasters is largely influenced by subjective perceptions of those objective events.   
The realist and constructionist positions reflect the traditional division between 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ approaches with the former common within governments, 
science and industry, while the latter is common with the public (Williamson and 
Weyman, 2005). Slovic (1999) argue that risk assessment may appear non-rational due to 
its subjective nature, particularly if contrasted against technical probabilistic analysis. 
These differences in the conceptualization of risk have broad implications in public risk 
assessment. If risks are conceived as ‘objective’, and assessed within an empirical 
framework, evidence that relates to other conceptions of risk is rejected as ‘unscientific’ 
(Gaskell and Allum, 2001).  
Combining these two positions is problematic for academia and policy regulators. 
Some researchers have realised that there is a challenge to combine the realist and 
constructivist positions (in relation to different hazards) for a more comprehensive 
understanding of RP that can inform regulatory decision-making. Governments and 
regulatory bodies face the difficult task of balancing and integrating scientific evidence and 
public risk evaluations (Pidgeon, 1998; Ball and Boehmer-Christiansen, 2002). Although 
there exists little prescription, or consensus in how to combine empirical judgments with 
public perceptions to ascertain the acceptability of risks, there is great need to integrate 
these two perspectives (Fischer, 2003). These positions are important to this research 
because the government or scientists perception of the cause of the LND and solutions to 
any subsequent treats from the Lakes based on technical knowledge (see Section 6.3.1), 
differs from that of the affected population whose opinion seems to be influenced more by 
the culture of the affected areas and public opinion (see analyses in Chapter 8).  
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Social Amplification of Risk 
The framework for the social amplification of risk (SAR) focuses on integrating multi-
disciplinary approaches to risk, especially how characteristics of a hazard interact with 
social, cultural and psychological processes that strengthen or weaken RP. This approach 
conceptualizes risk both as a social construct and an objective property of the hazard. The 
level of enquiry is usually at the collective, rather than individual level and focuses both on 
the direct experience of risk and how it is interpreted. Research in this area is especially 
concerned with the social processes (the mass media and sources of risk information) that 
increase public concern and socio-political activity over some hazards (Kasperson et al, 
2003; Williamson and Weyman, 2005). Box 2.2 is an overview of the social amplification 
of risk after Kasperson et al. (2003). SAR is relevant to this research because risk is 
conceptualised in this thesis both as a physical and social attribute (Sections 5.6 and 6.3.1 
analyses technical risk while Section 6.3.2 and Chapter 7 analyses social risk).  
 
 
Box 2.2: KEY FINDINGS IN SOCIAL AMPLIFICATION OF RISK 
 
 Public concern regarding a hazard does not necessarily mirror media coverage, i.e. 
sustained media coverage does not in itself ensure amplification. The relationship 
between mass-media coverage and the formation of risk opinion is not 
unidirectional, but complex. 
 Several factors may need to be present for the amplification of risk, such as, media 
coverage; signal potential; and perception of incompetence for risk management. 
 Risk signals that are attributable to incompetent risk management are important for 
public concern. 
 Similarly, trust and perception in institutional risk management handling of risk are 
important. 
 Important differences between individuals who amplify risk, and individuals who 
attenuate risk relate to the perception of individual risk (for amplifiers), and 
satisfaction with institutional responses to risk (for attenuators). 
 There can be a discrepancy between risk amplification on a national/regional scale, 
and attenuation at the local level. This can relate to such issues as economic 
benefits associated with the risk at a local level (see Walker et al., 1998, Social, 
Cultural and Institutional processes). 
 Some hazards may be hidden and not subject to amplification effects. 
Characteristics of these ‘hidden’ hazards include: diffuse effects of the hazard; time 
lag between the hazardous event and the onset of deleterious consequences; 
assumptions made about the hazard obfuscate the potential for harm; the hazard 
affects people at the margins of society; and the fast pace of change that introduces 
the hazard is too quick for society to respond. 
 The stigmatization of a hazard is in part due to it being perceived to have such 
qualitative characteristics as: dread consequences; involuntary exposure; 
inequitable impact; unbounded impact; and the violation of a natural standard (see 
Psychometric approaches). 
Source: Adapted from Kasperson et al. (2003) 
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2.4.3 APPROACHES THAT FOCUS ON THE INDIVIDUAL 
There is a complex set of psychological, social and organisational factors that have been 
found to affect how individuals express their risk assessments (Kirshenbaum, 2003; 
Sjoberg et al., 2004). Approaches to studying risk at the level of the individual that are 
relevant to this study include the Rational Actor Models and Mental Models.  
 
Rational Actor Models   
This model is based on the assumption of human behavior as the outcome of rational 
choice. Approaches under the Rational Actor Model can be further categorized as 
Behavioral Decision Theory and Value Expectancy Models. The Behavioral Decision 
Theory discusses the concept of ‘revealed preferences’ where the equilibrium between a 
risk and the benefit to society reflects the acceptability of that risk or that risk is evaluated 
in terms of cost and benefits (Starr, 1969). However, critics have argued that decision 
making is often not rational and leads to improper judgments in individuals’ processing of 
risk information that modify perceptions of risk in recognisable ways. An example relates 
discrepancies between actual fatalities and lay estimation of fatalities, e.g. overestimation 
of low probability fatalities, and underestimation of frequent causes of death (Weyman and 
Kelly, 1999). Research in the USA has revealed that perception is heightened by 
experience (Vitek and Berta, 1982). In the study of people’s perception of natural hazards, 
the concept of bounded rationality7 is the model of decision taking most widely employed 
(Winchester, 1986; Smith, 2001).  The concept of bounded rationality has been used to 
stratify people into three groups based on their RP (Smith 2001). These include: 
 Determinate perception: The recognition of hazards in this group is based on their past 
experience and knowledge.  
 Dissonant perception: This is a view that is often shared by the very powerful and rich 
people who have much material wealth at risk. They try to deny or minimize the threat 
from hazards in a way that makes the future risk from hazards more acceptable or 
comfortable with daily functioning of the society. 
 Probabilistic perception: This view is often shared by many people who accept that 
disasters will always occur. However they feel no personal obligation on risk reduction 
and transfer the responsibility for managing the hazard to superior authorities like the 
government.  
The Value Expectancy Approach attempts to give reasons why people are motivated to 
protect themselves based on their understanding of risk and perception of vulnerability. It 
                                                 
7
  The concept of bounded rationality centres on individual choice and decision based on their 
knowledge and experience 
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draws on assumptions from Behavioural Decision Theory, principally that risk behaviour is 
based on a rational decision making process (Williamson and Weyman, 2005). Weyman 
and Kelly (1999) summarises the common characteristics of value expectancy models as: 
 The desire to minimize the negative consequences of an anticipated event motivates 
individuals to protect themselves.  
 The perceived seriousness of these consequences is judged to influence the outcome of 
the self-protective behaviour.  
 The perceived likelihood of an event occurring influences the motivation to adopt self 
protective behaviour. 
 The benefits of self-protective behaviour are weighed against the costs of such 
behaviour. 
This approach is criticised for lack of attention given to social and group effects in relation 
to individual decision making.  Also, the reliance on attitudes to perceived risk as 
determinants of precautionary behaviour is increasingly questioned, due to evidence that 
suggests the weakness of the relationship between attitude and behaviour. It has also been 
recognised that factors such as the costs of preventive behaviour, social pressure, and 
perceived self-efficacy play an important role in determining behaviour. Research posits 
that personal risk assesses individual vulnerability, whereas societal risk examines a 
person’s estimate of the generalized risk to the rest of the population (Weyman and Kelly, 
1999; Green, 1998; cited in Weyman et al., 1999).  
 
Mental Models 
This model is fundamentally cognitive and rooted within the psychology of the individual. 
The cognitive model centers on the psychometric and cognitive psychology of risk. While 
the psychometric approach seeks to enquire about people’s choice to occupy hazardous 
locations or invest in mitigation measures, the cognitive psychological approach asks 
questions on how people reason under conditions of uncertain knowledge of risk (Otway, 
1992; Slovic, 1992; Mc Daniels et al., 1995). A central assumption is that people 
understand the world by creating internal representations of it. This approach focuses on 
eliciting lay understandings of hazards, without imposing expert conceptualizations. It is 
an essentially ‘bottom up’, data driven process, as opposed to a ‘top down’ conceptually 
driven one, which is reflected in many of the other approaches (Weyman and Kelly, 1999).  
Perceived risk is widely acknowledged and can be characterized using certain 
attributes, which underpin the cognitive theory of RP (Renn, 1992; Slovic, 1992). 
Perceived risk is the outcome measurement (revealed or expressed) of the interaction of an 
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individual and the external environment mediated through cognitive structures (Krimsky 
and Golding, 1992:18). Revealed risk preferences or observed human behaviour can be 
used as a measurement of RP based on the assumption that society has arrived at an 
acceptable balance between the cost and benefits of occupying hazardous areas. The 
location of settlement patterns and development trends, including the quality and quantity 
of mitigation measures adopted can be viewed as determinants of perceived risk (Krimsky 
and Golding, 1992). Local peoples risk perception does not only take into account the 
possible exposure to danger and future damages (vulnerability) but also their capacities, 
options and the implications of their decisions. The choice of certain coping strategies over 
others may provide insights into perceived security and risk and may enhance 
understanding of levels of vulnerability (Few, 2003, Heijmans, 2004; White et al, 2004). 
Expressed risk is known from statements concerning people’s personal preferences on risk 
attributes and determinants of perceived risk. Both revealed and expressed risks have been 
investigated in this research (see analysis in Chapter 8)  
 
2.5 MIGRATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 
2.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although hazards constitute an inescapable part of life (Smith 2001), vulnerability varies, 
as does the ability of individuals and households to engage in a range of coping strategies. 
Migration represents one particular strategy in the face of perceived risk associated with 
environmental hazards. The form of migration due to environmental hazards ranges across 
a continuum from forced to voluntary, and the association between migration and 
environmental hazards varies by context, hazard type, and household characteristics. The 
terminology ‘Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs) has been used to describe persons 
‘forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence’ for reasons 
which include conflict and civil strife (Walter, 2005:10).  However, it should also be noted 
that not all affected populations move away from disaster sites (Kates, 1962; Fordham, 
1992 and Bimal, 2005). This review is important because the case study for this research 
involves IDPs and non-displaced populations from the disaster site following the Nyos and 
Monoum gas disasters.  
 
2.5.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF MIGRATION  
Many classic migration frameworks have been constructed by western researchers and 
incorporate environmental considerations. Wolpert’s theoretical “stress-threshold” model 
(1966) is often credited as a migration model that incorporates non-economic aspects of 
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residential satisfaction (Fredrickson et al., 1980). This model explains that migration is a 
response to stress experienced in residential location, with residential ‘stressors’ that 
include pollution, congestion and crime. The model suggests that these stressors bring 
about ‘strain’ which may lead to considerations of relocating.  
This view is similar to that of Speare (1974) who outlined characteristics of 
individuals, households, housing unit location and social bonds that influence residential 
mobility, arguing that individuals experience a “threshold of dissatisfaction”, which may 
influence their decision to relocate. Within Speare’s framework, physical amenities or 
disamenities as “locational characteristics,” are of most relevance for consideration of 
environmental hazards. Factors related to residential context interact with individual and 
household characteristics to shape migratory behaviour (Speare, 1974). Research by 
Blackwood et al. (1978) and McAucley and Nutty (1982) suggest that people prefer to live 
in areas free of hazards although individual or household characteristics or other contextual 
factors may influence migration behaviour. Lee (1966) also noted that both origins and 
potential destinations are characterized by attributes that either attract or repel migrants.  
Gardner’s (1981) work on the migration decision-making process highlights the 
place of values within residential satisfaction, and therefore represents an extension to 
work by Speare (1974) and DeJong and Fawcett (1981). Hunter (2004) highlights the 
importance of Gardner’s consideration of the individual’s formation of values with the 
emphasis that these values shape the perception of the local environment.  
Economic frameworks have posited that migrants tend to choose destinations that 
offer the highest level of benefits, assuming that there are variations in utility that result 
from occupying alternative locations. Socio-economically disadvantaged households may 
be more willing to accept proximate environmental risk in order to achieve affordable 
housing (Graves, 1983; Hunter, 2004). Areas with high levels of environmental risk lose 
more socio-economically advantaged residents, as compared to socio-economically 
disadvantaged residents (Hunter et al., 2003). However, Chan (1995) posits that in less 
developed regions, hazardous areas may be settled by poor households because they have 
no choice in residential location.  
 
2.5.3 MIGRATION AS A RESPONSE TO NATURAL HAZARDS 
Societal response to environmental hazards can be through technological adjustments 
(engineering mechanism), cultural adjustments (norms and values), regulatory (policy) and 
distributional mechanisms involving the movement of people, activities and resources 
(Micklin, 1973; Miteti, 1980; Hugo, 1996). Migration, whether permanent or temporary, 
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has always been a traditional response or survival strategy of people confronting the 
prospect, impact or aftermath of disasters (Hugo, 1996). Several categories of 
environmentally-induced population movements have been identified (UNHCR, 1996). 
These are (i) acute onset movements, with the possibility of return; (ii) acute onset 
movements, without the possibility of return; (iii) slow onset movements, with the 
possibility of return; (iv) slow onset movements with predictability (for example, 
displacement caused by large-scale development projects) with no possibility of return 
because of human activities; (v) slow onset movements, without the possibility of return 
because of the natural conditions of the area. The category of movement that fits this study 
is the acute onset movement with the possibility of return. This kind of movement might be 
generated by natural disasters such as flash flooding, earthquakes, typhoons, or volcanic 
eruptions. 
Hugo (1996:107) views population mobility as ranging from totally voluntary, to 
forced migration. Generally, out-migration from disaster areas occurs due to disaster 
impacts mentioned in section 2.1.3. Disaster victims and survivors frequently lose their 
livelihoods and/or income opportunities and migrate to non-affected areas in search of new 
livelihood opportunities. Another reason for out-migration is the fear that the impacted 
area may experience more natural disasters in the near future. However, Mileti (1999) 
explains that some migrants seem soon to forget this concern and return to their original 
place of residence, while others remain at their new destinations. This is the case with two 
of the study populations of this research. One of the study populations of this research is 
formerly displaced Lake Nyos survivors who have returned to the disaster site while some 
victims remain in their resettled locations. In some situations, out-migration from disaster 
areas does not occur. Bimal (2005) through empirical research in the aftermath of the 14 
April 2004 tornado in Bangladesh has provided evidence that disasters do not always 
create out-migration. The Monoum Study Population for this research has also not moved 
from the disaster site around Lake Monoum. 
Disaster victims forced to migrate or relocate either temporarily or permanently 
have been seen as a subset of the category of ‘environmental refugees’ (Jacobsen, 1988; 
Oliver-Smith, 2005a). Disaster forced migration refers to a variety of demographic 
movements, such as: flight, evacuation, displacement or resettlement with both economic 
and social dimensions (Locke et al., 2000; Oliver-Smith, 2005a).  It has also been shown 
that many households express the desire to relocate although they may not actually do 
(Goldhaber et al., 1983). There is also evidence that movement from hazardous areas is 
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sometimes related to family composition, community ties and job status (Goldhaber et al., 
1983).  
 
2.5.4 INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 
Internal displacement is commonly described as taking place within the confines of a state 
and those affected are known as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). IDPs are defined by 
the United Nations as:   
“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or 
to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a 
result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of 
generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-
made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized 
State border.” (Perecman, 2005:11).  
 
The LND survivors or case study populations in this research are IDPs (see Section 4.2.2, 
Page 65). Population displacement is caused by multiple sets of factors. The many “push 
factors” leading to internal displacement can be aggregated into a range of overlapping 
categories: natural and human-made disasters, ethnic or religious persecution, 
development, and conflict. “Displacement”, which is involuntary as in the case study 
populations, occurs where coercion is employed, where choices are restricted, and where 
the affected populations are facing more risks than opportunities by staying in their “place” 
of residence, which distinguishes it from “voluntary” or “economic” migration. Therefore, 
displacement is by definition, forced and involuntary and involves some form of de-
territorialization (Hyndman, 2000).  
Migration usually involves an element of choice, which is central to the dichotomy 
between forced or “involuntary” displacement and “voluntary” migration (Vernant, 1953; 
Zolberg et al., 1989). As Penz (2003:3) observes, “If it is voluntary, it is not displacement”. 
Voluntary and economic migration is more a reflection of people’s deliberate pursuit of 
new opportunities. Displacement and resettlement become “involuntary” when the choice 
to remain is not provided (Muggah, 2003). This research is exclusively concerned with 
disaster induced involuntary displacement. Its focus is on populations who do not cross an 
internationally recognized state border, and are therefore not classified as “refugees”. The 
international legal and institutional regime created to protect refugees did not consider 
IDPs because they were seen as falling under domestic jurisdiction or sovereignty of the 
states concerned (UNHCR, 2000). According to Lavoyer (1995), they were deliberately 
excluded because of state concerns with the infringements on sovereignty as outlined in 
Article 2 of the UN Charter.  
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2.5.5 RESETTLEMENT 
The resettlement of IDPs has, until recently, been treated as a peripheral issue in the field 
of forced migration studies (Muggah, 2003). The reasons for this include: the absence of 
international attention, the marginal status of the displaced populations prior to 
displacement, and the limited attention devoted to the subject by social scientists (Cernea, 
1997). This is the case with this research, involving the study populations of the LND, who 
were forcefully removed from the disaster zone and resettled in camps. The resettlement 
literature (Scudder and Colson, 1982; UN-Habitat, 1991; World Bank, 1994; Guggenheim, 
1994) contains numerous references to involuntary resettlement caused by natural disasters 
(earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and storms). 
 Irrespective of the cause of displacement, resettlement schemes are regularly 
erected to deal with displaced populations. They are designed to transfer population from 
one area to another on a planned basis. Early scholars on resettlement in the 1960s, noted 
that resettlement constitutes a form of planned social change, which entails population 
movement, population selection and most probably population control (Chambers, 1969). 
Resettlement can have dire consequences, as revealed in this study in Chapter seven. 
Therefore, organisations associated with involuntary resettlement decisions (governments, 
private sector entities, NGOs) need careful planning and DM to mitigate the negative 
socioeconomic and environmental consequences that may arise from resettlement (World 
Bank, 1990; Asian Development Bank, 1991; OECD, 1991; Davidson et al., 1993; 
Cernea,; 1999; 2000).  
 It had been noted that only more vulnerable displaced people tended to move to 
camps and settlements. Migration researchers have also asserted IDPs as potentially 
dependent, and vulnerable (Chambers, 1979; Hansen, 1981). This is supported by earlier 
studies, some of which asset that: 
 “the failures of settlement policy, while evident and largely known, are 
considered to lie with the displaced and symptomatic of a dependency 
syndrome” (Harrell-Bond, 1986:20).  
 
Past research has also shown that involuntary resettlement, left people no better off, and 
frequently even worse, than people who resettled themselves (Hansen, 1991). This is 
relevant in this study because one major research theme is the socio-economic problems 
faced by the resettled populations following the LND.  
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2.5.6 EFFECTS OF RELOCATION OR RESETTLEMENT DUE TO DISASTERS 
Geographical Space and Identity 
Recent anthropological research places much emphasis on the place of origin of 
individuals and their communities (Oliver-Smith, 1982).  This emphasis means that the 
loss or removal of a community from its location by disaster may have traumatic 
consequences due to loss of identity from relocating (Altman and Low, 1992). The 
displacement of populations whether caused by manmade or natural factors generates 
problems for receiving and displaced populations alike. This is relevant to this research 
because tension over the use of resources and farmland exist between the survivors of the 
LND resettled in camps and their host populations (see Page 164 in Section 7.3.1) 
 
Human Rights 
In countries where migration has been triggered by disasters and by conflict, violence or 
insurgency, there may be serious implications for identifying the rights and guarantees to 
protection and assistance of affected populations. These issues were highlighted especially 
in the aftermath of the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004. Hedman 
(2005) discusses the situation after the tsunami in Banda Aceh, Sumatra, where the IDP 
identity of tsunami survivors has become politically sensitive and contested due to a 
massive counter-insurgency campaign against separatists that has displaced over 300,000 
people since 1999. In Thailand, there is evidence of de facto discrimination by local 
government authorities and Thai citizens against Burmese tsunami survivors in the affected 
southern provinces in which Burmese migrant workers have been excluded in the 
distribution of emergency relief and the implementation of Thai government aid programs 
by local officials. In Sri Lanka, the civil war that has gone on for almost three decades, 
which the Sri Lankan government recently won against the Tamil Tigers, has left about 2.5 
million Tamil populations displaced. Following the defeat of the Tamil Tigers, the 
Sinhalese have placed thousands of Tamils in temporary camps under appalling and 
horrific conditions both in physical and human rights terms, pending permanent 
resettlement.  
 Authors in the July 2005 special issue of Forced Migration Review highlight a 
range of protection concerns in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, including access to 
assistance, enforced relocation, sexual and gender-based violence, safe and voluntary 
return, loss of documentation and restitution of property (Couldrey and Morris, 2005b; 
Walter, 2005; Harris, 2005; Scott, 2005; Age, 2005). The human rights of IDPs are not 
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always sufficiently addressed despite the introduction of the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement. With reference to the Indian Ocean tsunami relief, Walter (2005) states that: 
 “In the understandable rush to provide assistance to the survivors of the 
tsunami, insufficient attention has been devoted to protecting the human 
rights of those forcibly displaced by the disaster”(Walter, 2005:10).  
 
Making reference to natural disasters in general, Walter (2005) concludes that 
discrimination and violations of economic, social and cultural rights can become more 
entrenched the longer the displacement lasts.  Problems of housing, land and property 
rights have also been exposed in disaster induced IDPs. Scott (2005) states that the   
recovery and reconstruction process of the 2004 tsunami provided a pretext for evictions, 
‘land grabs’, unjustifiable land-acquisition plans and other measures designed to prevent 
homeless residents from returning to their original homes and lands. In a reflection on the 
first six months of the reconstruction effort, he notes that:  
“The tsunami has reminded us of the need for a rights based approach to 
post-disaster reconstruction. If housing, land and property rights are put 
at the heart of a post-disaster plan – rather than cast aside as too 
complicated or expensive – the chances are that it will succeed. If these 
rights are ignored or, more ominously, systematically violated, not only 
will rights be abused but also reconstruction will fail”(Scott, 2005:15).  
 
There are also reports that tsunami survivors worried that relocation away from their 
villages might mean loss of their land, since many had lost legal certificates, and 
boundaries demarcating fields had in many cases been washed away by the tsunami (Age, 
2005:22). 
 
Social Vulnerability 
Emergency resettlements following natural disasters are commonly characterized by 
undesirable long-term socio-economic changes that affect the displaced population, such as 
increasing poverty and malnutrition (World Bank, 1980; Mahapatra, 1991; Escudero, 
1988; Downing, 2002). Resettlement can result in significant adverse impacts on the 
resettled population (particularly the most vulnerable members of society) due to a number 
of factors: loss of shelter and land; inadequate sanitation; decline in the quality of 
education; loss of employment opportunities; disruption in social support networks; and 
the loss of cultural assets (Cernea, 1996). Frequently, houses in the newly resettled location 
are not adequate (Mahapatra, 1999; Picciotto, Wicklin and Rice, 2001). Moreover, 
previous living standards are often not met and the resettlement process may destroy the 
existing socio-economic system, reducing income levels, which leads to a decline in living 
standards (Konig and Teman, 2000; Nayak, 2000). Social vulnerability (also see Section 
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1.5.4; Pages 25 and 27) is a core object of enquiry in question two and discussed in detail 
in Chapter seven.  
 
Impoverishment Risks 
Cernea (1997, 2004) uses general trends and common characteristics revealed by a range 
of empirical data to construct a theoretical model of displacement and reconstruction. His 
Impoverishment Risk and Resettlement (IRR) model is a theoretical model of involuntary 
resettlement that highlights the intrinsic risks that cause impoverishment through forced 
displacement, as well as the ways to eliminate or mitigate such risks. According to Cernea 
(2004), the key impoverishment risks and components for reconstruction of involuntary 
resettlers' livelihoods are: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food 
insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to common property resources, and 
community disarticulation. The IRR Model is explicitly concerned with impoverishment as 
a multi-faceted dynamic process. Through the deconstruction of the concept of 
impoverishment, Cernea advances the notion of 'cumulated deprivation' (Cernea, 1997, 
2002) that can only be understood from a combination of economic, social, cultural and 
psychological perspectives. Cernea (1997) suggests how his proposed model can be used 
by practitioners and researchers as a diagnostic, predictive, problem-resolution, and 
research-guidance tools.  
 During recent years, the IRR model has been increasingly discussed by researchers 
and practitioners and used in numerous development and research projects. A large study 
carried out by the Institute for Socioeconomic Development in Orissa, India, took the IRR 
model as its conceptual and methodological basis in exploring resettlement processes 
caused by development projects (Pandey, 1998; Ota and Mohanty, 1998). In Nepal (Kali 
Gandaki Project) the application of the model in several ongoing impact evaluation 
resettlement studies revealed positive experiences and produced operational 
recommendations (Sapkota, 1999). The IRR model can perform four distinct but 
interrelated functions: a diagnostic explanatory and cognitive function; a predictive 
warning and planning function; a problem resolution function for guiding and measuring 
resettlers' reestablishment; and a research function for forming hypotheses and conducting 
theory-led field investigations. The IRR model has been used in Chapter seven to analyze 
impoverishment in the displaced case study populations.  
 
 
 
51 
 
Public Health Concerns for Receiving Communities and IDPs 
The arrival of IDPs into another community or region strains local health systems, and the 
host population ends up sharing the sufferings of the internally displaced. Displacement of 
populations always affects health status and health care and exposes IDPs to new hazard 
dynamics. For the World Health Organisation (WHO) vulnerability for IDPs is a dynamic 
condition that involves a complex process. How and where to intervene will require the 
IDPs point of view on entitlement to protection and access to health (Xavier et al., 2001). 
According to Toole (1999) if the vital health needs of IDPs (which include security, food, 
water, shelter, sanitation and household items) are not satisfied, the provision of health 
services alone cannot save lives. This review is relevant to this research because as 
revealed in Chapter seven, the LND survivors resettled in camps have numerous health 
problems that are intimately linked to relocation and resettlement.  
A number of factors compound the health hazards of IDPs (Toole, 1999; Xavier et 
al., 2001).  Loss of assets and entitlements as well as loss of social networks and caring 
capacities due to the displacement of households can have a profound impact on 
vulnerability. Lack of knowledge and information about the new environment, decreased 
food security, dependence on external aid and often inadequate shelter, sanitation and 
access to safe water also compound their troubles. IDPs also have reduced access to health 
care facilities and services in their new location and are also disadvantaged in cultural, 
financial and functional terms, in accessing health services in areas of relocation.  
In a review of health hazards in tropical Africa, Prothero (1994) describes 
significant interactions between disease and population mobility associated with coerced 
resettlement in North East Africa and refugees from environmental catastrophe 
(pastoralists affected by drought in West Africa). He concludes that higher levels of 
mortality and morbidity are experienced within these affected populations particularly 
from infectious and communicable diseases associated with ecological conditions, which 
differ from those in which they have lived previously. Statistics in some countries also 
show that crude mortality rates for IDPs are significantly higher than the baseline. In 
Somalia, crude mortality rates for IDPs were 50 times higher than the baseline (Xavier et 
al., 2001). In April 1999, Angola experienced the largest polio epidemic ever recorded in 
Africa due to 30 years of war, destruction of health infrastructure, massive population 
displacement and overcrowding, poor sanitation and inadequate water supply. The 
mortality rate for IDPs due to post disaster health problems is usually higher in women, 
children and the elderly. Recent research carried by Nubuyuki et al. (2006) on the mortality 
and health related risk factors which affected the displaced population after the 2004 
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tsunami in an eastern coastal district of Sri Lanka reveals that a significantly high mortality 
was observed in women and children.  
 
Effects of Migration on Receiving Populations 
Displaced populations are often viewed as competitors for resources and employment by 
local populations in the receiving areas. Migration has the potential to enhance social 
resilience by providing new opportunities and experiences. It also has the ability to 
diminish resilience by weakening social structures and access to natural resources (Locke 
et al., 2000; Hunter et al., 2003). In some cases the migrants may strain the social and 
economic fabric of the areas to which they relocate. Later Chapters will reveal that this is 
the situation that prevails in the resettlement communities following the LND, where an 
increase in crime, unemployment, land conflicts or quarrels have been reported since the 
resettlement of displaced Nyos residents. According to a UNHCR report produced during 
an International Symposium held in April 1996 in Geneva, negative consequences 
resulting from mass migration in the receiving areas include: a reduction in migrants’ well-
being; damage to the natural resource base on which the local economy depends; economic 
and political difficulties for the areas hosting mass migrants and erosion of efforts made by 
governments and the international community to support sustainable development of the 
areas concerned. The impact of some of these consequences has also been felt in the study 
area.  
 
2.5.7 DISASTER RISK PERCEPTION AND MIGRATION 
RP is a crucial factor influencing and controlling people’s or communities’ decision to 
relocate (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1976; Kielcolt and Nigg, 1982; Kirschenbaum 1996). 
Some disadvantaged social groups (poor, disenfranchised individuals, and minority 
groups) make tradeoffs, whereby the perceived costs of continuing to reside in a risk area, 
or an area perceived as posing risk, are judged against the perceived benefits gained 
(Cvetkovich and Earle 1992:2; Kirschenbaum, 1996). Several reasons have been outlined 
as to why residents might not migrate from hazard-prone areas (Kates, 1962 and Fordham, 
1992). These include that residents may: not be aware of hazard; be aware but do not 
expect a disaster; expect a disaster but do not anticipate loss; expect loss but not serious 
loss; expect serious loss and have undertaken or plan to undertake loss reduction actions; 
expect loss but accept it as a cost of gaining location benefits; have no choice in location 
(Kates 1962; expanded by Fordham 1992). Research evidence has also shown that 
outsiders’ perceptions of environmentally hazardous residential contexts may be 
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fundamentally different from that of residents (also see Page 36 in Section 2.3.2), thereby 
suggesting the importance of not imposing risk judgment when undertaking analyses on 
these associations (Greenberg and Schneider 1996; Hunter, 2004). In similar findings from 
research among residents of a char, located in the middle of Jamuna River in Bangladesh, 
Lein (2000:126) concludes that: “It is misleading to perceive the chars as high-risk areas 
filled with marginalized, poor people living on the brink of disaster.”  These studies 
provide support for Slovic’s (1987) contention that people respond to the hazards they 
perceive and suggest the importance of considering insiders’ risk perception in the 
examination of migration as related to environmental hazards.  Risk perception is likely to 
be more closely related to migration than the probability of hazard occurrence (Hunter, 
2004; Hunter et al., 2003) 
 
2.5.8 RESETTLEMENT PLANNING 
Key barriers to successful resettlement policies and practices have been identified in a 
number of countries (for example, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal and 
Sri Lanka). These include the absence of a national resettlement policy, inadequate 
compensation for lost assets, and insufficient institutional capacity for resettlement 
planning and implementation (Badri et al., 2006). While various factors contribute to the 
failure of resettlement policies, inadequate planning, lack of financial resources, 
embezzlement and poor management often play a major role. Conversely, a well-planned 
and managed resettlement process can produce positive development outcomes, such as a 
more favourable socio-economic environment, including new jobs and better access to 
education and health facilities. 
Over the past several decades, researchers have identified a number of successful 
resettlement practices in some countries around the globe, including Bangladesh, China, 
Nepal and Vietnam (Burbridge et al., 1988; Fernades, 1995; Zaman, 1996; Cernea, 1997). 
According to these ‘best practices’, a resettlement plan should consider a number of issues: 
 First, careful attention should be paid to social, economic and health issues. This 
involves conducting a baseline social survey to identify stakeholders and potential 
losses. 
 Second, it is important to engage stakeholders in a meaningful participatory process 
and to disclose all relevant information. 
 Third, it is essential to adopt an appropriate compensation policy based on the 
market/replacement value of acquired properties. 
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 Fourth, compensation should be provided to all affected persons regardless of their 
tenure/ownership rights. 
 Fifth, the compensation policy should explicitly recognise all losses, including land, 
housing, business, income sources and displacement costs. 
 Sixth, the compensation package should provide multiple options, such as cash, 
compensation, replacement land, small business grants and temporary/permanent 
project employment. It is vital to ensure that resettled persons are provided with basic 
civic amenities so that incomes and livelihoods can be restored. 
 Seventh, the resettlement process should pay special attention to the needs of the 
socially disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, such as single mothers, the disabled and 
ethnic minorities in the resettlement process. 
 Eighth, it is very crucial that a strong organisation exists in order to implement 
resettlement, with assistance from community groups and NGOs. 
 Ninth, it is important that effective systems for monitoring and evaluating 
compensation and resettlement activities are created. Furthermore, a practical time 
frame should be established in the resettlement plan (Badri et al., 2006: 454). These 
resettlement practices have informed the recommendations for improvement in the 
resettlement practices/policies and reintegration plans of the LND survivor’s 
resettlement at the end of the thesis (see Section 10.5; Appendix 14).  
 
2.6 SUMMARY 
This Chapter set out the theory relevant to this research. It also provides the relevant 
background knowledge necessary to understand contemporary issues concerning the 
research enquiries. Key insights that underpin this study include the understanding that 
disasters are now mostly interpreted from the perspective of the political ecology and the 
mutuality of hazard and vulnerability to disasters due to complex interactions between 
nature and society. Disasters do not only impact negatively on development, but 
development failures can create disaster risks. Contemporary disaster research adopts 
integrated approaches. Some disaster models, which have been instrumental in the 
modeling, interpretation and understanding of disasters adopt system perspective with 
feedback/regulatory or control mechanisms that can mitigate disaster impacts. Effective 
and efficient DM process should mainstream DRR into sustainable development practices 
and planning process. People’s reactions to risk, is influenced by the social and cultural 
contexts in which hazards arise, and their past experience and knowledge. Migration or 
relocation is a traditional response or survival strategy of people confronting the prospect, 
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impact or aftermath of disasters. The ramifications of involuntary resettlement can have 
dire socio-economic and cultural consequences for resettled populations. An understanding 
of the main research concepts and the possible link between them has helped in building 
the framework that guides this research. The conceptual framework is discussed in the next 
Chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The complexity of disaster studies makes it difficult to adopt a simple epistemological and 
conceptual framework. This is reflected in the statement by Gandy that:  
“Disasters because of their material expression, their emergence from 
human-environment mutuality and their cultural construction, belong to 
the class of phenomena that are neither purely natural, nor cultural and 
that are situated between the opposing epistemological points: between 
the natural and social sciences” (Gandy, 1996:35).  
 
Alexander (1995) further supports this description of the disciplinary evolution of disaster 
studies. The challenge is then to use an approach that will be broadly acceptable since the 
interpretation of theory8 and concepts varies across different disciplines. Any theoretical 
inquiry into the nature of vulnerability and disasters inevitably involves ontological and 
epistemological questions that deal with the nature of cultural versus material realities 
(Oliver-Smith, 2004:17).  
This Chapter draws on the key insights and research elements discussed in Chapter 
two and summarized in Section 2.5 to develop a conceptual structure for the thesis. It 
should be noted that the overall locus of this research is on the present risk and 
vulnerability in the LNM area, incorporating the effects of the past gas tragedies. The main 
interest is in how the disaster response and the overall DRM, through processes of risk 
perception and generation of long-term vulnerability, have influenced relocation decision. 
This was set out in the research questions 1-4 (see Section 1.4.2), which focus respectively 
on disaster management, vulnerability, risk perception and relocation decisions. It is 
envisaged that an approach that takes a more balanced evaluation of the core concepts that 
can be applied in this research is desired. This may be a guiding tool for analysis on how to 
integrate natural disaster mitigation with development planning in Cameroon.  
 
3.2 FINAL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
The framework for this research adopts a systems view, which has been popular in 
modeling, understanding and managing disasters.  The goal of this empirical research in 
the LNM disaster regions of Cameroon is to understand the effects of disaster events and 
ongoing risk on individuals and society and how this has caused or influenced relocation 
decisions. This study is therefore philosophically centered on the social constructionist-
social structuralist view of disasters within a political ecology framework. The approach 
                                                 
8
  Theory consists of a set of principles (laws or empirical generalisations) and conceptualisation that provide 
explanatory coherence to an empirical domain (Krimsky, 1992). 
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adopted requires investigation of the relationships between natural hazards within the bio-
geophysical system and societal factors within the human-use-system. The framework 
therefore conceptualizes that human systems do not only contribute to vulnerability but 
have the ability to reduce vulnerability and risk within the study area, through actions 
including disaster risk management. How the two system components (Bio-geophysical 
system and Human Use System) considered in the framework relate different research 
perspectives and to key concepts and hypotheses, is shown in Table 3.1.  
The framework also seeks to integrate risk perception, relocation behaviour of 
disaster survivors and experiences at the personal, local and institutional levels to 
understand the social context of risk and vulnerability, and also to emphasise the need to 
shift from DM to DRR. An approach that integrates disaster risk mitigation with socio-
economic development is therefore desirable in order to close the gaps and challenges 
exposed by both the short and long-term problems of DM in the study area. This approach 
therefore, underpins the need to integrate DRR within the development process. This 
conceptual/epistemological framework is therefore intended to direct the research process 
and guide analysis of the research questions.  
Figure 3.1 is a diagrammatic representation of the linkages between the Human Use 
System and the Bio-geophysical system, which has also adopted Kates (1971) systems 
view of disasters to further illustrate the relationship and interactions of the system 
components presented in Table 3.1. An important characteristic in the diagram are 
feedback or control mechanisms in the Human System (Disaster Management Cycle and 
Disaster Risk Management Cycle) that interact with the Bio-geophysical System to  
regulate or mitigate disaster effects or impacts. 
The research questions (red) have been located around the conceptual framework 
with their red arrows pointing to areas in the framework where the different questions seek 
answers. The Human Use System at the centre of the framework can interact with the Bio-
Geophysical System, in both a positive and negative feedback mechanism as shown by the 
pink arrows.  
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Table 3.1: Conceptual elements for framing the research 
Figure 3.1 is a diagrammatic representation of the linkages between the Human Use  
 
When a hazard occurs in the Bio-geophysical system, it can cause primary or 
secondary effects, leading to a disaster through the process shown in green colours (see 
Figure 3.1). A hazard may cause damage or destruction to property, deaths, disruption of 
services, and displacement of populations with subsequent resettlement as is the case with 
the LND survivors. The seriousness of the hazard impact and whether it would eventually 
become a disaster depends on the effectiveness of both structural and non-structural 
mitigation measures employed. In Figure 3.1, this is represented by the Human Use 
System, which comprises of the disaster cycle and risk management cycle. The interaction 
and similarity of activities that occur within the disaster and risk management cycles are 
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prone areas is based on weighing the 
advantages against the risk 
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shown in the Human Use System. These activities are instrumental in shaping the 
resilience and coping capacity of a society prior to, during, or after it has been affected by a 
hazard or disaster.  These are shown by pink arrows labeled mitigation and response in the 
diagram. Effective disaster risk management may increase people’s resilience during the 
incubation phase in the disaster risk management cycle through inculcating DRR practices 
with development planning. Robust DM after a hazard impact in the relief, rehabilitation 
and reconstruction phases will greatly reduce the short and long term socio-economic 
problems of disaster survivors and improve their livelihoods.  
The green colours in the Bio-Geophysical System that define the process of a 
disaster occurrence can also influence adjustments in the Human Use System as shown by 
the pink arrows that point towards the Human Use System. This could be through the 
hazard type or intensity, involuntary or forced displacement and resettlement, risk 
perception or through relocation into risky areas. A good Human System should be able to 
adjust accordingly to tackle any problems that might originate or results from the impact of 
a hazard. The interaction of the system components and their elements as presented in 
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 has been used to drive the research process.  
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               Figure 3.1: Diagrammatic representation of Linkages between the Human System and the Bio/Geophysical system. Source: Autthor
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter two reviewed the main themes that underpin this research. How these themes link was 
presented in the conceptual framework in Chapter three, which guides the methodology 
presented here. This study integrates knowledge from both the social and physical sciences to 
study the complex phenomenon of “natural disasters”. To gain a deeper understanding of how 
the concepts interact, a case study research strategy has been adopted for this research.  In 
studying specific location, the empirical part of the research allows an in-depth inquiry into 
the complexity of human-environment interactions.  
The main methodological framework of this research employs triangulation across 
different types of research methods and analysis. The multiple sources of evidence include 
interviews, questionnaires, personal observation and analysis of documentary evidence 
involving both qualitative and quantitative methods (Yin, 1989; Stake, 2000; Bryman, 2004: 
275).   
The research approach links the data to be collected and the conclusions to be drawn to 
the research questions while trying to maximise four aspects of quality of the design (construct 
validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability). The next section justifies the 
choice of the case study approach and explains how the research was designed to answer the 
questions under investigation.   
 
4.2 RESEARCH APPROACH  
4.2.1 QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA 
A mixed qualitative and quantitative research methodology, using empirical and secondary 
data, has been adopted in this research. Many in the research community recognise that 
qualitative and quantitative methods of research are equally efficient, legitimate and valuable 
in their own context (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Robson, 2002; Sarantakos, 2005). While 
quantitative approaches typically use random sample surveys to collect mainly quantifiable 
data and analyse these using statistical techniques, the qualitative approach uses purposive 
sampling and semi-structured or interactive interviews to collect data mainly relating to 
people’s judgments, attitudes, preferences, priorities, and/or perceptions about a subject and 
analyse these through sociological or anthropological research techniques (Kanbur, 2001:4).  
However, Booth et al. (1998) cautions that this does not mean qualitative methods do not 
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collect quantitative data or that qualitative methods collect quantitative data.  The integration 
of the two in research practice is favoured in recent research undertakings with the argument 
that a continuum of levels of investigations exist and that the oppositional categories used to 
explain the differences in social thought are fluid and open (Giddens, 1984; Fay, 1996). The 
relevance of both methods is further captured when their epistemological significance is 
considered.  
Quantitative and qualitative research approaches draw on different ontological 
standpoints and their epistemological derivations.  Ontology (what is considered acceptable 
knowledge of the world) precedes Epistemology (how we came to accumulate knowledge).  It 
is the relationship between them that shapes how and why data are collected and theory 
generated. Any theoretical inquiry into the nature of vulnerability and disasters inevitably 
involves ontological and epistemological questions that deal with the nature of cultural versus 
material realities (Oliver-Smith, 2004:17). 
The primary ontological source for the analysis of quantitative research is that of 
‘objectivism’ (Bryman, 2004:16).  This sees the world as capable of being objectively known. 
Social phenomena and associated meaning are independent and external of the actor, and the 
world exists independently of our knowledge of it (Sayer, 1995:5). As such it has a coercive 
force upon us, which we cannot influence (Bryman, 1994:16). However, this downplays free 
will and suggests that, like nature, the social world follows laws, leaving us as pre-determined 
beings (Guba and Lincoln 1994:109).  As opposed to objectivism, qualitative research is more 
concerned with ‘constructionism’.  It is the meaning and context applied to social phenomena 
that is important here. This ontological position claims that the world is socially constructed 
and that even the categories people employ in helping them understand the natural and social 
world are social products. In this case, concepts are relevant and our observations determine 
meaning (Bryman, 2004).   
The dominant epistemology in quantitative research is positivism. Positivism holds 
that knowledge can only be confirmed through careful observation. This epistemology is 
usually used to generate general statements or test hypotheses (Bryman, 2004: 50). Positivism 
therefore tries to predict and explain human nature and the associated social system (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994:113). Interpretivism is the epistemological position for qualitative data 
analyses, and this approach contends that methods from the natural sciences are not applicable 
to the social world and its institutions (Bryman, 2004). As observers, we understand the social 
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world through our own interpretations (Giddens, 1976). This forms the dominant 
epistemology for this case study research.  
The main difference between quantitative and qualitative data relationships is where 
theory comes in relation to the data. Deductive and inductive reasoning tend to be the 
respective basis for analysis. The deductive method of reasoning is considered as both 
experimental and manipulative, with the verification of hypotheses specifically suited to 
quantitative methods (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:109). Inductive analyses arise when the 
research is conducted with a view of building the theory from the data, with no preconceptions 
as to the result. Qualitative research methods therefore generate theory through an iterative 
analysis of data (Stauss and Corbin, 1994:273). The theory comes in at a different point in the 
research and knowledge comes from the data. This is the case with the empirical research in 
this thesis, which tries to understand the phenomena of risk, vulnerability, DM and relocation 
decisions within a societal context based on a past event.   
Table 4.1 summarises the strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative 
research approaches, according to DFID (2000).  
 
Table 4.1: Strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative methods 
RESEARCH STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
QUALITATIVE 
 Can provide the initial basis         
      for further quantitative work 
 More participatory 
 Can be quick and low cost 
 Good for social processes and    
      context 
 Can explain causes of    
     quantitative  findings  
 More prone to bias because   
      of  reliance on    
      interpretation 
 Difficult to infer population     
      characteristics from a small    
      sample   
 Can be time consuming 
QUANTITATIVE 
 Can be more concrete,   
      systematic 
 Can  infer population  
      characteristics   from a small    
      sample 
 Can test the significance of    
      quantitative  findings  
 Its concreteness can be       
       misleading 
 Can be very extractive 
 Has the tendency to collect  
      much data and to produce   
      over-complex analysis 
Source: DFID Guidance Sheets (2000) 
Although both qualitative and quantitative data follow different and distinct paths for 
ontology and epistemology, many researchers stress the importance of triangulation and 
encompassing both techniques into research (Sayer, 1992; Guba, 1994:107). To understand 
fully the depth and breadth of vulnerability, motivations for relocations, risk perception and 
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DM issues requires multiple research techniques, an approach which has been adopted in this 
research. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000), triangulation has the strength to combine 
multiple observations, theories, methods, and empirical materials and cover any concerns 
about using a case study. It also serves to clarify meaning and verify interpretations, 
generalisations and evaluative judgments (Flick, 1998).  
 
4.2.2 CASE STUDY STRATEGY 
Yin (2003:13) defines case study research as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’. Case study methods may be 
involved in exploratory/descriptive, evaluation and hypothesis testing (Stake, 1995; Yin, 
2003). Contemporary social science research advocates for appropriate levels of funding for 
both multiple and comparative case studies.  Case studies provide an account of social life as 
well as the deep insights generated by ethnographic studies (Robson, 2002; Brenda, 2005).  
Apart from providing qualitative information, a statistical analysis to complement the 
qualitative analysis is also given to further clarify the results of this research. This is the 
preferred strategy for examining this contemporary phenomenon because the research 
questions are exploratory and explanatory, and the relevant responses can be investigated 
within real life contexts (Yin, 1984, 2003).  Before explaining the research techniques, it is 
relevant to first situate the case study and research area.  
 
Research Area 
As mentioned earlier in Section 1.4.1, the North West and West Provinces of Cameroon (also 
see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1) where the Lake Nyos and Lake Monoum gas disasters occurred 
are the areas chosen for this case study. A description of the disaster zone is presented in Box 
4.1. The LND occurred in 1986 and caused close to 2000 fatalities, with the subsequent 
displacement and resettlement of the affected populations in seven camps within the region. 
The LMD occurred two years earlier in 1984 but the affected population were not displaced 
from the vicinity of the incident in Njindoum village. The consequence of the sudden and 
unpredictable release of poisonous gases from crater lakes in both instances is described in 
more detail in Chapter six.  
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The Study Populations 
The study populations associated with both events are: (1) the displaced victims of the LND, 
presently living in resettlement camps; (2) former displaced victims of the LND who have 
moved back to the disaster zone within the vicinity of the deadly lake; and (3) the residents in 
and around LM who were not resettled and have not moved from the disaster area. The fourth 
study population is the major stakeholders in DM in the country. These include government 
officials or administrators at the national, regional and local levels, local council members and 
scientists whose influence has shaped the DM style and policies of the country. A more 
detailed description of the demographic profiles of the study populations and the impact of the 
disaster managers on the overall DM of the country is provided in the analytical Chapters that 
follow.  
 
4.3 FIELDWORK IN CAMEROON 
Prior to the main data collection in 2007, a preliminary scoping visit was carried out at the 
Ukpwa Waindo resettlement camp (URC) in December 2005/January 2006.  During this visit, 
the researcher held informal discussions with local authorities, and members of the public in 
the area hosting the LND survivors. These discussions further enlightened and strengthened 
the conceptual research ideas and helped in designing the research questions. The fieldwork 
was conducted in Cameroon for seven months from March to September 2007. 
Box 4.1: DESCRIPTION OF THE DISASTER ZONE 
 
The disaster zone comprises an area of about 300km2 (see Figure 6.2) involving three 
villages (Baxter and Kapila, 1989). This region is inhabited by the Bum and Mmen people 
(Melinda, 2002) who belong to four ethnic groups; Nyos/Cha, SuBum, Aku and Bororos 
(Shanklin, 1988). The languages spoken in this region are Nyos, Mmen and Fulani 
languages, which reflect the different ethnic groups of the region (Griffen, 1994; Troyer, et 
al., 1995). This area is located about 25kms ESE of Wum town in Fungom sub-division of 
Menchum Division in the NWP. A survey carried out in 1994 to assess the languages of the 
region (Troyer et al., 1995) states that 150 people were present in Nyos village. However, 
field research findings indicate that at the time of the fieldwork, about 330 were living in 
Nyos village in a scattered settlement with houses and hamlets located within farms. The 
respondents also indicated that about 90 people were living in Upper Cha, which is also 
part of the disaster zone. The disaster zone is about 45kms from Wum town on a road that 
is impassable by cars. A motorcycle ride along the narrow road passes through a beautify 
terrain (see Figure 9.1) characterized by an undulating topography and usually takes about 
five hours from Wum town. 
Source: Author 
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4.3.1 FIELDWORK LOGISTICS 
The Political Climate in Cameroon 
While planning for the fieldwork the impact of the political climate on the fieldwork activities 
in the country was not anticipated. 2007 was a politically important year in Cameroon as 
municipal and legislative elections were scheduled to take place on the 22nd of July 2007.  
After establishing initial contacts, it became clear that the fieldwork plan had to be slightly 
altered because of the forthcoming twin municipal and legislative elections on 22nd July. The 
researcher was advised that many disaster managers within the government sector would be 
very busy with political campaigns. Every opportunity was therefore utilised to interview 
disaster managers from the government sector; effort was made to meet them in their villages 
or provinces where they were out campaigning, and this was where most of the interviews 
were conducted. Interview experiences outdoors in an informal environment and atmosphere 
proved to be more relaxing and friendly than those conducted in offices.  
 
Research Assistants 
The data collection process was facilitated by research assistants who came from the affected 
communities and had some knowledge of field research. Using research assistants from within 
the study population or region heightens insights, provides potential cultural contextual 
information, and opens doors normally closed to outsiders (Brenda, 2005). Gottfried (1996) 
highlights the importance of involving the population in research projects and asserts that 
research with or from the perspectives of those most affected continues to be rare. “Insider-
outsider” approaches to sampling and research that has been debated by field researchers 
(BacaZinn, 1979); the fact that the researchers were all from the affected areas in which they 
worked proved to be very valuable.  
Two research assistants referred to hereafter as senior research assistants (government 
teachers) helped the researcher to choose other two junior research assistants from within the 
Nyos study area. The research assistants helped the researcher in his logistic arrangements 
while working in the area and also in making contacts and arranging interviews with local 
administrators and others within the area.  
Two French speaking research assistants from the West Province of Cameroon, helped 
with the fieldwork in the French speaking Njindoum area within the LM vicinity. Both 
assistants were familiar with the local language and culture and had worked in the area. In a 
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few circumstances they were involved in administering research questionnaires to respondents 
who indicated that they would not be available for pre-planned visits. They also served as 
translators in many instances where the locals could not communicate with English language 
or “pidgin English”.  
 
4.4 RESEARCH TECHNIQUE AND DATA SOURCES 
The techniques and data sources were determined by the research questions. The link between 
the study populations in the case study, the research questions and related tasks is shown in 
Table 4.2. 
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CASE STUDY 
GROUP 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RELATED TASKS 
 Question 1 
What strategies have been adopted to 
cope with and recover from the Lake 
Nyos and Monoum disasters? 
Question 2 
How can we understand the 
vulnerability of individuals and their 
households to the present risk at  Lake 
Nyos and Monoum 
Question 3 
How do people perceive and respond 
to the risk that still exists in the 
disaster areas? 
 
Question 4 
What makes people settle or move 
away from the risky areas? 
 
Displaced 
disaster 
survivors still 
living in 
resettlement 
camps 
-To perform an analysis of the responses, 
institutional arrangements and 
mechanisms for disaster and risk 
management for the displaced victims of 
the Nyos disaster. 
-  To conduct an assessment of structural 
and non-structural mitigation measures 
To perform a qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of the socio-economic condition 
of disaster survivors (social 
vulnerability) in the resettlement camps. 
 
-To analyse how the population within 
the displaced communities have 
responded and will respond to any 
disaster mitigation and preparedness 
measures. 
-To analyse why they have decided to 
settle where they are although some of 
their colleagues have  relocated to the  
Nyos area 
-To analyse why they think others are 
returning to Nyos. 
 
Former 
displaced Nyos 
victims now 
resettled within 
the disaster 
zone 
 
-To perform an analysis of the responses, 
institutional arrangements and 
mechanisms for disaster and  risk 
management 
- To conduct an assessment of structural 
and non-structural mitigation measures 
-To perform a qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the physical risks 
(physical vulnerability) to the population 
in the disaster zone. 
 
- To analyse how  the returnees  
perceive and understand natural 
hazards 
- To analyse the level of threat that  
returnees perceive Lake Nyos still 
poses 
-To analyse how they  have responded 
and intend to  respond to any disaster 
mitigation measures 
 
-To analyse what motivated these 
displaced people to return and resettle 
within the Lake Nyos area 
 
 
Residents in 
Njindoum 
village close to 
Lake Monoum  
-To perform an analysis of the responses, 
institutional arrangements and 
mechanisms for disaster and  risk 
management 
- To conduct an assessment of structural 
and non-structural mitigation measures 
-To perform a qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of physical and 
social vulnerability of  the population in 
the lake Monoum area 
- To analyse how the non-displaced 
monoum residents perceive and 
understand natural hazards 
- To analyse how they perceive the 
magnitude of the threat that Lake 
Monoum poses. 
-To analyse how they  intend to 
responded to any disaster mitigation 
measure 
-To make an analysis of reasons why 
the residents still live within the lake 
vicinity and have not relocated despite 
the known risk 
 
Table 4.2: Matrix of link between the case study populations, research questions and related tasks 
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Data were generated through the following steps in the fieldwork. 
1) Establishment of contact with community leaders, key officials and NGOs working in 
the study areas 
2) Short fieldwork entrance briefing meetings with Senior Divisional Officer and mayors 
in disaster area 
3) Preliminary visit of the study communities to gain a better contextual understanding.  
4) Gathering of documents required for the study (reports, media articles, plans, project 
reports, policies, maps, and demographic, poverty and ecological reports etc) 
5) Administration of  questionnaires to the study populations  
6) Survey of risky areas determined by physical features and geology.  
7) Interviews with key officials (government sector, private sector, NGO and others in the 
civil society involved in DM) and the study populations. 
The procedure as listed above guided the methodology. While 1-3 served as the 
preliminary information gathering tools, 4-7 were the main data collection techniques 
administered to the study populations that were sampled.  
 
4.4.1 SAMPLING 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 on the next page show the sample sizes for the various study 
populations for both surveys and interviews and the various sample locations. 225 and 108 
survey questionnaires were administered to 5 resettlement camps and 3 villages 
respectively within the Nyos disaster zone. In Njindoum village, 130 questionnaires were 
also administered. A total of 90 interviews were also conducted, comprising 25 interviews 
each with the displaced disaster victims and Njindoum residents, while 20 interviews with 
returnees to the disaster zone. A further 20 interviews were conducted with disaster 
managers. Not all survey questionnaires administered (face to face with researcher and 
later administering by research assistants) was collected by the researcher.  Although only 
64.1 percent of administered questionnaires were collected, the total of responses from 
questionnaires (295) exceeded the minimum anticipated.  
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Table 4.3: Surveys conducted  
Study Population Place Questionnaires Administered 
Questionnaires 
Collected 
 
 
Displaced Nyos 
Victims 
 
 
 
 
Ukpwa Camp 100 74 
Buabua  Camp 40 27 
Kimbi Camp 25 16 
Wum Camp 40 14 
Kumfutu 20 4 
Total 225 135 
 
Returnees to Disaster 
Zone 
Nyos 65 48 
Cha 25 16 
Subum 18 11 
Total 108 75 
Non-displaced Njindoum Residents  130 85 
Total Number of questionnaires 463 295 
Source: Author 
 
Table 4.4:  Interviews conducted  
STUDY POPULATION   INTERVIEWS 
Returnees to Nyos 20 
Displaced Nyos Victims (Ukpwa Camp)  25 
Residents around Lake Monoum ( Njindoum) 25 
Key disaster management officials 20 
  
                       Total  90 
Source: Author 
 
Simple random sampling was carried out for the three study populations for the 
administering of survey questionnaires. Every effort was made to cover most of the 
resettlement camps to administer survey questionnaires and a total of five camps were 
sampled for the displaced disaster victims. The survey was also done in the three villages 
of Cha, Subum and Nyos within the disaster zone (that had suffered the effects of the 
disaster) because people had returned to these villages. 77.9 percent, 87.8 percent and 90.6 
percent of those who answered the survey questions were household heads in the displaced 
Nyos survivors, returnees to the disaster zone and the non-displaced Njindoum residents 
respectively. The number of questionnaires administered in the Nyos study populations is 
in proportion to the population size in the various locations.  
For the interviews, the URC was chosen for cluster sampling for the displaced 
survivors. This camp was chosen because it is the closest to Wum, the largest town and 
capital of Menchum division and also the most accessible of all the resettlement camps. 
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Furthermore, more information about the social situation of the survivors of this camp was 
provided to the researcher by the mayor of Wum during a preliminary visit to the area prior 
to the fieldwork, and one of the research assistants, a disaster survivor who lived in the 
camp.  
The criteria for choosing interviewees within the disaster zone were based on 
availability at home due to the relatively smaller population. Most of these interviews were 
conducted in Nyos village, and only a few in Cha and Subum villages because of their 
small populations and because some of the respondents did not honour the rendezvous for 
the interviews. Few trips could be made to the disaster site due to its remote location and 
very poor accessibility. After travelling for several hours to get there, every effort was 
made to interview any resident that was found especially if pre-programmed interviews 
could not be undertaken because the respondents were not available.  
In Njindoum village, many people were available for interview but most of them 
refused to talk without having proof that the chief knew of our presence and had accepted 
that they could disclose information about our enquiry. However, this issue was solved 
after more people became aware of our presence in the field and got information that we 
have had some meetings with the chief and some of his notables in his palace concerning 
our mission in the area. Interviewees were selected based on information that was collected 
during the earlier surveys. The category of people chosen for interviews were those who 
lost a relative during the gas incident in the lake, those who were displaced from the 
lakeside settlements, those whose livelihood activities like fishing and farming close to the 
lake had been affected and some local traditional authorities in the village. Group 
interviews were also held with some traditional leaders in the village, in the presence of the 
Chief of Njindoum village.  
 
4.4.2 SURVEYS 
Survey questionnaire administration sampling in the three study populations (displaced 
Ukpwa camp survivors, returnees to the disaster zone and Njindoum residents) was 
conducted through random sampling but in a manner to be representative of the 
populations concerned. Prior to the fieldwork, the plan was to conduct 75 questionnaires in 
each of the study populations. But during the fieldwork, the researcher wanted to maximise 
every opportunity available to get survey data especially when it was realised that the 
political atmosphere could be a hindrance to conducting interviews. The idea was that the 
questionnaire survey could make-up for any deficiencies in conducting interviews. Hence 
in some study populations more surveys were carried out.  
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The survey questionnaires were structured to have both closed and open-ended 
questions, with open-ended questions used in instances where the respondents’ personal 
view on an issue was needed. Generally, the questionnaires were designed to yield data, 
which could give a better understanding of the issues under investigation. Some question 
themes in the surveys include: indicators of socio-economic and demographic profile of 
households; an infrastructural asset profile and determinants of perception to natural 
hazards. The survey questionnaire instrument is provided in full in Appendix five. Most of 
the surveys were conducted through face to face administration in order to be certain that 
all those to be sampled have been contacted. In some instances where the respondents were 
not available at home, some questionnaires were kept with the research assistant to 
administer them at a later date and time. Box 4.2 explains the questionnaire administration 
process.  
 
The questionnaires were administered to the respondents by writing the responses directly 
on the question sheets that was prepared and taken to the field. Thus, all the survey data 
Box 4.2: QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTRATION PROCESS 
 
The process for administering survey questionnaires reflected the reality in the field. For 
the displaced populations, the number of questionnaires administered and those 
collected reflects the accessibility and population of the various camps. Though visits 
were made to all the camps mentioned above to administer questionnaires, more visits 
were made to the Ukpwa, Buabua and Kimbi camps because these were more 
accessible. Planned visits to the camps were arranged beforehand to administer the 
surveys and the camp residents were informed of the date and arrival time. In the 
camps, we went from house to house. If no one was in the house when we visited, we 
passed on to the next house due to the time constraint. The houses whose occupants 
were not available were noted and their neighbours were asked to inform them of our 
next visit.   
The second group of questionnaires was administered to households who had 
relocated back to the disaster zone in Nyos, Cha and Subum, the main villages that were 
affected by the disaster. It was very difficult to make frequent visits to the disaster zone 
due to its remoteness and inaccessibility. Very few households’ members were found at 
home when we visited, though the research assistants travelled to this region to arrange 
for interviews and also to administer questionnaires. Through advice from some 
residents; we planned a scheduled visit on a day when there was a traditional wedding 
in Nyos village. This is the day we were able to administer most of the questionnaires as 
many of the residents returned home early from their farms to attend the wedding.  
Survey questionnaire administration in Njindoum village was done within a 
few kilometers of Lake Monoum, mostly within the linear settlement along the main 
road into the village. Though this study group has the largest population of the three 
studied and more people were available for interviews and for the survey, many of them 
were reluctant to talk to us because they were not very sure that we were not 
government officials.  Many of the villagers asked for proof that we were students and 
many of them only began to cooperate after getting a message from the chief of 
Njindoum that we were not linked to the government.   
Source: Author 
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was recorded directly on the question sheets in the field. The questionnaires were 
structured in a manner in which it was easy to quantify the results. How research data was 
generated from the survey questionnaires is explained in Section 4.5.  
 
4.4.3 INTERVIEWS 
Interviews were the main method of qualitative data collection. Semi-structured interviews 
were undertaken in all the disaster affected study populations and with the main 
stakeholders in DM (see Box 4.3). Interview themes with the affected populations include 
history of where lived in relation to disasters and intra-household risk perception.  Themes 
covered in interviews with disaster managers include knowledge of Cameroon’s DM 
system, strategies/policies/plans for DM in Cameroon and past experience with the 
management of the LNM disasters. According to Bernard (1994), semi–structured 
interviews have much of the free-wheeling quality of unstructured interviewing but are 
based on the use of an interview guide. Semi-structured interviews allowed greater 
flexibility within the interview structure and process through the use of open-ended 
questions to allow the respondent to express their thoughts on a subject freely. Though the 
interviews were based on a guide (see Appendix 6) some instances that required additional 
understanding of pertinent issues in the various study groups or where the respondent’s 
knowledge of certain matters was more relevant, unstructured questions were used to probe 
these areas further. Criteria for selection of key informants are presented in Box 4.3.  
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The interview times varied depending on the study populations. Interview times 
with disaster survivors who could not understand English language or “Pidgin English” 
took longer and lasted at times for three hours, and occasionally up to four hours. With key 
informants involved in DM actions, it took on average two hours. But there were many 
opportunities to talk to these people more than once and continue the process at other times 
to complete the interview and probe into other issues. Where some key personnel could not 
be met for an interview, a telephone interview was arranged where a similar format to the 
questions used for the semi-structured interview was adopted.  
Interviews were taped and notes taken on field note books, which were later 
transcribed mostly in the evenings and during the weekends. Some respondents did not 
want their interviews to be recorded and we had to comply with their request. In such 
situations, the interviews took longer as we had to write down all the relevant responses in 
the field notebooks.  
During the interview process, especially with the disaster survivors, the researcher 
was conscious guiding against bias. Every effort was made to triangulate in household 
interviews where possible. Though interviews targeted the household heads, in cases where 
their spouses were present or other senior members such as elderly grand fathers or 
mothers or grown-up children, they were also asked similar questions to maximise the 
Box 4.3: SELECTION OF KEY INFORMANTS 
 
Key informants were chosen based on the sectors they worked in and their impact on DM 
in the country. Their selection was grouped into three main categories. One group 
comprised of officials working with the disaster survivors at the local level. Both the local 
government officials and non-government officials managing the local councils fell under 
this group. These groups of officials were very knowledgeable about the operational and 
practical measures involving DM at the local level, and deal directly with those affected by 
the LNM disasters within the local village communities. These are the people who 
implement any decisions taken from above and who are also responsible for directing any 
queries, concerns or problems concerning the survivors to higher quarters. This group 
included Divisional officers, Senior Divisional Officers and Mayors etc. The second 
group of key informants was the main policy-makers in DM in the country and those at the 
higher level of administration whose decisions can impact on the DM process and those 
affected. These people were mostly working in the government ministries at the higher 
ranks of government administration. This group included Directors, Provincial Delegates 
and Chiefs of Service. The third group was scientists and researchers, most of whose 
activities also impacted directly or indirectly on DM and the survivors. Some of these 
people are either involved in scientific research activities on mitigation at both lakes or act 
as advisers or consultants to the government. Though these categories were determined 
prior to the commencement of the interviews, most of the members of these groups were 
sampled through a snowball sampling technique (Sarantakos, 2005). 
Source: Author 
75 
 
accuracy of information given with regards to some questions.  This was very relevant with 
questions about social vulnerability that concerned coping strategies and livelihood 
activities, because it was realised that the respondents were keen to express their problems 
and could in some instances exaggerate information that was given, especially regarding 
living conditions, farming/grazing space and assistance from the government.  
Corroboration of statements sought on the basis that reliability and credibility of the data 
being gathered depended on the accurate presentation, interpretation and correlation of 
information gathered from the respondents.  
 
4.4.4 SECONDARY INFORMATION 
Literature and documents concerning the issues under investigation were retrieved from 
various sources and searched for evidence on the issues under investigation. Documents 
were collected from government ministries, research institutes, newspaper publishing 
houses in the country, NGOs who have worked in the area (see Appendix 7 for sources of 
secondary information). More secondary data were collected from internet sources and via 
library facilities, through which the few journal articles and publications on the LND were 
sourced.  
 
4.4.5 PERSONAL OBSERVATION AND EXPERIENCE 
The researcher is a Cameroonian from the North West Province where the LND happened.  
He felt the indirect impact of the disaster when shortly after the incident, the death of 
thousands of cattle caused the price of meat in Bamenda to rise since Menchum Division 
was the main supplier of meat in the North West Provincial capital of Bamenda. Apart 
from this early experience, when serving as an assistant lecturer in the Department of 
Geology (School of Education Annex Bambili) of the University of Yaounde, the 
researcher was concerned with the technical aspect of the LND and had made several field 
trips with undergraduate students to crater lakes in the region. During this period prior to 
embarking on further studies in the UK, the researcher had heard of the social problems the 
survivors of the LND were facing.  
The researcher who possesses an M.Sc in Applied Geology, made a technical 
assessment of the new risk of flooding from Lake Nyos that had been indicated by 
scientists working on the lake (see Page 133 in Section 6.3.1). Aside from the technical 
aspects, the researcher spent much time in the URC during the fieldwork and experienced 
some of the social problems the camp dwellers are living with on a daily basis, many of 
which they have explained during the research process. Meeting the families of many of 
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the survivors in the camps and also in Wum town and hearing about their problems and 
predicaments gave further insight into areas for probing during the research process.  
During the fieldwork, the researcher participated in the annual remembrance of the 
LND in which many of the issues under investigation were highlighted by both the disaster 
survivors and the government representatives to the event. Due to his presence in the area 
for this research, he was informed of all the activities being undertaken both by the 
government and the disaster survivors in preparation for the annual event. Though this 
occasion took place almost at the end of the fieldwork, it exposed most of the issues that 
were initially built into the research hypothesis and the findings that were being unveiled 
from the research process. It was also an opportunity to meet many of the key personnel 
involved in DM in the country since some top government officials came to the region for 
the event.  Box 7.1 (Page 175) in Chapter seven has a details account of the event.  
 
4.4.6 TECHNIQUES USED FOR EACH RESEARCH QUESTION 
The data collection methods were used to answer multiple research questions. How each of 
the research questions draws from the techniques mentioned above is presented in 
Appendix 9 (Page 294). Table 4.5 summarizes the mix of methodology used to probe into 
the main themes for inquiry in the research which include disaster management, 
vulnerability drivers, risk perception and motivations for relocation.  
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Table 4.5: Summary of methodology for main research themes 
RESEARCH 
QUESTION 
DATA 
COLLECTION
TECHNIQUES/ 
TOOLS 
DATA SOURCES AND 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS. 
Risk 
Management 
(Question  1) 
 
 
Primary Data 
 
 
 Semi-structured 
interviews 
 Thematic coding of semi-
structured interviews with key 
decision-makers and managers 
Secondary Data  Documentary Evidence.  
 Analysis of documentary 
evidence from  UNDP, 
government institutions,  
reports  and news paper 
articles  
 Analysis of projects and plans 
for disaster mitigation  
Vulnerability
Drivers 
(Question 2) 
 
Primary data 
 Semi-structured 
interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey  
 Personal 
observation 
 Quantitative and qualitative 
analysis 
 Thematic coding of 
questionnaire survey, and 
semi-structured interviews 
with key decision-makers, 
household heads and managers 
Secondary data, 
 Documentary 
evidence  
 Analysis of policy documents 
and reports 
 Historical documentary 
evidence allows analysis to be 
conducted on the root causes 
of vulnerability in Cameroon. 
 
Risk 
Perception 
(Question  3) 
Primary Data 
 
 Questionnaire 
survey  
 Semi-structured 
interviews 
 Thematic coding of 
questionnaire survey, and 
semi-structured interviews 
with key decision-makers, and 
household heads and managers 
Secondary Data 
 
 Documentary 
evidence  
 Analysis of secondary data. 
Motives for 
Relocation 
decision 
(Question 4) 
Primary Data 
 Questionnaire 
survey,  
 Semi-structured 
interviews 
 Thematic coding of 
questionnaire survey involving   
household heads, and officials 
involved in response and 
recovery efforts. 
Source: Author 
 
4.5 DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS 
The main analytical work was done after the fieldwork had been completed and mainly at 
the University of East Anglia. Initial data processing and analytical work was undertaken 
during the fieldwork as more data were being collected to provide initial findings, which 
helped fine-tune the study (Crang, 1997). Qualitative hypotheses and theories emerged 
from the data-set while the data collection was in progress, and after data analysis started 
(Morse and Field, 1995).  
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The hundreds of questionnaire surveys administered to the study populations were 
transported to the UK to be processed. The questionnaire surveys were entered into SPSS 
software to produce data that can be used for quantitative analysis, and the other data 
sources including transcribed interviews and notes went through a coding scheme. 
 
4.5.1 CODING 
The process of coding and categorising was more complicated than anticipated. As has 
been pointed out by some researchers, segmenting and coding data are often taken for 
granted though this forms the core of any qualitative research. The ability to organise, 
mange and filter out the most relevant information are skills, which researchers involved in 
qualitative research must possess (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996).  
The development of a coding strategy was based on breaking down, 
conceptualizing and reconstructing data (Yin, 1993:62). Gordon (1992) describes the basic 
steps in any reliable coding process, which comprise definition of the coding categories, 
assigning code labels to the categories and classifying the relevant information into the 
categories. The first stage is an initial annotation of materials in which topics are noted 
neutrally, rather than a search for significant themes, though Cook and Crang (1995:78) 
note that in practice “no researcher can confront such a text quite so innocently”. In the 
second stage, codes are developed that are used to label similar topics. The codes are then 
used to collate data items relating to each code, which is useful to identify analytical 
themes and underlying relations.  According to Bryman and Burgess (1994) coding should 
be a flexible, interactive process throughout, in which materials are repeatedly re-read and 
previous steps re-evaluated as queries, contradictions, omissions and inconsistencies 
inevitably arise.  
Having in mind the relevance of coding and the various coding methods, the design 
of the coding process took into consideration how the data generated would facilitate the 
analysis. The interview transcripts and notes for the three study populations and the 
disaster managers were coded separately. This painstaking process began by reading 
interview transcripts several times while examining the data for descriptions, patterns, and 
relationships between categories. The relevant data segments or phrases that conveyed 
similar information were highlighted and underlined. Main categories were identified and 
given generic names and codes of capital letters. To assist with identification and analysis, 
the various interview responses were separated under the main categories. Within the main 
categories, sub-categories were also identified and given code names. A complete coding 
consisted of the interviewee’s group or study population (coded with the 1st capital letter of 
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the groups), interviewee identity (coded as two digit numbers), main category (coded as 
capital letters of the category initials) and sub-category (coded as small letters).  Table 4.6 
below shows the codes and their meanings.  
Table 4.6: Codes and their meanings 
CODES MEANING 
U Displaced Ukpwa camp study population 
M Non-displaced lake Monoum study population 
N Returnees to Nyos  study population 
D Disaster Managers 
Numbers e.g. 01,02 Interviewee identity 
Initials of Main Category e.g. 
(PRS) Preferred  relocation site 
Sub-category e.g. fer or cul Fertility and culture 
U02PRcul Example of sorted transcript reference  
 
An attempt was made to group responses for the study populations under similar main 
categories in order to facilitate comparative analysis between the study populations. A total 
of 13 and 16 main categories for the study populations and disaster managers were 
identified respectively with more than 40 subcategories in each study group. To facilitate 
topical breakdown, all the coded subcategories of transcript references for all the study 
groups were sorted and separated against the corresponding main categories to which they 
fit in a table format as illustrated in table 4.7 below (see appendix 10 for sorted transcript 
codes placed against their matching categories). It was such a table format that was used to 
do the analysis by studying the coded transcript subcategories and referring back to 
examine the corresponding coded transcript references for the original information. 
 
Table 4.7: Example of sorted transcript codes placed against their matching categories. 
CODES FOR 
MAIN 
CATEGORIES 
MAIN 
CATEGORIES 
SUB 
CATEGORIES 
CODED SORTED 
TRANSCRIP  FOR  SUB-
CATEGORIES 
RL Effects or 
Impact  due to 
Relocation  
Income “loss of 
income”  
U01RLinc; U02RLhous; 
U20RLhous;  
Community 
Cohesion 
U03RLcomcoh; 
U04RLcomcoh; 
U04RLcomcoh;  
Education 
“education of 
children” 
U01RLedu; U03RLedu; 
U04RLedu; U04RLedu; 
U09RLedu; U13RLedu;  
U19RLedu; U20 RLedu;  
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Strange
Relocation
 
School 
Fertility 
It was realised that the ideas in the coded transcript references could not be 
completely separated to match specific categories since in most cases many ideas or 
opinions were conveyed by the respondents. As such many coded interview transcripts 
could be used for more than one sub-category especially in cases where the ideas overlap 
or many issues are mentioned in a response as was commonly the case. The transcript 
extract in Box 4.4 below is an example. 
 
Box 4.4: CODED EXTRACTS FROM INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
 
U15MRL: I don't like being here because this place is strange to me. 
Although the government says this is our land, we are not free here. I 
always feel like a stranger here and have discussed with my wife the 
possibility of us going back to Nyos. But the problem is that our two 
children are going to primary school here and we cannot take them to 
Nyos because there is no school there.  We want them to have some 
education because we did not go to school.  It we went to school, 
maybe we would not be suffering here so we don’t want them to suffer 
like us. Even if they don’t go to secondary school because there is 
none here, it is good for them to have at least the First School Living 
Certificate.  If not of our children, we should have gone back to Nyos 
to farm there because the crops don’t do well here.  
Source: Interview U15MRL 
 
 
In the example above, the transcript extract is coded as U15MRL and falls under the main 
category MRL (Motivation for relocation). The four sub-categories identified are indicated 
on the margin against the areas where they are found in the text. The codes for the sorted 
subcategories can be added to the transcript code to refer to those categories when 
segregating the data for analysis as shown in the last column of Table 4.7.  This is relevant 
for checking the data in the transcripts as well as for referencing within the text in the 
analytical Chapters. Box 4.4 explains how referencing is done in this thesis.  
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4.5.2  ANALYSIS 
The search for analytical themes started during the fieldwork as the data collection process 
painted a clearer picture of the issues under investigation. This initial analytical 
framework, which emerged during the fieldwork was vague and patchy but provided initial 
feedback which helped to polish the study (Bryman and Burgess, 1994; Crang, 1997).  
A series of analytical themes for the disaster affected study populations and disaster 
managers emerged from the processed data. These analytical themes were derived from the 
coded transcripts that had been sorted into main and sub-categories (Appendix 10).  After 
sorting and categorizing the analytical themes, their source materials were searched for in 
the coded references and transcripts. The original transcripts and notes were read 
thoroughly to complement the categories in searching for the main themes. All relevant 
analytical source materials were then selected and classified under various major themes 
that were then fed into the relevant analytical Chapters of the thesis. 
The analysis was oriented more towards an inductive than deductive approach 
(Kitchen and Tate, 2000), following an orientation “in which generalisations are developed 
from information presented in the case studies using refinement, typification and 
categorisation” (Eyles, 1988).  Therefore, explanatory concepts were underpinned mainly 
by the fieldwork experience though it would be naïve to suggest that the data collection 
process was wholly rooted in empirical reality and not to some extent theory-driven (May, 
2001).  
Overall, the main field techniques, data processing and analyses could be situated 
within the “grounded theory” research method.  A grounded theory approach attempts to 
prevent the temptation of applying premature theoretical categories and themes to 
Box 4.5: REFERENCING OF ORIGINAL AND SECONDARY INFORMATION 
IN THE THESIS 
 
In this thesis, referencing of secondary materials follows the conventional method for 
published sources and includes the authors, dates of publication, title of article or 
material and the publisher. Empirical data from interviews and notes from group 
interviews and personal observations is referenced by protecting the identity of the 
respondents using the codes of their names, study group and category under which the 
response falls (e.g. U15MRLfer or U03DIedu). These references are used to 
substantiate or support the arguments presented in those sections of the thesis.  In some 
sections also direct quotes from transcripts are reproduced verbatim in the text to show 
the words of the speaker. However only those words that were used by most of the 
speakers in “Pidgin English” or Creole, a common language understood by most 
Cameroonians and the local indigenes are presented and mostly in  cases where the 
interview was done without a translator.  
Source: Author 
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qualitative data based on previous background knowledge of issues under investigation. It 
instead favours the identification of categories emerging from empirical data generated 
during the field research process (Bryman and Burgess, 1994; Bailey et al., 1999). This 
implies that in this thesis, there are no clear cut distinctions or segregation between the 
analysis and results. The result Chapters double as the analytical chapters since discussions 
inevitably evolve into preliminary analysis as findings from the issues under investigations 
are revealed.     
 
4.6 REFLECTION ON THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
Before moving on to the results and analytical Chapters where the case study findings are 
discussed, reflection on the field research process is necessary. 
 
4.6.1 BIASES, CREDIBILITY AND SUBJECTIVITY  
Irrespective of the research methods chosen, social scientists bring their own beliefs, biases 
and assumptions to research being undertaken. The design of the study and how the 
research questions were formulated are influenced by the researcher’s personal 
background, knowledge and experiences (Madge et al., 1997).  Researchers’ attitudes and 
behaviour is the product of their cultures, genders, experiences, up-bringing and training. 
Their decisions, actions, perception and approaches to issues, which influence research at 
all the stages are shaped by their social relations (Cook and Crang, 1995; May, 2001; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The analysis was influenced by main and sub-themes that 
emerged because of the way data were coded. Biased transcription and interpretations, 
generalisations and too much attention to some emerging patterns more than others of 
equal significance are possible threats to the credibility of the research (Gibbs, 2002).   
The quality of the research could also be undermined by those facilitating the 
research or the case study populations.  Most top government officials in order to protect 
their positions did not want to criticise the government’s management of the LNM 
Disasters and therefore did not always give an objective response to questions. Secondly, 
the interview environment and atmosphere of most government officials in their respective 
home towns during the campaign for last municipal and legislative elections also 
influenced their objectivity. These people were out campaigning for the government and 
found it difficult to paint any negative picture of the government even in a one-to-one 
discussion. However, disaster managers from the opposition parties interviewed during this 
political atmosphere were also keen to expose the flaws of the government. This created 
some sort of balance, though the responses were treated with caution.  
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Since most of the interviews with the disaster affected populations were conducted 
in their houses, the presence of others influenced their responses. In some situations, like 
interviews with those who have returned to the disaster zone, the tradition does not permit 
a stranger to be alone with someone’s wife so the spouse always insists upon staying in the 
same room or not far away. Since it was impossible to keep others away from interview 
scenes, they eavesdropped the conversations and in many cases uttered remarks that 
influenced the respondents’ responses.  
From knowledge of the culture of the disaster affected communities prior to the 
fieldwork and the initial fieldwork entrance meetings in the disaster areas, it was clear that 
focus group discussions would not be a credible way of generating useful data as the 
communities in this part of Cameroon have great respect for elders and would not give 
contrary views in public. In most focus group discussions, participants are likely to 
conform to majority opinion or those of a very dominant or opinionated member (Morgan 
and Krueger, 1993). This was clearly the experience in a group meeting held at the end of 
the fieldwork in the palace of the Fon of Njindoum.  
Another source of possible distortion arises from the use of field assistants who hail 
from the study populations as translators in cases where the respondents could not speak or 
understand English or Pidgin English.  Passing on information through someone from the 
same community may influence the responses and the interpreters may not pass on the 
exact message from the respondents. For the LM case study populations, the translation of 
the questionnaires and interview question into French (Appendix 5 and 6) by a professional 
translator may have slightly altered the initial questions written in English. The responses 
from this community were in French and the translations into English by research 
assistants may also have created avenues for distortion of information.  
From a retrospective look at the entire research process from the initial conception 
of the research proposal, the procedural stages leading up to the fieldwork and the writing 
up stages, it is practically impossible to deny influences from my subjectivity on the end 
result. I have my own perceptions of how the Lake Nyos Survivors have been treated.  By 
belonging to the English-speaking or Anglophone community in a dominantly French- 
speaking bilingual Cameroon accused of marginalising the minority English speaking 
sector, it is very easy to have biased feelings about the issues under investigation, which 
are influenced by politics. Disaster survivors’ stories of corruption, embezzlement, 
negligence and poverty in the camps reminded me of the general feelings among 
Anglophones of the way they are treated by the central government. By interacting with 
the respondents, listening to responses, trying to put their responses in the perspective of 
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what I was observing in their community, and in attempting to represent their views as 
accurately as possible, I did my best to minimise my subjectivity in the analysis.   
 
4.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
The main ethical issues considered for this research included the following: informed 
consent and voluntary participation; confidentiality and anonymity; access to people 
(ethnic diversity); dissemination of result and reciprocity based on tradition of the area.  
The participants in this research did so with their freewill and on a voluntary basis.  
An information sheet that described the purpose of the research was prepared prior to the 
fieldwork and given to all literate participants in advance to seek their consent in the 
research. In cases where the participants were illiterate, what was written in the forms was 
explained to them verbally. Consent forms that had also been prepared were handed over 
to the participants to sign and indicate their willingness to participate in the research. In 
cases where the participants could not sign the forms, their consent was taken orally and 
the researcher only indicated this on the forms. Although some participants approached 
refused to participate in the research, in most instances participants were willing to 
participate in the research but were not willing to sign the consent forms. It was even 
noticed that in some cases, mention of the consent forms even scared some participants as 
many did not want their signatures on the forms.   
Confidentiality was taken with high regard since the researcher was entrusted with 
private information and this was also made known to the participants. The participants 
were ensured that any data would be used for the purpose of the research and not shared 
with others against their will. They were also told that they had the right to withdraw any 
information or material given to the researcher at any time. In photographs taken for 
interviewees during the fieldwork, they were told that such photographs could be published 
on the thesis or on the web. Those who did not wish their pictures to be published were 
told to indicate this. This was particularly true for close-up pictures of participants.  They 
were also told that their identity would be kept private and informed of circumstances 
when anonymity may not be maintained especially in cases when someone could be 
identified by his position. It was however noticed that the non-government local 
administrators and disaster survivors were not worried of their identity being known or the 
role they played in the research. On the contrary, most of the government personnel were 
concerned about their anonymity and some only promised to cooperate with the research 
provided their identity was not revealed.  To protect the information gathered during the 
field research process, field notes, questionnaires and tapes were stored in a safe place 
where no other person had access to them.  
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As mentioned earlier, the study populations consist of different ethnic groups. In 
the pursuit for information, the researcher was careful not to override the social, religious 
and cultural values in the study populations. Some of these cultural values that were 
respected during the fieldwork included: avoidance of any discussions with female 
respondents in the study sites without the presence or knowledge of their spouses and no 
scheduling of interviews or questionnaire administration on Friday afternoons (the prayer 
period for the Fulani and Muslim people who predominated in the research community).  
The participants were also well informed about the dissemination of the results 
from the research, which will be used for a PhD thesis and also for publications. They were 
also told that if they require the result of particular aspects of the research for their 
communities then it has to be provided to them after the research has been completed. The 
researcher also ensured that he appreciated the help of participants and reciprocated the 
assistance in such a way that it did not influence or alter their genuine attitude or 
participation in the research.  In many instances after interviews or questionnaire 
administration, the researcher thanked the participants for their time and for providing the 
information required. He also gave some bread and sweets to children in the household, a 
gesture which many appreciated.  
 
4.8 SUMMARY 
This case study research has adopted a mixed methodology comprising qualitative and 
quantitative data. Constructivism and interpretivism are the dominant epistemological 
positions adopted, with the argument that it is the meaning and context applied to social 
phenomena that is important and that we understand the social world best through our own 
interpretations. There is the consciousness that the disaster affected case study populations 
and disaster managers have different interests concerning the research enquiries and might 
misrepresent certain facts. This challenge was resolved by employing the triangulation 
technique, which uses multiple sources of evidence to enhance analysis. For example, if 
the researcher thought the interviewee was exaggerating some issues, such issues were 
cross-checked with his peers in subsequent interviews. This worked well for the 
government and non-government disaster managers who seemed to have different 
perspectives on many similar issues. While empirical information from the study groups 
via questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews plays a central role in the mainly 
inductive analysis, documentary information and in some instances personal observations 
provides essential background information for the interpretation and explanation of risks, 
vulnerability drivers, disaster management and relocation decisions.  Since it is inevitable 
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that researchers may influence the research process through their past experiences, cultural 
and social values, every attempt was made to minimise biases and subjectivity on the part 
of the researcher and the research participants in order to enhance the credibility of the 
research. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK IN 
CAMEROON 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although it may not be feasible to stop hazardous events from happening, efficient and 
effective DM will prevent many hazardous events from becoming disasters. As mentioned 
earlier in Section 2.3.2 (from Page 32), DM usually involves prediction, warning, 
emergency relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The main approach of DRR is to be 
proactive in all the phases of the disaster cycle (mitigation, preparedness, response and 
recovery as well as prevention). The UN-ISDR (2005) recognizes that effective DM is a 
key element in good governance and governments have been urged to place disaster 
mitigation as a key element of their governance programs. 
Each government of a country has the primary responsibility for taking effective 
measures to reduce disaster risk for the protection of its population, infrastructure and other 
national assets from the impact of natural disasters (UNCED, 1992: UNESC, 1994; 
WCDR, 2005). It is now internationally acknowledged that efforts to reduce disaster risks 
must be built into legislation and systematically integrated into policies, plans and 
programs for sustainable development and poverty reduction at the highest decision 
making level for implementation at the national and community levels. To meet the 
national and international challenges of DM, concerted action through bilateral, regional 
and international cooperation and partnerships are needed. International organisations have 
been urged to mobilize adequate resources, including financial, human and technological 
means to assist nations in the field of natural disaster reduction with particular focus in 
helping developing nations that are most vulnerable to the impacts of these hazards 
(UNESC, 1994; WCDR, 2005).  
In view of Cameroon’s high exposure to natural hazards and disasters, the 
government has taken the primary responsibilities for DM activities by creating and 
directing all the various state institutions and administrative bodies involved in the process.  
It will be shown in the course of the analysis that the DM process generally adopts a top-
down hierarchical approach for the administration and implementation of activities, with 
more emphasis on disaster response rather than risk prevention and mitigation.  Although 
government policy regarding civil protection in the country recognizes other actors like 
councils, populations and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), their role in DM is 
not very clear.  
The degree of success of DM in Cameroon depends hugely on the structures and 
institutions that have been put in place to guide the process. This Chapter seeks to review 
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critically, DM in Cameroon by examining the various legislative, institutional and 
administrative frameworks and the external agencies and key stakeholders that help to 
facilitate the process.  It reveals the DM structure in the country and provides the basis for 
answering research question one (What strategies have been adopted for the affected 
people to cope with and recover from the Lake Nyos and Monoum disasters). A critique of 
the DM process is also performed to expose flaws in the system and highlight areas for 
improvement. Triangulation of information sources has been used to complement 
secondary information sources in the analysis to enhance credibility. This Chapter 
represents the first comprehensive document that has been produced on DM in Cameroon.  
 
5.2 CIVIL PROTECTION IN CAMEROON 
Civil Protection (CP) is a common umbrella term that covers the risks posed by natural 
hazards/disasters, technological hazards, and biological hazards as well as those caused by 
human induced hazards in Cameroon. It is a concept, mission and service, which consist of 
permanently protecting people and property against environmental risks, disasters and their 
impacts (www.onr.cm). According to the Cameroon government, CP is the shared 
responsibility of the State, municipalities, non-governmental and humanitarian 
organizations and the people who are beneficiaries of the CP services. To counter the risks 
and threats faced by the country from the various hazards, the government has drawn up a 
National Disaster Prevention and Management Program. Government policy that 
emphasises disaster prevention and mitigation of disaster risks as priority areas of action 
with the assistance of the UNDP, within the framework of the National Disaster Prevention 
and Management Program.  This program enables the putting in place of a legal framework 
for-the prevention and management of emergencies; national and sectoral plans on disaster 
prevention; and programs for the prevention, education and sensitisation of populations in 
emergency situations at the divisional or local levels. Government policy states that for CP 
to succeed, all the various stakeholders involved in the process need to cooperate and 
support government actions in risk reduction and management.   
Though the emphasis here is on natural hazards and disasters, it should be noted 
that the overall government DM strategy covers all hazards under the auspices of the DCP 
in the MTAD. Many laws have been developed over the years to regulate CP in Cameroon 
but the management of risk and disasters has been built into the overall government 
administrative machinery and governance structure. By generally addressing all risks and 
hazards in the country (Box 5.1), peculiar problems of natural hazards/disasters have not 
been properly addressed.  
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5.3 LEGISLATION AND POLICIES 
The Government of Cameroon has adopted a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary approach 
through policies, practices and programs for DRR and management that target both natural, 
technological and human-induced hazards. These programs are managed by several 
ministerial departments under the auspices of the MTAD. The process to provide a more 
comprehensive legal framework for CP in Cameroon began shortly after independence and 
various laws, decrees, presidential instructions and prime ministerial instructions existed 
on the subject (MTAD/DCP and UNDP, 2006; MTAD /DCP, 2007). Although the policies 
and programs has been revised and modified since 1967, the several ordinances and acts do 
not provide a framework which shows a clear linkage between disaster mitigation and 
development planning in the country. The several modified policies and laws on disaster 
risks are masked within the general regulation on CP in Cameroon and are not very 
explicit. The various legislations on DM are shown in Appendix 11. The legislation need to 
be updated to clearly identify and isolate the rising risks from natural hazards and their 
potentially devastating consequences. The findings from this research could help inform 
plans to perform a legislative review in the design of a new natural hazard mitigation 
policy. Such a policy could provide the regulatory structure for linking all the existing 
policies and programs that are relevant for vulnerability reduction and development 
planning.  
Box 5.1: DIFFERENT RISKS AND DISASTERS IN CAMEROON FROM 1980-2000 
 
 3 gas disasters: Two gas emissions from crater Lakes-Lake Monoum (1984), Lake 
Nyos (1986) and industrial gas accident-Nsimalen (1996) 
 3 volcanic eruptions: Mount Cameroon (1982, March/April 1999 and May 2000) 
 16 tornadoes/storms/thunder strikes in South, Far North, Adamawa and North 
provinces.  
 7 major floods: Kribi (1998), Lagdo, Maga (1998), Far North (Diamare, 1996, 1998, 
1999) and Limbe (2001) 
 9 major landslides: South West (Bafaka Balue, 1997), Centre (Yaounde, 1998)  
 20 fire disasters: Nsam (1998), Bafoussam market (1999), Mokolo (1998), Limbe 
market (2000), Sangmelima market (1998), Essos market, military headquarters 
ammunition depot (2001) 
 5 armed conflicts and acts of vandalism: Boyo (1998), Kotoko-Arab Choas (1993), 
Meiganga, Bakassi, East, Moloundu (1997). 
 3 cases of destruction by elephants: Far North (Diamare, 1996, 1998 and 1999) 
 7 epidemics: cholera (North and Far North, 1996, 1998; 1999);  Meningitis (Far North, 
1998-695 cases); Red diarrhea (East, 1997; Messock, 1998 and Mbalmayo, 1999) 
 More than 1000 total road accidents per year 
 3 plane crashes  
 Famine/Drought/Locust invasion: Far North 1998-1999 with loss of 140 tons of cereals 
per year.  
Source: Adapted from document on civil protection in Cameroon (www.onr.cm) 
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5.4 INSTITUTIONS ENGAGED IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
Government policy on DM in Cameroon published by the DCP in the MTAD recognises a 
multi-agency effort in DRR. However, not all government agencies and NGOs involved in 
DM are mentioned and their roles are not defined. The agencies that collaborate with the 
DCP include government ministries, municipalities, the civil society and NGOs. At the 
national level, there is no evidence of a strong horizontal integration and collaboration 
between ministries. Linkages between all agencies involved in DM need to be fostered and 
strengthened.  
 
5.4.1 GOVERNMENT SECTOR 
Department of Civil Protection 
The DCP in the MTAD is the nodal agency responsible for coordinating and managing 
disaster activities in Cameroon.  The influence of the DCP covers the entire territory and 
its actions also cover all the main aspects of DRR including prevention, mitigation, 
response and rehabilitation for natural and human induced disasters. Decree N°2004/320 of 
8 December 2004 concerning the organization of the Government placed CP as the second 
most important function of MTAD (MTAD/DCP, 2006) including territorial administration 
and decentralization. Decree N° 2005/104 of 13 April 2005 on the organization of this 
ministerial department, gave the DCP the responsibility to organize and coordinate CP 
activities throughout the country. This department has an annual plan of action in which 
they set activities and targets for preceding years and work towards realising them. 
Important features of these annual programs are risk prevention activities; training and 
education programs and the production of an annual report on the state of CP in Cameroon 
(MTAD/DCP, 2005). As revealed in Section 5.6, these activities have limited successes 
and impact on DM in the country.  
In 2002, the DCP commenced a yearly publication of the state of CP in Cameroon 
in French with title “Rapport sur L’etat de la protection civile au Cameroon” with 
different themes on varied aspects of natural, human-induced and technological hazards 
and disasters that affect the country. The reason is to regularly update disaster managers on 
the state of CP and on government action regarding the mitigation of hazards/disasters. 
Five editions (2002, 2003/2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007/2008 editions) of this publication 
have been produced with different themes. The most recent publication is the 2007/2008 
edition with the theme “Securiser le milier professionnel” translated as “Security at Work”. 
This fifth 2007/2008 edition focuses on risk and security at work and has four main 
sections with 24 chapters and 305 pages.  It highlights government assistance to victims of 
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diverse catastrophes in the country such as floods, accidents and ethnic conflicts. It also 
gives an account of government strategy in tackling natural and technological hazards and 
civil conflicts within the national territory. Since the booklet addresses all issues about CP, 
topical matters concerning natural hazards and disaster risks are not properly addressed.   
During the fieldwork, the researcher was given a copy of the 2005 and 2006 
editions by a senior administrator in the DCP.  The most recent edition was also obtained 
by the researcher from the Director of CP in Cameroon during the August 2008 
International Disaster and Risk Conference in Davos Switzerland. It is interesting to note 
that though the Cameroonian delegation brought copies of this to show to the international 
community, those who are really in need of the documents in Cameroon have never seen 
them as mentioned in section 5.3.3. Field observations and empirical information shows 
that most government and non-government institutions, expected to cooperate with the 
DCP in DRM do not have the booklets. The main responsibilities of the DCP are described 
in Box 5.2.  However, field evidence as revealed in Section 5.6 and the management of the 
LNM disasters (analysed in the next Chapter) indicates that these responsibilities are not  
 
always translated into the desired actions. Government policy and documents produced by 
the DCP shows an organisation chart of the DCP, the organs that facilitate DM in 
Cameroon at the national level and the various agencies that work with the DCP in 
mitigating disaster risks in Cameroon (see Appendix 12). These organisational chats as 
presented by the government are not explicit. They do not explain the relationship and 
linkages between the various agencies involved in DM in the country. A summary of all 
BOX 5.2: MAIN RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL 
PROTECTION 
 General organisation of civil protection in the whole country 
 Initiate cooperation between national and international organisations on civil 
      protection issues 
 Coordinating all the institutional structures concern with Civil Protection 
  Develop studies and research on civil protection issues in times of war and of peace in 
partnership with relevant organisations 
 Training and capacity building of all personnel involved in Civil Protection with the 
partnership of the Human Resources Department 
 Control of transfer of corpses 
 The assessment of requests for compensation and financial assistance made by disaster 
      victims 
 Control of financial and material aid meant for disaster victims 
 Coordinate disaster relief and rescue operations 
 Coordinate the deployment of back-up and auxiliary services 
 Coordinate  logistic operations  
Source: Adapted from Nana (2005) and MTAD/DCP (2005) 
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the local, national and international organisations and bodies that cooperate and are 
coordinated by the DCP are shown in Box 5.3. 
 
According to MTAD/DCP (2005) the government requires an estimated annual budget of 
46.7 billion CFA francs (£467 million) to deal with the problems of CP in the country. This 
amount is to be divided between the different ministerial departments concerned with CP.   
Because of lack of financial resources, this estimate cannot be met. The budget of the DCP 
is about 500 million CFA francs (£500,000) annually and is used for interventions during 
disasters, relief operations and for its functioning. Compared to the estimated amount of 
46.7 billion CFA francs required to carry out this responsibility, the amount available for 
the DCP is very small (MTAD/DCP, 2005).  
 
Government Ministries 
Although public protection and disaster reduction and management is solely under the 
jurisdiction of the DCP, the functions of other ministries that play a supportive role are not 
very explicit in legislation guiding CP that is produced by MTAD. All the ministries 
involved include: 
 The MTAD that is responsible for coordinating DM activities in the country. 
 The Ministry of Scientific and Technical Research that is responsible for carrying out 
scientific research on natural hazards in the country through the NIGMR and the NIC  
 The Ministry of Town Planning and Housing that is responsible for the implementation 
of town planning, land use regulations and building codes.  
Box 5.3: LOCAL, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANS AND BODIES 
THAT COOPERATE WITH THE DCP 
 
 National Civil Defence Council (NCDC)  
 National Risks Observatory (NRO) 
 National Disaster Prevention and Management Programme (NDPMP) 
 National Fires Service (NFS) 
 Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 
 National Institute of Geological and Mining Research (NIGMR) 
 National Institute of Cartography (NIC)  
 Cameroon Red Cross (CRC) 
 Local representative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
 Local representative of the International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) 
 Local representative of the United Nations High commission of Refugees 
(UNHCR) 
 Local representative of the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
 Local representative of the United Nations Cultural and Education Foundation 
(UNICEF), UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, and ICRC  
Source: Author 
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 The Ministry of Defense that is called in emergency situations to provide forces and the 
necessary logistics for search and rescue operations. 
 The Ministry of Public Health, through the EMS that is responsible for providing 
medical assistance to disaster victims in the case of any emergency. 
 The Ministry of Transport, that takes charge of implementing safety measures in the 
various transportation sectors in the country. 
 The Ministry of Social Affairs that is responsible for reintegrating and the 
rehabilitation of disaster victims. 
 The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, which has a telecommunication 
service that is responsible for ensuring that telecommunication resources are available 
for disaster prevention and mitigation. 
 
Local Government 
Local councils and municipalities have the responsibility to improve the living conditions 
of the people in their locality.  Although councils are important players in DM within the 
local areas, their specific role in carrying out this function is not mentioned in government 
legislation. Councils are the smallest local authorities within the Divisions and Sub-
Divisions of the country and are divided into City Councils9 and Divisional councils. 
While Government Delegates (appointed by the government) and elected Mayors are the 
head of City councils, only Mayors control the Divisional Councils.  The main missions of 
the councils as specified in the law10 relating to their functions include the improvement of 
the living conditions of its inhabitants and promoting local development. In performing 
these key roles they have the right to request assistance from the population, civil society 
organizations, other local and regional authorities, the State and international partners. The 
powers devolved to councils to carry out their social welfare functions gives them the right 
to participate in upkeep and management, where necessary, of social advancement and 
reintegration centers and also in organizing and coordinating relief operations for needy 
persons. Though given these responsibilities, many councils are constrained by the DM 
power structure and limited resources (see Section 5.5.2). Some affected municipalities 
play key roles in DM especially in assisting their local affected populations. The Wum 
Divisional Council has faced serious challenges with the LND victims, many of whom 
were resettled in camps within the council’s jurisdiction. According to a local 
                                                 
9
 Certain urban centers, because of their special nature, may be granted a special status, to have City 
Councils. 
10
 Sections 1-8 under general provisions in Law No 2004/018 of July 22, 2004 that lay down rules applicable 
to councils 
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administrator, “the council has been providing the Ukpwa resettlement camp survivors of 
the Lake Nyos disaster with financial and material assistance, with minimal external help” 
(D01CMV) 
 
5.4.2 NON-GOVERNMENT SECTOR  
 Civil society actors including volunteers, community-based organizations, the scientific 
community and the private sector, are vital stakeholders in supporting the implementation 
of DRR at all levels (WCDR, 2005). The government recognizes that CP is a shared 
responsibility between the various government departments; the local governments or 
municipalities; the media; the general population; NGOs and humanitarian organizations 
that complement government action in vulnerable communities. However, how this 
responsibility is shared, and the level and/or degree of linkages and interaction between 
these different agencies is not mentioned in government policy. Government policy also 
requests civilians and citizens including parliamentarians, mayors, traditional chiefs and 
civil society leaders to support the action for CP in all its dimensions (MTAD/DCP 2005). 
But how the government intends to facilitate this process is not also mentioned in 
government legislation. Empirical information revealed later in this Chapter shows that the 
DM process is politicised with huge implications for disaster victims and also that some 
mayors take personal initiatives to assist disaster victims with limited assistance from the 
government (see interview D01CMV in previous Section). The different non-government 
bodies and their role in DM are further explored.  
 
National NGOs and Development Agencies 
Not all the National NGOs and development agencies involved in DM in Cameroon are 
recognized in government policy or documents as major players in the DM field of the 
country. However, these NGOs have a small resource base to perform their routine 
functions in post-disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.  
Although only the CRC is recognized within the operational structure in DM (see 
Appendix 12), other national development agencies such as Plan International and 
Helvetas have been providing humanitarian assistance especially to disaster victims in 
different parts of the country. The Red Cross played a significant role in assisting victims 
of the August 2000 floods in Douala and the floods and landslides that hit Magha in 
August 2003, both of which resulted in loss of property, life and displacement of  hundreds 
of people (IFRC, 2001b; Par Bleu, 2004). Both Helvetas and Plan International have been 
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involved in helping the displaced victims of the LND presently residing in resettlement 
camps.  
   
Local NGOs 
Local11 NGOs are also important players in the DM field in Cameroon.  Local NGOs like 
the Movement for Democracy, Development and Transparency (MDDT), Research and 
Development Association (RDA) and the Global Centre for Compliance, Hazard and 
Disaster Management (GLOCECOHADIM) are engaged in lobbying, advocacy and 
disaster mitigation actions. Mrs. Tadzong Esther Mofor founder of GLOCECOHADIM 
was the Laureate of the 2003 UN Sasakawa Award for disaster reduction. Apart from 
providing support to victims of technological accidents in the country like the NSAM 
petroleum fire disaster in Yaounde, her NGO has also provided disaster reduction services 
and support to local communities in the North-West Province of Cameroon.  
 
Research 
The research community has not been indifferent to the risk and vulnerability situation of 
the country to natural hazards and has been engaged in research, which has led to the 
publication of many articles. Some include Dumort (1968); Hedberg (1968)  Nni (1984); 
Freeth and Kay (1987); Kling (1987); Sigurdsson (1987); Zogning (1988); Lambi (1989, 
1991); Fairhead and Green, (1989); Kusakabe (1989); Sigvaldason (1989); Freeth et al. 
(1990); Binks and Fairhead (1992); Neba, (1999); Coulon et al. (1996); Deruelle et al. 
(2000); Suh et al. (2003); Ayonghe et al. (1999, 2004); Zogning et al. (2007). The majority 
of these publications are in the physical and natural sciences, dominated by extensive 
publication on the technical aspects of landslides, volcanic eruptions and the physical state 
and chemistry of LNM. Most of the research publications have been produced by 
academics and scientists in the NIGMR, which is under the Ministry of Scientific and 
Technical Research. Their findings provide policy makers with key information that is 
supposed to guide decision making in DRR. While considerable scientific academic work 
has been done on natural disasters, social and anthropological research is still lagging 
behind, with very sparse information on these aspects in relation to natural hazards in the 
country.  
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 The local NGOs are formed by Cameroonians and mostly involved in community development programs.  
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Social Groups 
Many civil society groupings have been formed by members of local communities that 
have been affected by disasters. In the North West Province, the Mr. Bamenda 
Organisation (MBO) and the Buabua-Kimbi Lake Nyos Cultural and Development 
Association (BUKILSDA) were formed to highlight the plight of the LND victims. The 
MBO have been working with BUKILSDA in recent years to help articulate the problems 
of the LND victims to the government and international community. From March to 
August, 2007, these social groups, together with local NGOs like MDDT and RDA, 
embarked on a crusade to collect 5,000 signatures to be used to petition the government 
over the neglect of the Lake Nyos (LN) survivors. They also took an unprecedented action 
to lobby parliamentarians to reject the 2008 budget if some allocation was not made for 
investments in the LN resettlement camps. They also urged the mayors of Boyo and 
Menchum division where the resettlement camps are located to devote part of their budgets 
to helping disaster victims and other development projects in the resettlement camps. 
These actions are meant to continuously highlight the plight of disaster victims and to force 
the government to implement decisions taken to assist victims, which are not often 
respected. Interviews with some members of affected populations suggest that the social 
groups understand the problems of the affected populations more than anyone else, and can 
play a very key role in the DM process to properly articulate the problems of the victims 
and suggest priority areas for assistance. Community experiences from hazard prone areas 
around the world have demonstrated that community-based organisations are key actors in 
disaster reduction. Their efforts have improved development outcomes and increased the 
capacities of high-risk communities to cope with disasters (UN-ISDR, 2007).  
 
5.4.3 PARTNERSHIPS 
Ratification of multi-lateral agreements means commitment on the part of the Cameroon 
government to undertake DM projects. The government can also benefit from financial and 
technical resource assistance from international agencies and other countries.  
 
International Development Organisations  
The key International Development Organisations (IDOs) involved in DM in Cameroon 
are UNDP, UNICEF, and WHO. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) plays 
a crucial role in influencing DM in the country through education, awareness, training and 
provision of technical expertise through various ways. In its website, the UNDP has 
published a document on the State of CP in Cameroon that is updated regularly.  For the 
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years 1997-2002, the UNDP embarked on a project in Cameron on ‘Natural Disaster 
Management and Prevention’ in partnership with other agencies.  The main aim of the 
project was to reinforce the managerial, material and infrastructure capacities of the 
Government for the management and prevention of catastrophes. According to UNDP 
(2003), major achievements include: successful training activities, greater awareness and 
sensitization of disaster reduction, emergency relief for victims of floods and volcanoes 
and the elaboration of a UN Inter-agency contingency plan.   
Proposed activities for the years 2003-2007 were to organise and coordinate 
response to emergency situations as indicated in the contingency plan prepared by the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) experts. 
This includes a preventive approach oriented towards the reinforcement of national 
capacities for the prevention of disasters and its integration into development processes. 
The plan was also to implement a sub-regional dimension of catastrophes and crisis 
management oriented towards the identification of ways and means to create a cooperation 
mechanism for Central African countries with the support of UNDP, other UN agencies 
and development partners. Part of the plan is also to create a fiduciary fund aimed at 
mobilizing emergency humanitarian intervention funds from various development partners 
and those of the UN system (UNDP, 2003).   
Through its local office in Yaounde, the UNDP regularly liaises with the relevant 
government departments to organize workshops and seminars on DRR and management in 
Cameroon.  The UNDP organised a series of workshops that laid the foundation for the 
creation of a National Observatory for Disaster Risk Prevention in the DCP in 2003. In 
September 2005 a team from the United Nations Environment Program/Office for the co-
ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNEP/OCHA) together with local Cameroon 
scientists visited Lake Nyos to assess the natural dam and potential flood hazard at the lake 
(Kling et al; 2006).  Although a complete assessment of the success of this program is yet 
to be made, there is no doubt that the UNDP is a major player in the DM landscape of 
Cameroon with a central role that involves the government and other international 
development agencies.  
 
International Organization of Civil Protection  
Government policy documents mention that the government has an excellent relationship 
with the International Organisation of Civil Protection (IOCP). Under the auspices of the 
IOCP, the government ratified the convention on the subject of assistance and CP matters 
in Mali in 2002. Cameroon regularly joints the other member states of the IOCP in the 
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annual celebration of the International day of CP.  The IOCP has given technical support to 
Cameroon through the realization of the National Program for the Prevention and 
Management of Risks in Douala in 2001 and the general forum on Mount Cameroon in 
Yaounde in 2001.  Two pending projects that require the assistance of the IOCP include 
the finalization of a document on the creation of a Sub-Regional Centre for CP in 
Cameroon and development of an Urgent Intervention Plan (Nana, 2005; MTAD/DCP, 
2005).  
 
Bilateral Cooperation  
The government also engages in international cooperation involving other countries for 
financial assistance and technical support in risk reduction and DM. Substantial financial, 
material and technical support was received from the international community during the 
catastrophic 1986 LND and external support is still being provided by several countries to 
the ongoing post-disaster technical mitigation activities in the lake. The NMDP that was 
initiated by the Cameroonian Government have been financially supported by USA 
(through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance), France and Japan. Technical support 
for this project, through the provision of human resources and scientific materials, has also 
come from Germany, France, Japan and Belgium (Kling et al., 2006).   
Government policy elaborates on the relationship or partnership that Cameroon has 
with France on the subject of CP. France, through her cultural action and cooperation 
service has signed a convention with the Cameroonian Government in several sectors for 
the provision of material assistance in CP worth 1.5 billion CFA francs. The main 
objectives fall within the areas of reinforcing CP, better enhancing the prevention of 
natural hazards and facilitating the management of disasters or crises (MTAD/DCP, 2005).   
 
5.5 ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK AND POWER STRUCTURE 
5.5.1 ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
The administrative framework of DM in Cameroon is interwoven with the governance 
structure of the country. It can be grouped into three levels: the national, 
provincial/regional and local levels. The three levels have institutions that function under 
the auspices of MTAD to coordinate DM activities at the various levels. At the national 
level, there is the DCP in MTAD. MTAD is represented at the regional level by ten 
provinces12 governed by Governors13. At the local level, each province is divided into 
                                                 
12
 The ten Provinces of Cameron are Centre, South, Littoral, North-West, South-West, West, Adamaoua, 
North, Far-North and East Provinces. 
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divisions headed by Senior Divisional Officers14 (SDOs) and the divisions are further 
divided into sub-divisions. Each sub-division is divided into districts placed under the 
authority of a District Head. The basic administrative units (subdivisions and districts) 
have Local Government Councils15, which also play a crucial role in DM as mentioned 
earlier. Altogether, MTAD is represented by 58 divisions and a network of 385 
administrative structures responsible especially for implementing disaster emergency 
response and relief operations in the country.  
One of the constraints or limitations identified is the absence of a separate 
coordination body or organisational framework that provides the administrative structure 
for a natural hazard mitigation policy. This means that DM decisions, especially during the 
crises phases immediately following disasters are made by 
presidential/ministerial/provincial decrees causing agencies to offer duplicate services. 
This was the case with the management of the LNM gas disasters explained in the next 
Chapter. The absence of a coordinating body also implies that there is no designated 
agency to guide and coordinate activities, or monitor the quality of post disaster services in 
the short and long term. This contributed to the dire socio-economic problems faced by the 
LND survivors examined in Chapter Six.  
 
5.5.2 POWER STRUCTURE 
The administration of DM in Cameroon involves a network of different administrative and 
institutional structures following a hierarchical top-down power structure. This framework 
is similar to the management of other state affairs and the intention is to decentralise its 
management in accordance with Article 1 (2) of the Constitution, which states that the 
Republic of Cameroon shall be a decentralized unitary State. The law16 on 
decentralization17 and deconcentration18 of powers is applied under MTAD that is 
responsible for managing and coordination DM activities in Cameroon.  
                                                                                                                                                    
13
 Each province is placed under the authority of a governor who resides in the headquarters of the province. 
He represents the Head of State in the province and is the custodian of State authority therein. He is the 
representative of both the Government and each minister. In this capacity, therefore, he represents the State 
in all civil and legal matters. The Governor is responsible for the enforcement of laws and ensures law and 
order by applying the laws and regulations in force 
14
 The division is managed by a senior divisional officer placed under the direct hierarchical authority of the 
governor of the province. He is custodian of State authority within his administrative unit and represents the 
government and each minister. He is responsible for ensuring that the laws and regulations are enforced and 
sees to it that all government initiatives aimed at fostering development in the division are implemented. 
15
 Cameroon currently has a total of 339 councils of all types, including the two city councils (communautés 
urbaines) of the two main cities Douala and Yaoundé. 
16
 Law n° 2004/017 of 22 July 2004 on the orientation of decentralization 
17
 Various means of more widely distributing decision-making to bring it closer to the point of service or 
action or transfer of power and authority from the central government to the local levels, e.g. Regional and 
local councils 
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Government policy and administrative structure for DM represents a process where 
power is disseminated from a central administration to a network of hierarchical structures 
passing down through provincial governors to local authorities. The legal framework is 
explicit about the power structures regarding policy in DM at the highest level, with the 
President of the Republic having the right to make policies relating to DRM.  This is 
closely followed by the National Council for CP that can also define policies which are 
intended for endorsement by the president, in most cases through a presidential decree. The 
MTAD through its DCP is responsible for implementing the policies. This is all over the 
country through the ten provincial governors offices. The provincial governors are the 
main administrative heads of their provinces. Next in line from the provinces are the 
administrators of the divisions and sub-divisions within the provinces. At the lowest level 
are the government delegates and mayors of councils within the divisions.  This structure 
implies that key DM decisions or policies can be taken at the higher levels and enforced at 
the lower levels progressively. However, during emergency situations, a crisis committee 
can be initiated at the divisional and provincial level to handle the situation pending further 
instructions from above. As will be shown in later sections of this Chapter (See interview 
D20VPR in section 5.6.4), the ability to take DM initiatives at the local levels with limited 
resources (financial and material) has a huge impact on disaster victims. This is more 
serious in situations where they have to wait for a very long time for resources to come 
from the provincial and national levels.   
 
5.5.3 THE MAIN ACTORS IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT  
The main players in the DM field in Cameroon are civil servants and politicians; most of 
whom are local government administrators trained at Cameroon’s National School of 
Administration and Magistracy with the French acronym “Ecole National D’administration 
et Magistracy” (ENAM) in Yaounde. This school trains most of Cameroon’s 
administrators at the divisional, provincial and national levels who amongst other 
administrative functions also act as disaster managers.  These administrators, who are 
called Governors, Senior Divisional Officers (SDOs) and Divisional Officers (DO), govern 
the provinces, divisions and sub-divisions respectively. At the tail of this structure are 
Government Delegates (GD) and Mayors in the councils. This implies that there are at 
least 454 key government personalities concerned with DM in the whole country. 
                                                                                                                                                    
18
 Transfer of central administration powers to its representatives in the different local areas. Delegation of 
powers by the central authority to the local authority (delegation of power is by the president of the Republic 
to Governors and Senior Divisional Officers via Ministers). 
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It is worth noting that the Ministers, Governors, SDOs, DOs and GD are all civil 
servants appointed by a presidential decree and they function as government administrators 
in their areas of jurisdiction with DM being one of the issues they have to tackle. Mayors 
are democratically elected. During the fieldwork, the researcher noted that the appointed 
officials were very protective of the government when discussing DM issues while the 
elected mayors seemed to give a more candid and frank perception of DM in the country. 
Interviews with disaster survivors, as revealed later, seem to suggest that government 
administrators politicise DM especially during election campaigns. Squabbles between 
opposition parties and the government have arisen in recent years about the role of GDs in 
opposition controlled councils as their functions seem to be complementary with that of the 
mayors. How these disaster managers obtain their power certainly impacts on DM and 
other activities of the councils as discovered during fieldwork in those areas. 
Apart from the government trained and appointed administrators, the other 
important group of persons whose impact in DM is also significant are academics, 
researchers and scientists. The academics work mainly in the Universities and some serve 
as advisers to some ministers and directors on DM issues. Researchers in research 
institutes within the Ministry of Scientific and Technical Research are also instrumental in 
influencing the direction of DM activities in Cameroon.  This is very true of the NIGMR, 
which is the leading institute concerned with research on natural hazards in the country.  
Many of the scientists in this institute have been involved in technical research on the 
LNM gas disasters and also in international scientific teams monitoring the gas in both 
lakes, as discussed in the next Chapter. Their advice to senior government officials has had 
a serious impact on the overall technical DM approach that the government has been 
adopting for the management of the LNM gas disasters.  
 
5.6 CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
Empirical research through interviews was conducted with civil servants with DM 
responsibilities, scientists and academics researching on natural disaster risks who 
influence government policies directly or indirectly and politicians from opposition parties 
who also have DM responsibilities.  They are hereafter referred to as “Disaster Managers” 
though they are a mixed bunch with varying levels of DM activism. These disaster 
managers were interviewed to get their perspectives on different issues concerning natural 
hazards/disasters and DM in the country.   
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5.6.1 AWARENESS OF GOVERNMENT LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON 
DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
Most disaster managers interviewed are aware of the existence of government laws or 
regulations relating to DM in the country (88 percent) though very few possess in-depth 
knowledge of the content of the laws or regulations and how they should be enforced.   
Most have only superficial knowledge of the regulations and expressed lack of more 
detailed information regarding the application and enforcement of the laws even in their 
own sectors.  Many responses on the subject were limited to statements liked: 
 “Yes I know that the government has policies relating to hazard 
management in Cameroon” (DO1LDM) or “I know Legislation exist 
about hazards” (D02LDM).  
 
When probed further, many could not give any further details of the policies or the relevant 
aspects to which the laws refer. The few who gave more information simply said the 
legislation gives guidance to DM or is a document that seeks to guide DM in the country.  
Though five editions of the report on the state of CP in Cameroon have been 
produced by the DCP between 2002 and 2008 and aimed to regularly update and inform 
disaster managers and the society on the state of CP in the country, empirical research 
indicates that many Disaster Managers still do not know of their existence. Only 23 percent 
of those interviewed know of this publication and are all working in government ministries 
in Yaounde.  The disaster managers within the provinces and divisions do not know of this 
document. Research results also show that the few who knew of this document do not  
have a good knowledge of its purpose nor the contents, since a majority lack copies of the 
documents that are supposed to be given free of charge to all the ministries involved in 
DM. Further interviews with disaster managers at the local levels confirm that most lack 
DM reference materials. When involved in these activities, these managers take and follow 
instructions and directions from above without any guidelines on which to function or base 
their activities. This certainly has implications for the effectiveness of DM activities since 
they do not possess any working documents or have guidelines on which to operate.  Part 
of the reason is that most of these disaster managers are government administrators whose 
responsibilities are very wide ranging and not restricted to DM alone.  Secondly many do 
not place DM as a priority in their numerous administrative functions.  
 
5.6.2 ASSESSMENT OF CAMEROON’S HAZARD MITIGATION PROGRAM 
Since DM is just one of the many issues that the government administrators are involved 
in, their perspective on the issue was sought during the research process.  The respondents 
used words like poor, fair and good to express their opinion on the success of DM in the 
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country. Most of the disaster managers attached to government ministries stated that the 
program is a success, while a majority of the others rated the program between fair-poor. 
However, some (35 percent) said the program is improving and needs more financial, 
human and material resources with even more government commitment for further 
improvements.  
Those who presented a more objective view thought the program is not working 
well. This set of disaster managers who do not have very strong ties with the government 
administration and are mainly academics and mayors of opposition-controlled councils, 
attributed the lack of implementation of government policies on DM as major constraints 
in the process. The poor enforcement of legislation on DM, shortage of skilled and trained 
personnel in DM and the shortage of adequate financial and material resources were also 
mentioned as some key constraints on the effective functioning of DM in the country. One 
respondent said: 
 
“One problem is that many people given the responsibility to manage 
these programs are not professionals and simply do what they are told by 
their superiors. Since these people cannot take initiative, their job cannot 
be done properly. In many instances, financial and material resources 
disbursed to assist victims are not always sufficient and it is very difficult 
to communicate such concerns to higher authorities” (D04AHM). 
 
Another interviewee gave the example of landslide-prone areas in the country where 
people were and are still living on the slopes in risky areas without land and building 
permits, and nothing is being done to protect them or reduce the risk. This respondent 
(D20AHM) said: 
“The Government is more reactive than proactive to mitigate the risk of 
life lost and damage to property in these areas and only waits for a 
disaster to happen before they rush in to assist”  
 
Other managers also confirmed that the entire DM process in the country is more reactive 
than proactive and believe this is one area that warrants urgent attention.  
 
5.6.3 CAMEROON’S NATURAL HAZARD RISK ASSESSMENT 
Most disaster managers rate the risk to natural hazard in Cameroon as moderate and high, 
with 65 percent having the belief that the risk is high. During the interview process, 
respondents were told to indicate from a scale of low, moderate, high and very high where 
they would place the country’s risk to natural hazards.  It was noticed that the basis of their 
assessment is informed mostly by their knowledge of the geology of Cameroon and recent 
geophysical, geological and geomorphologically induced hazards that have affected the 
country. While most scientists used their technical knowledge (on the geology and tectonic 
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setting of Cameroon) to support their reasoning, the politicians and administrators mostly 
used examples of past and frequent occurrences of hazards such as landslides, the toxic gas 
emissions from crater lakes and volcanic eruptions as their main argument. Many responses 
were similar to this one:  
“...... As a geologist yourself you know why the risk is high. The frequent 
volcanic eruptions, the gas explosions form the lakes and the frequent 
landslides show that this country is at great risk to hazards....” 
(D06HRA) 
 
Disaster manager’s perceptions of the level of natural hazard risk in the country are 
significant in the research because it can be expected to influence their level of disaster 
preparedness and contingency planning for future hazards.  This is examined in the next 
Section. 
 
5.6.4 CAMEROON’S VULNERABILITY PREPAREDNESS AND RESILIENCE 
Many disaster managers think the country is making enough progress in tackling the risk 
posed by gas emissions from crater lakes and volcanic eruption though the country is not 
yet adequately prepared to tackle the high risk of natural hazards as a whole. The 
researcher noted that respondents’ attitudes and responses to questions on this issue varied 
depending on their portfolios, positions, responsibilities and the sectors they worked in. 
Most disaster managers within the government sector were reluctant to engage in 
discussions on this issue and the few  did seemed to be protective of government actions on 
preventive measures to reduce the impact of natural hazards in the country, though no clear 
evidence was advanced for this.   
Most disaster managers feel that Cameroon is well prepared to tackle the physical or 
technical risks posed by some crater lakes in the country. A majority referred to the NMDP 
as a major success in mitigating the risk of poisonous gases in both lakes (see Section 
6.4.3). They also mentioned that a risk assessment for the gas contents of the many other 
crater lakes on the CVL will be carried out though no detail on this was provided (see Page 
135 in Section 6.3.1). Others said the government is also taking measures to monitor the 
volcanic activity of Mt Cameroon by providing more scientific equipments such as 
seismographs in the Geology Research Institute in the South West Province at the foot of 
Mount Cameroon. One response which mentions these issues says:  
“I think the country is making progress towards achieving a higher level 
of vulnerability preparedness. The de-gassing project in Lake Nyos will 
soon be over and the area will be safe. We have plans to de-gas other 
lakes in the country, which are also dangerous.  The government is also 
spending much money to buy scientific equipments for use in monitoring 
Mt. Cameroon, which as you know is very active” (D07VPR).   
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Similar management strategies for natural hazards, technological and human-induced 
hazards within the policy of DCP are another major reason for the continuous problems 
posed by these hazards to the country. Some key players in DM feel that more human, 
financial and material attention should be deployed for proactive measures in natural 
hazard mitigation because, though not as frequent as other catastrophes like road accidents, 
their impact often cause greater death tolls and damage to property. Inadequate financial 
resources and insufficient scientific instruments and other materials to monitor hazards all 
over the country is another main constraint to the process that some respondents 
highlighted.  
Another limitation to natural hazard preparedness that some influential personalities 
in DM pointed out was the non-existence of a Natural Disaster Management Plan for the 
country. This plan they said would prioritise hazards within the different sectors of the 
country and outline a plan of action to deal with them.  Without this plan, there is no clear 
and consistent pattern or method in pre-hazard/disaster planning, and government action 
remains limited to post-disaster relief and rehabilitation efforts, which are often fraught 
with confusion and corruption. A senior government official responded that: 
“------I think the country is well prepared to tackle other hazards like 
road and fire accidents than natural hazards. This is because CP in 
Cameroon does not have very detailed plans for natural hazard 
mitigation. Part of the reason is that it is very difficult and costly to do 
natural hazards assessment. It is even more difficult to prevent them. 
However, the National Institute of Geological and Mining Research will 
soon provide a more comprehensive plan for natural hazard mitigation 
in the country soon” (D01VPR). 
 
On an arbitrary scale of vulnerability preparedness discussed during interview processes 
that ranges across low, moderate, high and very high, many disaster managers without 
government administrative functions classified disasters or vulnerability  preparedness in 
the country as low while those who hold government positions at the local, provincial and 
national levels graded the preparedness level as high.  However, irrespective of the sector, 
most think that continuous progress is being made to improve on the government’s 
monitoring and mitigation of the various risks facing the country including the 
technological, human-induced and natural hazards.  
Though the disaster managers are keen to reveal efforts being made in reducing the 
gas risk at LNM, some acknowledge that many problems exist within the administrative 
process that hinder decision making and application of preventive disaster measures.  
Though denied by the government administrators who double as disaster managers, other 
key stakeholders in DM think that the complex administrative and power structure in the 
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country is partly to blame for the ineffective and slow implementation of DM issues.  A 
local disaster manager said: 
“This country cannot easily resolve problems caused by natural hazards 
because the DM process is not clear. ------the process of obtaining 
financial and material assistance is not clear. Many people and 
committees are involved and it is difficult to know who to contact. The 
result is that most of the money you hear over the radio that has been 
given to help victims are embezzled by those given the responsibility to 
manage disasters” (D20VPR). 
 
Some argue that the civil administrators who are empowered with taking key DM 
decisions at all levels do not have DM knowledge and, in many cases, use such 
opportunities for political purposes.  These respondents pointed out that in crises situation, 
the selections of crisis committees by civil administrators is often along party lines rather 
than prioritising competent human resources knowledgeable enough to handle the 
situation.  Many disaster managers said an administrative process that is highly politicised 
is an impediment to efficient DM and risk reduction in the country. 
 
5.6.5 THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
Government DM guidelines to the administrative authorities briefly outline main DM 
activities to be considered before, during and after a disaster. The three main areas 
highlighted for the pre-disaster periods are knowledge of the administrative units; 
understanding of risks; and knowledge of the means of actions. During the disaster phase, 
the key considerations mentioned include: basic laws on CP and relief plans; information 
management; the setting up of a Joint Crisis Committee by the governor or SDO; the 
setting up of a command posts; and implementation of the relief organisation plan. The 
post-disaster management focuses on two main administrative processes-the Joint Crises 
Committee evaluation meeting and general report on the management of the disaster 
(MTAD/DCP, 2008). During a disaster or crisis, key DM actions can be initiated at the 
national, provincial or local levels depending on the nature and magnitude of the natural 
hazard in the different administrative units of the country though key decision making 
follows a top-down hierarchical structure. When a disaster happens, the emergency 
response plan can be launched at the various levels by the competent authorities. Upon the 
receipt of reliable information concerning a potential disaster, the competent authorities 
can take the following measures without any particular order based on the intensity of the 
disaster:  
 Communicate the situation to higher authorities 
 Initiate emergency relief and humanitarian activities 
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 Inform the public through various communication means available 
 Alert or warn vulnerable populations if necessary 
 Appoint and convene a  crisis commission to manage the disaster 
If any of the competent regional or local authorities encounters a disaster that is beyond 
their capacity to handle immediately given the available means and resources at their 
disposal, they have to inform their immediate bosses including an appraisal of the situation 
and what steps if any have been taken to contain the situation.  Any major decisions that 
may involve huge relief operations, human, material and financial support will be taken by 
the higher authorities and then channeled downwards. Lower authorities will be 
responsible to implement them with supervision form the higher authorities. 
This administrative process for the pre-and post disaster phase is barely outlined and 
does not provide any details of what is actually required or expected during this process. 
Even the issues mentioned are very vague. For example guideline number B (mastery of 
risk types) under actions during the Pre-disaster phase just mentions that disaster prone 
zones should be recognised without showing those zones. The vagueness of this document 
complement responses by some disaster managers that the policy is not very explicit and 
needs to be simplified and top priority areas clarified. A scientist responded that:  
“I think Cameroon’s vulnerability preparedness will improve with time. 
More effort is being put to reduce vulnerability to hazards unlike before.  
Within the geology community, a lot is being done to delineate and map 
risk zones that will help the government to set priority areas for natural 
disaster mitigation and hopefully a better policy” (D06VPR). 
 
The administrative process is also very complicated with powers to perform similar 
functions given to different administrative authorities. This often lead to duplication of 
functions and confusion, constraining the management of relief and rescue operations as 
shown in the case of the management of the LNM disasters examined in the next Chapter.  
 
5.7 GENERAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGY 
In a document on the prevention of risks and DM in Cameroon presented at the World 
WCDR in Kobe Japan in 2005, the government outlined five main complementary 
strategies to tackle disasters and risk. These strategies, divided into the periods before, 
during and after hazards or disasters are that:  
 During the periods before a hazard or disaster; to “put in place a NRO”; to organise and 
establish a contingency plan designed to obtain, analyse and disperse information on 
the major risks with the aim of protecting the populations and minimising any disaster 
impacts on their lives and property. 
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 During a crisis, to “develop an emergency intervention plan” aimed at helping the 
affected populations and to monitor the disaster and assist victims.  
 After a disaster, to “inform the affected population and public about the risky zones 
and to produce a map of the various risks”; to guide against subsequent dangers and 
reinforce the preventive action of citizens. Rehabilitation measures are also put into 
action.  
 To create a national humanitarian fund for urgent intervention aimed at providing 
initial help in case of a disaster 
  The government and the UNDP aim to put in place an urgent operational plan and to 
organise a sub-regional conference on DM and prevention within the central African 
sub region (MTAD/DCP, 2005).  
The report also states that the government is taking measures to sensitize, inform and 
educate the population progressively on the basic regulations of CP, using a network of 
communication organs through the various media in the country. This campaign is usually 
undertaken during the World Day of CP on the 1st of March yearly and the International 
Day for the Prevention of Catastrophes on the 2nd Wednesday of October. However, the 
government acknowledges difficulties in engaging in these activities due to shortage of 
financial resources, the lack of a culture of prevention in the populations and insufficient 
interest on CP by the private sector. 
The limited influence that natural hazards seem to exert on shaping policies and 
development decisions is a major constraint to achieving sustainable development. Left 
unchecked, Cameroon will witness increases in socio-economic loss from natural hazards 
as population continue to grow in hazard risk zones in search for agrarian livelihoods. It 
should be noted that though government policy and a plan of action exists, these are not 
very explicit on relevant aspects of DM in the country. A huge gap still exists in translating 
these policies into action.  Many disaster managers believe this gap is caused by the lack of 
will on the part of the government to invest more on proactive risk reduction measures, the 
lack of adequate funds for DRR and DRM, and a complicated administrative DM process 
that is closely tied-up with other administrative processes and that is often politicized.  
 
5.8 SUMMARY  
The DM system of any country or organisation is the basis upon which its activities can be 
assessed through DM policies and plans are not often put into practice as this case study 
shows. This Chapter has examined the legislative, institutional, administrative and power 
structure of DM in Cameroon. It contributes to answering question one and also informs 
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DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL 
PROTECTION 
 Central Agency that co-
ordinates     disaster  
 management activities   in                  
Cameroon    
       
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS 
 International Development 
organisations such as  UNDP, UNICEF, 
WHO, UNHCR 
 Bilateral cooperation with countries like      
          France, USA and Japan etc 
 Membership of the International    
         Organisation of Civil Protection 
 
HUMANITARIAN 
ORGANISATIONS 
 Development organisations 
like  Plan International,  
Helvetas and Cameroon  
         Red Cross  
 Local NGOs and Social 
Groups 
NATIONAL ORGANS 
 National Disaster Prevention   
          and Management Program  
 National Institute of 
Geological    and Mining  
          Research 
 National Institute of  
Cartography 
 National Civil Defense 
Council 
 National Risk Observatory 
 Emergency Medical Services 
 National Fires Service 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 Local councils and  
       municipalities 
 Fondoms 
GOVERNMENT 
MINISTRIES 
 Ministry of Territorial Administration and         
         Decentralisation 
 Ministry of Scientific and Technical     
          Research 
 Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications 
 Ministry of  Town Planning and Housing 
 Ministry of Public  Health 
 Ministry of Social Affairs 
 Ministry of Transport 
 Ministry of Defence 
the subsequent Chapters whose enquiries have implications for the DM process in the 
country.  It has been shown that DM in Cameroon is under the auspices of the state, which 
has the responsibility of CP as enshrined in the constitution.  
The DCP in MTAD is the nodal agency of DM in Cameroon. It has three basic 
functions of coordinating all the other organs and bodies involved in CP, facilitating their 
activities and assist in their operations. At the national level, together with the DCP, other 
organs that play a central role in CP in the country are the NRO and the NCDC, which are 
under the auspices of the presidency of the republic. The other principal emergency and 
DM intervention agencies include other government ministries, research institutions, 
NGOs and international organizations, which work in collaboration with the DCP (See 
figure 5.1).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Summary of main institutions involved in DM in Cameroon. Source: Author  
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Some limitations exist in government policy on DM.  No clear idea on the DM 
process that involves the various institutions all over the country and how the legislation 
should be enforced is mentioned in government policy. Not all important stakeholders in 
DM are recognised in government policy. Local NGOs and the private sector are yet to be 
sufficiently recognised as important in the DM process. There are no comprehensive and 
explicit laws that show how the DM policy is applicable to institutions and the managerial 
process for the entire territory. There are no comprehensive strategies and programs and no 
coherent and coordinated needs analyses have been undertaken. Little or no attention is 
paid to potential hazards, particularly those faced by vulnerable communities, and what can 
be done to mitigate their impact. From the author’s experience of interacting with disaster 
victims, managers and others, it is apparent that the entire process is not understood by all 
involved and has not been properly implemented in past natural disasters involving 
displaced and resettled victims, as examined in the next Chapter.  
This empirical research has also revealed that disaster managers are not generally 
conversant with the laws and regulations on DM and many more are not regularly updated 
on the contemporary issues of CP since many do not have access to the annual publication 
of the state of CP in the country.  While most key government personal involved in DM 
think the process is successful, their peers hold a contrary view. The general opinion is that 
the country has a high risk from natural hazards. The general perception is that 
Cameroon’s preparedness to tackle these risks is still very low. However there is the 
general agreement that progress is being made in the area of DRR and DM.  
Although the DM framework in the country is still far from being robust, it 
provides the basic foundation for the process. The basic guidelines for the implementation 
of policies, strategies and programs for the three phases of DRM exist though their 
implementation is hampered by many factors discussed previously. A major challenge still 
lies in shifting from emergency response to wider risk reduction among key players and 
stakeholders, and to ensure that risk reduction remains a national and local priority. How 
this DM process has impacted on the management of the LNM Disasters is examined in 
the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MANAGEMENT OF THE NYOS AND MONOUM DISASTERS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter examines the management of the LNM disasters.  One of the objectives of 
this research is to investigate the process of risk management and disaster preparedness in 
the Nyos and Monoum areas following the disasters of 1986 and 1984. To achieve this, it 
is necessary to state the context of DM and DRR by looking back at how those disasters 
were and are still being managed.  The management of the crises caused by the LND has 
been examined in more detail because it generated enormous interest and attention 
worldwide due to the death toll, the thousands of people affected and the huge relief and 
rescue operations that were involved. Little attention was given to the LMD when it 
occurred, probably because the risk of the lake to a larger population was not known then.  
The threat that Lake Monoum posed to the people of Njindoum only came to light after the 
LND two years later, especially when the causes of death in both cases was established to 
be similar.  
The main purpose of this Chapter is to review the management of both disasters 
and especially how the DM process is impacting on the present risk and vulnerability in the 
area and the affected populations. It may not be possible to provide a very comprehensive 
account of the disasters because these happened more than two-decades ago.  
Contemporary DM issues are also examined in the long term management context 
of those disasters. The perspectives of the survivors, affected populations and key 
stakeholders in the DM process provide rich empirical information, which can be used to 
understand how the disasters are being managed. Therefore, the main aspects of the LNM 
DM, including the main actors, the managerial and the procedural or government 
machinery employed are examined over short and long term time scales. The case studies 
aim to provide an insight to DM in Cameroon, and identify lessons, which can be learnt to 
improve on the current situation. 
 
6.2 IMMEDIATE POST DISASTER MANAGEMENT   
Since the LND happened more than two decades ago, it is difficult to get detailed and 
complete information about the various processes, actions and stakeholders that were 
involved in the event. This is partly because no detailed accounts and records were kept of 
the DM process by those who were involved. Few journal articles or publications exist on 
the management of that disaster and most of the records that were kept in government 
departments cannot be found and/or are missing.  Part of the reason may be the lack of a 
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culture of record keeping. However, it is also possible that many of those involved in DM 
removed or destroyed the records for fear of being implicated in allegations of 
misappropriation of funds and other materials destined for the victims.  During the period 
following the LND, the Cameroon Tribune (the state owned press) produced detailed 
coverage of the disaster with valuable information on some crucial aspects of the DM 
process. This, together with other accounts of the immediate aftermath of the disaster in 
foreign press reports, articles and government commissioned reports, provides a reasonable 
basis to reconstruct what transpired.  
 
6.2.1.  ON THE NIGHT OF THE APOCALYPSE 
The LND occurred at 9 p.m on Thursday August 21st 1986, and the first news about the 
disaster to the outside world was 15 hours later.  According to the Cameroon Tribune of 
Wednesday August 27th 1986 (page 4):  
“Struggling survivors got to Wum, headquarters of the affected 
Menchum Division only on Friday August 22nd 1986 at about noon to 
report the tragedy.”  
 
 The delay in the news of the disaster was due to poor communication between Nyos 
village and Wum, which is the closest town. There is no telephone, radio or TV network in 
Nyos and the road that links Nyos and Wum is impassable except by 4-wheel drive 
vehicles. Therefore, bearers of the tragic news had to trek for 45 km to get to Wum, the 
biggest town in the Division. The disaster was highly unpredictable, sudden and 
unexpected to everyone in the country, including scientists, even though two years earlier a 
similar event at LM had killed 37 people in Njindoum village. Smolowe and Philips (1986) 
describe the event: 
“The only warning was a nocturnal rumble that resembled distant 
thunder. Then a silent plume of colorless gas shot up from the turbulent 
depths of Lake Nyos. Within minutes, the heavy fumes of carbon dioxide 
burst over the rim and sank into the valley below, enveloping sleepy 
hamlets in a deadly bubble. Villagers who had already bedded down for 
the night and others just finishing their evening meal quietly suffocated 
in their sleep”. 
 
Reports from the international conference on the LND, held in Yaounde (Cameroon) from 
16-20th  March 1987 shows that scientists were divided into two camps on the mechanism 
of the eruption and the release of the toxic gas. Two hypotheses, vulcanological19 and 
                                                 
19
 CO2  could have burst through the lake as the result of a sudden gas eruption 
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limnological20, were proposed and the latter was widely accepted within the scientific 
community as the mechanism responsible for the disaster (Sigdalvason, 1989). 
The impact of the LND in Cameroon, as reported by the government and many 
reports of the incident, concentrated mostly on the mortality and death of people and 
livestock. The effect on the local or national economy has never been highlighted although 
it is well known that the area affected was the main supplier of beef in North West 
Province of Cameroon and the death of almost all the cattle in Nyos had a serious effect on 
the local economy. Many livelihood activities depended on the supply of meat to 
Bamenda, the capital of North West Province.  Even though the impact of individual 
disasters on the national economy may not be easily quantifiable, they affect the local 
economy and their cumulative effects on the country’s economy can be tremendous. In 
Cameroon, just as in many developing countries, the economic impact of small-scale 
disasters on the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable communities, whose economy is largely 
in the informal or subsistence sectors, is rarely documented. This is an oversight because 
many of these vulnerable rural communities are the poorest, as is the case in Cameroon 
where the incidence of poverty in rural communities is 86.5 percent (Amin and Dubois, 
2001). The general lack of available information on the economic impact of natural 
disasters in Africa makes it difficult to get an accurate picture of the damage caused by 
natural disasters (CRED, 2007). 
 
Survivors Experiences about the Disaster’s Impact  
Information from interviews reveal that survivors of the LND complain that the death of 
relatives, and livestock (cattle, goats, fowl etc.), and some skin and respiratory diseases are 
the direct impacts from the LND. Secondary effects due to the disaster, which many also 
acknowledged, were their displacement from their ancestral land and relocation in camps, 
the loss of social networks and loss of economic livelihoods. The relocation of the LND 
survivors in seven resettlement camps scattered within the disaster area in Menchum 
Division (Figure 6.1) has disrupted their social networks and community cohesion, 
traditionally a very important survival strategy, especially in local communities in 
Cameroon.   
 The LMD did not result in the movement of very large populations from Njindoum 
village except for the relocation of a few residents living around the lake.  The primary 
impact was the death of 37 people, while some residents also commented that they were 
restricted from fishing in the lake and from farming around the immediate vicinity of the 
                                                 
20
 The limnological hypothesis is based on the fact that CO2 could have accumulated slowly in the lower part 
of the lake, only to be released abruptly by the overturning of the bottom waters. 
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lake. Though this affected a few people in Njindoum village, it wasn’t on the scale or 
scope as that suffered by the LND survivors, who were removed from their villages which 
were delineated as a disaster zone and restricted from returning.    
 
Disaster Manager’s Experiences in Disaster Impact  
Interview results show that disaster managers within the government sector and those in 
the non-government sector have polarised views on the management of the LND. While 
the former focused on the scientific and technical aspects of the disaster and its 
management, the latter were more concerned with the social and economic impact of the 
LND. This is because disaster managers in the non-government sector worked more at the 
local level and therefore, had a greater understanding of the problems faced by the disaster 
survivors. Disaster managers at the local levels were keen to express their opinion about 
the social welfare of the survivors, the tensions with other communities created by the 
resettlement in camps and the impacts to both the local and regional economy. A local 
disaster manager said:  
“Initially the government provided assistance to the survivors. But this 
was not for long. The social and economic situation of the survivors has 
not been addressed for many years now, leaving them in a very desperate 
situation…” (D20MNM) 
  
 Figure 6.1: Location of the seven resettlement camps for the Lake Nyos disaster survivors. 
 Source: Author
 
Other managers expressed similar views that disaster survivors were highly traumatized 
and have been living in poorer conditi
mentioned the destruction of many family structures and social ties that existed prior to the 
disaster. The resettlement of survivors in camps far from their ancestral lands on smaller 
pieces of land has been creating tensions over farming space with their new hosts and is 
another main concern voiced by some influential personalities in DM in Cameroon. This is 
taken up in later Chapters in more detail. 
The death of thousands of cattle, goats, sheep and
and regional economy. The death of livestock during the disaster led to an increase in the 
price of meat and these prices have remained fairly high since the incident. This did not 
only affect the cattle trade but also man
cattle rearing, thus creating more unemployment and hardship in the region. 
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ons than in their original Nyos settlement.  They also 
 
 wildlife also impacted the local 
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6.2.2  MANAGEMENT OF RELIEF OPERATIONS 
The management of the LND took place at National, Provincial and Divisional Levels. At 
the national level, the government created committees to manage the disaster; organized an 
international conference to seek the causes of the disaster and also sent medical experts to 
the disaster zone. A National Committee for the Reception and Management of Relief Aid 
(NCRMA), created by a presidential decree, had representatives from the Ministries of 
Health, Defense, Mines, Energy and Information, and the Cameroon Red Cross (Othman-
Chande, 1987). Another decree (ministerial decree No 86/1069 of 27th August 1986) 
created provincial committees for the reception of the disaster aid in Douala and Bamenda, 
the capitals of the Littoral and North West Provinces respectively without any of the UN 
agencies locally represented such as UNDP, World Food Program, international or local 
NGOs (Othman-Chande, 1987). The committee in Douala received international aid 
coming into the country through Douala Airport while that in Bamenda received local aid 
coming into the province (Ngwa, 1992). The non-involvement of international relief 
organisations and NGOs in these committees facilitated corruption by government officials 
as will be revealed later in this Chapter (see Section 6.2.9). Creating the head-quarters of 
the NCRMA in the then Ministry of Territorial Administration in Yaounde (the Capital), 
about 520kms from the disaster zone was also considered another major flaw in the 
management of relief operations (Othman-Chande, 1987). The long distance, and very 
poor communication and road infrastructure between the head-quarters of the NCRMRA 
and the disaster area is partly to be blamed for some of the problems experienced by the 
relief operations (refer to Section 6.2.5).  
The government organized an International Conference on LND21 (held from 16th-
20th March 1987) to seek the cause of the poisonous gas discharge from Lakes Nyos and 
Monoum (Sigvaldason, 1989). Most of the recommendations from this conference 
concerning the social welfare of the disaster survivors have not been implemented for more 
than two decades (see Table 6.2 on Page 126) now, making the survivors very destitute 
(see Chapter seven). More progress has been made in areas of the conference 
recommendations relating to physical risk mitigation through gas removal (discussed in 
Section 6.3.1).  
The management of relief operations at the provincial/regional level was done by a 
committee of senior government officials (Commander of the Gendarmerie Legion; the 
Provincial Chief of Internal Security; and the Provincial Delegate of Information and 
Culture) under the auspices of the Governor of the North West Province. The committee 
                                                 
21The International Conference on the Lake Nyos Disaster was  jointly sponsored by the then Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific Research and UNESCO 
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had the responsibility to put together all the local and international food, money, and other 
material resources for onward distribution to the camps and hospitals in the disaster region 
(Ngwa, 1992). The exemption of NGOs and members of the civil society from the 
provincial committee also facilitated embezzlement in the committee due to lack of proper 
accountability and monitoring of the material and financial aid delivered by third or private 
parties.  
The third committee at the divisional level (established under the authority of the 
SDO of Menchum), was responsible for the rescue and evacuation operations from the 
disaster zone; the temporal resettlement of the disaster survivors and also for the reception 
and delivery of aid to the survivors (Fonte, 1986:4; Nkemngu, 1986:4). The authorities 
faced enormous challenges to provide the required needs to the disaster victims because as 
explained later in Section 6.2.4, a lot of unsolicited items were donated to the survivors, 
which did not meet their immediate needs.  
 
6.2.3  RESCUE MISSION 
As mentioned in the last paragraph above, the rescue mission from the disaster zone was 
conducted under the auspices of the SDO of Menchum. This was done through prefectural 
orders and evacuation operations from the disaster area. A series of radio communiqués 
from the Governor and SDO of Menchum restricted all movements, including anxious 
relatives, into the affected area. Logistical problems and uncertainly in the disaster area 
(fear of the unknown or what had happened) in the immediate post-disaster period, 
hampered the rescue efforts.   
Due to uncertainly in the cause of death during the disaster, many people, including 
government officials were afraid to enter the disaster zone and rescue survivors for fear 
that their lives may be at risk. The SDO of Wum traveled to Nyos on August 22nd 1986 to 
assess the situation but was afraid to enter the disaster zone. The Governor of the North 
West Province also visited the region but ended in Wum and did not proceed to Nyos (The 
Cameroon Tribune of Wednesday August 27th 1986).  This uncertainly is described by 
Shanklin that:  
“……they drove to the border of the affected area but stopped when they 
saw the littered corpses. Was what-ever killed all these people, all these 
animals, still in the area? Would they die, too, if they went in to 
investigate?”(Shanklin, 1988:12) 
 
A Roman Catholic priest (Father Ten Horn), played a very significant role in the rescue 
operations. He was the first non-native in the area who was bold enough to enter the 
affected area. He rescued many survivors who had inhaled the gas and were unconscious.  
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The priest transported several sick survivors to the hospital out of the region in his truck 
and initiated the burial process (gave orders for the dead to be buried immediately in mass 
graves) because no government official were there (Shanklin, 1988).  This single initiative 
saved some lives but the overall delay in evacuating the several sick survivors, placed 
more lives at risk.  
When the authorities realized later that the area posed no immediate risks to life, 
the divisional administration initially used beer trucks within the vicinity of Wum (due to 
lack of appropriate vehicles to use on the bad road to Nyos) to convey survivors to the 
hospital and carry the police into the affected zone before they received assistance from the 
military. This implies that no proper assessment was done in the disaster zone prior to the 
initiation of rescue operations. Although a huge rescue operation went underway a few 
days later, if it had started earlier, more lives could have been saved. The army later 
entered the affected zone and carried out the bulk of the rescue operation. The army had 
appropriate vehicles for the poor condition of the road, which was a major handicap in the 
evacuation process (Othman-Chande, 1987). Krajick (2003:2) who visited the area 
described the road to Nyos as: “a washed-out dirt track winding through forested hills and 
passable only in a four-wheel drive vehicle”. The poor road condition to Wum and the 
disaster region also prevented top government officials from visiting the disaster survivors. 
The president (Paul Biya) came to the NWP on the 24th of August three days after the 
incident and stopped in Bamenda. The Cameroon Tribune (Wednesday August 27th 1986) 
reports that: 
“The head of state regretted that he could not personally visit the scene 
of the calamity during his abrupt visit because of the inaccessibility of 
the area and promised that steps would be taken to improve the road 
network.”  
 
Even during the distribution of aid to the disaster victims in December 1986, members of 
the National Relief Commission did not go to some resettlement areas due to their 
inaccessibility and kept the aid at the Divisional Offices in Wum and Nkambe for onwards 
transmission (Cameroon Tribune of Friday December 5th 1986:1). This clearly shows that 
the road to Nyos was so bad that it prevented key government officials who came to assess 
the disaster from travelling to the actual disaster site. During the fieldwork for this 
research, the road was still in poor condition and the researcher could only travel to Nyos 
by motorbike. The poor roads had been a major development concern in the region. Since 
the LND, suggestions for the road to be graded (see Table 6.2 and Page 125 in Section 
6.2.8) and government promises to grade the road (refer to Section 6.2.6) have not been 
met close to a quarter century after the disaster occurred.  
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 Due to lack of medical facilities (hospital, health center, medical personnel) in 
Nyos and environs, the sick (survivors who had inhaled the toxic gas) were transported 
about 45kms to Wum (divisional head-quarters of Menchum) for treatment. Early reports 
on the LND also suggest that due to lack of enough medical staff in the Wum government 
hospital-only two medical doctors at the time (Nkemngu, 1986; Shanklin, 1988), health 
practitioners were mobilized nationally and internationally to treat the sick survivors. 
Health practitioners who entered the region two days after the LND (from Yaounde and 
military doctors from Bafoussam) advised that: all persons moving into the affected areas 
should wear oxygen masks; non corrosive clothing with long sleeves; and also that those 
who died should be quickly buried in massive graves to avoid the possible outbreak of an 
epidemic in the area (Nkemngu, 1986). External medical experts greatly improved the 
health situation of the survivors. According to Cameroon Tribune (12th September, 1986), 
three weeks after the disaster, only 94 victims were still left in hospital out of the 478 
people admitted.  
 Many problems that hampered the rescue and relief operations following the LND 
such as the poor road to Nyos, lack of health amenities in the region such as 
hospitals/health clinics/medical personnel etc (Othman-Chanda, 1987) still persist more 
than two decades after the tragic incident as would been seen in Section 7.3.1 on Page 162 
(also see interview D19NMM on page 135). Integrating natural disaster mitigation with 
development planning would ameliorate or prevent similar problems in the future as 
recommended in Chapter 10 (See Section 10.5 and Appendix 14). 
 
6.2.4  FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE  
Much financial and material assistance was received after the LND. The government’s 
appeal for help in solving the crisis was met with enthusiastic local, national and 
international response. Private and public companies, corporations, co-operatives, 
associations and individuals made significant material and cash contributions to the 
NCRMRA. Some of the material aid received was in excess (22,000 blankets, 1,430 tents, 
more than 5,000 gas masks, over 1,000,000kg of air-freighted food aid valued at 
approximately US$800,000, 5 tons of medicaments and 25 tons of vaccines) and did not 
meet the immediate needs of the survivors. Reports on the international relief aid also 
suggest that governments and organisations sent relief supplies without any prior 
information or coordination and that the relief was not only far in excess of needs but also 
inappropriate. Among the unsolicited food aid were large qualities of canned sardines, 
corned beef, beans, instant and packet soup, cakes, war rations and protein biscuits and 
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11,000 frozen chickens (Cameroon Tribune of Wednesday 12th September, 1986; Othman-
Chande, 1987). The lack of proper assessment of the needs of the disaster survivors and 
non-cooperation with donor agencies was responsible for the donation of the unsolicited 
materials and those that were in excess. This facilitated corruption as some of the goods 
destined for survivors ended up being sold in the streets and shops around the country 
(mentioned in Section 6.2.9 as reported in Cameroon Post of Tuesday 30th August, 2005). 
The sources of the major contributions received 18 days after the disaster, including the 
material and foodstuffs donated are shown in Appendix 13. Overall, even without 
including the unpublicized contributions, the Cameroon Government received cash 
donations amounting to more than 1.5 billion FCFA (approximately US$ 3,000,000) from 
both local and foreign donors (Cameroon Tribune of Wednesday 12th September, 1986). 
 Though the negative consequences of inappropriate aid have long been recognized, 
it remains a feature of many recent disaster responses such as a wide range of goods in the 
tsunami response (Telford et al. 2006); culturally inappropriate hygiene kits in the Pakistan 
earthquake (Crawford et al., 2006); expired medicines in Yogyakarta (IFRC, 2007) or 
unneeded high-energy biscuits in Pakistan (Reed et al., 2007). Following the 1997 
earthquake in Iran, it was noted that:  
“Most of the foreign help with approximate value of 11 million dollars, 
even though it was appreciated, was more political than toward the 
immediate need of the affected people” (Ghafory-Ashiany, 1999: 17). 
 
Aid is appropriate only if it meets the needs of the affected population. A review of 
humanitarian action highlights the need for agencies to consult with beneficiaries, and 
relief and recovery plans should be based on profound knowledge of the context of the 
community (ALNAP, 2008). Agency performance can only be known if the affected 
people are satisfied with the assistance provided. Beneficiary surveys are now a feature of 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations with recent ones undertaken to evaluate 
response to the 2004 tsunami (IOM, 2005; Lindgren et al., 2005; UNORC, 2006). Many 
agencies have started using complains and feedback mechanisms as a tool for improving 
their program quality and ensuring that relief operations and aid are appropriate. MedAir 
changed its non-food-item package in Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami on the basis of 
beneficiary feedback while in the Yogyakarta earthquake, the mobile phone numbers of 
senior officials were given to the affected population to as a channel for complaints 
(Wilson et al., 2007). Though there have been many complaints by survivors of the LND 
for more than two decades, empirical evidence suggests that no formal means of complaint 
has been set up by the government or officials managing the disaster. This is not surprising 
since no contingency planning was done for the long term social management of the LND.  
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6.2.5  MANAGEMENT OF RELIEF AID 
Just like the management of many disasters, the LN disaster had shortcomings in the 
overall management of the relief aid. Initial problems involved the donation of relief 
materials and foodstuffs by local and international donations were provided spontaneously 
without any consideration of the short and long term needs of the survivors. Other 
administrative problems beset the transportation, distribution and preparation of food for 
survivors. Ngwa (1992) and Othman-Chande (1987) describe problems faced by the 
management of the Nyos relief operation, which included uncoordinated aid donation and 
distribution, poor storage and transportation of aid materials, inconsistent local donor 
supply source and absence of some key relief organizations to coordinate relief operations. 
The main problems are discussed in Box 6.1 on the next page.  
 
 
 
 
Box 6.1: MAJOR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH MANAGEMENT OF 
RELIEF OPERATIONS DURING THE NYOS DISASTER 
 
 The headquarters of the National Relief Committee was located 500km away in 
Yaoundé, and the other distribution centers in Douala, Bamenda and Wum were 
located at considerable distances and travel time through a poor road network to and 
from the beneficiaries. This created problems with coordination of relief activities, 
personnel movements and storage especially of perishable items.  
 Materials for burying the dead such as spades, gloves, and boots arrived 11 days late, 
while other utensils in great need for carrying, treating and distributing water, as well 
as drugs to treat water borne diseases fell short of demand. This highlights the patchy 
and uncoordinated aspect of aid distribution to the displaced persons. 
 There was no permanent field staff from the Ministry of Health, Department of 
Nutrition and Social Welfare to advice on nutrition in the camps where there was 
communal food preparation during the first weeks. 
 The Catholic Relief Services provided funds through the local Archdioceses, but due to 
lack of staff, did not follow up with the experience already acquired elsewhere in the 
field of relieving human suffering through supplies. 
 The World Food Program authorized the purchase of assorted foodstuffs from its 
distant Yaoundé base but lacked personnel to follow up and evaluate for a feedback on 
the food values derived from each foodstuff sent. 
 Save the Children Fund sent assistance mostly to children but did not have any 
feedback from the field to correct any mistakes for future action.  
 The UNHCR with headquarters in the capital Yaoundé, far away from the field had 
very few field staff to work with the displaced people. 
 Problems in the camps included stress problems, which stemmed from poor centrally-
placed corn mills for many users, inadequate lighting in the camps, and inadequate 
access to elementary medical care, overcrowding, and no permanent resident camp 
coordinator to assist and bring rapid solutions to such stress problems. 
Source:  Author 
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6.2.6  PROMISES AND PLEDGES TO HELP SURVIVORS 
Several promises and pledges were made during speeches delivered by government 
officials during the crises following the disaster. The SDO of Menchum and Bui, the 
Governor of the North West Province and the President all made promises to resettle the 
survivors of the disaster and build the road that goes to Nyos from Wum. Other 
development projects such as health centers and schools were also promised to the 
survivors. The Cameroon Tribune (19th September, 1986:4) published a letter sent to 
government officials managing the Nyos disaster in which suggestions are made about the 
long-term management of the survivors. In the letter, educated people in the Nyos area, 
who had noticed the unusual behaviour of the lake, but did not inform the authorities are 
blamed. This is probably because some survivors spoke of complaints by villagers that 
Lake Nyos had been boiling for five days prior to the disaster (Tanjong, 1986). His 
suggestions also concern the resettlement site, social amenities for the survivors and a good 
road to the region. He also stated that these projects should be started immediately whilst 
there was sufficient money to realise them. The detailed content of the letter is reproduced 
in Box 6.2 on the next page.   
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 It is the view of the researcher that if the government had followed the advice in 
this letter, the major problems of the Nyos survivors (related to their socio-economic 
condition and the development of the region) could have been greatly reduced.  But, as 
discussed in later Chapters, most of the socio-economic problems faced by the victims 
shortly after their resettlement in the camps remains two decades later, indicating that the 
problems were either ignored or the government’s priorities were placed elsewhere. 
 
Box 6.2: LETTER ON HELPING SURVIVORS SENT TO NYOS DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT COMMISSION  
 
Cameroon by this tragedy “the Nyos” has suffered heavy loss of lives. This particular 
unusual scenario has left an everlasting wound in the minds of people of this area, 
especially those who must have been a little lucky to escape the catastrophe or the 
orphans, widows and widowers or those who must have been overseas studying or were 
in other parts of the country doing business.  
 I start by blaming educated people of this area who had noticed on several 
occasions the unusual behaviour of this lake but failed to notify government. I’ll like to 
heartily thank those countries which have acted promptly towards the relief program for 
the survivors.  
 For this reason, I am suggesting to the administrators that a suitable site of 15-20 
kilometers away from Nyos be chosen and a township, created for resettlement. Simple 
solid building or say 2-bed rooms could be built for each family. Primary schools could 
be created including a health centre, security post, a market and water system. The main 
way from Wum to this town should be macadamized and widened. If not all, a portion 
of it should be tarred to Lake Nyos and to the created township. The entry point of the 
town should bear an inscription “THE NYOS” or any such significant name that could 
remind people of the original village.   
 Government should accept and promote education of orphans up to any level of 
education they may aspire to obtain. Other victims after accepting to live in the created 
townships should have a handsome amount to start life with. We don’t need to waste 
time to know first how much we have in hand before starting the project: we have just to 
start now.  There are already large sums of money from friends to start simple buildings 
for the needs of homeless. We don’t need days to draw the plan of the place or choose 
the resettlement area.  
 Survivors of these four villages should be encouraged to live in the resettlement 
sites. It is going to cost much but government should give its support. It is advisable not 
to give this job or projects to contractors. As for the road our military services could do 
the digging. The road could be dug to the township not passing through Nyos. If we 
treat Nyos this way or better than what I have said, the world shall be pleased with us 
and shall continue to help the Nyos people. 
 Before I end, I will ask a few questions to some of the volcanologists who 
visited the area. Where in the world has a volcanic eruption produced CO2 or any gas 
that killed people? (2) If it is CO2 as French volcanologists say, what does this CO2 
contain as elements that cause burns on the body and even deformation of limbs? (3) 
After death why do they swell? (4) The Nyos tragedy has puzzled a lot; even ants and 
flies died. Can we compare the Nyos episode to the “nuclear age”? 
       Source: Adapted from The Cameroon Tribune (September 19th 1986) 
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6.2.7  THE MEDIA 
The LND caught the interest of media all over the world, probably because the release of 
poisonous gases from crater lakes is such a rare event. During the early days of the 
disaster, there were many inconsistencies in both the local and international media reports 
of the incident, especially in the number of people and livestock killed. Though these 
immediate reports were common, Othman-Chande (1987) claims that other relevant 
aspects of the disaster relating to the long term management were ignored:  
“What is striking about disaster news forwarded to the world public is 
that there is invariably no mention that the victims need long term 
assistance and that international solidarity should be manifested not only 
in bringing immediate relief, which is essential, but also in bringing 
about long term rehabilitation to the affected population” (Othman-
Chande, 1987: 98-99). 
  
This comment lends further support to the focus of this research on the long-term 
management plan for the disaster survivors; especially those resettled in seven camps (see 
Figure 6.1 and the next Section).       
 
6.2.8  RESETTLEMENT OF SURVIVORS 
Field reports carried out in March-April 1987, under the auspices of the then Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific Research (MHESR) revealed that approximately 40 
percent of survivors had gone to live with relatives in Mmen (Shanklin, 1987) where 
according to Shanklin (1988) “they are being accommodated and rehabilitated into the 
community, although not without strains”. After the disaster and as early as the morning 
following the incident, some 1,979 survivors were evacuated and provided temporary 
accommodation around the area in Wum, Kimbi, NKambe, Kumfutu and Bafmen and later 
resettled in seven camps (Othman-Chande, 1987; Shanklin, 1988; Ngwa, 1992).  Table 6.1 
shows the temporary camp sites, their populations and distances from the various 
distribution centers.  
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Table 6.1: Distribution of survivor’s populations in the various camps  
Camp 
site 
Resettled 
Populatio
n 
Distance 
from 
main 
town 
(Wum) 
Distance 
from 
provincial 
HQ 
(Bamenda) 
Distance 
from 
capital 
city 
Yaounde 
Distance 
from 
port 
(Douala) 
Occupation of 
camp 
co-coordinator 
Catholic 
Mission 215 - 80 km 480 km 426 km 
Parish priest 
WADA 200 7 km 87 km 487 km 433 km Employee of local parastatal 
Esu 128 25 km 105 km 505 km 451 km Administrator of 
a rural council 
Kumfutu 213 16 km 96 km 496 km 442 km Chief of Police Post 
Kimbi 
River 1041 51 km 131 km 531 km 477 km 
Assistant 
Administrative 
officer 
Misaje 182 88 km 168 km 568 km 514 km Local veterinary Officer 
Source: Ngwa (1992)  
Many recommendations were made from the various post-disaster studies 
sponsored by MHESR from February-April 1986 and the International Conference on 
LND (Box 6.3). Among were recommendations that: the road to Nyos and the resettlement 
camps be upgraded; survivors be provided with viable farming areas; survivors should be 
involved in the management of the decision making process that involved their future and a 
restricted risk zone be imposed in the area.  
It is worth noting that these recommendations include both the social and technical 
aspects necessary to reduce the impact of the disaster for the survivors. But as will be 
mentioned later in this thesis, the long term management of the disaster focused mostly on 
the technical and scientific aspects of gas reduction (see Section 6.3.1). Very little attention 
was given to the social aspects of the disaster as indicated in the later sections of this 
Chapter.  
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Table 6.2: Recommendations on the management of the Lake Nyos Disaster 
Source: Author, produced from a range of sources (e.g. The Cameroon Tribune, 1986; Othman-Chande, 1987; Shanklin, 1988; Sigvaldason, 1989)
RECOMMENDATIONS  ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE LAKE NYOS DISASTER IMPLEMENTATION ACTION TAKEN 
That a zoning map identifying known hazards, viable farming areas and areas of possible 
resettlement be produced. 
Poor Hazard map produced is not comprehensive 
That occupation patterns should be analysed and plans for intensification of agricultural and 
stock-farming activities be implemented. 
Nil No action 
That access roads be constructed that will lead to Nyos and the resettlement camps. Poor Contracts awarded but project yet to start 
That other dangerous lake in the country be identified and a criteria for selecting lakes for 
further investigation be put in place. 
Nil No action  
That government should produce a long term database for monitoring disasters. Nil No action taken 
That hazard information be integrated into regional development planning. Nil No action taken 
That emphasis be placed on local community-level disaster preparedness and planning. Poor No concrete actions taken though mentioned   
That the relevant information be sent to all social scientists who have worked in the NWP. Nil No action  
That emergency-preparedness training be initiated for all resident relief and mission personnel, 
for educational staff and for local community leaders. 
Poor Most training are done at national level 
without local disaster managers  
That a solutions be sought for the farmer-grazer difficulties, which have long preceded the 
current problem of displaced people. 
Partial Insufficient effort made to resolve problem 
That survivors be encouraged to farm to supplement their food and sell some for money. Poor Farm to market roads remain very bad 
That corn mills be provided for each resettlement center. Partial Corn mills were given to survivors but no 
assistance provided for their repairs 
That survivors be participants in the decision-making process concerning their future. Poor Survivor are not consulted for DM actions  
That traditional authorities be incorporated into any emergency evacuation plans. Nil No contingency planning has been done 
That a thorough census of survivors be conducted. Partial Was done only after the disaster 
That farm land and farming tools be allocated to survivors. Partial Tools not given regularly and only few 
people get them.  
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6.2.9 OPINION ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE CRISIS PERIOD  
The opinion of disaster professionals on the management of the immediate aftermath of the 
LND was sought through interviews.  The disaster managers within the government sector felt 
that the government handled the affairs of the disaster properly when the incident occurred and 
committed much human, financial and material resource to it. Though some acknowledged a 
few shortcomings during the management of the crisis period, including some points 
mentioned in Box 6.1, they argued that considering this was the most serious disaster the 
country had ever experienced, the relief and rescue operations had been handled properly. On 
the contrary, other key officials in DM within the academic field and opposition-controlled 
councils felt the crises period was not properly co-ordinated by the government. They 
mentioned the delay in the supply of material and human resources as a main handicap during 
the crisis period. Even more important is an allegation that government officials embezzled 
most of the material and financial aid provided by the international community for the 
survivors. Mbuh (2005: 194) asset that over 80 percent of the aid destined to survivors was 
diverted away by government officials managing the LND.    
“They steal even blankets and milk destined for displaced people! The case 
of the bus diverted to Colombe Football Club of Sangmelima is very glaring. 
Since Sangmelima is Paul Biya's constituency, there is no way Paul Biya can 
deny this fact. Many reports of how fraud and theft took place were never 
investigated” (Mbuh, 2005:194). 
 
Research evidence suggests that many LND survivors also felt the immediate aftermath of the 
disaster was well managed. The disaster survivors in the URC and those who had moved back 
to the disaster site generally had the impression that the immediate relief and rescue efforts 
which led to their temporary resettlement were properly handled. They received goods and 
gifts from many organisations, communities and church or social groups all over the country, 
some of which were channeled through the government and others were given to them directly 
by representatives of the contributing groups.  According to a respondent:  
“…..Immediately after the disaster, the government took good care of us. 
Many people donated many things, which were given to us. But things 
changed later. After that they abandoned us and left us for ourselves and we 
have been suffering since then” (U03GM) 
 
Survivors’ accounts indicate that material and financial assistance provided by the government 
dwindled rapidly after the disaster as the months went by. This was also attributed to 
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corruption. Corruption allegations were also reported in newspapers and articles shortly after 
the disaster. According to David Alexander, reported in Mbuh, (2005:194)   
"The Cameroon government seemed to have had surprisingly little to say 
about the quantity and quality of what was supplied by the international 
community...unnecessary aid seemed to have stimulated corruption...which 
retarded rehabilitation." 
 
A report in Cameroon Post (edition of Tuesday 30th August, 2005) about the 19th anniversary 
of the LND also states that:   
“From inception, management of resources provided by sympathetic foreign 
donors was characterised by corruption and sheer dishonesty on the part of 
those financial "Vampires" and "Draculas" appointed to control them. This 
commentator personally saw frozen chicken destined for Nyos being hawked 
in the streets of Yaounde in 1986 by people who never new even the 
direction of Nyos.” 
 (http://www.postnewsline.com/2005/08/lake_nyos_survi.html). 
 
There is a significant body of research and analysis to show that relief and humanitarian 
assistance, just like aid and development assistance, is vulnerable to corruption and misuse of 
funds. Analysis of the LND shows that distribution of goods and services fell prey to 
corruption networks and bureaucratic obstacles limited access to those in need. It was difficult 
to track the inflow of funds and therefore to assess whether they reached their desired 
destination. Moreover, while public and international funds were more easily identifiable, 
private funds were difficult to track and monitor their expenditure. 
The relationship between humanitarian aid and corruption in governments, especially 
in developing countries is well known. Humanitarian operations often take place in 
environments that are prone to corruption risks and the aid process itself can add to these risks 
(Walker and Maxwell, 2009). In the humanitarian operations following the LND, international 
aid entered into an already corruption-prone environment, exacerbating existing endemic 
corruption.   
 
6.3 LONG TERM MANAGEMENT 
This section seeks to examine the DM processes that have been operational for the past two 
decades after the immediate post-disaster relief and temporary resettlement of the Nyos 
survivors. Note that the residents of Njindoum village where Lake Monoum is located were 
not resettled. The discussion of the long-term management has been divided into scientific or 
technical and social management of the LND.  
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6.3.1 SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT OF THE LAKE NYOS AND 
MONOUM DISASTERS 
The background to the Nyos and Monoum Degassing Project (NMDP) was set in motion 
during the International Conference on the Lake Nyos Gas Disaster (ICLND) held in March 
1987 in Yaoundé, Cameroon.  Some scientist who attended the conference created an 
International Working Group on Crater Lakes (IWGCL). The strategy for reducing the hazards 
in Lakes Nyos and Monoum by gas removal was taken by the IWGCL in Nancy, France in 
1990 (Freeth et al., 1990:201). The IWGCL, which was subsequently raised to the status of 
Commission on Volcanic Lakes in 1993, set the basis on which degassing experiments were 
carried out in Cameroon in the 1990s (Kusakabe, 2000). 
To mitigate the gas hazard in the lakes, in 2000 the Cameroon government initiated the 
NMDP. The main objectives of the project was threefold: to continuously monitor the 
physical, chemical, and biological conditions in both lakes; to install carbon-dioxide 
monitoring stations at both lakes to provide an audible and visual warning in the event of a gas 
release and to install permanent degassing pipes to remove the gas from both lakes. The 
government (through an Inter-Ministerial Committee responsible for all degassing activities on 
LNM) had the responsibility to  construct roads and permanent buildings close to both lakes, 
educate the local people about the dangers of the lakes and ensure that Cameroonian scientists 
and technicians received proper training to manage the degassing equipment and procedures in 
the future. The Commission on Volcanic Lakes then established an international committee 
made up of eight members from six countries known as the NMDP Advisory Committee to 
provide guidance for the project (Kusakabe, 2000; Kling et al., 2006) 
Prior to the start of the degassing project, scientific evidence showed that since the 
catastrophic releases of the poisonous gases in the 1980s, both lakes had been experiencing a 
carbon-dioxide recharge at alarming rates of up to 80 mol/m2 per year resulting in gas 
saturation levels of up to 97 percentage. To reduce the build-up of these gases, controlled 
degassing started at LN (2001) and LM (2003) with the installation of one pipe in each lake. 
This took place amid speculation that it could inadvertently destabilize the lakes and trigger 
another gas burst (Krajick, 2003). Figure 6.2 shows degassing in progress.  The gas content 
has been reduced in the lakes by approximately 12-14 percent compared to pre-degassing 
conditions. The monitoring of the effects of degassing suggests that the degassing process is 
not destabilizing the lakes and increasing the likelihood of another disaster (Kling et al., 
2006).    
130 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Water fountain produced by the degassing process in Lake Nyos. Source: Author 
(picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in July 2007) 
 
The main funding for the NMDP has come from France, Japan and USA totalling about $ 
680,000. The Cameroon Government had fulfilled one of her responsibilities, which was to 
construct permanent storage buildings where scientific equipment for monitoring both Lakes 
are kept (see Figure 6.3 below) as mentioned earlier in this Section. However, the government 
has not fulfilled other project requirements including support funding in the areas of road 
improvement.  
 
Figure 6.3: Scientific storehouse building constructed by the Cameroon Government at the 
outlet of Lake Nyos to keep scientific equipments used for monitoring. Source: Author 
(picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007)  
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Present Risk in Lakes 
The two main risks that have been identified in the lakes are the risk of continuous gas 
recharge into both lakes and the risk of flooding from Lake Nyos. Although the gas is being 
removed, the lakes are still very dangerous because they still contain tremendous volumes of 
gas-more than was released in the initial disasters and therefore still pose grave danger to the 
local population (Krajick, 2003; Kling et al., 2006). Three years after the degassing started in 
LN, the lake’s 500,000 tons of built-up gas had dropped only 6 percent and according to U.S. 
Geological Survey chemist Bill Evans, quoted in Krajick (2003), “at this rate, it could take 30 
to 50 years to make Nyos safe—and in the meantime, there could be another eruption”. A 
technical report produced by the U.S. OFDA based on a monitoring program in both lakes in 
2006 revealed technical problems with the degassing process caused by the pipes installed in 
the lakes. Pipe design and implementation flaws in both lakes have led to their malfunction, 
leading to only a very small quantity of the gas being removed. The report also mentions that 
in LN, a rock fall or landslide from the cliffs around the lake could supply a tremendous 
amount of energy that could mix bottom waters upward and trigger another gas burst. 
Scientific modeling has predicted that only approximately 30 percent of the gas 
remaining in LM can be removed, and in LN that the single pipe will remove approximately 
25 percent of the gas remaining by 2015. To further reduce this risk, the advisory Scientific 
Committee for the NMDP recommended that more pipes be installed in both lakes in order to 
reduce the gas pressures at a much quicker rate. Their model indicates that 75-99 percent of 
the gas remaining would be removed by 2010 with two pipes in Monoun and five pipes in 
Nyos (Kling et al., 2006).   
Scientific studies on the structure of the dam that holds Lake Nyos’s water in place 
have revealed that it can easily be bridged, leading to devastating consequences in both 
Cameroon and Nigeria. Figure 6.4 shows the Crater Lake and the dam in which it sits 
surrounded by high cliffs. The upper 40m of Lake Nyos’s 50m-wide natural dam consists of 
poorly consolidated pyroclastic rock (Figure 6.5) that is being eroded at an uncertain but 
geologically alarming rate that could cause an eventual failure leading to floods in 
downstream areas as far away as 108km in Nigeria (Lockwood et al., 1988; Lockwood and 
Shuster, 1991).   
A report published by the joint UNEP/OCHA Unit in 2005 based on a mission to 
assess the stability of the natural dam in LN on the request of the government, discusses the 
present risk associated with the dam. The risk was that a breach of the dam would be imminent 
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within the coming 10 years, with a high likelihood for this to occur within the next five years. 
Such a breach would lead to severe flooding in downstream Nyos Valley, affecting an 
estimated 10,000 people in Cameroon and Nigeria. Moreover, that breach could likely lead to 
a re-occurrence of the 1986 carbon dioxide eruption, affecting a further unknown number of 
people. The most likely area where the dam could be breached easily is along the narrow 
spillway (Figure. 6.5), which is the weakest part of the dam (UNEP/OCHA, 2005; Kling et al, 
2006). 
Figure 6.4: Lake Nyos: Note the spillway at the south eastern part of the lake close to the 
white house (scientific store house) Source: UNEP/OCHA (2005) 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Spillway of the Nyos dam.  Source UNEP/OCHA (2005) Diagram is cross-section 
of the lake showing upper and lower units of pyroclastic deposits. Source: Lockwood et al. 
(1988).  
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During the fieldwork for this research, the author also visited LN and undertook an onsite 
physical assessment22 of the stability of the dam. Based on the rock types and structures in the 
rocks found on the natural spillway of the dam in July 2007, the author confirms fears 
expressed by former researchers that the dam could be breached if nothing is done. The 
pyroclastic rocks on the spillway are becoming increasingly unstable as they are weathered 
and eroded. Field observation was carried out in July 2007 when the level of the water in the 
lake was about three metres lower than the rim of the spillway, thereby exposing the inner 
surface of the rocks on the spillway. General observation of the exposed rocks in the inner 
surface reveals differential erosion within the layered rock surfaces, both vertically and 
laterally. The layered pyroclastic materials show very visible signs of lateral erosion on the 
upstream side. There is also clear evidence of backwards erosion at the spillway that could 
cause it to bridge the water in the lake. These structures can easily be seen in Figure 6.6 and 
provide strong evidence that the rocks of the spillway are undergoing rapid erosion. Note the 
depression in the picture behind the author that extends backwards towards the outer edge of 
the spillway.  
Figure 6.6: Fragile eroded inner surfaces of the spillway. Source: Author (picture taken during 
fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007: Author is wearing a cap and sits on the eroded rocks) 
 
This photograph is the clearest picture that has been taken of the dam showing evidence of 
erosion in the spillway, because the level of water in the lake is below the height of the 
                                                 
22
 It should be noted that the author has two Masters Degrees, one of them in Applied Geology and therefore 
possesses technical knowledge on the scientific aspects relating to the eruptive activity of the lake and the risk 
posed by the dam’s stability. 
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spillway (3m). The photograph taken during the assessment mission by the joint 
UNEP/OCHA environment unit in September 2005 (Figure 6.5) shows water overflowing the 
spillway, thereby covering the eroded surfaces of the spillway rocks. Figure 6.6 therefore 
makes a significant contribution to the evidence for the continual weakening of the dam along 
the spillway.  
The suggestions for the remediation of the flood hazard are that the water in the lake 
should be lowered to about 20-40m after which the dam wall can then be removed.  But prior 
to this, the quantity of gas has to be lowered to safe levels first to prevent any gas eruption 
during reduction of the water level. In the degassing process currently going on in the lake, the 
level of water is held constant. The full mitigation plan is a more complicated process 
involving scientific and engineering methods for depressurizing the gas in the lake and 
pumping the water out (Lockwood and Meyer, 1989; UNEP/OCHA, 2005; Kling et al. 2006). 
A flow diagram to summarize the process is shown in Figure 6.7. 
 
Figure 6.7: Remediation plan for natural hazards of gas bursts and flooding at Nyos. Source: 
Kling et al. (2006) 
 
The present state of remediation in the Lake is at level 3 and 4 in Figure 6.7 where the gas is 
still being reduced and the level of the lake is held constant. However, the Scientific Advisory 
Committee for the NMDP recommends that the flood mitigation process should be delayed 
until most of the gas in the lake has been removed. In the short term, the dam can be 
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strengthened. Overall, there is considerable evidence that much has been done to mitigate the 
risk of any subsequent gas release from the lake by degassing. However, the risk of 
subsequent gas release is still associated with the risk of flooding.   
 
Opinion on the Technical Management of the Lake Nyos and Monoum Disasters 
Information from interview sources reveals that disaster managers in all the sectors believe 
enough attention has been given to the reduction of the physical risks from the lakes. 
Government officials were quick to mention the NMDP as a government success in reducing 
the poisonous gases that are accumulating in LNM. Some said the lakes will soon be free of 
poisonous gases and the survivors will be allowed to return to their ancestral land in Nyos and 
environs. A senior official said: 
“I think this is one area in which the government has invested many human 
and financial resources. Cameroonian and foreign scientist are involved in 
the NMDP project and much money has been invested into the project. If you 
go to Lake Nyos and Lake Monoum, you will see pipes inserted into them. 
These pipes reduce the gas in the lake and you can see the gas escaping from 
them in jets. The government could not have done this alone. It took foreign 
assistance for this to be done. I think scientifically much has been done and 
is still being done to make the lakes safe” (D06TML).  
 
Though other key officials in DM also think much progress is being made to mitigate the 
physical risk in the lakes, some think the success cannot be attributed to the government.  
They argue that without foreign aid both in human and financial resources, the progress 
achieved this far could not have been possible. Some mention that the non-compliance of the 
government to construct a good road to the disaster site in Nyos (to ease the transportation of 
equipments and personnel) is also a main setback to the project. This view was expressed by a 
local official who has DM responsibilities:  
“I know a de-gassing project is going on in Lake Nyos but the government 
cannot take credit for it. Without foreign assistance, nothing would be done 
just as nothing was done after the Lake Monoum tragedy. The government 
has failed to construct a good road to Nyos since the disaster happened 
although we have heard several times that the road will be constructed. I am 
sure they are waiting for a foreign government to construct it for them” 
(D19NMM) 
 
Though general comments were made about the success of the NMDP, apart from some 
scientist, most administrators could not give specific information regarding the approximate 
expected date of completion of the project, when the lake will be declared totally safe from 
any gas emissions. This indicates that either uncertainty still exists as to when the project will 
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be completed, or that government officials are not sufficiently informed or aware of the 
progress being made in mitigating the physical risk.  
Just like the disaster managers, most survivors are poorly informed about the risk 
mitigation process. There is no consistent information channel to update them or give 
feedback on the progress of the degassing process. According to the WCDR (2005:14): 
 “It is necessary to provide easily understandable information on disaster 
risks and protection options, especially to citizens in high-risk areas, to 
encourage and enable people to take action to reduce risks and build 
resilience. The information should incorporate relevant traditional and 
indigenous knowledge and culture heritage and be tailored to different 
target audiences, taking into account cultural and social factors.” 
Disasters can be substantially reduced if people are well informed and motivated towards a 
culture of disaster prevention and resilience, which in turn requires the collection, compilation 
and dissemination of relevant knowledge and information on hazards, vulnerabilities and 
capacities (WSSD, 2002; WCDR, 2005). It appears that this is not happening at LN at present. 
6.3.2 SOCIAL MANAGEMENT OF THE LAKE NYOS AND MONOUM DISASTERS 
The social management of the LNM disasters involves the management of the socio-economic 
aspects of the disaster area, the resettlement camps and the displaced populations. It should be 
recalled that during the immediate aftermath of the LND, the government made promises to 
the disaster victims concerning their well-being and the development of the affected area. 
Other recommendations from elites and organizations from the affected area and early field 
studies commissioned by the government also related to both the technical and social aspects 
of the disaster. These include recommendations submitted to the Cameroon government after 
the ICLND and other studies commissioned by the MHESR between February and April 1987 
(Shanklin, 1988; Sigvaldason, 1989; see Boxes 6.2 and Table 6.2)  
 
Recent Social Management Plan for the Lake Nyos Area 
Within the last few years, due to persistent complaints of poverty, hunger and poor living 
conditions by the survivors, the government seems to have taken the socio-economic aspects 
of DM more seriously. With the support of the UNDP, the government has come up with a 
project on the rehabilitation of Lake Nyos and the psycho-social and economic resettlement of 
the local population. The project structure and design was produced in a report for UNDP and 
the Cameroon government in 2006 by consultants commissioned by UNDP. The title of the 
project was “Formulation d’un projet de rehabilitation du lac Nyos” and it was estimated to 
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run for five years. The project had four main objectives: to rehabilitate the zone back to its 
economic potential; to reinforce the capacity of the population to be relocated; to reduce their 
poverty, and to improve the infrastructure of the affected villages. The project report mentions 
that after the immediate post relief and resettlement operations, the survivors were left to 
themselves and they had to engage in their former agricultural activities with lots of 
difficulties. It also mentions the poor living situation of the survivors in the camps that was 
linked to the poor communication network of the region, poor agricultural soils and very low 
incomes (Oumarou and Ousman, 2006:10). The project proposal plan that was estimated to 
cost about 7.4 billion FCFA, but with 6.6 billion programmed for the physical risk reduction 
measures (Oumarou and Ousman, 2006).  The very big proportion of the budget programmed 
for the physical aspects again shows government’s inclination more towards technical than 
social mitigation measures. To set in motion the project, on the 2nd of August 2007, the 
government of Cameroon and UNDP together with MTAD as implementing partner signed an 
agreement to implement part of the project with title “Security and Socio-economic 
Reintegration of Lake Nyos Area (Cameroon)” with an estimated budget of US$ 1,990,000 
expected from the European Union as the donor partner. The objectives of the program are to: 
build the capacity of local structures dealing with DM; de-gas the Lake and secure the area; 
build rural infrastructure; develop land use planning and emergency preparedness plans; and 
provide information and awareness rising of the population.  
 
Awareness of Disaster Mitigation/Management Plan for the Nyos/Monoum Area 
Interviews with disaster managers show that more than 95 percent hold the view that recently 
there has been more government interest in addressing the problems of the Lake Nyos disaster 
victims but only a few respondents’ had any in depth information about any current projects or 
plans for the survivors. The most widely held knowledge about the disaster mitigation plan for 
the Nyos/Monoum area relates to the NMDP that is ongoing in both lakes. When asked if he is 
aware of a disaster mitigation plan for the Nyos and Monoum area, a disaster manager replied 
that: 
 “Yes, there had been a plan which is nearing completion. The NMDP has 
been going on for many years now and very soon the project may end when 
the gas in the lakes had been removed” (D08NMM). Another respondent 
simply said “I know there is a plan to remove the gas from the lake” 
(D14NMM).  
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Only few disaster managers within the government departments are informed of the 
resettlement plans for the disaster victims.  Though these top officials could not be specific on 
the expected start date or period of the impending resettlement project, they were quick to 
defend the government’s non-engagement in any early program. They attribute the lateness in 
the start of the resettlement project to lack of funds, which some said had been diverted to the 
NMDP. A senior disaster manager stated:  
“….. the government had set up committees to plan for the resettlement of 
the Lake Nyos survivors. We shall soon have the result of that committee. 
That project was delayed because the government has spent much money on 
the NMDP. The resettlement program cannot be done when the disaster zone 
is not safe. The resettlement program is government’s priority now and we 
are working with the UNDP to implement the program” (D03NMM) 
  
They also felt the NMDP was more important because people cannot be resettled to their 
original land if the area is not safe.  Research evidence from interviews also suggests that 
administrators at the local level do not have any detail information about the social 
resettlement project, like their counterparts at the national level. A local administrator within 
the disaster area said:  
“I think the higher authorities are better aware of any plans for the 
survivors. We simply get orders from above and execute them. Whatever we 
at the local level are instructed to do and given the means to do, we simply 
do them…” (04NMM) 
 
They seem to get information about projects for survivors and the disaster area only during the 
period preceding commemorations of the LND when senior officials came to the area and 
engage them in preparations for the event. This shows that there is no steady stream of 
information from the higher to the lower levels of the administrative departments.  
 
Government Promises to Disaster Survivors 
Though most of the key personnel involved in the LND management were not sufficiently 
informed of the resettlement project for the survivors, they expressed concern that promises 
made to disaster victims were long overdue.  Disaster managers who were more critical of the 
government’s management of the disaster revealed that a social management plan for the 
displaced survivors had been in existence since the event but had not been implemented.  They 
highlighted government failures in handling the social concerns of the victims over the years, 
despite the continuous complaints by the survivors and some local managers whose area of 
jurisdictions cover some resettlement camps. The general notion was that projects, which 
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focus on improving the social situation of the Nyos victims, should be considered a matter of 
urgency. It is notable that the awkward condition in which the disaster survivors have been 
living and their cries for attention for more than 20 years have been making headline news in 
recent times, especially during commemorations of the LND.  
Many secondary reports, mainly from newspaper articles, also reveal that the disaster 
survivors have been neglected and left to fend for themselves. The Cameroon Post, (a 
prominent newspaper in Cameroon) of 30th August 2005 discusses speeches made by 
survivors of the Nyos disaster during the 19th anniversary of the LND. Government neglect of 
survivors was the main theme in the speeches delivered by survivors and local chiefs in the 
area (http://www.postnewsline.com/2005/08/lake_nyos_survi.html). The paper stated that: 
“All speeches during the celebrations centered on government's 
neglect…….He commended the Fon of Sawi, traditional ruler of the area, 
who championed the protests against government's neglect in the domain of 
road network, lack of health facilities and other pressing needs of the 
victims…….. Neglect is not however, the only crime for which government 
deserves hanging. In the opinion of the survivors, government still has to 
convince them that the lake, which had been their friend from time 
immemorial, had suddenly become an adversary”. 
 
An article in the Cameroon Tribune (the state owned newspaper) of 30th August 2007 also 
makes reference to the 21st anniversary of the LND and reports that:  
“Amongst the lots of problems presented to Governor Koumpa Issa included 
the fact that they have been crying in the rain for standard educational 
facilities, health and road infrastructure. Aboubaka Suleiman, a 
representative of the survivors said accessibility to their camps is a 
nightmare, while some camps have schools without roofs, their living houses 
are dilapidating and there is great need for well equipped health facilities. 
Many of their children cannot be educated due to poverty while they keep 
being haunted by the fact that it is taking too long for them to returned to 
Nyos, the land of their ancestors” 
(http://www.cameroon-info.net/cmi_show_news.php?id=20327). 
 
These recent newspaper articles give a clear picture of the situation during the last two 
decades. While a significant amount of effort has been put into the physical risk reduction 
measures, much has yet to be done with regards to the social management of the disaster as 
revealed in later Chapters. More detailed analyses of government handling of the social 
aspects of the disaster are discussed in Section 6.4. 
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6.4 REFLECTING ON THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
6.4.1 MAIN CONSTRAINTS TO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE LAKE NYOS 
DISASTER 
The research also examined disaster managers’ perspectives on the main problems inhibiting 
the proper management of LNM disasters. Many top officials were reluctant to respond to 
questions concerning the constraints faced by the government in managing the disaster, 
claiming that it is a popular myth that government is doing nothing to assist displaced 
survivors resettled in camps. However, some of them attributed financial limitations and the 
weak state of the country’s economy as the main limiting factor for the government to meet all 
promises made to disaster victims. These disaster managers tended to blame the economic 
crisis that the country experienced in the late 1980s shortly after both disasters occurred and 
the subsequent devaluation of the CFA francs in the early 1990s (see Section 7.2.1) as major 
factors that weakened the government’s financial capability to handle the long term effects of 
the LNM disasters.  
The disaster managers who were critical of government’s DM, attributed improper 
planning and follow-up of post-disaster projects a major limitation in the long-term 
management of the LND.  Some emphasised that concrete plans were not put in place for the 
survivor’s resettlement and living conditions in the camps, and their eventual rehabilitation 
back to Nyos.  According to a respondent’s perspective: 
 “…..I think the problem was lack of proper planning into the future. The 
survivors were resettled without any plans to cater for their need until they 
return to Nyos. The money donated during the disaster, could have been 
sufficient to improve the social situation in the camps for a very long time if 
it was properly managed. I do not agree with those who say there is not 
sufficient money to assist the survivors because part of the money being used 
for the degassing project can solve many of their problems….” (D19CMV) 
 
The complexity of the government’s administrative mechanism led to limited initiatives, and 
the complicated process of approving decisions initiated at local levels and administrative 
bottlenecks were also identified by some administrative personnel as major constraints. 
Some disaster managers, mostly local officials also thought the overall poor 
governance of the country was responsible for the poor management of the social aspects of 
the disaster. Their general impression was that other socio-economic problems of the country 
are also not properly managed and the negligence of the government in the social aspects of 
the LND is just one of several problems in the country. One disaster manager commented:  
“…… money is being wasted on scientists who live comfortable lives while 
the disaster survivors are suffering. I think a main problem also is 
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governance. You do not expect a government that cannot manage the 
country well to manage a situation like this. If the government cannot stop 
corruption and embezzlement, then you do not expect them to solve the 
problems of the Nyos survivors because government officials will embezzle 
all the money and goods sent to the survivors as they did when foreign 
assistance poured into the country after the disaster” (D12CMV) 
 
It is also possible that a lack of DM skills in disaster managers is also a contributing factor. 
The DM processes cannot function properly because many government administrators, and 
those involved in the management, are politicians who have been given such responsibilities 
based on their political lineages rather than their knowledge, capability and ability. In most 
situations, those appointed to handle affairs relating to disasters are politicians within the 
ruling party who have no experience of DM. General observation during the interview process 
suggests that the trained administrators who are appointed to administer the provinces and 
divisions always work to protect the interest of the government. They always try to defend the 
government on issues that they are failing to resolve, at least in public.  
The non-involvement of the disaster survivors in the management of their own affairs 
is also a major factor in the very limited social management. Survivors only act as 
representatives of camps with the main responsibility of channeling information to their peers. 
They are not fully involved in the decision making process that affects their well being. As 
such, social groups protesting the poor treatment of the LND survivors have emerged from 
within the disaster affected community (mentioned in Section 5.4.2 on Page 96). These civil 
society groups like MBO and BUKILSDA came into existence in order to protest at the 
government’s poor treatment of the survivors and to engage in meaningful discussions for 
solving the numerous social problems that exist in the area. The role of the locals and the 
disaster community’s involvement in their own affairs appears to have been grossly ignored. 
The Yokohama strategy (UNDP, 1994) stresses the importance of DRR being underpinned by 
a more pro-active approach to informing, motivating and involving people in all aspects of 
DRR in their own local communities. Based on a review of post-disaster response in 
Indonesia, it has been noted that relief and recovery efforts will be more effective if they 
identify, use and strengthen existing social capital (community based skills, programs, and 
networks). This community-driven approach to post-disaster recovery, which builds on social 
capital, results in greater client satisfaction, more rapid disbursement, and local empowerment 
(Leitmann, 2007). 
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The mayor of the Wum local council, that was controlled by the SDF23 at the time of 
the research, claims that due to government neglect of the disaster victims, his council has 
been assisting disaster victims in the URC in provision of basic social education  to children 
and livelihoods support, especially in providing basic farming tools.  
Some disaster managers mentioned corruption as a major problem facing the 
management of the LND (see quote D12CMV in previous page). Such people, mostly local 
officials, said that due to political affiliations with the party in power, some unscrupulous 
officials embezzled much of the money donated during the crisis period with the complicity of 
other colleagues in higher positions and claimed this practice has continued since the disaster. 
They also mentioned that embezzlement, corruption and lack of accountability inhibit the 
management process and frustrate DM activities because financial and material resources do 
not reach their intended destinations. 
This section has revealed that the response and recovery process was enabled at the 
international and national levels, ignoring the affected communities. Although some 
international NGOs have been providing limited assistance to the Nyos survivors resettled in 
camps, they have not been able to form linkages between the disaster survivors and external 
social partners. NGOs have been known to operate outside their established disaster response 
network to form bridges between local communities and the international community. Social 
capital can be utilized to achieve community integration through the interactions of informal 
organizations and institutions. This process could help build the socio-economic status of the 
disaster affected community. The interactions of formal organizations and institutions did not 
result in social policy outcomes that benefitted the Nyos disaster stricken community. The 
opportunity for using disaster recovery to enable sustainable development was missed due to 
the absence of long-term socio-economic development plans to guide the process. The 
recovery process was led from the top-down rather from the bottom-up and that is why the 
socio-cultural and economic problems of the affected community were not addressed. These 
findings reinforce the position that local governance is crucial to empower communities to 
participate in disaster recovery and development.  
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 The SDF have controlled the Wum  Council for the past  eight years prior to the 2007 municipal elections 
when they lost the council to the ruling government party (CPDM). 
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6.4.2 HOW THE NYOS AND MONOUM DISASTER MANAGEMENT COULD HAVE 
BEEN IMPROVED 
Many high officials declined to respond to questions on how the management of the disasters 
could have been improved, with some insisting that all possible actions were taken.  Most non-
government officials, however, expressed opinion that the management could have been 
improved if proper planning was done at the onset. Some suggested that different committees 
with well-defined budgets could have been set-up to manage, monitor and report the progress 
of their activities regularly to a central coordinating body. According to them, if this was done, 
the government could have realised the difficult situation of the disaster survivors.  
Their opinion was not only restricted to the social and technical aspects of the 
disasters. Those working at local levels felt the situation could have been improved if they had 
a greater role to play in DM activities at all stages, including planning, because they could 
easily monitor the activities as they live in the disaster areas on a permanent basis. They 
further mentioned that complicated administrative procedures to obtain requests and delivery 
of financial and material resources hamper the progress of management actions and swift 
realisation of objectives.  A local DM administrator said:  
“After the survivors were resettled, a monitoring program to assess their 
living conditions could have prevented many of the problems they have been 
experiencing. No committee was set-up to monitor the conditions of the 
survivors after their resettlement. An independent committee made up of 
people of all sectors of the community and political parties is necessary to 
study the situation of the LND survivors now. Only such a committee can 
produce a fair and unbiased report to the government. This is what we have 
been suggesting for many years now but no one listens to us” (D20SDM) 
 
Failure to improve the road infrastructure to the various resettlement camps was another issue 
identified. Some of the local administrators believed this alone would have made a significant 
improvement to the entire management of the disaster, as many of the survivors engaged in 
subsistence agricultural activities would have been able to transport their goods to Wum. 
 
6.4.3 USEFULNESS OF LESSONS FROM THE NYOS AND MONOUM DISASTERS 
FOR FUTURE PLANNING 
Interview results suggests that many disaster managers at the national level do not appear to 
recognise that lessons learned from the LND can be useful for further planning of DRM in the 
country (apart from the technical aspects). However, their peers at the local levels and non-
government have a contrary view. More than 95 percent acknowledged that the disasters 
provide a good platform for Cameroon to be better prepared for subsequent gas related hazards 
since the country have many crater lakes. Though they think the degassing projects in LNM 
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can be applied to other crater lakes that might contain lethal amounts of carbon-dioxide or 
other poisonous gases, there was no evidence that there are plans to set this in motion. The 
failures and challenges of management of social aspects of the LND have made many 
government officials wary of such discussion. However, it can be argued (as expressed by 
some local DMs) that the LND provides important lessons for the management of hazards that 
involve the displacement of large numbers of people. Lessons need to be learned in the areas 
of tackling social welfare and livelihoods of disaster survivors after resettlement. This 
highlights a need for proactive measures, bearing in mind that the phases of relief, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction following a disaster are windows of opportunity for the 
rebuilding of livelihoods and for the planning and reconstruction of physical and socio-
economic structures, in a way that could build community resilience and reduce vulnerability 
to future disaster risks (WCDR, 2005). The results suggest that it is necessary to have skilled 
personnel in DM at all administrative levels. The civil administrators trained at the National 
School of Administration do not possess adequate DM knowledge. The Hyogo framework for 
action stresses the need to develop training and learning programs in DRR targeted at specific 
sectors (e.g. development planners, emergency managers, local government officials). 
 
6.5 SUMMARY 
A key feature of contemporary understandings of DRR and DM are that they aim to reduce 
vulnerability.  As has been shown in this Chapter, disaster occurrence and impacts do not only 
depend on exposure to extreme natural phenomena, but also to anthropogenic factors such as 
government policy, DM strategies and the effectiveness of the DM process. This Chapter has 
analysed the management of the LNM disasters over the short and long term, based on 
secondary sources, personal observations and interviews with disaster managers and the 
affected populations. The overwhelming result is that while significant progress has been 
made in technical management (with some issues about its effectiveness), the socio-economic 
management of the disasters has not been well handled (also see Bang, 2008). Although 
limitations to the socio-economic management are partly attributed to the poor financial 
situation of the country, the bulk of the problems appear to be related to human systems (e.g. 
lack of DM expertise and skills, improper planning, negligence, corruption). These factors 
partly contribute to the ongoing vulnerability of the survivors and the underlying drivers of 
vulnerability are examined in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 RESETTLEMENT, POVERTY AND VULNERABILITY 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
An examination of the DM Framework in Cameroon in Chapter five has shown how the 
various legislation, institutions and administrative processes have been established to guide the 
process of DM. Whether and how the framework has enabled or constrained the process in the 
case studies has been introduced in Chapter six. The analysis in Chapters five and six has 
revealed that one of the key responsibilities of good DRM is to analyse existing hazards and 
vulnerability. Vulnerability has not been addressed very successfully, as shown in the LND 
case study. Failures in the management of the LNM disasters, especially their long term socio-
economic aspects have been highlighted. This Chapter takes the argument further and 
examines in more detail, the dire recovery situation and social problems faced by the displaced 
LND survivors and their families in the resettlement camps. The socio-economic problems, 
which have exacerbated poverty in the resettlement camps, are examined, thereby indicating 
some of the major push factors that have forced many survivors to return to the disaster zone 
and become vulnerable once again to disaster.  The relocation process is dealt with in detail in 
Chapter nine.  
This approach builds further on Chapter six in seeking to answer the second research 
question about the understanding of vulnerability in the case study populations. This Chapter 
therefore offers a closer examination of the environmental, social and economic factors that 
are responsible for creating vulnerability referred to here as drivers of vulnerability. These 
social vulnerability drivers are examined in detail in the LND population groups, but first, it is 
important to understand the wider socio-economic context and poverty situation in Cameroon.  
 
7.2 CAMEROON’S ECONOMY 
7.2.1 CAMEROON’S ECONOMIC SITUATION SINCE THE LAKE NYOS AND 
MONOUM DISASTERS 
For a quarter-century following independence, Cameroon was one of the most prosperous 
countries in Africa. The country is rich in natural resources like minerals, dense tropical forest, 
oil and gas and fertile volcanic agricultural soils and used to be the commercial and economic 
leader in the sub-region. Within the last two decades and coincidentally, since the LND, the 
country’s economic development has slowed relative to other countries in the region. 
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According to one external report, this was caused by economic mismanagement, pervasive 
corruption and a challenging business environment (US State Department, 2008).   
Prior to 1986, Cameroon accomplished an annual growth of 7 percent over a 10-year 
period (Government of Cameroon, 2003).  GDP per capita increased at an annual average rate of 
4 percent during 1965--86 but the situation deteriorated into the 1990s and the country suffered 
a severe social and economic crisis. The country’s real GDP declined by an annual average of 
3.8 percent from 1986 to 1994 representing more than 60 percent drop for that period. The per 
capita income increased on average by 6.5 percent during the same period. External debt rose from 
39 percent of GDP in 1986 to 65 percent in 1992 before escalating to 105 percent in 1994 after 
devaluation (Government of Cameroon, 2003:1; Nkama, 2006).  The economic crisis was 
blamed on a slump in the prices of  main export commodities (oil, cocoa, coffee and cotton) to 
the world market in the 1980s, an overvaluation of the  coope´ration financiere en Afrique 
(CFA) franc against the dollar and economic mismanagement (Baye, 2006a; US State 
Department, 2008). 
In order to achieve macro-economic stability, the government embarked upon a series 
of economic reform programs suggested by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank medium-term structural adjustment programs (SAP) from 1988.  In order to cope 
with the budget deficits engendered by the economic crisis, the government implemented the 
SAP which included reduction in public expenditure, cuts in prices of traditional exports, 
reduction in the civil service and increased borrowing. Public expenditure was drastically 
reduced through: (1) restructuring of public and para-public enterprises in the early 1990s, 
which led to staff redundancies and increased unemployment, (2) slashing public expenditure 
on education, road infrastructure, extension services, rural water and electricity supply, and 
healthcare services, (3) freezing recruitment in the public service, and (4) Civil service salary 
slashed by 65 percent in 1993 (Baye et al., 2002). The CFA franc (the common currency of 
Cameroon and 13 other African states) was devalued by 50 percent in January 1994.  The 
devaluation was intended to prop up the global competitiveness of the economies of the 
countries using the CFA francs.  
Unfortunately these measures had a serious impact on livelihoods of Cameroonians 
and did not stimulate growth. Instead they compounded the effects of the crisis on the welfare 
of households and eroded the real purchasing power of most Cameroonians. Poverty increased 
and debt servicing grew rapidly and started crowding out investments. Though the country 
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achieved macro-economy stability after the devaluation, incomes still remained low (Mbanga 
and Sikod, 2002; Baye, 2006a). 
The impact of the economic crisis and the SAPs was considerable. It led to reduction in 
public finances drastically reducing government spending on maintenance and new 
development projects. This had a serious toll on public services and incomes. The Government 
reduced basic health and education funding and this led to a major decline in health delivery 
systems and school enrolment (Khan and Noumba, 2001).  Baye (1998) observes that a freeze 
in increments and recruitment in the public service, the retrenchment of public sector workers, 
the meager salaries following the double cuts in the salaries of public sector workers in 1993, 
and price hikes resulting from the 50 percent devaluation of the CFA franc all eroded the real 
purchasing power of Cameroonians and increased unemployment.  The general impact on 
Cameroonians as argued by Baye and Fammbon (2002) is reported in Baye (2006b:310) that:  
“the economic crisis and the immediate effects of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) amalgamated and forced many Cameroonians to adopt 
coping devices such as moonlighting, seeking for survival in the informal 
sector, occupational and geographical mobility, changing regional patterns 
of activities and productivity, and adopting ‘behavioural innovations’ like 
corruption and other malpractices for survival”.   
 
The liberalization of export commodities also exposed farmers to the volatility of 
world market prices. Farmers suffered a cost-price squeeze that reduced their incomes 
drastically. The high cost of imports and fierce competition for main export crops by countries 
like Indonesia and Vietnam, depressed output prices on the world market. This lead to low 
incomes for farmers and many abandoned their coffee and cocoa farms that had sustained 
them prior to the crises (Baye, 2006a). Investment declined from 27 percent to less than 11 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) between 1985/86 and 1992/93. The steady decline in 
incomes led to a 40 percent fall in per capita consumption and the external debt more than 
doubled from less than one-third to more than three-quarters of GDP over the same period 
(Government of Cameroon, 2003:2). On average, human development economic and social 
indicators (Table 7.1) deteriorated considerably during the crisis period and the ensuing 
economic improvement was unable to remedy the situation.  
Over the last three years (2004-2007), GDP growth has averaged 3 percent, which is 
far below the population's expectations and insufficient to meet the MDGs. Official statistics 
indicate that inflation is under control (projected by the World Bank at 2.9 percent in 2008). 
The weak economic situation has caused frustration in the county as  
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Table 7.1: Selected data on some economic and social indicators in Cameroon between 1984 
and 1996  
ITEM 
 
1984 1986 1988 1992 1994 1996 
1984 
Vs 
1996 
(%) 
POPULATION AND 
NATIONAL 
ACCOUNTS. 
       
GDP at current market 
prices (millions of US 
$)  
7801.82 10621.23 12493.53 11396.2 7853.53 9108.55 16.7 
GDP at factor cost 
(constant 1995 prices, 
millions of US $) 
8872.03 10291.73 9311.39 7847.97 7490.3 8101.03 −8.7 
Annual growth in real 
GDP (%)  4.1 6.5 −6.8 −3.9 −1.5 4.3 0.2 
Population (million)  9.76 10.34 10.964 12.278 13.597 13.597 39.3 
Urban (%)  34.8 36.5 38.3 41.8 45.5 45.5 10.7 
Labour force 
participation rate (%)  41.1 40.7 40.4 40.2 40.4 40.6 −0.5 
Gross National Income 
(GNI) per capita (US $)  780 930 1110 910 730 610 −21.8 
Total revenue and 
grants (% of GDP)  22.6 21.4 16.4 15.7 10.2 14.8 −7.8 
Nominal exchange rate, 
CFA franc/US $, period 
average  
436.96 346.31 297.85 264.69 322.75 511.55 17.1 
Consumer Price Index 
(1995 = 100)  52.4 61.3 70.5 70.1 91.7 103.9 51.5 
SOCIAL 
INDICATORS        
Life expectancy at birth 
(years)  51.3 52 52.3 52.4 51.4 50.5 −1.6 
Primary school 
enrolment ratio (%)  101.3 104.2 102.6 93.0 88.5 85.4 −15.9 
Illiteracy rate (%)  46.7 43.6 40.5 34.6 31.7 29.0 −17.7 
Crude death rate (per 
1,000)  15.4 14.9 14.5 13.9 14.3 14.6 −5.2 
Crude birth rate (per 
1,000)  44.3 43.5 42.6 40.7 39.5 38.2 −13.8 
Total fertility rate (per 
woman)  6.3 6.2 6 5.7 5.5 5.2 −17.5 
Daily calorie supply 
(per capita)  2130 2249 2072 2206 2139 2115 −0.7 
Source: Baye (2006A) 
people’s spending power declined considerably. Recently, public frustration over rising prices 
resulted in outbreak of social unrest and violence in many Cameroonian cities in February 
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2008. Poverty in Cameroon is still high, the country remains one of the lowest-ranked 
economies on the World Bank's annual “Doing Business” survey and regularly ranks among 
the most corrupt countries in the world (US State Department, 2008).  
A strong economy, in which the benefits are shared throughout society, provides more 
resilience against future disasters. A strong economy means larger financial reserves to cope 
with future losses. Measures that help the community reduce future economic losses that 
improve their ability to recover after loss, and that make it possible for communities to afford 
higher levels of safety are all important elements of an overall mitigation programme 
(Nateghi, 2000). The low GDP per capita, increasing poverty, and cuts in public expenditures 
certainly had a toll on natural DM in the country. Unfortunately, the start of the economic 
crises coincided with the LND and this probably had a serious effect on the management of 
the event. Since government expenditure decreased on public spending, many projects 
(infrastructural and social) to improve the disaster area and survivors could not be met because 
of reduced government spending caused by the crises and measures to restore macro-economic 
stability proposed by the IMF and the world bank in the SAPs. 
 
7.2.2 POVERTY IN CAMEROON 
Income poverty today is widely spread over Cameroon as a result of the unprecedented 
economic crisis although it is unequally distributed among the various socioeconomic groups 
and regions in the country. An analysis of poverty in Cameroon is based on household surveys 
carried out in 1984 (the budgetary and consumption survey), 1996 (Cameroon Households 
Consumption Survey) and the latest Cameroon Household Consumption survey of 2001 
carried out by the government’s statistics office. Overall, poverty in Cameroon deepened in 
the period 1984–96 with the incidence of overall national poverty increasing from 39 to 68 
percent between 1984 and 1996 (Fambon et al., 2004; Baye, 2006a). From 1996–2000, 50.5 
percent of the population lived below the poverty line, compared with 40 percent in 1984 
(Amin and Dubois 2001). Because of economic recovery due notably to devaluation and joint 
World Bank/IMF assistance programs, the poverty headcount index dropped to 40.2 percent in 
2001 (IMF, 2003; Nkama, 2006).  
Poverty in Cameroon varies considerably (see Table 7.2) and is higher in rural areas 
than in urban areas. About 86.5 percent of the people in the rural areas are poor compared to 
only 13.5 percent in the urban areas of the country (Amin and Dubois, 2001). There is also 
strong inequality among the various regions. The regional incidence of poverty shows that the 
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study areas (including the West) have the highest incidence of poverty (66 percent) in the 
country, contributing 36.4 percent to income poverty (Government of Cameroon, 1996).  
 
Table 7.2:  Regional ranking according to poverty incidence 
 
Region 
 
Poverty 
incidence 
(%) 
Poverty 
contribution 
(%) 
Consumption 
adult equivalent 
(CFAF) 
Poverty 
intensity 
(%) 
Douala 19.7 3.8 522,500 12.8 
Other urban areas 21.4 5.5 358,500 12.6 
Yaoundé 29.6 4.2 441,900 16.7 
Savannah 56.7 27.2 188,000 36.7 
Forest 63.8 22.9 165,600 41.2 
Upper plateau24 66.0 36.4 219,300 41.5 
Cameroon 50.5 100.0 275,300 32.0 
Source: ECAM1996. 
 
 
7.3 SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF DISASTER SURVIVORS 
As mentioned in section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4, the case study populations linked to the LND are 
the displaced survivors presently living in the URC and former displaced survivors who have 
moved back to the disaster zone in Nyos village.  Both study populations are located in 
Menchum Division of North West Province.  
Surveys carried out shortly after the disaster showed that the demographic profile of 
the LND survivors comprised of 984 males (47.7 percent) and 995 females (50.3 percent). 
Their age range was between 3 weeks to 90 years, with 51.9 percent under 15 years of age 
(Ngwa, 1992). A report produced from studies on the socio-cultural and economic impact of 
the LND commissioned in February 1987 under the auspices of the MHESR, produced 
statistical information which shows that 70 percent of the native population were farmers 
while 30 percent were cattle herders. The research survey shows that 57.7 percent of displaced 
survivors at the URC have lived there for 18 years. The average time, which most residents 
have lived here is 17.6 years. The survivors belonged to five ethnic groups: Nyos, Cha, 
SuBum, Aku and Bororos.  Results from a similar MHESR study in the resettlement camps 
done in March-April 1986 identified a series of problems in the resettlement camps, which 
included lack of farmland and pasture and/or employment especially for farmers, an attitude of 
dependency, poor sanitary conditions, lack of privacy and increase in promiscuity (Shanklin, 
1988; Ngwa, 1992; Krajick, 2003).  
                                                 
24
 The study area is located within the Upper plateau region 
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Empirical data obtained at the URC (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2), were used for analysis of 
impoverishment due to relocation and resettlement of the LND survivors. The URC is one of 
seven resettlement camps. The other resettlement camps for the displaced LND survivors are 
Buabua, Kimbi, Esu, Ipalim, KumFutu and Yemnge camps. The URC is located in Menchum 
Valley Subdivision in Menchum Division about 9 km East of Wum, the biggest town and 
divisional headquarters of Menchum division. The URC was chosen as the cluster sample to 
study the displaced LND survivors because it is the most accessible of all the other camps 
from Wum.  At the time of the research, the camp had about 650 residents with over 65 houses 
in an area of about 80km2.  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Ukpwa Resettlement Camp in the background. Source: Author (picture taken by 
during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007) 
 
The main means of transportation to the camp from Wum is by motorcycle and bicycle, 
though most of the camps inhabitants prefer to walk as the road is very slippery especially 
during the rainy reason and motorcycle accidents are very common. The disaster survivors 
resettled in the URC and those who have returned to Nyos village are used in the next section 
to analyse the factors that exacerbate vulnerability in the LND survivors.  
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Figure 7.2: Main road into Ukpwa camp. Source: Author (researcher arriving URC during 
fieldwork in 2007) 
 
7.3.1 IMPOVERISHMENT DUE TO RESETTLEMENT  
It has been widely recognized that a common effect of involuntary displacement is the 
impoverishment of those involved (Cernea, 2005). The methodology here used socio-
economic variables in the survey questions and interviews to examine aspects of livelihood 
and wellbeing of disaster survivors. This section analyses the responses of the LND survivors 
to explore their poverty status and vulnerability to subsequent hazards using the 
Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction model (IRR) of Cernea (1997, 2004, and 2005).  
Removing people from their known environments separates them from the material 
and cultural resource base on which they have depended for life as individuals and 
communities (Oliver-Smith, 2005b). According to Tilley (1994:15) “Geographical experience 
begins in places, reaches out to others through spaces and creates landscapes or regions for 
human existence”. Resistance to resettlement reveals how important a sense of place is for the 
creation of an “environment of trust” that links space, kin relations, local communities, 
cosmology and tradition (Giddens 1990:102 as cited in Oliver-Smith 2005B: 48). Recognising 
the numerous problems faced by displacees and resettlers, the World Summit on Social 
Development (Copenhagen, March 1995) incorporated the call for reestablishing resettlers’ 
livelihoods into its Program of Action (United Nations, 1995). During the WCDR (2005) 
countries were also urged to ensure, as appropriate, that programs for displaced persons do not 
increase risk and vulnerability to hazards. 
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As highlighted in Section 2.4.6 on Page 50, Cernea's IRR model is a theoretical model 
for involuntary resettlement that highlights the intrinsic processes that can cause 
impoverishment through forced displacement, as well as the ways to counteract and eliminate 
or mitigate such effects. Cernea’s conceptualization of impoverishment emerged out of his 
own and others research into the impacts of rapid change brought about by forced 
displacement and involuntary resettlement due to development projects. Whether the 
displacement was caused by natural hazards, conflict or planned development, the effects and 
processes of involuntary displacement and resettlement are similar. There are particularly 
close parallels between the experiences of disaster-affected and development-affected 
populations (Cernea, 1997; McDowell 2002).  
Researchers have been challenged to map the “variables of impoverishment” (Cernea, 
2000:19) and understand the ways in which those variables are interlinked and influence one 
another in ways that lead to livelihood reconstruction or further impoverishment.  McDowell 
(2002) suggests that impoverishment risks are compatible and appropriate when seeking to 
understand the impacts of disasters and forced displacement on the livelihoods of affected 
populations and the process of post-disaster livelihood reconstruction. The IRR model has 
been used as a diagnostic explanatory and cognitive tool (Cernea, 2004) to analyse 
impoverishment in the displaced and affected case study populations.   
The results suggest that survivors living at the URC have been made poorer by a 
number of socio-economic factors associated with their involuntary resettlement and the 
political economy (also see Bang et al., 2009). The analysis of factors that have exacerbated 
poverty is informed mostly by the IRR model (Cernea, 1997; McDowell 2002). Mc Dowell’s 
(2002) proposed “impoverishment risk and sustainable livelihoods” (IRSL) research 
methodology in post-disaster settings identifies three main synergies between Cernea’s IRR 
model and the SLA, which examine impoverishment processes, institutions and livelihood 
strategies. The IRSL posits that the concepts of sustainable livelihoods and impoverishment 
risks are compatible and are appropriate theoretical models to understand the impacts of 
disasters and forced displacement and the process of post-disaster livelihood reconstruction. 
These multifaceted interlinked variables of impoverishment (Cernea, 2000:19) share with the 
SL approach a focus on dynamic processes, livelihood systems and vulnerability. Using 
categories based on the IRR model (Cernea, 1997, 2004; Mc Dowell, 2002), it is possible to 
identify a series of impoverishment processes at work in the case of the LND survivors.    
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Access to Land 
Considering that agriculture or farming is the main occupation of the LND survivors, 
respondents were always keen to talk about the limitations that their new environment posed 
to this activity. The URC survivors are very bitter about the relatively smaller pieces of land 
allocated to each household to engage in agricultural activities compared with the land they 
had in Nyos village. The URC survivors complain that the situation is exacerbated because the 
land is not as fertile as the volcanic soils of Nyos, on which they had been cultivating crops for 
many generations. This was a major problem because most of the people are farmers and their 
livelihoods depend solely on farming. It should be noted that most respondents owned larger 
pieces of land in their original village and many were keen to mention how they missed their 
fertile and extensive lands in the Nyos valley.  Many of the camp dwellers who owned several 
hectares of land in Nyos village now owned only an average of  400m2  (0.04 ha) of land 
around the URC.  A young man responded that:  
“I don't feel happy living here at all. My life and that of my family is 
completely different because I don't have anything. All the cows and sheep 
we had died. I should have inherited them from my father but they all died 
and I had nothing to start life with. At least we still have our land back in 
Nyos. That is the only thing I have left” (U18RL). 
 
Apart from farming, the land is also used to keep cattle.  More than 8000 cattle died during the 
LND and the survey evidence shows that many URC residents lost from a few cattle to about 
seven herds25 of cattle. Some survivors who wanted to start rearing cattle again received some 
cows from NGO’s like Hiefer Project International (HPI). However, these people are facing a 
problem of restricted land space and paddock area to graze their cattle. Due to limited land 
allocated to the households in the camp, those who have started keeping cows are forced to 
graze their cattle very close to their houses in the camp (see figure 7.3).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 According to the Ukpwa Camp survivors, a herd of cow comprises of about 65cattle.  
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Figure 7.3: Cattle grazing close to houses in the Ukpwa Resettlement Camp. Note the distance 
of the cows from the house. Source: Author (picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 
2007) 
 
These research findings are in line with earlier work, which shows that populations relocated 
by disasters or uprooted by government actions usually end up farming inferior quality/size or 
marginal lands (McDowell, 2002). During the interview session some cows could be seen 
grazing less than 10m from houses in the camp (see Figure 7.4).   
Cernea (1997) argues that limited access to land is the principal reason for increased 
poverty of displaced people, since they lose both natural and man-made capital. Loss of 
valuable land removes the main foundation upon which people's productive systems, 
commercial activities, and livelihoods are constructed.  This experience with loss or reduction 
of original land size is supported by empirical evidence from other areas in the world.  For 
example, a survey by the Institute of Ecology of Padjadjaran University in Indonesia around 
the Saguling reservoir found that resettled families' land ownership decreased by 47 percent 
and their income was halved. Similar evidence is available from Brazil (Mougeot, 1989). 
Findings from sociological and anthropological field studies also show that for farm families, 
loss of land generally has far more severe consequences than the loss of a house. Unless the 
land basis of people's productive systems is reconstructed elsewhere or replaced with steady 
income-generating employment, landlessness sets in and the affected families become 
impoverished (Cernea, 1997).  
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Figure 7.4: Researcher with a young family in front of their house at the Ukpwa Resettlement 
Camp. Note their two cows close to their bamboo toilet in the background. Source: Author 
(picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007)  
 
Limited Job opportunities  
Many URC residents lost their main source of income and livelihood activity after 
resettlement. Many cattle herders lost their cattle during the disaster and could not continue 
with that livelihood and hunters have been restricted from their traditional hunting areas.  
Apart from their new strange hunting environment, attempts to continue with this activity have 
resulted in serious clashes with hunters from the host population who complain that they do 
not have enough wildlife left.  As such, these people have been forced to switch to new 
livelihood means to support their families.  The only alternative is farming and apart from 
adapting to this new livelihood means, the problems of  poor fertility and small land size 
available to household poses a major impediment to raising enough food and income to 
support their families.  A former hunter said:  
“….I cannot continue to hunt as before because the wildlife in this region is 
smaller than we used to have. I cannot go hunting far from the camp because 
the natives of this region will not allow me.  I am now forced to farm even 
though the land here is not fertile” (U16 RL)  
 
The above interview reveals that both the scarcity of wildlife and limited access to hunting 
area is affecting hunting in the resettlement camps.  
The interview results also reveal that some women milked the cows owned by their 
husbands. Loss of mainstream livelihood activity has also affected women. The milk was then 
 
157 
 
sold to the local market and also used to produce other local dairy products, which were eaten 
and also sold to generate income.  Following the death of the cows during the disaster, many 
of the younger women in camp have now resorted to farming, but some older women 
complain that they are not strong enough to engage in farming because of their age.  These 
women prefer to milk cows than to farm because they think the former is less arduous than the 
later.  An 82 year old woman in the camp replied that:  
“I lost my means of getting income when we were brought here. I used to 
milk cows and sell the milk while in Nyos but my husband and all our cows 
died. Since we moved here I couldn't do anything because I’m now old. That 
could have been easier for me to do but at my age I cannot farm. Life is very 
difficult for me here” (U02RL).   
 
All the URC respondents stated that their economic situation in the camp was worse than 
before and had not improved over the years.  
 
Homelessness 
The concept of homelessness as in the IRR model refers to the lack of personal house, and in a 
broader cultural sense, loss of family’s individual home linked with the loss of a geographical 
area, resulting in alienation and derivation (Altman and Low, 1992). The URC residents are 
not happy with life where they are now resettled because they feel that is not their home. “We 
are living here like strangers” was a common phrase used by many interviewees to express 
the way they felt in that area.  Many respondents are not happy with life in the URC because, 
as they say, the land is not theirs and their host population, is often aggressive towards them. 
Some indicated that they are not secure in the camp and its surroundings because the natives 
whose land had been given to them were always ready to challenge them concerning farming 
and grazing space.   
“This is very worrying” said one man (U05DI) “because we are foreigners 
here and cannot argue with those who own this place even though the 
government says it’s our land now. But we know that isn’t true because the 
land has been taken from the Aghem people. When they encroach into the 
land that has been given to us, we cannot argue or fight with them because 
it’s truly theirs”.   
 
Interview transcripts reveal that many other respondents expressed similar concerns 
and many revealed that irrespective of the facilities they may have in Ukpwa, they will never 
be comfortable to live there because it is not their home and they do not truly own any 
property there. Research survey data indicates that while 83 percent of residents at the URC 
are living in camp houses provided by the government, 93.2 percent of their peers who had 
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relocated to the disaster zone were living in their own houses. Apart from feeling alienated at 
the URC, the respondents complain that their camp houses are not the “modern” houses which 
the government promised to construct (Figure 7.5). 
 
Figure 7.5: Houses at the Ukpwa Resettlement Camp. Source: Author (Picture taken during 
fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007)  
 
Housing Conditions 
Most houses have not been completed and promises to complete the many unfinished houses 
shortly after the survivors moved into the camp in 1997 have not been met by the government. 
Inspecting the exterior of the camp houses does not give a good picture of the overall state of 
the houses. As expressed by the respondents, many of the camp houses are not plastered inside 
and lack ceilings, cemented floors and walls (see Figure 7.6). Some residents have attempted 
to complete their unfinished houses by putting interior doors that were not fitted and plastering 
the walls and floors. 
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Figure 7.6: Interior of camp houses without plastered walls and floors. Photograph taken by 
author during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007 (Date in picture is default camera date setting) 
 
 The camp residents have also had to build kitchens and toilets, which were not constructed 
with the houses. The kitchens have been constructed using local materials, in most cases 
through community labour. Figure 7.7 shows the nature of the exterior kitchens. These 
findings are not uncommon, since other studies have revealed that resettled populations 
commonly live in sub-standard housing with few government services, often in conflict with 
the host population and local government, and without international recognition of their plight 
(Mc Dowell, 2002; World Bank, 2004).  Interviews showed that the residents have to 
construct their kitchens and toilets though with very limited resources. An elderly respondent 
explained the situation:  
“The government gave us houses that were not completed.  The houses were 
not constructed with external kitchens and toilets. We have to construct them 
ourselves. We are forced to use grass roofs on the kitchens because we do 
not have money to buy zinc. You can see that we cannot even build the toilets 
we dug ourselves” (U23RL) 
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Figure 7.7:  Mud kitchen at the Ukpwa Resettlement Camp constructed by the residents. 
Source: Author (picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007)  
 
Because of lack of space, many of the toilets have been constructed in close proximity to the 
houses as shown in Figure 7.8. As a result, this may pose a serious health hazard to the 
residents because potential sources of infection from these toilets are easily carried into the 
houses nearby.    
 
Figure 7.8: Pit toilets between two houses at the Ukpwa Resettlement Camp constructed by 
the survivors using local raffia palm branches and bamboo sticks. Note the closeness of the 
toilets to the camp house. Source: Author (picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 
2007)  
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Apart from the lack of facilities in the camps such as electricity and piped water, the very poor 
living condition of the survivors is clear when one enters the camp houses. Photographs taken 
of the interior of the camp houses (Figure 7.9) shows the basic condition in which the 
residents live, though they were promised after the disaster that their living conditions would 
be better than in their original village.  
 
Figure 7.9: The interior of houses at the Ukpwa Resettlement Camp. The first picture shows 
the living room in one house whose walls has been plastered and locally decorated by the 
occupant. The other picture is a resident’s bed in his bedroom. Source: Author (picture taken 
during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007)  
 
Construction materials used in the houses at the URC are different from those in the disaster 
zone. The camp houses have been constructed of cement bricks and roofed with aluminium 
zinc (see Figure 7.5), as opposed to most of the houses in Nyos, which are built of mud-bricks 
and have grass roofs. However, many respondents still feel that their houses in Nyos are better 
because, though built of mud bricks, they are more spacious and warmer inside during the 
rainy season compared with the camp houses. The toilets are also further from the houses than 
those at the camp. Because of these reasons, the respondents tended to feel that their houses in 
the village were still better than the houses they have now in the camp. The leader of the URC 
camp stated that:  
“The government promised that we will live in a better house here than the 
one we have in the village.  You have seen that the houses have not been 
completed. Many of them do not have cemented floors; the walls are not 
plastered and have no ceilings. Even many internal doors are not there. 
Toilets and kitchens were not constructed. We have tried to do what we can 
do to make the houses better. But we do not have the money to put plywood 
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on the ceilings so the houses are always very cold during the night and many 
of the people do not have good blankets to keep them warm.  I still think our 
houses in the village are better than these ones here because they are 
warmer.  There we also have enough space to build more houses for the 
children who have grown-up.  The mature children in the family who want to 
marry cannot build their own houses because there is no land.  I don’t think 
the housing situation here is better than the one in our village” (U04DI) 
 
Apart from the poor condition of the houses in the camp, no repairs are done on them by the 
authorities. The survivors have to undertake repairs, which at times can be prohibitively 
expensive.  The oldest man in the URC at the time of the survey had been displaced from his 
camp house because it collapsed, and the authorities could not assist him to rebuild the house.  
This is an excerpt of what he said:  
“We have received no assistance from the government…….even this camp 
was constructed with funds from abroad and not from the government and it 
was not even well constructed……many of the houses are not plastered, no 
ceilings, no toilets and external kitchens……The house I was living in 
collapsed and I did not have any place to live in. I complained but no one 
listened to me.  This unfinished one that I live in now was constructed by my 
son who is in the US.  No one cares about us anymore…” (U07GM).   
 
Although those fortunate to be given houses at the URC complained of their poor state, not 
everyone was fortunate to have a house at the camp. A few survivors who were promised 
houses did not have one and they had to live with friends and relatives at the camp. For such 
people, homelessness remains a chronic condition as they experience a lasting sense of 
“placelessness”. These findings are in line with others, which shows that if resettlement 
policies do not explicitly provide improvement in housing conditions or if compensation for 
demolished shelters is paid at assessed value rather than replacement value, the risk of 
homelessness increases (Cernea, 1997, 2005).   
 
Increased Morbidity and Mortality 
It has been known that declines in health can result from displacement-caused social stress, 
insecurity, psychological trauma, and the outbreak of relocation-related illnesses (Shears and 
Lusty, 1987; Toole, 1995; Collins, 2009). Though the measurement of social stress and 
disease is beyond the scope of this thesis and not a core objective of the study, from the 
responses, personal observation and attitude of many of the URC residents, it was clear that 
many people are suffering from social stress. This should be the case with many of the elderly 
people in the camp because more than 95 percent of those above the age of 50 complained in 
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their words of “always been sick since I came here”. Some authors have highlighted exposure 
to "social stress" as having differential consequences on mental health across age, gender, 
marital and occupational status (Scudder, 1993; Turner et al., 1995), 
In the IRR model, morbidity and mortality are addressed specifically to the variety of 
diseases to which resettlers are prone. The context addressed here is concerned more with 
access to medicine, medical facilities and treatment. From respondents’ responses, it appears 
that the URC residents have very little access to medicine, medical facilities and treatment for 
the range of diseases that they are faced with in the camp. Survey data reveals that common 
infectious diseases suffered by survivors include gastric problems, and malaria.  
Responses reveal that the camp has no medical officer, medical facility and medicines 
for the residents, contrary to government promises to provide these facilities. The camp 
residents have to walk about 10kms on a poor, muddy and hilly road to Wum town to get 
medical attention, treatment or buy drugs. Interview responses reveal that prior to the disaster 
and subsequent displacement; many common illnesses like fever, malaria, and dysentery were 
treated in Nyos by traditional doctors, using concoctions prepared from local herbs. This 
reduced their dependency on modern drugs. Unfortunately many of the traditional doctors died 
during the disaster. To make matters even worse, many of the local herbs that the survivors 
knew in Nyos are not found around the camp. These limitations have compounded their health 
problems and could probably lead to increased mortality in the absence of preventive health 
measures. Unfortunately no statistics exist in the region to show the scale of mortality and 
mobility due to these health problems.   
 
Food Insecurity 
The problem of loss of extensive fertile lands in the Nyos valley and the smaller infertile lands 
around the camps, together with the loss or under-utilization of livelihood skills, suggests that 
food insecurity may be worse for the LND survivors. Survey data shows that 75 percent of the 
displaced household heads are farmers. According to respondents, food production in the 
camp is far lower than they could achieve in their native land. More than 90 percent of 
respondents said that the food production is not enough to feed their families and provide 
additional income to meet other basic needs. They are also not able to cultivate a variety of 
food crops, because of limited farm land and also because some crops do not grow well in 
their present location. Although undernourishment was not assessed quantitatively, 
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observations showed that the camp dwellers do not eat a balanced diet. The staple food of 
these people is “corn fufu”, processed from maize, and this is what they eat most of the time.  
 
Loss of Access to Common Property 
The most important common property or common pool resources that have been lost by the 
URC survivors are the sparsely forested land and raffia palm bush within the Nyos vicinity 
and extensive grazing lands around Nyos village. Since their relocation to the URC, several 
social tensions have developed between the survivors and their hosts over land for farming, 
grazing and firewood (a critically important household resource since it is used on a daily 
basis for cooking).  Households at the URC now compete in the search for firewood within the 
camp’s vicinity. Many of the URC residents explained that they now have to search very hard 
for firewood, unlike in Nyos where it was readily available.  This competition has made the 
URC residents develop a new habit of storing firewood in order to be sure that the resource is 
available when needed.  During the fieldwork, large piles of firewood could be seen stored on 
the side of the camp houses (Figure 7.10).   
One of the main problems that those who have decided to start grazing are facing is 
lack of grazing land around the camp. Fertile grass land is abundant in Nyos, (the area used to 
be the highest producer of cattle in Menchum division and the North West Province). The 
extent of grazing fields on the many hills in the disaster zone is a resource that is unavailable 
to the residents of the camp. The common property resources of the LND survivors do not 
appear to have been considered in the relocation schemes and resettlement plans by the 
government. Other research evidence shows that loss of access to common property assets that 
belong to relocated communities (such as forested lands, water bodies, grazing lands, burial 
grounds) results in significant deterioration in income and livelihood. Several studies have 
shown that edible forest products, firewood and deadwood, common grazing areas and public 
quarries account for a significant share of poor households' income (Sequeira, 1994; Mathur, 
1997). 
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Figure 7.10: Firewood stored at the side of camp houses. Source: Author (picture taken during 
fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007) 
 
Social Disarticulation 
Respondent’s experiences in URC parallel other research findings that forced displacement 
unravels spatial and cultural based patterns of self-organisation, social interaction and 
reciprocity, which represents loss of valuable social capital that compounds the loss of both 
natural and man-made capital. Community disarticulation also disperses and fragments 
communities, social groups or organizations and scatters kinship groups (Cernea & McDowell, 
2000:363-364). The disaster incident and activities leading to the temporary and permanent 
resettlement in the URC have caused a net loss of social capital in the community. This was 
revealed in many ways at both intra-household and community levels.  
Widows complained that the loss of their husbands had increased their burden in 
providing for the family. Young men complained that they lost property (mostly cattle), which 
they were expecting to inherit from their parents as is the tradition of the area. The death of 
almost all the cattle in Nyos created a major problem in the community because cattle rearing 
were the main livelihood activity in the area. Parents and their sons were deeply engaged in 
keeping cattle and since most of the children did not go to school, it meant they only had to 
inherit or be given part of the property to start their own life.  The death of livestock meant 
that most people and young men had virtually nothing left on which to build their lives.   
Apart from the death of many “bread winners” upon which many others were 
dependent, post-disaster resettlement further disrupted the remaining social networks.  Many 
family members are separated by the relocation of survivors into the seven resettlement camps 
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thereby weakening their social ties. Oliver-Smith (2005b) posits that uprooted people 
generally face the daunting task of rebuilding not only personal lives but also those 
relationships, networks and structures that support people as communities. Individuals 
traumatized by loss and suffering due to resettlement are often unable to reconnect or re-enter 
the weave of the torn social fabric that was their community (Cernea and McDowell, 2000). It 
was due to the recognition of this problem that countries have been urged to strengthen the 
implementation of social safety-net mechanisms to assist the poor, the elderly and the disabled 
and other populations affected by disasters (WCDR, 2005) 
The unraveling of spatially-based patterns of self-organization, interaction and 
reciprocity is a net loss of valuable social capital that compounds the loss of natural and man-
made capital. Just like the loss of common property resources, social capital lost through 
social disarticulation was not considered in the resettlement of the LND survivors. This is 
probably why the survivors were relocated in a dispersed manner rather than relocating them 
in groups and social units. According to Cernea (1997), this real loss will reverberate long and 
detrimentally during subsequent periods because as Downing (1996) states “The people may 
physically persist, but the community is no more". It’s spatial, temporal, and cultural 
determinants are gone. It has also been argued that the heaviest costs of all for relocated 
people are the severing of personal ties in familiar surroundings, to face new economic and 
social uncertainties in a strange land (Sowell, 1996).   
Other research findings has shown that when faced with deprivation, one way 
displacees cope is through the maintenance of their rural kinship ties, which play a critical role 
in both daily survival and adaptation to extreme events such as natural hazards (Greenberg, 
1986; Haque and Zaman, 1994). Some primary social groups in rural societies comprise of 
networks of social and religious links and interdependence whose participants are obliged to 
assist one another in the event of a difficult situation usually in the form of physical and 
financial aid, food and material support (Haque and Zaman, 1994:75). Societal reintegration is 
therefore a major challenge faced by the LND survivors.  
 
7.3.2 DISRUPTED CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICES 
Though not discussed under the IRR model, disruption of cultural and religious practices was 
identified as another factor affecting the lives of the URC survivors. Relocation to the URC 
has affected many traditional practices and traditional rights that constitute an integral part of 
their custom. It will be seen later in Chapter nine that cultural factors are responsible for 
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relocation back to the disaster site (see Section 9.2.4). Apart from the fact that some important 
traditional leaders were killed during the disaster, their displacement has also distorted some 
traditional institutions, which were instrumental in sustaining the people morally and 
psychologically. Some traditional ceremonies such as annual cultural festivals and others that 
are supposed to be performed in particular locations in their ancestral village (e.g. traditional 
rites for soil fertility) cannot be performed anymore.  
The planning for resettlement at Ukpwa did not consider the faith or religion of the 
survivors. Interviews reveal that residents were unhappy about the neglect in considering their 
religion when the camp was being constructed because no place of worship was constructed. 
The URC residents are mostly Fulani who value their faith and religious practice very high.  A 
place of worship is core to their livelihood and daily living. Most of the respondents felt the 
government was undermining their faith by not constructing a place of worship prior to their 
resettlement. An old man stated that: 
“The houses were not completed…..even a mosque was not constructed 
although they knew our religion. We had to construct the mosque ourselves 
with the help of some NGOs” (U06PR)  
 
 The researcher was taken to the only house of worship in the camp, which the 
survivors constructed by themselves using local labour and building materials. Due to the poor 
construction, the small mosque that was built on the highest elevated area in the URC (see 
Figure 7.11) already has several cracks on the walls and floors. The camp dwellers did not 
have the means to obtain professional labour or to buy good building materials. They were 
assisted with some building materials like sticks, planks and zinc by the Wum local council 
and some NGO’s such as Plan International and Helvetas.  The survivors had to divert their 
labour, time and small resources towards constructing the place of worship. The quest for 
cultural and religious identity by the URC survivors is not surprising because as the works of 
Hansen and Oliver-Smith (1982) and Malkki (1992) show, those communities that can 
maintain their cultural identity and social fabric are more resilient in the face of dislocation 
and resettlement. Furthermore, churches, chapels, shrines have important symbolic meaning 
for communities. They serve as social resources that are tangible evidence of a group identity 
and necessary to reconstruct communities (Koenig, 2001).  
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Figure 7.11: Local mosque at the Ukpwa Resettlement Camp constructed by the survivors. 
Source: Author (picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007)  
 
7.3.3 INCREASES IN CRIMINALITY 
Respondents complained of an increase in crime and other negative social practices, which 
were far less common in their ancestral village. With regards to crime, interview responses 
identified the stealing of crops in the farms and some basic household needs as new 
occurrences to which the survivors have not been accustomed. The URC survivors felt the 
perpetrators of such criminal activities were people from their host community and other 
young men in the camp. The difficult living conditions and increased poverty in the camp was 
mentioned by respondents as the main causes of such bad activities. Some attributed the 
increase in theft also to the closeness of the camp houses (Figure. 7.5), which makes it easy for 
someone to know what is in their neighbour’s house and gain access to it. A female 
respondent stated that:  
“…..stealing from homes and even crops in the farm is a common problem 
here. We live closer here …. Even though we are poor, some people keep 
stealing the little cooking oil, salt and other small items we keep in the 
house. This was rare in Nyos because our people don’t have that culture of 
stealing…because of the many financial problems we have, many people 
have started to steal” (U24RL) 
 
According to Harvey (1996), the built environment in which we live is a material 
instantiation of our social relations, and hence it is crucial in the process of community 
reconstruction. Poorly-designed housing and settlement can endanger the connection that 
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people establish with their built environment, violate cultural norms of space and place, inhibit 
the reweaving of social networks and discourage the re-emergence of community identity 
(Oliver-Smith, 1991). The results here suggest that the latter is the situation in the URC, where 
the construction pattern of the houses (very near to each other) is different from the scattered 
settlements of their original area. This arrangement may have exacerbated social tensions 
within the camp, often as a result of persistent theft. Plans and structures of resettlement 
camps are generally elaborated according to donor needs of efficiency and cost rather than the 
needs of the displaced to reconstitute their community. Long, even rows of barrack-like 
structures built for the uprooted and resettled can aggravate the social tensions and conflict 
that often plague such displaced populations. The social disarticulation these factors foster, 
undermines productivity and self-sufficiency. If a planned settlement does not take the form 
that affected people are used to and like, community recovery will be impeded and the 
settlement may fail (Oliver-Smith, 2005).    
 
7.4 SOCIAL MANAGEMENT OF THE LAKE NYOS DISASTER 
Although all forced displacements are prone to major socioeconomic risks (Cernea, 2004), it is 
not inevitable they succumb to them because DM processes can mitigate or prevent the 
impoverishment risks. As discussed in Section 6.2.2, the management of the long-term socio-
economic aspects of the LND has not been very satisfactory (Bang, 2008B; Bang et al., 2009). 
Some of the social problems discussed in Section 7.3 (joblessness, homelessness, housing 
conditions and landlessness) can be influenced and prevented if robust and adequate social 
DM strategies are put in place. These factors fall within the progression of vulnerability 
discussed in the Disaster and Pressure Release Model of Blaikie et al. (1994) (Page 25), and 
also within the Human Use System of the conceptual framework of this thesis (Figure 3.1 in 
Chapter 3). This shows how the human and social systems operate to generate disasters by 
making people vulnerable (Blaikie et al., 1994:11; Hutton and Haque, 2004). In this case, not 
just how long-term recovery has been hampered by poor DM post-event but also how poor 
social management of displacement, has led to people placing themselves again at risk by 
returning to the disaster site. Survey data indicates that more than 95 percent of the displaced 
Nyos survivors have not yet recovered from their socio-economic problems since the disaster 
occurred.  
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7.4.1 FAILED PROMISES  
Promises that were made by the government to survivors during the crises period following 
the LND are mentioned in Section 6.3.2 on Page 138. Many promises relating to the 
development projects in the area are yet to be fulfilled. Interview responses reveal that the 
government has been repeating some of the promises to survivors since the disaster happened 
for more than 20 years but their rhetoric is not matched by actions. According to a respondent:  
“…..The government has made several promises to help us but very little is 
done. Our leader in this camp has explained our problems to the SDO many 
times and every time, he says he will communicate our problems to Yaoundé. 
But we never get any response. We get a few gifts only during political 
campaigns and during the commemoration of the LND every year” 
(U06GM). 
 
Most of these promises are repeated during the annual commemoration of the LND, which 
takes place every year. Despite persistent complains about the plight of survivors, issues are 
verbally addressed during these annual events by the SDO, Governor and other senior 
government officials, but little practical activity results. Promises to complete the uncompleted 
camp houses with toilets and kitchens and to provide a health centre and medical officer to 
cater for the health needs of the URC survivors have not yet been met.   
Financial assistance to compensate the disaster victims who lost relatives and property 
during the LNM disasters has also not been provided. In Njindoum a respondent who lost a 
relative during the lake Monoum disaster said:  
“All those who lost relatives during the disaster were promised financial 
compensation by the government but nothing has been given to us till today 
as I speak with you.  Some government officials duped us and collected 
money from us that they were going to follow-up the situation in Yaoundé. 
We lost that money as well” (M16GM) 
 
The assertion made by the respondent above was confirmed during a group interview in the 
palace of the chief of Njindoum during the fieldwork. Those present confirmed that after the 
Lake Monoum tragedy, some influential government officials, asked the villagers to contribute 
money, which they claimed would be used to follow-up their financial compensation in 
Yaoundé. The money was given to the officials but the villagers did not receive the 
compensation. These unfulfilled promises are certainly exacerbating the other problems faced 
by the survivors due to relocation and resettlement and certainly increase poverty.  Prolonged 
and severe material deprivation in certain circumstances has been shown to erode the basic 
identities and interactions upon which community is based (Dirks, 1980). However, Oliver-
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Smith (1992) argues that in disaster, the differential perception of whether aid should address 
basic needs or compensate for loss can generate serious social divisions along socioeconomic 
lines in stricken communities, impeding the reconstruction of society.  
 
7.4.2 INCONSISTENT ASSISTANCE TO SURVIVORS 
Interview transcripts reveal that financial help has been promised several times but rarely do 
the survivors obtain any money from the government. Even if they do, they receive it in an 
uncoordinated manner. A respondent in Nyos village square describes one incident when a 
government minister visited LN prior to the anniversary of the LND and told survivors who 
gathered there that he had brought some help from the government. He describes how the 
money the minister brought was distributed to them:  
“The government has not given those of us staying here any assistance, in 
kind or in cash. I can remember only one time that a minister came here and 
gave us money in envelopes. He put money in envelopes and threw it in the 
air. Those who were there had to fight to pick the envelopes. Whatever you 
picked you took......the amount ranged from 500 FRS to 2000 FRS. There 
were also the military men who guide the lake there so all of us including 
them had to fight to pick the envelopes. They picked most of it and only a few 
of us had something.  I picked one envelope and opened to see 1000 FRS. 
That is all the money I have received from the government” (N01GM).  
 
The overwhelming opinion from respondents was that this ad hoc method was used to give the 
money because much of it had been embezzled. A few survivors receive some material help 
from the government during the annual anniversary of the LND.  These items, which are often 
farm tools, are destined for all the survivors in the seven resettlement camps but because the 
items are not many, only few survivors get them. Respondents believe the annual 
commemoration of the LND is used as a publicity stunt by the government to give the 
impression that they are assisting the survivors. Soon after the occasion, nothing is mentioned 
again about them until the next anniversary.  
During the fieldwork, the researcher participated in the 21st anniversary celebrations of 
the LND (Figures 7.12), which took place on the 25th and 28th of August 2007. The occasion 
was organised by the DCP in collaboration with the Ministry of Sports and Physical Education 
(MSPE).  
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Figure 7.12: Participants in front of the Wum grand stand about to begin the remembrance 
walk during the 21st Anniversary of the LND. Source: Author (Picture taken during fieldwork 
in Cameroon in 2007) 
 
The main activities comprised of a remembrance walk around Wum (Figure 7.13) and a visit 
to the disaster survivors by the Governor of the North West Province who represented the 
minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation. Many government administrators, 
religious leaders and some NGO’s (Figure 7.14) participated in the remembrance walk.  
 
 
Figure 7.13: Remembrance walk around Wum in progress during the 21st Anniversary of the 
Lake Nyos Disaster. Source: Author (picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007) 
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Figure 7.14: Government officials and other guests in the grand stand in Wum after the 
remembrance walk in celebration of the 21st Anniversary of the LND.  Source: Author (picture 
taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007) 
 
The researcher also played an active part in the celebrations and was awarded a certificate of 
participation (Figure 7.15), together with other participants. A more detailed account of what 
transpired during the celebrations based on the researcher’s personal observation is presented 
in Box 7.1.  This celebration took place when the researcher was almost at the end of his field 
work and it was an excellent opportunity for the researcher to observe the interaction between 
government officials and survivors. Government officials awarded trophies and certificate of 
participation to themselves and to other participants (see Figure 7.15 and 7.16). T-shirts 
prepared for the anniversary are an example of superficial help often given to the survivors.  
 
Fig 7.15: Certificate of participation given to the researcher during the occasion of the 21st 
Anniversary of the LND.  
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It should be noted that the event held in Wum, about 45km from the disaster site.  
Initially the occasion was planned to take place in Nyos but the decision was reversed because 
of the very poor and inaccessible road. The promise to improve the road was made again 
during the 21st Anniversary of the LND (refer to Box 7.1). Many of the survivors that the 
researcher met at the celebration (Figure 7.16) did not believe that anything new will come out 
of that year’s celebrations.  However, it seemed the government had finally realised that the 
social problems of the LND survivors was a major concern because it was in the public 
domain. Responses from the main government personnel who make influential decisions about 
the management of the LND and also from speeches delivered by senior government 
administrators during the event gave the impression that finally the social problems have been 
taken on board and the government was now prepared to act. More than one year on, no major 
change has taken place.  As this thesis is written, there is no sign that any development project 
has started.  
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Box 7.1: 21ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE LAKE NYOS DISASTER 
 
Celebrations commemorating the 21st anniversary of the lake LND were held on the 25th and 28th 
August, 2007 instead of the 21st of August, the date the disaster occurred. The government shifted the 
celebrations due to the opening of the new session of parliament following the twin municipal and 
council election that held in July, 2007. The main activity of the 25th was a solidarity march around 
Wum town while on the 28th the main item on the agenda was a visit to the survivors by the Minister 
of Territorial Administration.   
The solidarity march was organized by the MSPE in collaboration with the DCP. The 
activities started at the main grand-stand in Wum at about 9am with exercises coordinated by 
physical education teachers from MSPE.  About 300 people were present. The participants 
comprised of the civil society, prominent local government administrators, and other government 
officials from various ministries, senior military officials, religious personalities, some NGOs and 
survivors of the LND who traveled to Wum.  
After the various exercises, the solidarity walk started and took about 3hours to go 
around Wum town. The march ended at the Wum main grandstand where it started. This was 
followed by a few speeches made by the SDO of Menchum, the Divisional Delegate of MSPE and a 
representative of DCP. The speeches centered on the significance of the day, the solidarity of 
Cameroonians with the survivors and government pledge to continuously remember the victims of 
the LND.  After the speeches, certificates, medals and trophies were awarded to the participants. The 
awards went first to the government officials followed by the other personalities invited, and ended 
with representatives of the LND survivors.  The following personalities were awarded certificates, 
with certificates of merit going to the top senior officials.  
1. The SDO of Menchum                8.   1st  assistant SDO of Menchum 
2. 2nd assistant SDO of Menchum   9.   The company commander of Menchum 
3. The SDO of Wum Central          10.   The commissioner of public security 
4. Divisional delegate of Youth and Sports   11. The delegate for basic education 
5. The delegate of Social affairs       12.   Reverend sisters of Menchum 
6. Delegate of public works               13.   Delegate of Commerce 
7. President of Red Cross                  14.    Commissioner of special branch 
Three trophies were also awarded to:  
1. The Divisional Officers-Collected by the SDO of Menchum 
2. The Divisional Officer  of Fungom sub division where Nyos is located and  
3. Disaster Survivors- collected by the coordinator of Lake Nyos victims. 
 
After the award of trophies, there was light refreshment comprising of soft and alcoholic drinks with 
snacks.  The government officials and other guest were served in the grand-stand while the LND 
survivors queued to get their share.  The ceremony ended after the light refreshment at about 4.30pm.  
On the 28th of August, the governor of the North West Province, Mr Koumpa Issa traveled to 
Wum, where he represented the Director of Civil protection. The occasion began with an ecumenical 
service to remember the dead followed by a speech made on behalf of the government. The governor 
announced a CFA 24 billion package targeted towards the Nyos project to relocate survivors. He said 
the project involved the degassing of the lake, which is on course, construction of houses, schools, 
health centers, roads and other facilities to improve the wellbeing of the survivors. He also 
announced the construction of a monument for those who lost their lives during the disaster. 
He also announced that he was the bearer of gifts from the government comprising bags of 
rice, salt, oil, mattresses, beds, corn mills, school needs for children and financial assistance to 
orphans.  He said these items would be handed over to the leaders of the seven resettlement camps 
for onwards transmission to the survivors. The governor said the gifts were worth 15million CFA 
francs and reiterated that the wellbeing of the survivors have always been the concern of the 
government.   
Source: Author (based on his personal experiences during the 21st Anniversary of the LND) 
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Fig 7.16: LND survivors and other participants who attended the 21st anniversary of the LND 
queue outside the Wum grand stand to be entertained after the occasion. Source: Author 
(picture taken by author during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007)  
 
7.4.3 POOR TREATMENT OF DISASTER SURVIVORS  
There is the general perception among disaster survivors that they have been poorly treated 
and neglected by the government. Respondents complain that the government does not listen 
to their social problems or fails to take any action. Many survivors feel they are just being 
neglected or have been abandoned to fend for themselves because no one gives them any 
attention despite the numerous problems they are facing. A respondent said:  
“The government does not bother about what happens to us. We have been 
abandoned in this camp to fend for ourselves. No one listens to our 
problems. We are really suffering and do not have any assistance” (U19 
GM).  
 
Some survivors confirmed that they have been receiving assistance from the Wum rural 
council controlled by the SDF opposition party and from Helvetas and Plan International. 
Helvetas have provided them with a hydraulic pumped well from which they get good water. 
Plan International also assisted the camp residents to start animal farming through the supply 
of goats and fowls. The NGOs have also provided other farm utensils and organised 
workshops to train the survivors on basic agricultural techniques and micro-credit schemes.  
Interview responses also show that respondents feel the government is discriminating 
in its treatment of disaster victims in the country. The general impression is that disaster 
victims from French speaking Cameroonians are treated better than those from the English 
speaking sector. Some informed respondents cited examples of the Nsam fire disaster in 
Yaoundé, which occurred 11 years after the LND and that the victims and the families of those 
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who died had been compensated financially. But victims of the LND, which occurred earlier, 
are yet to receive any compensation although this was a natural event unlike the Nsam fire 
disaster, which was triggered by people trying to steal petrol.  A respondent at the URC had 
this response: 
 “For managing the disaster, I can give them a fair mark but the 
management could have been better. The Nsam disaster victims were 
responsible for their death because they went to steal fuel from a truck but 
they have been given more assistance than those of us here who suffered a 
natural disaster that was not caused by us.  The government gave huge sums 
of money to them a few years after the fire accident but has not given us 
anything although the LND occurred many years before the Nsam fire 
disaster. This shows that the government favours those people because they 
come from President Biya’s Province and are closer to the administration” 
(U01GM). 
 
There were also complaints from respondents that compensation is regularly given to victims 
of other natural hazards such as landslides, storms and floods in other parts of the country 
shortly after those events happen.  
The LND survivors feel they are being unfairly treated for two main reasons. The first 
is because they are Anglophones or English Speaking Cameroonians from the North West 
Province. This links with wider allegations in the country that Anglophone Cameroonians are 
being marginalised by their majority French speaking counterparts who live in eight  out of the 
ten provinces in the country. Survivors in the camp also held this view:  
“…..I am not surprised with the way we are treated. Anglophones are 
generally treated very badly in this country. We hear that the government 
has assisted many victims of natural disasters in the French speaking part of 
this country but does not want to help us because they say we are 
Anglophones and supporters of the SDF”. (U11GM) 
 
This has led to secessionist movements like the Southern Cameroon’s National Congress 
(SCNC) calling for the separation of West Cameroon (North West and South West English 
speaking Provinces) from the rest of the country. Though most of the main resources in the 
country are located in West Cameroon, this part of the country is argued to be marginalised 
politically, socially and economically (Mbuh, 2005).  
The second reason is political. Disaster survivors hold the strong belief that the 
reluctance to solve their problems is partly due to the fact that they are sympathisers of the 
main opposition party, SDF whose founder and headquarters are in Bamenda, the capital of 
the North West Province. Whether this is true or not is beyond the scope of this thesis but 
there is the common feeling among survivors that they are treated unfairly compared to other 
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disaster victims in the country. Respondents reveal that during political campaigns, politicians 
from the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), that has been in power 
since 1982 have been repeatedly warning them to vote for the CPDM if they want their 
problems be resolved.  A survivor at the URC made this comment:  
“…..I think they do not want to support us because they accuse us of 
supporting the opposition. During the recent municipal elections, those 
campaigning for the CPDM told us that if we continue to support the SDF, 
we will not receive any help from the government. They said if we vote for 
the CPDM, then our problems will be solved easily….” (U08 GM) 
 
The CPDM party have always lost all elections in this region and the entire province as a 
whole. The unpopularity of the main ruling party in this part of the country is regarded as a 
reason why the government has a lukewarm attitude towards solving the socio-economic 
problems of this region, including the long lasting problems that the disaster survivors have 
been experiencing for more than two decades.  
  
7.5 SUMMARY  
The economic crisis that Cameroon experienced in the 1980s, the devaluation of the CFA 
francs in 1994, embezzlement of state funds and economic mismanagement has set the 
precedence of Cameroon’s continuous weak economy. This has impacted seriously on 
poverty, development projects and the management of state institutions and is an important 
factor in the weak long-term response by government to the Lake Nyos Disaster. 
This Chapter has shown how multiple aspects of poverty have reduced the capability 
of the LND survivors to recover from the impact of the LND and, by acting as a driver for 
subsequent relocation to the disaster site, makes them more vulnerable to subsequent hazards. 
Institutional assistance to the survivors is infrequent, and reliance on traditional social 
networking and kinship for assistance is very weak since the survivors were resettled in seven 
different camps and separated. This removes past securities, increasing vulnerability and 
social problems. When reflecting on their past, most displacees tended to fall into a mindset 
that has been called “the wished-for former state”, that refers to idealized images of the 
community before the displacement (Oliver-Smith, 2005). 
  Interview data and inferences from them reveal that legitimate expectations of the 
disaster survivors are intimately linked to social, economic and cultural/religious factors. The 
disaster survivors expected that the resettlement planners would consider their extended 
family relations, potential increase of family sizes and houses when choosing camps. Though 
179 
 
resettled in uncompleted camp houses, it was also expected that the houses will be completed 
soon after they move in as promised by the government. With limited income from the main 
livelihood activities in the camps (farming, hunting and cattle rearing), the survivors expected 
the government to give them more access to land, and also to regularly provide them with 
fertilizers and farming tools. To ameliorate the hardship in the camps, it was also expected that 
the government would fulfill the promises made after the LND, especially financial 
compensation for the victims or those who lost relatives. The survivors in the Ukpwa 
resettlement camp thought that since the government knew their culture and religion very well, 
a mosque would be constructed for them. Unfortunately, these expectations were not met, 
exposing the failures in the socio-economic management of the disaster as has been shown in 
the Chapter.  
It should however be noted that the resettlement processes responsible for 
impoverishment do not play out in isolation from the wider political, economic and social 
context. The difficulties faced by uprooted communities, as has been shown by this case study, 
is as much due to poor DM policy, implementation of DM measures and the non-recognition 
of the plight of the survivors. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
RISK PERCEPTION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Ideas of risk and its perception reviewed in the earlier part of this thesis are a critical theme in 
this research and this Chapter focuses on themes of knowledge, communication and attitudes 
to risk. Approaches to risk analysis in Cameroon employ mostly technical perspectives as the 
analyses in Chapters five and six have shown. However, the conceptualization of risk in this 
thesis is both as a physical and social attribute. The Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction 
(IRR) model has been used to show that resettlement can cause socio-economic processes that 
undermine livelihoods and wellbeing. The socio-economic condition of such hazard-affected 
communities influences their knowledge and attitude to risk. It is not only relevant to 
understand the perception of decision-makers, scientists and policy-makers who plan or design 
strategies to reduce vulnerability, but also the often neglected populations who are affected or 
vulnerable to these hazards/disasters. This is because the fundamental base for their decisions 
and resultant actions or behavior concerning natural hazards and disasters are shaped by 
individual and collective perceptions of risk (Tobin and Montz, 1997). Many disaster 
researchers posit that people’s Risk Perception (RP) can be used to predict natural hazard 
judgments, preferences, preparedness and behaviours (Slovic, 1992; Oliver-Smith, 1996; 
Whitehead et al., 2000; Ronan et al., 2001). However, it has also been asserted that the impact 
of RP on preparedness intentions seems much higher than on actual preparedness behaviors 
(Paton et al., 2001).   
The threat posed by LNM and especially the very high fatalities of the LND raise 
questions about how the affected community is reacting, or responding to these disasters, and 
potential future hazards in the region. To understand these behaviours, the research question 
“How do people perceive and respond to the risk that still exists in the disaster areas?” is 
addressed in this Chapter. The aim is to analyse the perception of risk by the case study 
populations and the various stakeholders in DM. Revealed and expressed perceptions of risk 
are used as the main analytical techniques to understand this process.   
Revealed risk is analysed through careful responses and behavior of the disaster 
survivors and disaster managers. Expressed preferences are obtained through interviews, 
which were designed using risk attributes and determinants of perceived risk. These two risk 
measurements are utilized in this Chapter to understand disaster survivor’s attitudes towards 
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contemporary risks and to gain insights on how disaster manager’s RP influences effective 
DM and DRR in Cameroon.  
 
8.2 DISASTER MANAGER’S PERCEPTION OF RISK 
8.2.1 REVEALED PERCEPTION OF RISK 
From the preceding Chapters, one can deduce revealed perceptions of risk from the legislative, 
institutional and administrative DM framework of the country discussed in Chapter five.  
Attitudes to risk are also revealed in the long-term management of the LND.  
Disaster Management Framework 
A close examination of the legislative framework in Cameroon reveals that disaster manager’s 
perception of social risk management is limited to the crises period and the period following 
the immediate aftermath of a hazard or disaster. The long-term management of social risk 
including the secondary effects of primary physical risk is not considered. The legislation does 
not address the plight of populations affected by natural hazards in the long term. No laws or 
regulations on the monitoring and management of displaced populations exist. However, 
legislations exist on some specific aspects of DM such as relief and rescue operations and 
technical modes of disaster prevention (e.g. Decree N° 98/031 of 09 March 1998 relating to 
the organization of emergency and relief plans and Prime Ministerial decision N° 037/PM of 
19 March 2003 creating a National Observatory for Risks). The non-existence of regulations 
on the management of the long-term socio-economic problems of disaster-affected populations 
suggest disaster managers perceive that problems created by physical risks can be completely 
resolved shortly after the catastrophic events.  
The oversight in the long-term management of the socio-economic aspects of the LND 
was due probably to the fact that the DM legislation and institutions in Cameroon attempt to 
address all the different types of disasters, without giving special attention to natural disasters 
whose impact can cause displacement, which may continue to impact the population long after 
the cessation of the relief and rescue operations.  
 
Disaster Management Process 
Though many researchers in DM favour the management of all disasters (natural, 
technological and human induced) by the same agencies, I argue that special attention is 
required in the legislative, institutional and managerial processes for natural hazards whose 
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secondary effects can inflict long lasting socio-economic problems on the affected 
populations. Disasters normally require immediate assistance to the affected populations and 
the problems created by some rapid onset disasters may be resolved a few weeks or months 
after these incidents. But disasters such as the LND can take many years if adequate DM 
decisions are not made in consideration of the social problems they may create.  
This proposition seems to be justified through a closer examination of the management 
of the LND discussed in Chapter six. During the crises period of the LND, three committees 
were created to manage the relief aid and its associated logistic operations in the disaster site 
(a National Committee for the Reception and Management of Relief Aid, and two other 
provincial committees for the reception of aid in Douala and Bamenda) (see Section 6.1.2). 
Interestingly, no committees were formed to manage the long-term social problems created by 
the disaster though it was obvious that those displaced by the disaster would live in camps for 
many years. This oversight occurred either because this specific issue was not addressed in 
legislation or because the government did not understand or anticipate the socio-economic 
problems likely to be faced by the disaster survivors.  
The concentration on technical aspects in the management of the LND also reveals that 
disaster managers tend to prescribe technical solutions to disasters in order to mitigate 
subsequent impacts. This ‘realist’ position that is common among governments (see Section 
2.4.1), is shown by the domination of the NMDP in the management of the LNM disasters, 
while the socio-economic problems created by displacement and resettlement have been 
virtually ignored for more than two decades now. It is notable that amongst many other 
livelihood and social problems, the survivors of both disasters remain uncompensated decades 
after the tragic incidents, despite government promises to compensate them. This argument is 
further strengthened by research evidence, which shows that many promised development 
projects in the disaster affected areas have not been carried out though some of these projects 
would facilitate the technical management. For example, the road from Wum to Nyos (see 
Figure 8.1) has not been upgraded to make the disaster area accessible. This would not only 
facilitate the movement of equipment and other resources necessary for the NMDP, but would 
also benefit the disaster survivors especially as a farm to market road. Only high military 
trucks and 4-wheel drive vehicles can use this road during the dry season, hampering the 
development of the region.  
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Figure 8.1: Two sections of the road to Nyos village. Source: Author (picture taken during 
fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007. Researcher in picture on his way to Nyos) 
 
8.2.2 EXPRESSED PERCEPTION OF RISK 
Cameroon’s Natural Hazard Mitigation Program 
Based on disaster manager’s expression of the success rate of Cameroon’s DRM, it could be 
inferred that most respondents consider risk to be a physical attribute. More than 95 percent of 
DM at the national level considers mostly technical and scientific factors when making an 
assessment of the success rate of DRR strategies in the country. The NMDP is viewed by 
many as the only tool that can be used to measure Government’s engagement in reducing the 
risks from the area. This skewed view is supported by past research on RP, which has shown 
that governments, science and industry usually adopt a realist or objective approaches to risk 
(Williamson and Weyman, 2005; also refer to Page 39 in Section 2.4.2). When asked if they 
were aware of disaster mitigation/management plans for the Nyos/Monoum areas, responses 
like  
“A degassing project has been going on in both lakes for many years now. 
The aim is to reduce the gas in the lake to prevent any future gas explosion” 
(D05NMM); “….You can get more information about the NMDP from the 
National Institute of Geological and Mining Research in Yaounde, which is 
coordinating the gas removal in the Lake…” (D06NMM); “A lot of money is 
being spent to reduce the gas in the Lake” (DO9NMM).  
 
Reducing the social and economic risks caused by resettlement through social management of 
survivors is not considered a viable option in the assessment of the success of the mitigation 
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program by many stakeholders involved in the DM process, especially within the government 
department.  This further supports the hypothesis that the LNM disaster management has been 
skewed mostly towards technical means, influenced at least in part by disaster managers’ 
perception of risk.  
 
Natural Disaster Risk Assessment 
Interviews with disaster managers suggest that their risk assessment is influenced mainly by 
scientific and technical processes. More than 65 percent of disaster managers interviewed rate 
the risk of disasters occurring in the country to be moderate and high based mainly on the 
frequency of natural hazards on the CVL. Their judgements do not consider the processes 
operating within the human system that can mitigate or prevent these hazards from becoming 
disasters. Many responses were similar to those mentioned below: 
“I think the risk is high. This is because you cannot stay for two months 
without hearing of a natural hazard especially in the rainy season. We 
always have many floods and landslides every year, which makes the risk 
very high” (D01HRA); “Cameroon is a country that is prone to natural 
hazards because of the many volcanic eruptions that occur here. Apart from 
eruptions, landslides also occur frequently all over the country. The risk is 
very high” (D05HRA). As a geologist you know why the risk is high. The 
frequent volcanic eruptions, the gas stored in the lakes…… is testimony that 
this country is at great risk to hazards …….” (D06HRA)  
 
This also supports the argument that their perception of risk is mostly from a technical, 
scientific or structural and physical perspective.  
 
Cameroon’s Preparedness and Resilience to Natural Hazards  
Expressed views by disaster managers within the government sector on Cameroon’s 
preparedness  suggests that the country is well prepared to tackle natural hazards from 
volcanic origins like lava flows and gas emissions from crater lakes. It seemed fashionable to 
use the NMDP as an example to show how the risk from another lethal gas discharge from the 
lakes can be managed. Government sources also talked of more investments in scientific 
monitoring equipments like seismographs on Mount Cameroon to predict future eruptions and 
minimise any casualties.  A disaster manager at the national level responded that: 
“I think scientifically the country is very prepared. Through external help, a 
lot of money is being spent on scientific equipment to monitor and predict 
hazards like volcanic eruptions and the gas stored in some lakes. A similar 
project to that in Nyos and Monoum will be done in other lakes that may 
contain poisonous gasses. The government is committed to continuously 
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support the NIGMR in its programs to reduce the risk of natural hazards in 
Cameroon”. (D05VPR) 
 
These responses show an inclination towards physical vulnerability reduction, further 
confirming the general perception of risk, which is highly polarised towards scientific aspects.  
Past research shows that the interpretation of perceived physical risk, which acts as a catalyst 
for preparations to minimize harm is sustained and nurtured by public sector bureaucratic 
disaster agencies that dominate DM (Mamun, 1996; Kirschenbaum, 2003). However, a few 
respondents, especially those within the non-government sector acknowledge that the poor 
economic state of the country, corruption, embezzlement and inefficient DM exacerbates 
vulnerability to natural factors.  A respondent in charge of DM at the local level said:  
I think Cameroon is not prepared for future hazards because it seems the 
government has not learnt anything from previous hazards. The LND is a 
good example. More than two decades since it happened, the victims have 
not recovered because of government neglect and poor management of the 
social problems of the survivors. This problem is worsened because corrupt 
officials embezzle even small gifts and money donated by well-wishers to the 
survivors.  If these attitudes do not change, many more people in this country 
will continue to suffer from disasters. It is the responsibility of the 
government to make sure that the social problems of survivors are also 
solved…… (D02VPR)  
 
The different opinions expressed by disaster managers from different sectors suggest 
that those within the government departments (national and local levels) are keen to protect or 
defend government position on the general management of disasters in the country. Those 
within other sectors (non-government sector) seem to project a more objective view of the DM 
situation in the country and their perspective of risk encapsulates both the technical and social 
aspects. It is not clear if the defensive position shown by government administrators means 
they are conscious or not of the social risk aspects of DM. But from the DM policies and the 
practicalities of DM in the country, we can at least infer that the overall risk reduction 
strategies of government are driven by a ‘public transcript’ of risk that constructs it basically 
as a physical attribute, which has mainly technical solutions (Bryant and Bailey, 1997).  
 
8.3 DISASTER SURVIVOR’S PERCEPTION OF RISK 
As in Section 8.1, here we examine first the revealed perception and then the expressed 
perception of risk.  
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8.3.1 REVEALED PERCEPTION OF RISK  
For the study populations, analysis of revealed perception of risk is based on the behaviour 
and attitude of those affected by the LND and the LMD. This is based on the assumption that 
our actions are framed by the type of perceived threat and its inevitability (Kirshenbaum, 
2005). The analysis covers disaster survivors affected by the LND who have relocated back to 
the disaster site and those affected by the LMD whose activities still interact with the Lake.  
Relocation to Disaster Zone  
After the LND, the affected area was pronounced a disaster zone by the government and 
everyone within that area was evacuated to safety far from the region. The area was declared 
unsafe and the residents restricted or prevented from coming back because the gas threat, 
which caused the disaster was still considered to be high. As this thesis is being written, the 
area is still declared unsafe as measures to reduce the gas risk from the lake through the 
NMDP continue. However, many survivors who were resettled in camps have relocated back 
to the disaster zone. Field research evidence suggests that more than 300 people are 
permanently living in the LND area with about twice that number who visit the area at 
intervals and live there on a temporary basis. Research in other parts of the world has also 
documented cases where populations living near active volcanoes or geological faults remain 
or return to their former homes after a disaster (Alexander, 2000). This behaviour defies any 
simplistic assumption that perceived high risk of occurrence and severe consequences to 
oneself, family or community should lead to specific behaviours such as evacuation and 
preparedness (Kirshenbaum, 2005).  
Research evidence also shows that even non-natives of the area who were not affected 
by the disaster have also moved to live in the region. The reasons for their in-migration to the 
disaster zone are discussed in the next Chapter but this action alone raises interesting questions 
about how they perceive the risk in the restricted area. Interviews indicate that relocation and 
in-migration to the disaster zone are due mainly to economic factors.  Past research evidence 
indicates that people’s adoption of hazard adjustments is linked with the perceived cost of 
these adjustments in relation to household income (Peacock, 2003; Peacock et al., 2005). The 
relocation behaviour suggests either that the relocated population does not consider that the 
restricted area poses any serious threat to their lives, or that the advantages of living with the 
risk outweigh the gas threat in the area.  
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Living in Close Proximity with Lake Monoum 
The revealed RP of the returnees to Nyos village is also shown by the Njindoum residents who 
live close to Lake Monoum. Although the residents of Njindoum were not evacuated from 
their village after the LMD, they were restricted from close proximity with the Lake.  People 
who lived very close to the lake were told to move further away, farms near the lake were 
abandoned and livelihood activities in the lake were prohibited. The prohibition on fishing was 
taken very seriously after scientist expressed fears that any disturbance on the water column 
may trigger another gas burst from beneath the lake.  Like LN, the area is still not safe since 
the degassing project is still continuing. However, at the time of the fieldwork for this 
research, farming activities were in full operation around the lake.  The young villager at the 
extreme right in Figure 8.2 below was seen farming less than 50m from Lake Monoum.  
 
Figure 8.2: Farming activities close to Lake Monoum. Source: Author (picture taken during 
fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007. In picture are researcher “second from left”, research 
assistant “holding file” and local residents)  
 
Njindoum villagers were seen fishing in the lower sections of the lake in which degassing 
equipment were not installed. These prohibited activities are going on despite warning notices 
close to LM, warning of the danger of poisonous gases in the area (Figure 8.3). Another notice 
explains the carbon-dioxide detector installed close to the lake and the warning system 
associated with it. 
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Figure 8.3: Warning notice of gas risk at the entrance to Lake Monoum disaster zone. Source: 
Author (Picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007) 
Apart from livelihood activities, which are going on unperturbed around the danger zone close 
to the lake, field observations and experiences within the area indicates that there are no strict 
measures to restrict access to this risky area. It was observed that military guards are stationed 
permanently at the main entrance into LM, and restrict access to the lake through this point. 
Anyone who attempts to go to the lake through this entrance is questioned and many people 
are turned away or refused access (including the researcher until he provided a letter of 
introduction). However, the larger perimeter of the lake remains unguarded. Figure 8.4 shows 
the unguarded perimeter of LM, which has unrestricted access to the Lake. 
  
Figure 8.4: Unguarded perimeter of Lake Monoum. Source: Author (picture taken during 
fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007) 
Again it seems either that the lake is no longer considered dangerous by citizens in the area or 
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that they have re-engaged in their normal activities prior to the tragic incident despite being 
conscious of the risks in the area. The following discussions of expressed RP attempt to shed 
further light on these questions.  
8.3.2 EXPRESSED PERCEPTION OF RISK 
Data on expressed perception of risk was generated by empirical information from the three 
disaster affected study populations that are central to this study. These study populations could 
simply be identified as the displaced victims of the LND, presently living in the URC, former 
displaced victims of the LND who have relocated back to the disaster zone in Nyos and 
residents in and around LM who were not resettled and have not moved from the disaster area.  
 
Type and Origin of Hazard 
Survey data indicates that all disaster survivors (100 percent) and those interviewed in the 
URC were affected by the LND. Most respondents expressed doubt about the nature of the 
disaster as ‘natural’ as they had been told by the government and scientists.  They believe the 
source of the gas was from the testing of a lethal weapon by a foreign government with the 
complicity of the Cameroon government (Bang, 2008B).  A respondent in the URC had this to 
say:  
“I don’t think they are telling us the truth that the gas came from under the 
lake......I believe it came from something that was put in the lake to kill us. 
Whatever it was, only God knows, but I’m sure that it will not be repeated. If 
they want to do it, they will surely go to another place. I’m sure it will not 
happen again so I’m not afraid to go back” (U10HA).   
 
Another respondent who expressed a similar opinion simply said “Only God alone knows 
what actually happened” (U06HA) and many said they hoped such an incident will not happen 
again. Survivors who had returned to the disaster zone share a similar opinion to their 
counterparts who are still living in the camps. They persistently recounted popular myths in 
the North West Province of Cameroon that the gas source was a trial bomb planted in the lake. 
Perceptions of disasters are to a large extent influenced by subjective interpretations of 
objective events (Slovic, 1999). According to past research, such interpretations are dependent 
on ethnic group identity (Fothergill et al., 1999; Buckland and Rahman, 1999) as well as 
community and social networks (Kirschenbaum, 2004). The LND occurred shortly before a 
state visit of the Israeli Prime Minister to Cameroon. Many survivors believe the hypothesis 
that the gas was the test of a new chemical weapon in the Lake by the Israeli Government and 
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that is why the Israeli prime minister was in Cameroon shortly after the incident to assess the 
success of the new weapon.  These rumours, which are strongly believed by the people in the 
region, are in effect a social representation of risk: groups of individuals who have similar 
backgrounds or characteristics are likely to perceive risk of disasters in a similar light (Cutter 
et al., 1992).  
 
Unusual and Unexpected Disaster 
Interviews suggests that many of the LND survivors are conscious that the disaster zone is still 
not declared safe but are not afraid to move and live there. Respondents argued that even if the 
area is declared safe, there is no guarantee that something unexpected like the LND might not 
happen again. Many of the survivors both in the disaster zone and at the URC felt safety was 
not an issue, because even the government and scientist have accepted that it was a strange 
type of incident that no one anticipated. As such, many UCR expressed the desire to move 
back to the disaster zone irrespective of whether it is declared safe or not. One respondent at 
the URC replied that:  
 “Something might also happen here which we never expected and which no 
one ever told us before that it could happen. So I am not sure that we are 
also safe here or anywhere. I prefer to live in my village. Only God can safe 
us. If he wants something to happen, it will happen no matter where you 
are” (U15HAgas)  
 
This respondent said he is not afraid to go back and will prefer to die in his village like his 
relatives, rather than live and suffer in a foreign land. The same opinion is shared by those 
who had relocated to the disaster zone. More than 90 percent of those interviewed in the 
disaster zone indicated that they are no longer afraid of any gas eruption and are ready to live 
in their village with the treat of any subsequent gas eruption.  When probed further on whether 
they are not afraid to die from another gas eruption form the lake, many replied that moving 
away from the area will not make them safe because another previously unknown and 
unexpected hazard might still occur where-ever they may be located. Interview transcripts 
suggest that many would prefer to die of an unexpected and sudden hazard like their relatives 
in their village of origin rather than die elsewhere.    
Past Knowledge of Hazard in Area 
A majority of the respondents believe the LND was a one-off incident that will not happen 
again because it has never occurred before in that region. Respondents both in the URC and 
the disaster zone said they have never heard from their ancestors that any such tragic incident 
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had occurred in their ancestral land. Interviews show that respondents mention numerous 
cultural and mystical myths surrounding the lake, but none that relates to a devastating event 
in the past. A respondent in the URC replied that: 
“…….Our parents told us that the ancestors of the village are in the lake. 
When the Nyos people violate the traditions of the Land, the ancestors will 
be angry and the Lake will dry up. But they have never punished the village 
the way the gas did by killing many people” (U02/EH) 
 
A similar response was given by an elderly woman who insisted that the Lake has always been 
a source of inspiration and blessing to the village and what happened was very strange and 
abnormal. She said:  
“…….The ancestors of the village do not punish the people by killing them 
when they are angry. When the harvest is not good, we know that the 
ancestors are not happy and the chief makes some sacrifices in the Lake. 
What about all our cows that died? Those innocent animals were killed. I 
cannot understand what actually happened but the problem was not surely 
caused by the Nyos people” (U08/06) 
 
There is the overwhelming feeling among the interviewees that the LND was a one-off 
incident that might never happen again and this gives them the confidence not to fear another 
gas-related hazard. These expressions are in line with past research evidence that what we 
perceive as risky depends to a great extent on historical experiences that are culturally 
embedded in various social frameworks, including the community and the family 
(Kirshenbaum, 2005).   
 
Hazard/Disaster Preparedness or Readiness 
Despite the many problems in conceptualizing disaster RP, the weight of the evidence points 
to its relevance for explaining disaster behaviors such as preparedness (Barberi et al., 2008). 
Hazard or disaster preparedness can be conceptualized as a social based event (Norris et al., 
1999) and/or as a social psychological process (Enders, 2001; also see Section 2.4.2). 
Kirschenbaum (2002) describes preparedness in relation to obtaining supplies or provisions, 
planning for future threats, obtaining emergency skills and providing physical protection 
against potential disasters. In Chapter six, it has been shown that the government’s disaster 
mitigation strategies focus mainly on technical aspects, dominated by the NMDP (see Section 
6.3.1). It has also been revealed that no post-resettlement contingency planning was done 
(refer to Section 6.4.1), resulting to the dire socio-economic conditions in the resettlement 
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camps discussed in the last Chapter. The following section discusses how the disaster 
survivors would mitigate the effect of subsequent similar hazards or disasters.  
Research evidence reveals three main ways in which the affected case study 
populations can prepare for or can mitigate the effect of another similar catastrophe. These 
strategies are influenced by the respondents’ education and believe in risk mitigation. 
 
Religious and Cultural Beliefs 
Some respondents in the three study disaster affected populations do not believe it is possible 
to prepare for any subsequent gas hazard from the Lake or to escape from its impact.  This 
group of respondents seem to hold very strong religious and cultural belief (see role of cultural 
variables in risk perception on Page 39 in Section 2.4.2). A few argue that God or their 
ancestors wanted the tragedy to happen and only they can prevent it. Those who think the 
causation has cultural roots said the solution could be with the traditional rulers of the areas 
and/or their ancestors. According to a respondent: 
“……. I will go back to Cha and live there. I am sure the chiefs of Nyos and 
Cha have asked for protection from our ancestors. I am sure that if anything 
like that should happen again, my forefathers will prevent me from being 
killed just as those of other families did for them. I am confident that nothing 
will happen to me in Cha” (U15RI) 
 
This response support the assertion that cultural variables play an important part in how people 
understand risk and differences in public evaluations of risk might consider the social and 
cultural context in which those exposed to risk are located (Pidgeon et al., 1992).  Respondents 
who had religious thoughts suggested that citizens of that area should get closer to God in 
order to avoid any subsequent disastrous happenings in the area.  One resident in Nyos 
(N09DP) expressed his view that:  
“…….How can we be prepared for such a thing? Only God knows what 
truly happened here and only him will safe us. When the disaster happened I 
was very afraid but now I have given my life to God so I’m not afraid 
anymore of the Lake. I pray every day to God and only him will safe us here 
in Nyos. No one can save us here because if God wants it to happen, it will 
happen. No human being can stop it. So I think only God will protect us”.   
 
Some respondents think that because of their strong faith in God, they will be spared in case of 
any subsequent hazard or disaster in the area and therefore do not think any preparations are 
needed. From the perspective of these individuals, disasters are interpreted within religious 
and cultural milieu, and disaster risks are aspects of life over which they have very little 
influence or control.   
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Local Indigenous Method 
Some displacees in the URC and their counterparts who now live within the disaster zone are 
ready to use local indigenous methods to prevent death by inhaling gas.  Such respondents 
think drinking palm oil and using it to rub their bodies will prevent death. Research evidence 
shows that respondents with this opinion now keep at least one litre reserve palm oil in their 
houses for this purpose.  A respondent in Nyos village said:  
“I know what to do if the gas comes out again. I will drink palm oil and rub 
my body with it. I always make sure that there is enough palm oil in the 
house, which can be used. I hope you know that when the disaster happened, 
those who drank palm oil did not die” (N02DP) 
 
A young man in Ukpwa also expressed the desire to store palm oil if he returns to the disaster 
zone.  
“If I go back to Cha, I will always keep palm oil at home. I hear that if you 
drink it, you will not die when you inhale the gas. Those who drank palm oil 
when the disaster happened did not die” (U15/DP) 
 
This knowledge is not new in this population because some of the LND survivors used this 
method to protect their lives when the tragic incident occurred. The Cameroon Tribune (Friday 
29th August, 1986:2) has the picture of five men in Nyos who drank palm-oil and survived the 
disaster. How this knowledge was generated or conceived is beyond the scope of this research 
but it could be important to carry out further anthological research, in order to understand the 
indigenous knowledge base regarding natural hazards and their prevention as a whole.  
 
Scientific Method  
Some residents in the Nyos disaster zone and Njindoum are conscious of the scientific means 
of avoiding danger from the gas in both lakes. These groups of respondents are aware of the 
carbon dioxide gas detector placed near both lakes and the sound warning system linked to 
them. On approaching Lake Monoum, there is a notice by the road side that warns of the gas 
danger in the area (Figure 8.3). There is also another notice placed by the NMDP closer to 
LM, by the side of the road that briefly explains the carbon-dioxide warning system and gas 
detector (see Figure 8.6) placed nearby. The notice (see Figure 8.5) explains that in the event 
of any gas discharge from the lake, an alarm will sound and a red light will be seen flashing on 
the carbon-dioxide gas detector and warning system.    
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Figure 8.5: Notice of carbon-dioxide warning system close to Lake Monoum. Source: Author 
(Picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007) 
 
Respondents in the disaster zone in Nyos have been given the same information informally by 
scientist. However, the study populations generally do not understand how it will work or how 
it will sound.  Doubt about the success of the device was also expressed by some interviewees. 
Some were concerned about what might happen if the device sounded at night and the distance 
they might have to cover to reach safety in an elevated area or hill nearby. A respondent 
replied that: 
“I hope the gas does not happen again because I am not sure of what to do. 
We have been told by some scientist working in the Lake that if we hear a 
sound from the lake that means the gas is coming out so we should run to the 
hills. You can see that the closest hill here is where the lake is. If I have to go 
to the other hills, it will take me about one hour thirty minutes. If it happens 
in the night like it did the last time then you cannot run to the hills in the 
dark. Only God will help us here” (N12 DP).  
 
Other respondents were very sceptical about the possibility of moving their entire families 
(which comprise of elderly parents and very young children) in time and up elevated areas 
and, worse of all, at night.  Research evidence suggests that because of such impressions, 
many respondents do not think the scientific method can be successful in preventing many 
people from being killed by another gas emanating from the lake.   
 
 
195 
 
 
Figure 8.6: Carbon-dioxide gas detector and sound warning system placed in Lake Nyos. 
Source: Author (picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007)  
 
According to Barberi et al., (2008), among the important factors that are thought to encourage 
community preparedness and resilience during and after the crisis are self-efficacy and sense 
of community.  Likewise, stronger community bonds and attachments make it more likely that 
residents will participate in a community response to a disaster situation (Paton et al., 2001). 
Although there is a high sense of community in both disaster zones, the lack of self-efficacy 
due to poor or inadequate risk communication reduces community preparedness and 
resilience. The role of risk communication and community response to that information is now 
discussed in more detail.  
 
8.3.3 RISK COMMUNICATION  
Disaster researchers have since recognised the link between risk communications and disaster 
preparedness behavior, particularly the effect of official warnings. Some have shown that 
appropriate and reliable risk information or warnings influence risk perceptions, which in turn 
affects preparedness or protective behaviors (Mileti and Sorensen, 1990; Plapp, 2001). As 
explained earlier in the theoretical Chapters, research in this area is concerned with the ‘social 
amplification of risk’ or social processes that increase public concern and socio-political 
activity over some hazards (see Section 2.4.2).  
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Sources of Risk Information 
Risk information from government sources is one source of information. Apart from the 
annual celebrations of the LND when the media and speeches inform the general population of 
government’s action or activities in the disaster region, some government officials 
occasionally pass on information to the public and the affected community informally.  
Interviews reveal other risk information sources that are potentially available to 
disaster survivors. The most common and popular information source is from the general 
public. This source has a great influence on respondents. It leaves them with different opinions 
about the gas mitigation program and also influences their general perception of the disaster as 
a whole (such as the rumour, which links the gas disaster with the trial of a lethal weapon). 
One respondent at the URC was clear:  
“…… We are not having any information from the government about their 
work in the Lake so we cannot rely on them for help anymore because I think 
they do not care about us. Maybe they are not sure of what to tell us about 
what is happening in the Lake. The general public knows the truth about 
what happened in Lake Nyos and no one can deceive us again. They cannot 
lie to us anymore about what happened…” (U11GI)  
 
There is also evidence from interviews that the survivors take the opinion of their elites from 
Menchum division more seriously than any information they get from strangers or non-natives 
of that region. The general believe is that, elites from the disaster area will be more informed 
about the risk situation and can’t lie to them.   
“……People from this region who are educated know the truth about what 
happened in the Lake. They cannot lie to us because they are our children 
and what happened here also affected them. I believe in what they tell us 
more than anybody else…..” (N06GI)  
 
The researcher noted from interacting with people from this region that perception about the 
origin of the disaster as not being natural is a view that is also held by some elites from the 
region that has been transmitted to the local populations.  
Survivors in the two study sites also get scientific information from scientist, 
researchers and tourists who visit the lakes. Njindoum residents gave different dates from 
within 3 to 6 years as the duration they have been told by scientists and researchers the 
degassing will be over and the lake will be free from any gas threat. Survivors of the LND 
could not give any time frame or interval for the completion of the degassing projects.  Most 
interviewees’ knowledge on the NMDP is that if the lake truly contains gas, then it still 
requires many more years for the gas to be completely removed. Interviewees in both study 
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areas admitted to have more confidence in information obtained from non-government 
agencies including, opposition parties, clergy men, elites of the region and NGOs. However, it 
is not quite clear if this group of people have been giving them information that is contrary to 
what the government is providing about the source of gas in the lake. 
 
Inadequate Risk Information 
Respondents in the three study populations do not get sufficient information about the risk in 
both lakes from government sources. Research evidence shows that there is no steady or 
organized information channel to regularly update the affected populations about the progress 
in eliminating the risk in both lakes. Interviewees get information about the progress of the 
degassing project most of the time in an informal manner from talking with the Divisional 
Officers in the region or members of the public and scientists involved in the NMDP.  A LND 
survivor responded that:  
“We are not getting any information from the government about what they 
are doing in the lake and when we will go back to Nyos. I have said they 
don't care about us so they don't bother to come and talk to us about the 
disaster just as you are doing” (U20GI).  
 
Most of the information about the NMDP is conveyed to the population only intermittently 
through government sources mostly during the annual commemoration of the LND, which 
takes place every year on the 21st of August. One respondent was very clear:    
“I have said that the government is not doing anything to help us or give us 
any information. The only time they say anything about the lake is during the 
celebrations of the Lake Nyos Disaster. That is when we hear they are 
removing the gas from the lake. After the celebrations, we don’t hear 
anything or see any government person” (U05GI). 
 
It should, however, be noted that information on the progress of the NMDP is available on the 
internet in various reports by the project coordination team and is regularly updated. However 
most of the affected citizens are not literate and do not have access to the internet. Most of the 
information communicated to survivors by scientists and tourists is probably information they 
have read from internet sources, which may be diversified or not consistent. The establishment 
of a reliable and consistent information communication channel to the affected population will 
certainly improve their knowledge and understanding of the technical safety measures going 
on in the lakes. However, numerous studies over the past decades have shown that merely 
providing an at-risk population with information about a hazard does not influence 
preparedness behavior (Paton et al., 2006).  
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Confidence and Willingness to Follow Government Advice or Orders on Risk 
Interview results show that respondents in both case studies do not have confidence in 
Government’s information on the risk in both lakes. Respondents are generally suspicious of 
information from government sources that filters through to them. One main reason is the 
suspicion that the disaster was not natural as propagated by government sources and some 
believes whatever activities going on in the lakes are just a cover-up to conceal the truth of 
what really happened. Another reason identified during the research process is that failure by 
the Government to keep several promises made to disaster survivors has made them not to 
trust the government.  An elderly female respondent was very annoyed about this issue:  
“I cannot trust them. No one trusts them here because they are liars. They 
have made many promises to us in the past but have never respected 
them……..We never saw the goats they promised to give to the women in the 
camp here. We finally had the goats from some NGO…….They gave one 
goat to each woman and we were told to give the first offspring to women 
who did not receive the assistance……..if the government has lied to us 
many times in the past, how can we believe that what they are telling us 
about the lake is true? (U03CI).  
 
Other respondent affected by the LND also expressed doubts about the certainty of any 
information from the Lake because they felt it has taken too long for the government to 
resolve the problem.  A skeptical respondent said:  
“……..It has taken too long to make the lake safe. If the government knows 
what happened as they claim, they should have solved the problem by now. I 
actually wander if anything important is happening in the lake or they are 
just trying to give us the impression that they are working to make the lake 
safe” (N17/09)  
 
Though the Njindoum population seems to be more confident about the scientific information 
about the safety of the lake, the general impression held by most respondents is that the 
government is deceptive, untrustworthy and unreliable and therefore its information cannot be 
trusted. Therefore it is clear from the results that a major education-information effort is still 
needed to improve the survivor’s knowledge and confidence, thereby improving their 
collective and individual capability to positively face subsequent hazards or disasters.  
Past disaster research has shown that the level of risk perceptions affect our response to 
warnings (Mileti and O’Brien, 1992). Other findings suggest that responses to warnings are 
also influenced by a number of social and psychological characteristics of the population 
(Farley et al., 1993; Sorensen and Mileti, 1989). However, findings from this research 
suggests that response to warnings is also likely to be influenced by past disaster experience. 
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Responses to the willingness of disaster survivors to follow government instructions can be 
grouped into four categories: conditional; obey temporarily; will not follow orders or take 
advice; will follow orders unconditionally.  
 
Conditional 
Responses under this topic show that most survivors would be judgmental of any government 
orders or advice before deciding on a course of action. The general impression for those who 
held this conditional view is that they will initially examine the orders or advice given before 
deciding to take or ignore it. Research evidence reveals that this is a new attitude based on 
their past experiences with the LNM disasters. One man in Cha within the disaster zone stated: 
“I will not obey them. Except they tell me something I know is good for 
me……we were sent to the camps and told that life will be better than in 
Nyos after the disaster. All we had in the camps was suffering until I decided 
to come back here. If I knew that was how I will live in the camp, I should 
not have gone there……now I have learnt a lesson. No one can deceive me 
anymore. Not even the government” (N17GA).  
 
Another respondent in the URC also expressed his reaction to any subsequent orders from the 
government:  
“Well I will obey advice from the government because they have the power 
to control us. But that does not mean I will follow the advice if I think it will 
not be good for me. When we were told that we will come here, we did not 
expect to come and have all these problems and that the government will 
abandon us here. If I knew, I would not have come here.  I cannot trust the 
government so I will not just believe what they tell me. I will first think about 
it before taking any orders from them now because of what I have 
experienced since we came to this camp” (U04GA).  
 
The disaster survivors also intend to consult with peer and social groups prior to deciding on 
any orders they might face from the government. Respondents indicate that they will consult 
with relatives, friends, family members and other members of their community before taking 
any actions that might affect their livelihood. Some believe it will be easier as a group to resist 
any government orders than as individuals. Those who have resettled to the disaster zone 
indicated that they did not have any intention to move from there irrespective of any orders to 
do so.  
 
Obey Temporarily 
Another group of respondents can be classed as those who will obey government instructions, 
even if they think they are not good, but only on a temporal basis. Respondents in this 
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category believe it is not possible to defy government orders because the police can be used to 
enforce them. However, they are confident that if the orders are not respected subsequently, 
the government will not do anything to reinforce them. An interviewee in the URC said:  
“It is difficult to resist government orders because they can send the police 
to arrest you. But I know that nothing will happen to me if I return to Nyos 
now. If you disobey instructions after you had earlier obeyed, they will know 
you have a good reason” (U10GA) 
 
Research evidence suggests that the survivors within the disaster zone in Nyos are aware that 
they are not supposed to be there and believe it would have been impossible to resist 
government orders to leave the area when the disaster happened. However the fact that 
nothing has been done to forcefully remove them is evidence that the government cannot 
continue to enforce decisions taken to keep them away from their village. A respondent in 
Nyos stated that:  
“…….I don’t want to leave Nyos. But if they ask me to leave, I will leave 
temporarily. When the tension has subsided, I will return. When the disaster 
happened they said no one should come back here. When the tension 
subsided people came back. You see we are many here now and they have 
not done anything to remove us. But they know that we are here. The SDO 
comes here and sees us and says nothing” (N11GI) 
 
Will Not Follow Orders or Take Advice  
Another set of respondents were emphatic about not following any advice from the 
government, after the experiences they have had during their stay in the resettlement camp.  
These people do not believe that the government can tell them anything good or has good 
intentions for the disaster victims, following the sort of treatment they have received in the 
camps. A farmer in Nyos expressed his view on this:  
“…….If I was following their advice, I would not have been here. I can farm 
and feed my family here and no one will deceive me to leave this place. No 
matter what government officials say, I will not leave my village 
anymore….” (N06/GA) 
 
These respondents feel they have to take their own initiative to survive and cannot rely on the 
government because of the experience they have had since the LND. Another respondent 
simply said “I came back here to stay and no one including the government will convince me 
to leave” (N10GA). A similar view was expressed by respondents in Njindoum who indicated 
that some unscrupulous officials extorted money from them after the LMD. Other studies have 
indicated that individuals who feel they have some control over their fate and believe they 
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have the skills necessary to take action, are more likely to actually adopt self-protective 
measures (Bandura, 1997; Lindell and Whitney, 2000).    
 
Will Follow Orders Unconditionally 
A few respondents in both study areas informed the research process that they did not have 
any intentions to defy government orders. These people expressed the idea that the 
government has the technical and human resources to know the risks in the region and are 
placed in the best position to advise them on what course of action to take. A respondent in 
Njindoum stated that: 
“I will take government advice because it is the government’s responsibility 
to protect its citizens. The government has educated advisers and scientists 
who can warn them of any dangers in the lake. If we are given any orders to 
protect our safety, it will be unwise not to follow them” (M07GA) 
 
Although some believe the government may not always make the best decisions on their 
behalf, they felt it was their responsibility as citizens to obey orders from the government and 
then to complain later if necessary. A Nyos survivor stated that:  
“The government has the powers to control everyone and it is difficult to 
disobey government orders. ……. If I am told to leave this village, I will not 
disobey. I will return to my family in Kimbi…” (N18GA) 
 
8.4 SUMMARY 
This Chapter has shown that the technical information of risk, which had dominated the 
Cameroon DRM system only partially, contributes to understanding of risk and determines 
risk behaviors or decisions.  Results from the study populations on both expressed and 
revealed RP indicate that a complex set of psychological, social and organizational factors 
affect how individuals express their risk assessments. Examining the DRM framework shows 
the government’s perception of risk to be polarized towards technical or scientific causations. 
Efforts to mitigate the physical risk in LNM through the NMDP, without a project to cater for 
the socio-cultural and economic problems of the survivors, also reveal the skewed nature of 
RP in Cameroon. Disaster managers overwhelmingly indicate their perception of risk as a 
physical event whose prediction and mitigation lies in physical measures. The relocation of 
disaster survivors back to Nyos village and the resumption of livelihood activities close to 
Lake Monoum suggest that both populations perceive the risk in these lakes to be low or at 
least low enough to be tolerated. Expressed RP in these areas also confirms the revealed 
behavior. Survivors who had relocated to the disaster site in Nyos believe the source of the 
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poisonous gas was not natural while both the Nyos and Njindoum study populations believe 
both lakes would not emit poisonous gasses again for a very long time because such events are 
rare. The expressions of hazard or disaster preparedness and readiness are influenced by 
respondents RP, which is rooted in their religious belief, past and contemporary knowledge 
and information on physical risk in the area. Research evidence also shows that respondents 
have more confidence in risk information from other sources than from government sources.  
Analyses show that most respondents are not willing to take orders from the government 
without first reflection on the implications of such orders for their livelihoods. Based on the 
experiences of the socio-economic management of the disasters, some respondents feel that it 
is the responsibility of every citizen to take full control of their livelihood and safety rather 
than rely on the government.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
RELOCATION DECISIONS 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of relocation decisions presented in this Chapter follows on from the previous 
Chapter because people’s perception of risk when faced with natural hazards underpins their 
preferred relocation sites. This Chapter seeks to answer the fourth research question “What 
makes people settle or move away from the risky areas?” The objective is to explore and gain 
an understanding of the reasons behind the choice of where people decide to settle and/or 
resettle after the disasters. This Chapter forms the core of this thesis because it is not only 
influenced by the findings of other research enquires, but can also influence them. Ultimately, 
how relocation decisions influence the other main research themes will be explained in the 
new disaster model derived from this thesis in Section 10.2.  
It has been known that people commonly return to restricted or forbidden zones after 
natural disasters (Norio et al., 2003; World Bank, 2006:46) but few detailed studies have been 
performed to understand the motivations for relocations. This research attempts to bridge this 
gap by examining how relocation decisions are influenced by vulnerability drivers, risk 
perception and disaster management. Understanding the motives for relocation or non-
relocation from hazard areas will hopefully guide government’s DM and decision making 
process, and enable  decisions to be made that will not only benefit the affected populations 
but will also be respected by them. A comparative analysis of the non displaced Njindoum 
residents and of those who had returned to the disaster zone in Nyos provides insight into the 
factors that make people remain in or relocate to disaster areas.   
This Chapter develops four themes related to relocation decisions based on empirical 
information from the study populations. The themes addressed are motivations for relocation 
back to the disaster zone, motives for non-relocation to the disaster zone, intention to relocate 
from present location, and preferred relocation area (when the disaster occurred or if another 
should occurs).  
 
9.2 MOTIVES FOR RELOCATION BACK TO THE DISASTER ZONE 
Empirical data for motivations to return to the disaster zone was generated from the disaster 
survivors who have moved back from the various resettlement camps and are living in the 
disaster area at the time of the fieldwork. Information from respondents in this area indicates 
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that more than 330 people are living in Nyos village while about 90 were living in Cha.  
Figure 9.1 is a photograph of the disaster area taken by the researcher during the fieldwork 
along the road that leads to Nyos.  
 
 
Figure 9.1: Scenery of Disaster zone. Source: Author (picture taken during fieldwork in 
Cameroon in 2007) 
 
9.2.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE RESETTLEMENT CAMPS  
The deplorable socio-economic conditions in the resettlement camps are the main push factors 
motivating the survivors to relocate from there to the disaster zone. The impoverishment 
factors discussed in Chapter seven are mainly responsible for making people relocate back to 
the restricted disaster zone. Although empirical data to analyse the socio-cultural and 
economic situation of the disaster survivors was conducted at the URC, responses from 
disaster survivors from other camps indicate that the living conditions there are similar to 
those in the URC. Poverty and hunger in the resettlement camps are the main complaints given 
by residents in the disaster zone as the primary motive for leaving the camps. Information on 
the income of the studied populations, obtained through survey questionnaires (Table 9.1) 
shows that returnees to the disaster zone have slightly higher incomes than those in the camps.  
Although this data confirms information on the dire economic situation obtained from 
interviews, incomes in the disaster zone is not as high as would have been expected. This is 
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probably because as some respondents complained, the bad road makes it difficult to transport 
their products for sale in Wum.  
 
Table 9.1 The average monthly income for the three study populations.  
STUDY 
POPULATIONS 
INCOME  
Farming Cattle Rearing Salaries/Wages 
Given by 
relatives 
Remittances 
abroad 
FCFA US$ FCFA US$ FCFA US$ FCFA US$ FCFA US$ 
Displaced Nyos 
Victims 12,900 29 14,500 32 4,200 10 4,000 9 10,000 22 
Returnees to 
disaster zone 15,500 35 20,800 46 1,000 2 5,000 11 9,800 27 
Non-displaced 
Njindoum 
residents 
101,000 223 170,000 376 55,000 122 9,000 20 12,000 27 
 
Respondents living in the disaster zone, (Figure 9.2) complained of acute poverty in the camps, 
which is exacerbated by poor soils and limited farming and grazing space for agrarian 
activities.   
 
Figure 9.2: Houses in the disaster zone; Nyos (left) and Cha (right).  Source: Author (Picture 
taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007) 
 
One respondent replied that:   
“I moved back here from Kimbi because we were very poor there without 
enough food and money. Here I am able to cultivate and sell maize, beans, 
groundnuts, yams and also bananas and plantains, which we have in our 
farm. I have more money here than in Kimbi though the problem we face 
 
  
206 
 
here is that of transporting the crops to the farm. At times my bananas are 
ripe and get rotten in the farm because I cannot transport them to Wum to 
sell since vehicles don’t come here because of the bad road.  But the little 
that we are able to carry on our head to sell in Wum still give us more 
money to pay the fees of our children” (N06MR)  
 
Apart from the land problem, which has been troubling the disaster survivors in the 
resettlement camps, the cattle of their host population, the Aghem26 people, also eat and 
destroy the crops they cultivate. This has been an ongoing issue that the camp residents have 
not been able to resolve for many years despite several complaints to the authorities. A female 
respondent who has relocated back to Cha village stated:  
“What brought us here was hunger. We came back to Cha from Ipalim Camp 
and have been here for 8 years. At Ipalim camp we were working but the 
cows were eating our crops and when we complained, nobody listened to us. 
We were living there like strangers and suffering. Here we cultivate corn, 
cassava; plantains and the crops do very well” (N14MR).   
 
9.2.2 FERTILE VOLCANIC SOILS 
The fertility of the Nyos Valley and Nyos volcanic plains (see Figure 9.3) is a crucial pull 
factor into the disaster zone. The fertility of this region has been known for a long time and the 
natives of this region have always known that they produce much food because their land is 
very fertile (Melinda, 2002:5). The Cha people are said to have come originally from Fungi 
and have moved to their present location to farm the land below Lake Nyos (Troyer et al., 
1995). Most respondents (85 percent) made reference to the high richness and fertility of the 
soils in this region compared to the resettlement camps. The poorer soils of Wum and the 
surrounding areas create food insecurity to the Aghem people and the situation is worsened 
because the poor farmers do not have money to buy fertilizers, which can be used to enrich the 
soils (Thermoset, 2000). Interviews suggest that residents in the disaster zone have higher 
yields and incomes (see Table 9.1) than from the same farm size in the camps. Residents in the 
disaster zone also cultivate more variety of crops than in the resettlement camps. According to 
the account of one respondent in the disaster zone,  
“I came back to cultivate here because the soil here is very fertile compared 
to that in Kumfutu where I have been living since the disaster occurred.  
Here I can farm corn, ground-nuts, beans, sugarcane, cocoyams, egusi and 
cassava. In kumfutu, cassava does not do well. You can understand that if I 
really need to have more food then I had to come back because the crops 
grow better here and there are no cattle do destroy them” (N03MR) 
 
                                                 
26
 The word used to describe the language and inhabitants of Wum.  
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The field research process also discovered people who are living in the disaster zone but are 
non-natives of the area and were not affected by the disaster. Research evidence shows that 
some of these people have moved into the area from the neighbouring villages like Koskin, 
Fonfukka, Kong, Su, and Munken (see Figure 6.3) and from as far as Wum town.  These in-
migrants have taken advantage of the absence of most of the natives of that area and moved in 
to cultivate the rich soils. In Nyos, some in-migrants have been farming in the area for more 
than 15 years now and research evidence suggests that their numbers have been increasing 
over the years, with more and more non-natives from the neighbouring villages coming into 
the area. Many of the non-natives of the region do not live in the disaster area.  
 
Figure 9.3: Fertile Nyos valley. Source: Author (picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon 
in 2007)  
 
A few live there temporarily but the majority only travel to and from the region on a daily 
basis to farm. Interview transcripts also reveal that many of these people are using the lands of 
the disaster victims they knew who either died during the disaster or are living in the 
resettlement camps. Some in-migrants in the region also claim the land they cultivate is owned 
by people they know and that they have obtained permission from the owners who are not 
resident in the disaster zone. However, others gave the impression that they were farming on 
land that is not occupied or has been abandoned.  
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9.2.3 FARMING AND GRAZING SPACE 
One other dominant motivation for returning to the disaster site noted by respondents is the 
availability of enough land for farming and grazing. Many respondents who mentioned the 
fertility of the Nyos valley as a major pull factor also talked of the extensive land available for 
farming a variety of agricultural products. The respondents have overcome the land size 
problem encountered in the resettlement camp and are able to cultivate more crops and 
generate more income than in the resettlement camps. Survey data shows that 72 percent of 
those in the disaster zone are crop farmers and 24 percent grazers. A few people are engaged 
in both farming and grazing of cattle. Crops like maize, beans, cassava, groundnuts, egusi, 
plantains, banana and vegetables are grown on large areas (Figure 9.4). Respondents also 
indicated that the crops are safe from destruction by cattle unlike in some camps where cattle 
can easily enter farms and destroy or eat crops.  In the disaster zone, the cattle are kept in hills 
and ranches far from farms and only few people have started livestock farming again since the 
death of thousands of cattle during the disaster.  A transcribed interview reveals the account of 
a resident in the disaster zone: 
 “I came back from Ipalim resettlement camp to farm because the land here 
is fertile and we did not have enough farming land there. Here we have 
enough land to ourselves and don’t have problems like we used to have in 
Ipalim with the natives over land. Before the disaster, I used to rear cattle 
but everything died and I was left with nothing. My wife was the one who 
used to farm. Since she died, I had to start farming because there was 
nothing else to do. We had our land here where she used to farm so I had to 
come back to continue farming on the family land we have here in Nyos” 
(N17MR)  
 
As mentioned earlier, some people who have returned to the area are engaged in livestock 
farming. Prior to the disaster, livestock herding was the main livelihood activity of the 
Mbororo people in this area. These pastoralists made a significant contribution to the economy 
of the region and raised herds primarily composed of breeds thought to be more resistant to 
trypanosomiasis (Frantz, 1981). Livestock farming is relatively low key in this region now, 
possibly because most of the cattle died during the disaster and the remaining cattle were 
taken out of the region. Respondents in the disaster zone who are livestock farmers have few 
cattle compared to the pre-disaster period. They stated that there is abundant green pasture for 
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the cattle and their only worry is salt that is needed to improve the diet of the cattle. 
 
Figure 9.4: Extensive maize field growing in the Nyos valley. Source: Author (picture taken 
during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007)  
A respondent in Nyos who is engaged in livestock farming responded that: 
“I came back here to graze my cattle. There is enough land and fresh 
grazing pasture here. I was having problems in Ukpwa with my cattle 
because I didn't have enough land there. The land given to us by the 
government was very small. People’s cattle often destroyed my crops and my 
cattle also encroach into the farms of other people and at times will damage 
their crops. I was constantly having problems so I decided to come back 
here where we have enough land……we used to have more than five  herds 
before the disaster” (N13MR) 
 
It should be noted that farmer/grazier problems are not uncommon in the Wum area where the 
URC is located. Several farmer/grazier conflicts, which have sparked serious protests by 
farmers in the region over the destruction of crops, have occurred in the past with the most 
recent happening in 2004.  According to Nyeh and Chongsi (2005), a generation-old problem 
was repeated in 2004 when about 6000 Aghem women in Menchum Division camped outside 
the offices of the SDO and later laid siege on the Aghem Fon’s palace for 48 days demanding 
that grazers in the region remove their cows, which had been destroying and eating cultivated 
crops in the area, including at the URC.  
The farmer/grazier problem dates back to 1937 when the different administrations in 
the region began to seek solution to this old problem. The women in Wum always blame the 
predominantly Mbororo and Aku´u graziers for failing to restrain their cattle from grazing on 
cultivated crops in the farmlands (Ngeh and Chongsi, 2005). It is very clear that these cattle 
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encroach into farmlands because grazing pasture in this area is insufficient. This has 
compounded the problems of the resettlers, whose crops are also destroyed. Residents of the 
URC have also started keeping cattle, thereby adding to a problem that has long been in the 
region.    
 
9.2.4 CULTURE  
Interviews suggest that cultural factors such as place of birth, burial site for relatives and 
family members and inheritance rights are important pull factors into the disaster zone.  
Respondents indicated their wish to live where they were born rather than in what they 
referred to as “a foreign land”. Many said it was not possible to live away from their land of 
birth indefinitely. Some said they had to return independently because the government have 
not told them when they will be rehabilitated back to their ancestral land.  This is expressed by 
a respondent in Nyos: 
“This is our house. This is my village. This is where I was born. I cannot 
continue to live in Yemgeh without knowing when we shall be told to come 
back. My parents and grandparents are buried here and I prefer to live with 
them here. This lake has been here for many years and we cannot run away 
from our village because of it” (N15MR) 
 
Many respondents said they returned to the region to live near the graves of their ancestors, 
including those who died during the disaster. A few said the survivors are having numerous 
problems in the camps because their ancestors are angry with them for abandoning their 
homes in the village. Respondents also emphasised that it was their custom to live near the 
graves of dead relatives and weed them in order to receive their blessings.  One respondent 
(N07MR) responded that:  
“I came back here from Wum where I have been living with relatives since 
the disaster. I came back because I could not abandon our compound here 
and live elsewhere. In Wum, I was always having nightmares in which I was 
informed to come back to our house here in Nyos. My parents are buried 
here and I cannot abandon their graves to live elsewhere. I had to come 
back so that I can be weeding their graves”. 
 
It should however be noted that these cultural factors were not mentioned in isolation. Most 
respondents gave more than one reason as a motive for relocating to the region with the 
knowledge that the area is still declared unsafe. 
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9.2.5 PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Interview results suggest that some respondents returned to the disaster zone in order to 
protect their family property (such as farms and houses) from in-migrants who had moved into 
the region. They are afraid that these properties can be taken permanently by strangers if there 
is no one to protect them. A 57 years old man in Nyos said:  
“When the disaster happened I was not here, I came back from Wum eight 
years ago to farm our land which other people were using.  I came back to 
protect the land for my children because I am the only one left after my 
brothers and parents died….” (N01MR) 
 
This fear is supported by previous research, which indicates that people who occupy sites that 
communities have fled because of threat or actual violence may resist the return of original 
occupants and owners (Oliver-Smith, 2005B). Similar arguments presented by respondents for 
being in the disaster area relates to inherited property. Some claim that it was their 
responsibility to protect property they inherited from family members, some of which have 
been owned within the family for hundreds of years and they had the responsibility to pass 
them on to others. Failure to carry out this family obligation may result in them being cursed 
by their ancestors and they may die or suffer from an incurable disease. Respondent N05MR 
said:  
 “I was in Bafmen before coming here. All our family members died leaving 
only two of us.  At that time I was just 12 years old.  All our cattle died so we 
inherited only the land.  My brother and I came back to preserve our family 
land. Our ancestors will be angry with us if we abandon the family land, 
which was given to our parents. We have to pass it on to our children……” 
  
9.2.6 FAMILY SIZE 
The continuous expansion of the family size in the resettlement camps is another reason for 
relocation back to the disaster zone. Interview sources revealed that increase in family sizes 
with more children being born and the elderly ones get married, creates pressures within 
families for living space in the camp houses and also for farming land. Most of the camp 
houses at the URC have only two bed rooms to be shared by the parents and the children. The 
elderly children who eventually get married do not have place to live with their spouses since 
there is no provision in the camps for extended or new families. Responses from some young 
families in Nyos village indicate that many young families move away from the camps in 
order to be independent and to build their own lives. These young families do not want to 
continue living with their parents or relatives and prefer to relocate to their village where there 
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is often family land on which to build their own houses. Alternatively, some have moved back 
to their family houses that were abandoned when they were forcefully uprooted after the 
disaster. According to one young married person in Nyos,  
“What brought me back here is hunger. I decided to come back because I did 
not have enough food to feed my family and this is where I really belong 
although we were removed from here.  My parents and three brothers were 
killed during the disaster and I went to live in Esu with my uncle. I came 
back because I got married and could not continue to stay with my uncle 
since I was having my own family. My uncle’s house was small for me and 
my wife and his own family since he has 6 children. The land there is also 
small for all of us. When one of his sons also got married, I had nowhere 
else to go so I came back here where we have our house. The life in Esu was 
not good because we did not have enough money. I have been here for 4 
years now and I’m happy because I have enough food and also sell some of 
my maize, cocoyam and beans. My wife and I have enough land to farm 
because my other brothers died and I was left alone” (N11MR).  
 
The photograph below (Figure 9.5) shows the researcher with a young family in Cha village 
who have relocated back to the disaster site.  
 
Fig 9.5: Researcher with family who have relocated back to the disaster area in Cha. Source: 
Author (picture taken during fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007) 
   
9.2.7 FAMILY STRUCTURES  
This research has also revealed that 30 percent of respondents in the disaster zone do not live 
there with their whole families, and that some do not reside there on a permanent basis. 
Interview results reveal that some survivors came into the disaster area only to farm and 
thereafter return to their houses in the camps. Interview responses indicate that these survivors 
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live in the disaster zone from a few days to four months. During the harvest season, more 
people move into the area to harvest the crops, which are then carried to the camp houses for 
food and for sale.  At this time, the younger children may accompany their parents to help in 
the harvest and the transport of harvested products to the camp houses or the market. The 
respondents said this arrangement provides them the opportunity to have more food and also 
protect their entire family from being killed in the event of another disaster since the area is 
still declared unsafe. This is expressed by a respondent that: 
“…….I am living here alone and my whole family is in Wum because the 
children are in school. I go to visit them once every two weeks and during 
the harvest season they come to help me harvest the crops and take to 
town……I am not sure that  something terrible will not happen again here 
but if it does, it is better that I die alone, than for the  entire family to 
die….”(N20MR) 
 
This behavior is certainly an adaptive strategy employed by the people to have a means of 
livelihood while trying to cope with life in the camps.  However, some respondents informed 
the research process that they intend to move their families on a permanent basis to the 
disaster site in the nearest future.   
 
9.3 MOTIVES FOR NOT RELOCATING TO DISASTER SITE 
Interview conducted in the URC also revealed reasons why some disaster survivors have not 
relocated or do not intend to relocate to the disaster site. The motives for non-relocation back 
to the disaster zone are related to education, age, and adaptation.   
 
9.3.1 EDUCATION 
Many families are reluctant to move back to the disaster site because of the education of their 
children. Though the URC lacks many social facilities as mentioned in Chapter seven, it has a 
primary school (Government Primary School Ukpwa) that was created in 1997 (Figure 9.6). 
Survey results indicate that at the time of the research, 35 percent of households in the URC 
had children below 10 years of age. At the time of the fieldwork, the school had seven streams 
(class 1 to 7) in 9 classrooms with 623 pupils.  This is the only educational facility in the URC 
and is regarded as a valuable resource by the camp dwellers. The children attend primary 
school here although many cannot attend secondary or high school because there is none in the 
camp. Children in the camp who want to attend secondary or high school have to travel 10kms 
to Wum where the nearest secondary school is found or move away from the camp and live in 
Wum in order to attend secondary and high school. Interview results suggest that parents are 
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reluctant to allow their teenage children (less than 15 years old) attend high school in Wum.  
The few who are able to sponsor their children in Wum are only willing to send them there if 
there is a relative with whom they can live while studying.  Due to financial limitations and 
the constraints mentioned earlier, many of the children in the URC end their education in 
primary school.  A young parent responded that:  
“…that is the primary school our two children attend although we do not 
have a secondary school in this camp. If by the time they complete primary 
school and we still do not have a secondary school here, they will stay at 
home. They cannot walk from here to Wum everyday to attend secondary 
school and I do not have money to rent a house for them in Wum….. I don’t 
want them to live alone at a young age and will not leave this camp until 
they complete primary school.” (U06RL)  
 
Many parents in the URC want their children to have primary education even though their 
education might end at that level. Informal interaction with survivors indicates that many did 
not have formal education but simply followed the livelihood activities of their parents, which 
was basically cultivation of crops and livestock farming. They think their children should at 
least be able to read and write even if they cannot get a higher qualification. When asked why 
he does not want to move back to Nyos one man replied:  
“I don't like being here because this place is strange to me. Although the 
government says this is our land, we are not free here. I always feel like a 
stranger here and have discussed with my wife the possibility of us going 
back to Nyos. But the problem is that our two children are going to primary 
school here and we cannot take them to Nyos because there is no school 
there. We want them to have some education because we did not go to 
school.  If we went to school, maybe we should not have been suffering here. 
We don’t want them to suffer like us. Even if they don’t go to secondary 
school because there is none here, it is good for them to have at least the 
First School Living Certificate. If not of our children, we should have gone 
back to Nyos to farm there because the crops don’t do well here” (U15RL).   
 
 Figure 9.6: Government Primary School Ukpwa 
fieldwork in Cameroon in 2007)
 
Although many respondents in the camp have been held back for these educational reasons, 
interviews indicate that 52 percent plan to relocate to the disaster zone as soon as their 
children have completed primary school, and are either old enough to leave the camp for 
secondary or high school in Wum or move there to live with relatives on a temporary or 
permanent basis. A respondent said: 
“….. Coming here has been good and bad. Good because my children can 
go to school. We did not go to school in Nyos because our parents thought 
education was not important for us.  Now my children can learn how to read 
and write even if they cannot go to secondary school.  The sad thing is that 
this camp is a foreign place for us. We will return to Nyos when our children 
complete school……” (U13 RL)
 
One can infer from such responses that many residents of the URC are only there 
and plan to relocate back to the disaster zone in the near future. This finding strengthens the 
argument that the non
people to defy government orders or instructions not 
 
9.3.2 AGE 
A few elderly respondents expressed the desire to relocate to the disaster zone but indicated 
that their age was preventing them doing so.  These elderly people are too old to do any work 
and too weak to walk on their own. Some depend on their families and 
for water and even food and cannot live without assistance. Such people are willing to relocate 
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-availability of basic facilities is a push factor from the camps and makes 
to move back into the disaster zone.  
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neighbours in the camp 
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from the camp but need assistance. Interviews reveal that these elderly people can only 
relocate with relatives who will assist them in their village of origin. One old man responded 
that:  
“If I were younger, I should have moved back to my village a long time ago.  
You can see that I am old and sick and cannot take care of myself. My 
grandson and the people in the camp are those taking care of me and my 
children who are living in the town come to see me from time to time.  I 
cannot go back by myself and will not have someone to cater for me as they 
are doing here” (U08RIage).  
 
It can be deduced that these people are willing to relocate from the URC but cannot because 
their decisions are dependent on the goodwill of others who have to provide them with long 
term assistance. The wish of many of these people is to die in their village and be buried there 
and if it were possible, they would relocate to the disaster site as soon as any opportunity 
presents itself. Survey information shows that about 14.5 percent of survivors in the URC are 
above the age of 60.  
 
9.3.3 CAREERS 
Transcribed interviews reveal that few people intend to move to bigger towns such as Wum 
and Bamenda. A critical examination of these responses shows that it is mostly the younger 
people and couples (generally less than 30 years of age) who are interested to live in 
townships or urban areas. These individuals are not interested in farming and want to learn 
some livelihood professional skills like carpentry, motor-mechanics, driving, sewing, 
hairdressing etc. A young respondent said:  
“….. As soon as I have money, I will relocate to Bamenda to learn 
carpentry. Some of my friends who could not continue school learnt some 
professional skills and are working in Bamenda. They are better than us in 
this camp. The problem is that I do not have anyone who can assist me to 
lean a professional skill” (U20RL) 
 
Most of these people were probably less than 10 years old when the LND happened. It should 
however be noted that not all the LND survivors were resettled in camps. Many moved to live 
with relatives away from the region and also in the cities. Some children were also adopted 
and have grown away from the region in urban areas. As revealed in the interview above, it is 
likely that some survivors are influenced by the career path, which their peers who had moved 
away from the region have followed.  
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9.4 FURTHER RELOCATION PLANS 
Enquiries about plans to relocate from the present sites was conducted in all three disaster 
affected study populations. An understanding of the relocation plans in the region could help 
planners or disaster managers to anticipate potential demographic changes in the region.  
 
9.4.1 INTENTION TO RELOCATE FROM DISASTER ZONE 
A few residents within the disaster zone mentioned that they did not expect to live or continue 
with their livelihood activities there indefinitely. Such responses were given mostly by the 
non-natives of the region who have taken advantage of the absence of the original displaced 
indigenes of the region to move into the area. All respondents who are farming on pieces of 
land that are not theirs (including those who have obtained permission to farm in the disaster 
zone) stated that they are prepared to leave the area at any time the rightful owners of the land 
tell them to vacate.  An in-migrant said: 
“I was not affected by the disaster but have come to Nyos mainly to farm. I 
do not own the farm I am using at the moment and will stop using it when 
the owner comes. I am not here permanently and will have to leave one day 
even if no one instruct me to leave because this is not my village” (N05RI)  
 
However, those farming on pieces of land whose owners died during the tragedy hope to 
continue farming indefinitely, with the assumption that no one will stop them. The general 
feeling of the in-migrants in the disaster zone is that they intend to leave the area once the 
natives return.  
 
9.4.2 NO INTENTION TO RELOCATE FROM DISASTER ZONES 
There is strong evidence that the LND survivors who have relocated back to the disaster zone 
and the Njindoum residents who were not displaced from their village do not have any 
intention of moving away from their ancestral land. More than 64 percent of respondents 
stated that they have no intention to leave the disaster zone irrespective of the risk that exists 
there. A majority of the respondents said that they prefer to live with the risk in the disaster 
zone and be sure to have food to feed their families than to live away from there as previously 
and suffer. A respondent said:  
“I will never move away from here. I am not afraid to die from the gas 
disaster. I prefer to die of the gas disaster here than to die elsewhere. I 
prefer to live here in happiness with enough food and die of the gas from the 
lake than live elsewhere and die of starvation” (N07RI).  
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Some respondents who relocated to the disaster zone alone are planning to bring their families 
to live with them permanently in future. During the interview discussions, one respondent in 
Lower Cha responded that:   
“I will never leave my house again and no one will force me to abandon my 
village ever again. I am planning to bring my wife and children during the 
next summer holiday to live with me here. No one will convince me to leave 
this place, not even you. I hope you have not been sent to tell us to leave our 
village because I will not leave.  This is where I was born and will die here. I 
don’t care if the gas should happen again and kill me. I’m happier here than 
in Kimbi camp where I was living like a stranger” (N09RI). 
 
The Njindoum residents also expressed a similar opinion to those living in the Nyos disaster 
zone. 88 percent of Njindoum interviewees indicated that they have never even considered 
leaving their village. Respondents living close to Lake Monoum were quite optimistic that 
nothing would make them leave their homes and that if anything were to happen again, the 
worst they would do is to move temporarily further from the lake. They did not express any 
intentions of ever leaving their village or abandoning their homes because of the potential 
consequences of a subsequent gas discharge from the lake. An elderly man had this response: 
“I have lived here for more than 50 years and you do not expect me to leave 
my house, and all the property I have worked to acquire all my life here 
because of the treat of dying from gas from the Lake.  My children may leave 
elsewhere but not me. Since the gas incident happened, people have been 
talking of the risk from the lake. But I have never considered leaving the 
village because of that” (M08RI) 
 
9.5 PREFERRED RELOCATION SITE 
During the research process, respondents were also asked about the characteristics of the area 
where the disaster survivors could have preferred to be resettled.  The impression of Njindoum 
residents was also sought as to the site they would prefer to be resettled in the case of any 
hazardous or disastrous event that requires forceful displacement. Their responses are 
discussed under social and natural capital.  
 
9.5.1 SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The LND respondents in the camps and the disaster site said they would have preferred to be 
relocated in an area or community that has a similar religion and culture to theirs.  Survivors in 
the URC are the Mbororo people whose culture, religion and lifestyle are different from that of 
their host community. For example their host community, the Aghem people of Wum, have a 
matrilineal system of inheritance and lineage, which is an important attribute of the Aghem 
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culture. Aghem economics, family structure, and traditional culture are bound up in its 
matrilineal roots. The Aghem women have property and land-use rights, which remain 
constant before and after marriage (Thermoset, 2000). This is in stark contrary to the Mbororo 
at the URC who have a patrilineal system of inheritance and the women do not own property. 
The religion of the two communities is also different. While the Mbororo are more inclined to 
the Muslim faith and religious practices, the Aghem are mainly Christians of the Catholic and 
Presbyterian denominations.  
It is known from respondents’ perspectives that life in the URC would have been better 
if their host community had the same culture and religion. In such circumstances many 
problems are likely to be resolved more easily or not allowed to escalate to disproportional 
dimensions that can damage community relationships.  In such situations, it is easier for the 
resettled community to easily integrate in the life and activities in their new environment. A 
respondent in the URC said:  
“We should not have had many problems if we were resettled in a 
community with whom we speak the same language and share a similar 
culture. They would easily understand our problems and easily cooperate 
with us” (U07PR). Another respondent simply said “….We can live more 
comfortably in an environment where the host community easily understand 
our religion and way of life. Our relationship with the host community will 
be better if we share a similar culture” (U15 PR). 
 
 According to Oliver-Smith (2005b), culture and community are variously rooted in places and 
communities that can maintain their cultural identity and social fabric are more resilient in the 
face of dislocation.  
Some respondent mentioned particular areas they would have preferred to be resettled 
in. The predominantly Muslim Northern provinces and Hausa Quarter in Bamenda are some of 
the preferred relocation areas mentioned by the Nyos respondents.  The oldest woman in the 
URC at the time of the fieldwork stated: 
“I cannot be sure if life would be better elsewhere but would have preferred 
to be settled in Adamawa Province where we have relatives….” (U03PR).  
 
The inhabitants of these areas are the Fulanis and Hausas who have similar religious and 
cultural practices to those of the resettled community in Ukpwa. An attempt to probe this same 
issue with the Njindoum residents also produced similar results or responses.   
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9.5.2 NATURAL CAPITAL  
Another point highlighted by respondents on preferred resettlement site is intimately linked to 
their livelihood activities. Areas that have extensive fertile land where the resettlers can freely 
engage in farming and other livelihood-related activities such as livestock farming of cattle, 
goats, sheep and fowls are preferred relocation sites. It was noted that respondents always 
compared the anticipated productive assets of such an area to their native land in Nyos.  Being 
unable to identify an area with similar characteristic within their vicinity, some respondents 
indicated that they should have been resettled very close to the disaster zone because that area 
possesses similar characteristics to their native land in terms of environment and its 
agricultural potential.  A respondent in Nyos said:  
“There is plenty of fertile free land in this area where we could have been 
resettled. I don’t know why we were taken to a place where the land in not 
only poor but the natives are prepared to fight over the small pieces of land 
given to us.  At Kumfutu we were constantly quarrelling over the small land 
given to us, which became smaller as our families grew bigger.  If I knew 
that we would go through all these suffering, I should never have left this 
village. But at that time I was afraid and could not take any decision because 
I was young.” (N08PRL) 
 
These reasons are similar to others found elsewhere in the world where disaster displaced 
populations  generally prefer to remain near their former homes, as was the case in Bam, Iran 
(Ghafory-Ashtiany and Hosseini, 2008 :231-232), Islamabad, Pakistan (USAID, 2006:9) and 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia (Manfield, 2007:4). From these findings, one can deduce that 
productive assets are central in the mind of displaced populations when deciding where they 
would like to be resettled.   
Research into the preferred relocation site has underlined the importance of 
considering the opinion of the displaced population in deciding their resettlement site. This 
section has revealed that cultural, religious and productive land assets are central in 
determining the preferred resettlement site for displaced populations. Research findings have 
also revealed that displaced population can have very valuable opinions in choosing their 
preferred relocation site which if accepted, can prevent long term socio-economic problems.  
However, further research is needed to understand the perspective of the LND 
survivors who were resettled in communities with a similar culture and language.  Most of the 
survivors from Cha and Nyos villages were resettled in Yemgeh and Ipalim camps 
respectively. These camps are not only closer to the disaster site (see Figure 6.3) but the 
languages and culture are similar to the Mmen language, which is the most widely spoken 
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language in the region (Grant et al., 1993; Troyer et al., 1995). Nyos in the Mmen Language 
means “good”.  It would be interesting to test the assertion that life can be better with a 
community of similar culture and religion in the Ipalim and Yemgeh resettlement camps. 
 
9.7 SUMMARY  
This chapter has addressed four main themes related to relocation decisions that concern both 
case study populations and in so doing has attempted to answer the fourth research question. 
Analyses have shown that the motives for relocation from the resettlement camps are mainly 
related to social, economic and cultural factors. These factors are either acting as push factors 
away from the resettlement areas or pull factors into the disaster zone.  The reasons why many 
survivors are still living in the resettlement camps while their peers have relocated elsewhere 
are related to education and age. Many residents of the URC are reluctant to leave so that their 
young children can acquire primary education in Government School Ukpwa. Some elderly 
people in the URC who would have preferred to relocate back to the disaster zone are only 
prevented from doing that because they do not yet have someone to live within the disaster 
zone. Research evidence also shows that most of the residents at the URC plan to relocate 
from there in the nearest future and are only constrained by either the education of their 
children or old age. The original inhabitants of the disaster zone who have relocated back do 
not have any plans to leave the region again. Those who are willing to leave the disaster zone 
are generally in-migrants who took advantage of the absence of the real natives to enter the 
zone for farming. The non-displaced Njindoum residents whose village lies close to Lake 
Monoum also indicated that they have not considered leaving their village and do not expect 
to do so because of any threat from the lake. Cultural, economic and social reasons underpin 
this steadfast position. The study populations of both disasters also indicated their preferred 
relocation site to be a region with similar or the same culture, religion and good economic 
potential in terms of natural and physical capital. These findings do not only inform 
knowledge on migration decisions but are relevant for disaster management plans and policy 
building. They also relate to and inform the other main research enquiries in such a way that 
has led to the production of a new disaster model that links relocation decisions, vulnerability 
drivers, risk perception and disaster management (discussed in Chapter 10).   
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS AND NEW DISASTER MODEL FOR 
RELOCATION DECISIONS 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis set out to address the social context of natural disaster risk and vulnerability with 
particular emphasis on relocation decisions following the LNM disasters in Cameroon. A 
major motivation for the research was the need to broaden the scope of DRM in the country, 
which has focused on technical analyses and structural mitigation measures. This failure to 
reflect wider paradigm shifts in DRM approaches, which emphasize social risk and 
vulnerability analyses and non-structural mitigation measures, has been highlighted during the 
research process.  
In a poor country that experiences regular occurrences of ‘natural’ disasters, sometimes 
with devastating consequences, resettlement and subsequent relocation are processes often 
forced on or adopted by the affected populations. At Nyos, this has included the unauthorised 
return of displaced people back to the disaster site, despite on-going risk of hazards recurring. 
Since the DM system in Cameroon is not robust, not efficient and ineffective in policy as well 
as practical implementation, understanding relocation decisions is central to the subsequent 
application of DM practices that will impact positively on disaster victims. It is hoped that an 
attempt to provide answers to the research questions that link disaster management, 
vulnerability drivers, risk perception and relocation motivations will contribute in both a 
conceptual and practical manner to understanding the complex social framing of risk in 
Cameroon and beyond. These findings reiterate the need for DRM programs in the country to 
establish the link between risk, vulnerability, poverty and livelihood that is crucial for 
sustainable development.  
The logical order of the research questions (1-4) is reflected in the presentation of the 
analytical chapters (Chapters 5-9) that address the questions. In this concluding Chapter, the 
aim is to summarize and synthesize the findings. Based on the main themes and the key 
findings, a new disaster model for relocation decisions that links the themes has been 
suggested. This is followed by a discussion of further research needs. This Chapter also 
addresses major policy recommendations based on the need to integrate the main findings with 
the development process in the country. The key findings from the research, the new disaster 
model for relocation decisions and policy recommendations are presented in the following 
Sections of this Chapter.   
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10.2 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS IN ANALYTICAL CHAPTERS 
10.2.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM QUESTION ONE 
(What strategies have been adopted for the affected people to cope with and recover 
from the Lake Nyos and Monoum disasters?) 
Research enquiries to provide answers to question one have been presented in Chapters five 
and six. While Chapter five provides an overview of the natural disaster management 
framework in Cameroon, Chapter six deals with the management of the LNM disasters. This is 
the first time that a comprehensive document has been produced concerning DM in Cameroon. 
One major problem encountered during the research was the difficulty in finding any 
document about the functioning of the DM system in the country. All available material on the 
subject is not only incomplete, but scattered in different government documents and policies 
concerning Civil Protection in Cameroon. It was therefore a challenge to produce a Chapter, 
which will not only provide answers to question one, but will also be useful to policy makers 
and disaster managers by scrutinizing the DM framework of the country. The success of the 
DM process is being put to test in the management of the LNM disasters that has been 
examined in Chapter Six. Both Chapters therefore provide information that is relevant to 
understand the strategies that have been used and are still being used to recover from the LNM 
disasters.  
In Cameroon, the management of risks posed by natural hazards/disasters, together 
with other hazards is under the common umbrella term of CP (Section 5.2).  The legislative, 
administrative and institutional processes of CP, including response to disaster, have been 
built into the governance structure of the country over many years. National government 
organs (8 main ministries) and local government bodies (local and city councils including 
municipalities) are the main government sectors involved in DM (see Section 5.4.1). The 
institutions within the non-government sector include national and local NGOs, development 
agencies and members of the research and academic community (refer to Section 5.4.2). The 
government has also established relationships with international development organisations 
(UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, IOCP etc), and with other countries that facilitate the process of DM 
in the country (see Section 5.4.3). The DCP in MTAD is the nodal agency responsible for 
coordinating and managing all disaster activities in the country.  
The administrative and power structure of DM reflects the general governance 
structure and process in the country (refer to Section 5.5).  The DM structure is divided into 
the national, provincial or regional, and divisional or local levels, with the main disaster 
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managers being government administrators appointed through a presidential decree to govern 
these administrative units. These disaster managers can either be civil administrators or 
politicians of the various political parties (discussed in Section 5.5.3). The descriptive account 
of the DM framework in Cameroon has been presented above. How the research critically 
analyzed this framework is summarized below.  
 Empirical analysis of the state of Cameroon’s hazard mitigation program suggests the 
following:  
1) The DM framework follows a hierarchical top-down power structure from the ministries at 
the national level to governors at the provincial or regional level down to SDOs at the 
divisional or local levels. 
2) The roles of some institutions involved in DM are not identified in government policies.  
3) Most disaster managers possess only superficial knowledge of government’s regulations 
on DM. They are aware that the regulations exist but lack more detail information 
regarding the application and enforcement of the laws even in their own sectors. 
4) Most government disaster managers (administrator, politicians) assessed Cameroon’s 
hazard mitigation program as a success although they acknowledged that the program 
requires more resources for further improvements.  
5) The non-government disaster managers (mainly academics and mayors of opposition-
controlled councils) who presented a more objective view about Cameroon’s hazard 
mitigation program said the program is not working well. They attributed the failures to 
poor enforcement of government legislation on DM, the shortage of skilled and trained 
personnel in DM and the shortage of adequate financial and material resources as key 
constraints on the effective functioning of DM in the country. 
6) Most disaster managers rate the risk to natural hazard in Cameroon as moderate and high. 
This rating is based on their knowledge of the geology and tectonic setting of Cameroon, 
and also the country’s frequent occurrences of geophysical and hydro-meteorological 
hazards (landslides, toxic gas emissions from crater lakes, volcanic eruptions, floods) 
7) Disaster managers within the government sector rate Cameroon’s vulnerability 
preparedness/resilience to natural hazards as high. These disaster managers’ perception of 
Cameroon’s preparedness and/or resilience to natural hazards/disasters is heavily 
influenced by the progress of technical risk mitigation processes (of which the NMDP is 
considered the prime example).  
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8) Disaster managers without government administrative functions classified Cameroon’s 
vulnerability preparedness as low for the following reasons: Inadequate financial resources 
for natural hazard mitigation programs; insufficient scientific instruments to monitor 
hazards;  the non-existence of a natural disaster management plan for the country; the non-
existence of a natural hazard contingency plan; that government programs on DM are 
more reactive than proactive and that the complex administrative and power structure in 
the country stifles DM programs.  
The management of the LNM disasters has been analysed under the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster, the long term management process and contemporary reflections and 
perceptions on the management of both disasters. The LMD disaster (37 deaths) occurred two 
years earlier than the LND in 1984, but the danger and risk posed by Lake Monoum only came 
to light in 1986 after the LND killed 1746 people through a similar release of poisonous 
gasses. The secondary effects of the LND included the displacement of thousands of people 
from the disaster zone. In the Lake Monoum case the surviving residents of Njindoum village 
close to Lake Monoum did not leave their village and only experienced restrictions on 
livelihood activities around the lake’s vicinity such as fishing and farming.  
The very challenging relief and rescue operation that followed the LND was 
coordinated by the Cameroon government with financial and material help from the 
humanitarian and international community (refer to Section 6.2.2). The management of the 
massive relief aid that poured into the country was entrusted into the hands of three 
committees created at the national, provincial and divisional levels. The location of the 
headquarters of the National Relief Committee, 500km away in Yaoundé, with distribution 
centers in Douala, Bamenda and Wum, at considerable distances through a poor road network, 
created problems with coordination of relief activities, personnel movements and storage 
especially of perishable items. The variety of relief and material goods that was also 
contributed within the country and beyond was far in excess of needs and inappropriate.  This 
eventually led to allegedly widespread embezzlement of the relief aid, which had serious 
consequences for the socio-economic management of the disaster.  
The initial stages of the rescue operation to evacuate the disaster zone were 
characterized by confusion and inadequate resources, since no contingency plan had been in 
place for such an operation (discussed in Section 6.2.3). Although many government officials 
visited the region to console the survivors, most of them ended in the divisional headquarters 
in Wum and did not proceed to the disaster zone. Research evidence suggests that this was due 
226 
 
to the poor road condition to Nyos and fear of the unknown (the cause of the disaster). The 
rescued survivors were provided with accommodation in seven temporary camp sites shown in 
Table 6.5.  
The recovery process for the LND survivors has been approached mainly as a short-
term material problem. The aid and assistance marshalled to help the survivors largely 
focussed on material needs such as clothes, blankets, farm tools and housing. During the 
immediate post disaster period, several suggestions and promises made on how to help the 
disaster survivors have not been met two decades later. While the government administrators 
or disaster managers feel the crises period was well managed, their counterparts in the 
opposition parties hold a contrary view. Interview sources reveal that the survivors feel their 
welfare and basic needs were initially catered for during the immediate aftermath of the 
disaster, though this dwindled rapidly as time went on.  The most pressing demand now from 
the LND survivors is to achieve a greater balance between addressing their basic material 
needs and acting in a way that supports, rather than undermines, their struggle to reconstitute 
the social basis of their communities.   
Overall, the management of the LNM disasters has been biased towards technical 
aspects without sufficient attention given to the socio-economic problems of the survivors who 
were resettled in camps. The technical management has been dominated by the NMDP (see 
Section 6.3.1). The main funding of the project came from the USA, France and Japan.  
Preliminary technical results from the NMDP indicate very limited success with the degassing 
process, with flaws in the pipe designs and installation. The risk of flooding has also been 
identified in Lake Nyos (refer to Page 131 in Section 6.3.1) with investigative reports that the 
Lake could be bridged with catastrophic consequences that would lead to severe flooding in 
Nyos and part of Nigeria (UNEP/OCHA, 2005; Kling et al., 2006). During the field work, the 
researcher also carried out an onsite geologic technical assessment of the rocks on the 
spillway, where the breach is most likely to occur (see Figures 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8).  Suggestions 
to remediate the flood risk include a further reduction of the gas levels followed by lowering 
of the lake’s water level. Despite these problems, most government officials feel the NMDP is 
an outstanding success while their counterparts feel it is too early to assess the success of the 
project (discussed on Page 135). 
Knowledge of DM plans for the LNM disasters held by most key disaster managers 
within the government sector is limited mostly to the technical aspects, particularly the 
NMDP. Only a few at national levels and in the DCP are aware of detailed plans for the socio-
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economic reintegration of the Lake Nyos area. Disaster managers within the government 
sector attribute the limitations in the management of the LND, especially the social aspects, to 
the following:  
1) Economic crises in the late 1980s that weakened the economy.   
2) Poor governance, negligence, incompetence, corruption and politics (discussed in Section 
6.4.1).  
 Interview results show that disaster managers think the management of the disasters 
could have been improved if: 
1) Proper planning had been undertaken for both the technical and social management of the 
disaster in the long term.   
2) Committees were set-up to monitor and report the progress of projects progressively-gaps 
in the socio-economic management of the survivors in the camps could have been easily 
identified and addressed.   
3) Local disaster managers worked directly with the beneficiaries in all the decision-making 
stages thereby removing unnecessary administrative bottlenecks in the application and 
reception of resources (see Section 6.4.2).   
 Failures in addressing the social concerns and livelihood problems of the survivors is 
also a lesson that some feel should be learned and corrected in subsequent disasters that cause 
mass displacement of people. A summary of some key findings from question one and how 
they influence relocation decisions is mentioned in Table 10.1. 
 
10.2.2 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS FROM QUESTION TWO 
(How can we understand the vulnerability of individuals and their households to the 
present risks at Lake Nyos and Monoum?) 
Answers to question two are provided by sections in Chapter six that analyse physical 
vulnerability by examining the technical management of the LNM disasters and Chapter 
seven, which examines the social vulnerability drivers in the displaced Nyos populations. 
Socio-economic factors in the resettlement camps are motivating survivors to relocate to the 
disaster zone, thereby making them vulnerable to the physical/technical risks, which exist 
there.  
The LNM gas disasters, which form the case studies of this research, occurred on the 
Oku mountainous range that is part of the CVL (See Appendix 1). The populations in these 
areas are vulnerable to natural hazards in this extensive volcanic range. The case study 
populations in Nyos and Njindoum are even more vulnerable to the ongoing physical risk in 
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both lakes. The NMDP has not been very successful because the pipes installed in the lakes 
malfunctioned and caused only small quantity of gas to be removed. Recent scientific 
evidence showed that since the LNM disasters, both lakes still contain tremendous volumes of 
gas (see Page 129 in Section 6.3.1), more than was released in the initial disasters and 
therefore, still pose grave danger to the local population (Krajick, 2003; Kling et al., 2006). 
The risk of flooding has also been identified in Lake Nyos (see Page 131). Scientific studies 
have revealed that the upper 40m of Lake Nyos’s natural dam is being eroded at an uncertain 
but geologically alarming rate. This dam can be bridged, leading to floods in downstream 
areas as far away as 108km in Nigeria (Lockwood et al., 1988; Lockwood and Shuster, 1991; 
UNEP/OCHA, 2005; Kling et al, 2006). Despite these physical factors, socio-economic 
problems affecting the LND survivors are serving as push factors from the resettlement camps, 
driving disaster survivors and their families to relocate back to the disaster zone.  
A combination of specific conditions of resettlement and the wider political economy 
are also responsible for vulnerability. Cameroon’s economic situation paints a gloomy picture. 
Within the last quarter century, the country’s economic growth has declined due to: serious 
economic crises in the 1980s; a challenging global environment; the implementation of 
economic policies dictated by international financial institutions; pervasive corruption and 
consistent mismanagement of resources (Baye, 2006b; see Section 7.2.1). Unfortunately, the 
SAPs adopted by the government to solve the economic crisis instead compounded the crises 
on households and eroded their purchasing power leading to increased poverty. The severe cut 
in civil service salaries of up to 65 percent and the devaluation of the CFA franc by 50 percent 
in January 1994 aggravated an already precarious situation.  
This economic downturn impacted seriously on poverty (about 87.5 percent in rural 
areas), development projects, and management of state institutions and programs.  Indeed, the 
government has often used the economic crises as a rationale for not implementing promises 
and planned projects designed to solve the socio-economic problems of the survivors.  Against 
the negative backdrop of the economic situation, the displacement and resettlement of disaster 
survivors has further compounded their impoverishment.  
The sudden displacement and resettlement experience that the LND victims have 
endured, has limited opportunities for survivors to regain their pre-disaster livelihoods and 
adopt coping strategies which might ease the hardships associated with displacement. The 
social conditions of the LND survivors have been analysed based on Cernea’s IRR model 
(Cernea, 1997, 2004). These include access to land, limited job opportunities, homelessness, 
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housing conditions, increased morbidity and mortality, food insecurity, loss of access to 
common property, social disarticulation, disrupted cultural and religious practices, and 
increases in criminality (analysed in Section 7.3.1). These socio-economic problems have 
distinct and identifiable links with the involuntary resettlement processes. Wider research 
evidence shows that such problems reduce the capability of resettled populations to recover 
from the impact of the natural hazards (Wisner et al., 2004).  
The displaced populations have ended-up worse off for more than two decades now 
since the disaster occurred. The survivors have lost their homes, ancestral lands, and 
properties, and suffered strains on their spiritual, cultural and economic wellbeing.  This has 
been compounded by the dire social and economic situation in which they live in the camps 
with increased poverty, limited livelihood options and reduced coping strategies and 
capacities. Coming from agricultural backgrounds dominated by agrarian livelihoods, these 
survivors have extremely limited opportunities compared with more skilled labour force. The 
majority eke out subsistence livelihoods mainly in agriculture in very difficult circumstances, 
on small and infertile land holdings with lack of essential farm tools, and insufficient cattle for 
the herders. More than 98 percent of the survivors are confined to unskilled labour activities, 
of which more than 85 percent are engaged in subsistence agricultural activities working as 
farmers, cattle grazers or hunters. Only two disaster survivors in the URC were found to be 
building a career in skilled employment as primary school teacher trainers away from the 
camp in Wum.  
 Research results indicate that the social problems of the survivors are not exclusively 
economic. The survivors now experience more property theft both in the farms and at home 
(see Page 168 in Section 7.3.3). The survivors have also seen many aspects of their cultural 
and religious activities, which used to be integral to their daily activities and social life, 
seriously disrupted because of geographical relocation and the non-construction of a place of 
worship when resettled (see Page 166 in Section 7.3.2). The poor management of social 
aspects of the LND has also contributed to further compound the problems of disaster 
survivors. 
Government’s handling of the disaster, which has downplayed the social and cultural 
aspects of the overall long term DM, is also critical because it exacerbates the impoverishment 
factors. There is infrequent institutional assistance to the survivors and the government has 
failed to comply with promises to compensate disaster survivors, in tackling the socio-
economic problems and to carry out major development projects (see Page 170).   
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When reflecting on their past, most survivors tend to fall into a mindset that has been 
called “the wished-for former state”, that corresponds to idealized images of the community 
before the displacement (Oliver-Smith, 2005). Since the social management of the LND has 
not been addressed effectively, the impoverishment has added to the poverty problem in the 
region. This is one main driving force for the relocation of survivors back into the disaster 
zone, thereby increasing their vulnerability to any subsequent gas explosion or the risk of 
flooding from Lake Nyos.  Table 10.1 have a summary of some key findings from question 
two, and how they influence relocation decisions. 
 
10.2.3 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS FROM QUESTION THREE 
(How do people perceive and respond to the risks that still exist in the disaster 
areas?) 
Analysis in Chapter 8 focused primarily on question three. It examined both revealed and 
expressed risk by the various stakeholders involved in DM in Cameroon and the populations 
that were affected by the LNM disasters.  Analysis for revealed risk was based on observation 
of the behavior of the study groups, while expressed risk is based on interviews conducted 
during the field research process.  
Revealed perception of risk by disaster managers is informed mostly by the 
characteristics of the DM framework of the country and DM actions taken to solve the 
problems created by the LNM disasters. Detailed examination of this framework reveals that 
the government’s perception of solutions to risks from natural hazards centers mainly on 
scientific and technical methods (see Section 8.2.1). The legislation only addresses the 
immediate post-disaster relief and rescue operations. Measures to mitigate the socio-economic 
risks in the long-term are not mentioned. This is revealed in the management of the LND 
where crisis committees were formed to manage relief and rescue operations but none formed 
to anticipate and oversee the long term problems of the survivors. Preparations were not made 
to contain any future socio-economic vulnerability that may develop as a result of the 
resettlement experience of survivors in camps. This shows the shallow perception of risk by 
the government.  
In terms of expressed risk, interview responses from disaster managers regarding 
several risk-related themes strongly indicate that their overwhelming perception of risk is from 
a technical, scientific or physical perspective (see Section 8.2.2). No considerations are given 
to the robustness of the non-structural mitigation measures. Most disaster managers within the 
government sector said Cameroon’s natural hazard mitigation program is effective, based on 
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the NMDP. Expressed views on Cameroon’s vulnerability preparedness and resilience to 
natural hazard is also based on physical vulnerability, which indicate an overriding perception 
of risk as a physical event, whose prediction and mitigation lies in physical measures. Social 
vulnerability, which in this context will be the ability of affected populations to cope with, 
resist and recover from the impact of disasters (Wisner et al., 2004), is seldom considered.  
An analysis of the revealed and expressed perception of risk by the affected 
populations in the LNM areas was also performed. The relocation of some LND survivors 
back to the disaster zone, though still restricted, and the livelihood activity of Njindoum 
villagers in LM, which is still declared unsafe, is indicative of their revealed perception. 
Whole families are now living in the Nyos disaster zone and fully engaged in livelihood 
activities in defiance of government restriction orders to live outside of this area. In Lake 
Monoum, farming and fishing activities have since resumed in the lake and its vicinity. In both 
cases the affected inhabitants do not consider the lakes to be a prohibitively serious threat.  
 Interview data shows that the disaster respondents expressed doubts that the LND was 
a natural hazard, with feelings in line with a popular myth that the source of the gas is not 
natural (refer to Page 189 in Section 8.3.2). Their uncertainty is heightened by the general 
rarity of similar hazards in the world, and especially because no evidence or historical records 
exist to show that poisonous gasses have been released from LN in the past. Survivors also 
doubt if such an event will happen again, at least in the near future. Respondent’s perception 
of hazard/disaster preparedness and readiness are rooted in their religious belief, past 
knowledge and belief in contemporary information on physical risk (Kirschenbaum, 2002).  
Respondents who doubt scientific theories about the cause of the disasters believe prevention 
or safety lies in God, and that any physical risk mitigation strategies are beyond humans. 
Other survivors believe indigenous knowledge to drink palm oil if faced with a threat of 
breathing poisonous gas is better than the scientific safety measures. However, the more 
literate and educated survivors seems to adhere to scientific recommendations that people 
should stay away from the risky sites and follow the warning system that has been put in 
place.   
Research evidence on risk information suggests that respondents get risk information 
from the government, civil society and scientists (analysed in Section 8.3.3). A majority of 
respondents lacks confidence and doubts the authenticity of government’s sources of 
information that often trickle down to survivors at intervals (see page 197). The indigenes are 
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more confident in information sources from the public and members of their own community 
than other sources.  
Analysis of the willingness to follow government’s advice or orders is grouped into 
four categories (see Page 198 in Chapter 8). Research evidence suggests that most respondents 
in the first group are not willing to take orders from the government without first reflection on 
the implications of such orders for their livelihoods. Another category believes government 
orders can be obeyed on a temporary basis. This group believes that if the motives for such 
orders are not good, and the consequences are dire, then the orders can be defied later. The 
next groups of survivors are prepared to defy government orders. This group believes the 
government does not have genuine interest in helping them and expressed the feeling that 
every citizen should take full control of their safety rather than rely on government for help. 
The last group is willing to obey government instructions unconditionally. Those in this 
category said the government has the responsibility to protect all citizens and it was 
impossible to defy government orders because they have the means to enforce them. A 
summary of some major findings from question three and their relationship or influence on 
relocation decisions are further explored in Table 10.1.  
 
10.2.4 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS FROM QUESTION FOUR 
 (What makes people move away or settle in the risky areas?) 
Chapter nine addressed four main themes related to relocation decisions that concern both case 
study populations and in so doing, attempted to provide answers to the fourth research 
question. The themes addressed are: motives for relocating to the disaster site; motives for not 
relocating from the camps; further relocation plans and preferred relocation site.  
Analysis has shown that the main driving forces, which make people to leave the 
resettlement camps, are related to social, economic and cultural factors (see Section 9.2). 
These factors are either acting as push factors away from the resettlement areas or pull factors 
into the disaster zone. The dire social conditions discussed in Chapter seven, act as push 
factors for relocation. These include: 
1) Livelihood problems associated with smaller areas of land with poorer soils in the camps. 
2) The inability to fully engage in cultural practices in the camps due to a different 
geographical location where cultural and religious institutions cannot be established.  
3) Lack of health and medical facilities in the resettlement camps. 
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4) The ever growing family sizes in the resettlement camps with no extra camp houses for 
more family members.  
Pull factors into the disaster zone include:  
1) The high fertility of the disaster zone and the availability of lands for farming. 
2) Abundant, available pastures that attract the traditional pastoralist groups (Mbororo 
people).  
3) The desire to live close to the grave of dead relatives and ancestors in order to receive 
blessings from them.  
4) The protection of physical capital (houses and lands) and inheritance rights in the disaster 
zone.   
The reason why many survivors are still living in the resettlement camps while their 
peers have left seems to be related to education and age (analysed in Section 9.3). Many 
parents in the URC whose children attend Government School Ukpwa are keen that their 
children should complete primary school, or are able to look after themselves before they 
leave the camp. Some elderly survivors (who cannot take care of themselves) are reluctant to 
return to the disaster area because they do not have someone to support them there. These old 
people expressed the desire to return to their ancestral land if they could have someone with 
whom to live in the disaster zone.  
Indigenes of the disaster zone that had relocated back to the area do not express the 
desire to leave the region again (see Page 217 in Section 9.4.2). They are engaged in re-
establishing their lives and livelihood on a permanent basis and are poised to continue living 
in their village irrespective of any threats. Most expressed the desire to live with the risk in 
their village and have enough food and income than to live away from the threat in poverty. 
Those planning to leave the disaster site are the non-natives who entered the region to take 
advantage of the absence of the original inhabitants. These respondents do not intend to resist 
the incoming of the displaced or to remain there indefinitely. The non-displaced Njindoum 
residents also indicated that they have never considered leaving their village and will not do so 
in-spite of any threat from Lake Monoum. Cultural, economic and social reasons underpin this 
steadfast position.  
The results suggest that if confronted with the prospect of relocation, preference for a 
preferred relocation site is given to regions with a similar culture; religion and good economic 
potential (see Section 9.5). Interview responses from URC residents suggest that survivors feel 
their socio-economic and cultural problems could have been far reduced if they resettled 
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within a similar ethnic group with whom similar moral, religious and cultural values are 
shared.  
Findings from the first three research questions have similar implications to relocation 
decisions that question four addresses. How the results relate to or influence relocation 
decisions is presented in Table 10.1. 
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Table 10.1: How findings from the first three research questions relate with the fourth research question on relocation decisions.  
Summary of main  findings from research questions Relationship with relocation decisions 
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Cameroon’s DM framework follows a top-down hierarchical power 
structure.  
Such a framework makes it difficult for the problems of disaster 
survivors to be known and resolved, making them to relocate.  
The roles of some institutions involved in DM are not explicitly 
addressed in government policies. 
The role of the Ministry of Social Affairs, which is supposed to cater 
for the resettled disaster victims, is not explained. This could be why 
they can’t solve the social problems of survivors, causing relocation.  
 Government disaster managers possess superficial DM knowledge, 
including the application and enforcement of DM regulations. 
DMs do not understand the social based risks that facilitate relocations. 
They are also unable to implement orders restricting relocation into the 
disaster zone.  
Government disaster managers rate Cameroons DM as a success 
based on risk mitigation strategies using scientific methods.   
The neglect to incorporate non-structural measures in assessing DM 
success means they are not tackling the socio-economic push factors 
that are causing relocation.  
Non-government disaster managers attributed the failures of DM in 
Cameroon to the shortage of skilled personnel in DM.  
Lack of skilled disaster managers who can anticipate, understand and 
solve the social problems of disaster survivors, leads to relocation 
when social problems remain unresolved...  
Non-government disaster managers attributed  the failures of DM in 
Cameroon to the shortage of adequate financial and material 
resources in DM.  
Failure to provide the financial resources needed to solve the socio-
economic problems of the LND survivors, or the embezzlement of 
limited resources sent to them has aggravated their problems. The 
livelihood problems that the disaster survivors are facing as a result, 
has forced them to relocate to the disaster site as a coping strategy.    
Government disaster managers attribute the limitations in the social 
management to limited funds caused by the economic crises in the 
1980s, and embezzlement of resources destined for survivors.  
Disaster managers without government administrative functions 
rate Cameroon’s vulnerability preparedness as low, due to the non-
existence of a DM plan for the country. 
A DM plan that addresses the socio-economic problems associated 
with resettlement could have addressed such problems, thus preventing 
them from acting as push factors for relocation.  
Some disaster managers also criticize government programs to be 
more reactive than proactive.  
 
Government failure to implement development programs that mitigate 
long-term disaster risks such as good roads and medical facilities in the 
region are contributing to livelihood problems, thus facilitating 
relocation.  
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Disaster managers think the management of the LND could have 
improved if proper planning had been done for the social 
management of the disaster in the long term.   
Despite persistent complains by survivors, no serious measures have 
been taken to solve the dire socio-economic problems of the disaster 
survivors. With their problems unsolved, they are seeking alternative 
livelihood strategies-one of which is to relocate back to their ancestral 
land in the disaster zone.  
Some disaster managers think the DM could have been improved if 
committees were set-up to monitor and report the progress of 
projects in the socio-economic management of the survivors. 
Disaster managers are also critical of the complex administrative 
and power structure of DM in Cameroon, which include 
unnecessary administrative bottlenecks in the application and 
reception of resources.   
Top-down as opposed to bottom-up DM approaches that have been 
recommended by the international disaster community posses 
constrains in the management of the social problems of the survivors. 
Problems of disaster survivors and DM initiatives taken from below or 
local levels and transmitted through the hierarchy are rarely acted upon 
or implemented. Survivors are forced to relocate in areas where their 
lives can be better.  
Local disaster managers think the DM process can improve if they 
work directly with the beneficiaries, and involve them in the 
decision-making process.  
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Since the LND in the 1980s, Cameroon’s economic growth has 
declined continuously due to: economic crises in the 1980s; the 
implementation of SAPs; corruption and  mismanagement of 
resources  
Cameroon’s poor economy is a constraint in solving the socio-
economic problems of the LND survivors. The survivors are forced to 
seek better livelihoods in the disaster zone.  
Cameroon has a very high poverty rate, which is about 87.5 percent 
in rural areas.  
The poverty situation, exacerbated by resettlement limits the survivor’s 
ability to solve their problems or to receive external help from 
relatives. They relocate to improve their financial situation 
Economic problems that the resettled survivors have endured 
include food insecurity and limited job opportunities.  
These livelihood problems, with limited external assistance are 
encouraging relocation in search for a greater food security.  
Social problems are homelessness, increased morbidity and 
mortality, poor housing, social disarticulation, loss of access to 
common property, and increase in criminality. 
These problems as discussed in Section 7.2 are caused by resettlement. 
The easy option to get out of them is relocation back to their original 
land.   
In the resettlement camps, survivors are unable to perform cultural 
and traditional practices that require their presence in specific 
geographical locations in their ancestral land.  
 
 
In order to perform these cultural activities, they are forced to relocate 
to their ancestral land in the disaster site.  
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Solutions to risks from natural hazards focus on 
scientific and technical methods. Government 
Legislation addresses only the relief and rescue 
operations to solve the immediate post-disaster crises 
period.    
 
Measures to mitigate the social risks in the long-term are not 
mentioned in government legislation. This contributed to the lukewarm 
attitudes in solving the social problems of the LND survivors, leading 
to relocation as a survival strategy.   
In the management of the LND, crisis committees 
were formed to manage relief and rescue operations 
but none to oversee the long term problems of the 
survivors in the camps. 
 
 
Therefore, no preparations were made to contain any future socio-
economic vulnerability that may develop.  That is partly why the socio-
economic problems of the disaster survivors have not been resolved, 
acting as a push factor from the resettlement camps. 
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That Cameroon’s natural hazard mitigation program is 
effective based on the NMDP and efforts to mitigate 
physical risk on the Cameroon Volcanic Line.  
 
 
By not recognising social risks in the assessment of Cameroon’s hazard 
mitigation program, the social vulnerability problems of the LND are 
not resolved, acting as a push factors from the camps.    
That Cameroon’s vulnerability preparedness and 
resilience to natural hazard is high because the country 
has experience in implementing structural mitigation 
measures.    
 
Since social vulnerability is not taken as seriously as physical risks the 
government has not implemented non-structural mitigation measures, 
causing suffering survivors to relocate back to the disaster zone.  
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 Many LND survivors have relocated back to the 
disaster zone though it is still declared unsafe.  
   
Since the LND survivors do not consider Lake Nyos to be a 
prohibitively serious threat, they have relocated back to Nyos.  
The Njindoum villagers have resumed their livelihood 
activities in and around Lake  
Monoum, such as fishing and farming. 
 
 
Since the Njindoum residents do not consider Lake Monoum to be 
dangerous anymore, they have resumed their livelihood activities that 
were restricted in the Lake.     
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There is doubts that the LND was not a natural hazard 
because such hazards are rare, have not happened 
before in lake Nyos and also due to a popular myth in 
the region that the source of the poisonous gas was not 
natural. 
Since many survivors believe that the LND was a conspiracy involving 
the government, they do not think that such a plan would happen again 
in their area. This is partly why some are returning to their village.  
The perception of hazard/disaster preparedness and 
readiness are rooted in their religious believes.  
 
Many disaster survivors believe that due to their strong faith, God will 
save them from any risk in Lake Nyos if they relocate there.   
Other survivors believe their local indigenous 
knowledge, which saved some survivors during the 
LND, can still save them from a similar hazard. 
With the knowledge that palm-oil can prevent poisonous gasses from 
killing them, many survivors have relocated back to their village in 
Nyos-with the intention to drink palm-oil in a similar event.  
A majority lack confidence and doubts the authenticity 
of government’s sources of information about the 
dangers that lurk in Lake Nyos and Monoum. 
They believe more in myths that link the LND to a conspiracy 
involving the government. They are relocating into the disaster zone 
with the notion that such a conspiracy will not occur again.   
Many disaster survivors are not willing to take orders 
from the government without first reflection on the 
implications of such orders to their livelihoods. 
Due to their present and past experiences, the survivors think that in 
order to avoid further damage to their livelihoods, which was not 
anticipated prior to resettlement, they have to relocate to Nyos.  
Another category believes government orders can be 
obeyed on a temporary basis and defied later if the 
motives of such orders are later discovered to be 
wrong. 
This group believes that since they initially obeyed and have endured 
hardship in the resettlement camps with limited help, the solution to 
prevent further suffering is to relocate back to their village.  
Other survivors are prepared to defy government 
orders because they think the government does not 
have genuine interest in helping them. 
 This group is prepared to take responsibility for their own safety in the 
disaster zone and have better livelihood opportunities there.    
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This shows that answers from the other research questions lead logically and builds on to 
Chapter nine, which contribute to the knowledge and understanding of resettlement and 
related migration decisions. The key findings of this Chapter, which address research question 
four, are:  
1)  That relocation decisions are influenced by both socio-economic and socio-cultural factors 
that shape the livelihood, living conditions and aspirations of the affected populations; these 
can act in a dualistic way as both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Relocation in many situations 
constitutes a conscious livelihood coping strategy.  
2) That effective development projects can enable people to stay in resettled areas to take 
advantage of opportunities, which may not be available in their planned relocation site. This 
can help prevent the reproduction of social vulnerability by discouraging relocation back to 
disaster zone.  
3) That households facing the difficult choice between earning a livelihood in a risky 
environment and protecting their family from risk may structure their activities as a form of 
partial relocation such that at no particular time would the whole family be exposed in the 
risky area.  
4)  That people when confronted with the prospect of forced displacement or resettlement will 
prefer to live in areas with a similar culture and religion. This can be just as important as 
economic factors in cementing a social foundation for resettlement.    
These findings inform understanding of migration decisions, and are relevant for DM 
plans and policy building. They also relate to and inform the other main research themes or 
enquiries in such a way that a new model that links relocation decisions, disaster management, 
vulnerability drivers and risk perception can be produced. 
 
10.3 NEW DISASTER MODEL FOR RELOCATION DECISIONS 
The initial conceptual framework of this research (see Figure 3.1) was based on the key 
theoretical concepts relating to the research goal of studying the social dimensions of risk and 
vulnerability in the case studies and asking how the knowledge can be integrated in disaster 
and development planning. The main conceptual elements that guided the research process 
centered on the Human Use System, which interacts with the Bio/geophysical system via the 
resource base and political economy. Drawing on this initial framework, the interesting results 
from the research have yielded a new model for relocation decisions, which links the main 
research themes.  
  The model, which is grounded in the field realities, is name
Risk Perception and Vulnerability (DRV) model for Relocation Decisions (Figure 10.1). How 
disaster management, vulnerability drivers and risk perception (corresponding to the themes in 
the first three research questions respectiv
Table 10.1), makes a major contribution to the knowledge of natural disaster
displacement, resettlement and migration decisions. 
Figure 10.1: The Disaster Management, Risk Perception and Vuln
framework for Relocation Decisions 
 
Most disaster and vulnerability frameworks recognise man and nature as human and natural 
systems, which interact to produce natural hazards. Many of these frameworks also have an 
adjustment process contr
hazards like perception and preferences (See section
240 
ely) relate to or influence relocation decisions (see 
 
 
ol system, which incorporates key concepts and hypothesis on natural 
s 2.2.3). Although themes and hypotheses 
d the Disaster Management, 
-induced 
 
erability (DRV) 
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on perception, disaster management and vulnerability drivers are popular in these models, how 
they relate or influence relocation decisions is not captured or given explicit examination in 
the disaster models. 
The proposed DRV model for relocation decision comprises of four main themes 
(disaster management, vulnerability drivers, risk perception, and relocation decisions), which 
correspond to research questions 1-4 and are represented in the triangles. How the themes 
relate to each other is shown by the arrows that link the triangles. Relocation decision is the 
main or central research theme that is influenced by and also has the capacity to influence the 
peripheral themes (see Figure 10.1).  
How the peripheral themes influence relocation decision is shown in Table 10.1. The 
key findings from the research themes have been presented and how they affect, determine or 
influence relocation decisions is shown in the third column of the table. Relocation decisions 
can also influence the other themes as shown by the pink arrows in the model and explained in 
Table 10.2 below.  
 
Table 10.2: How Relocation Decisions influence Disaster Management, Vulnerability Drivers 
and Risk Perception.  
 
Peripheral Themes How Relocation Decisions influence the peripheral themes 
Disaster Management 
The survivors who have relocated back to the disaster zone, or resumed 
livelihood activities in Lake Monoum and its vicinity undermine DM 
efforts to protect them from subsequent risks from the lakes. The 
government needs to revise the present DM strategy or adopt a new 
strategy that can prevent survivors from further exposure to both social 
and physical risks.     
Vulnerability Drivers 
The LND survivors who have relocated to the restricted disaster zone in 
Nyos, and the Njindoum villagers who have resumed livelihood 
activities within Lake Monoum’s vicinity are now vulnerable to physical 
risks (flooding in Lake Nyos) and poisonous gas explosions in both 
lakes.  
Risk Perception 
The permanent relocation of disaster survivors in the disaster zone (who 
are fully engaged in farming and other livelihood activities) has a 
psychological impact on their peers in the resettlement camps. This 
influences their perception that the area does not pose a serious threat 
and encourages more relocation into the disaster zone.  
 
Apart from the reciprocal relationship between the peripheral themes and the central theme in 
the model, the peripheral themes also influence each other as shown by the orange arrows in 
the model. This relationship is explained in Figure 10.2 in the next page.
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The type of DM strategies 
adopted determines the success 
or failure of any DM program. 
The social vulnerability of the 
LND survivors is due to a 
skewed DM process that failed 
to address or solve the socio-
economic problems of 
survivors.   
 
Changes in the physical and 
social vulnerability factors 
and processes or conditions 
(such as social conditions 
arising from relocation and 
resettlement) can influence 
or alter the subsequent DM 
strategies adopted to 
mitigate such risks.  
 
By not enforcing the 
restriction orders in the 
disaster zone, the disaster 
survivors may think this is a 
conscious act because the risk 
there is not as high as 
purported. This change in 
perception may be 
influencing further relocation.   
Many LND survivors 
perceive the risk in Lake 
Nyos as low due to myths in 
the region that associate the 
LND with a conspiracy, 
rather than a natural hazard. 
DM strategies that can 
reverse this perception of risk 
need to be adopted.  
The hardship in the resettlement camps 
may influence the disaster survivor’s risk 
perception. They think the benefits of 
relocating to disaster zone to have better 
livelihood opportunities far outweighs the 
risks or dangers of living in the region.  
The disaster survivor’s revealed risk 
perception, by relocating to the dangerous 
disaster zone in Nyos, has created 
conditions or situations, which make them 
vulnerable to any subsequent physical risks 
from the lake.    
DISASTER   MANAGEMENT 
RISK 
PERCEPTION 
VULNERABILITY 
DRIVERS 
Figure 10.2: How Risk Perception, Disaster Management and Vulnerability Drivers influence one another. 
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As has been analysed above, evidence for framing the DRV model for relocation decisions 
is grounded in the research findings. The key message in the research findings that need to 
be embedded within Cameroon’s DM and research community is that disaster prevention, 
mitigation, and management has to be considered from a political, institutional, socio-
cultural and economic perspective. Social vulnerability, conceptualized in this thesis as 
political, institutional, socio-cultural and economic factors have been shown to be more 
responsible for creating ongoing risk and vulnerability within the affected disaster 
community. Success in integrating natural disaster mitigation with development planning 
cannot be achieved without considering the implications of social based risks and 
vulnerability in the society, as has been shown by the case studies.  
Negligence in tackling the socio-economic problems of the Lake Nyos disaster 
survivors and failed promises to provide basic development facilities in the region has 
caused major livelihood and poverty problems, which made the survivors destitute. This is 
a major push factor away from the resettlement camp into the disaster zone where the 
survivors become vulnerable again to the risks of any subsequent gas emission and 
flooding from Lake Nyos. Failure to compensate disaster victims and those evicted from 
their livelihood activities close to LM in Njindoum has also lead to the rejuvenation of 
restricted livelihood activities in LM and its immediate vicinity. As this study has shown, 
integrating such concerns into the DM and the development planning of Cameroon will be 
crucial in minimizing similar subsequent risks in the country.  
 
10.4 FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS 
Since the study of natural hazards/disasters is multifaceted and usually requires inter-
disciplinary approaches, it was clear at the start of this research that it would not be 
possible to explore all the defining features and effects or consequences of natural hazards. 
As such, some related but separate areas, which are beyond the scope of this research, 
could be identified for future research. Experiences gained during the research process 
have also identified some key areas that warrant further study.  These research needs are 
relevant to Cameroon as a country and/or important for disaster research as a whole.  
As highlighted in the thesis, “natural” disaster research in Cameroon is skewed 
towards technical mitigation measures. Disaster research by both local and foreign 
researchers has focused mostly on the scientific aspects of natural hazards. Very few 
publications exist on the socio-economic and socio-cultural aspects of natural 
hazards/disasters in Cameroon. Most of this information is limited to relief and rescue 
operations.  It was therefore very difficult to get published information on recent socio-
cultural issues associated with disasters in the country. Although this enhances the 
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credibility and originality of this research, this situation does not offer a sound platform on 
which subsequent research can build. The government could jump-start socio-economic 
and socio-cultural research on natural disasters in the country by creating a national 
institute for social science research to run parallel with the NIGMR, which currently 
carries out research on scientific/technical aspects of natural hazards. The two research 
institutes could carry-out interdisciplinary research to study the interactions of physical and 
human systems in the creation of natural disasters - an approach that is widely accepted in 
the global disaster research community.  
Findings about the social management of the LNM disasters bring to light several 
problems with the Cameroon government’s longer-term DM. More studies of how 
governments respond to disaster are needed, especially in developing countries where 
disaster affected communities often have low resilience and limited coping strategies. 
Research that investigates how and when major decisions are made from the impact/crisis 
phase to the recovery phase and plans for resource allocation between relief and 
rehabilitation phases will provide lessons that could be used to improve good DM practice 
and sustain good governance.  
This research has also revealed the long-term impact of disasters on the local 
economy, which has major implications for the resilience and recovery of households and 
the disaster-affected community. Disaster statistics often capture impacts on the well-
defined sectors of the national economy, but more research is needed to explore longer-
term development and poverty processes at the micro-economic scale.  This should 
recognize that the implications of disaster for poverty include not only direct impacts on 
those affected but also secondary economic effects transmitted through the wider 
community.  
The key research finding in this thesis is that relocation to the disaster zone is a 
livelihood coping strategy that has been adopted by the LND survivors. Relocation has 
been explored in relation to risk perception, disaster management and vulnerability drivers 
in this study. Research into the continued linkages and integration between relocated 
people and their former households and community is required. How this activity 
influences the relocation of other family members and the former community needs to be 
explored. Research could focus on the strength of social networks and its impact on the 
socio-economic status of households.  Another research direction could be the impact of 
relocation on the micro or local economy and its effects as a pull factor for more in-
migration into the area. Such studies may help governments and other stakeholders in 
disaster management to anticipate potential demographic changes associated with 
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relocations. These future research directions could have wide application in natural hazard 
and disaster research across many developing countries.  
 
10.5 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the analysis and results from the main analytical Chapters, it is possible to draw 
out a series of policy recommendations for future DRR in Cameroon that highlight the 
need to integrate “natural” disaster mitigation with the development process in the country. 
These relate to the main instruments and enabling procedures for policy, the managerial 
and institutional arrangements for practical implementation, and the actions relevant to 
disaster situations that can be integrated within disaster planning for long term 
development gains. The policy recommendations are set out in detail in Appendix 14 and 
relate to the following main areas: 
1) Government policy on integrating natural hazard/disaster risk reduction with 
development planning in the country 
2) Legislative and institutional framework of disaster management in the country 
3) Administrative process of disaster management 
4) Knowledge, skills  and expertise in the country’s disaster management staff 
5) Information, communication and education 
6) Natural disaster research and academic engagement with the international community 
 
The recommendations are based on key findings from the research questions. Results from 
question one reveals inadequate DM policies, poor coordination between DM institutions 
at the national level, the lack of trained disaster managers, a skewed DM system and a top-
down hierarchical structure within Cameroon’s DM framework. The recommendations aim 
to correct these limitations. Recommendations also address key findings from question two 
that adversely affect the disaster survivors. These include the socio-economic problems 
caused by displacement and resettlement, and also the vulnerability to the risk of another 
gas explosion and flooding due to relocation in the disaster zone. The recommendations 
also consider key findings from question three, which have shown that disaster manager’s 
perception of risk is highly polarized towards technical mitigation measures, while past 
knowledge, public perception and history of the disaster areas are influencing the risk 
perception of the affected populations and consequently their actions. The dire 
socioeconomic conditions in the resettlement camps, cultural factors and better livelihood 
prospects in the disaster zone, which have attracted survivors back to the risky area (Nyos) 
or to stay there (Njindoum) thereby increasing their vulnerability to the physical risk from 
246 
 
the lakes are key findings from question four. These have also been considered in the 
recommendations.  
A review of natural DM policy in the country, which takes into account these 
recommendations, is necessary to enhance the robustness of Cameroon’s DM framework. 
The skewed DM approach in the country, the socio-cultural conditions of disaster 
survivors and motives for relocation indicate that integrating natural hazard risk reduction 
with development planning hinges around a strong institutional framework for DM and 
resource allocation that is underpinned by good governance. The recommendations adopt a 
holistic approach for hazard/disaster mitigation strategies, which incorporates technical and 
socio-economic considerations, thereby bringing inter-disciplinary perspectives together to 
solve complex problems caused by natural hazards. Lessons must be drawn from the past: 
in this case from the experience of the LNM disasters, the management of which has 
brought long-term changes in the socio-economic and socio-cultural condition of 
survivors, and has ultimately motivated a relocation process that has made communities 
vulnerable once again to physical risk from the lakes. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
OCCURRENCE OF NATURAL HAZARDS/DISASTERS IN CAMEROON 
 
The occurrence of natural hazards in Cameroon is intimately linked to geology and 
geography. Natural geologic factors are responsible for volcanic activity, earthquakes and 
external structural features like mountains, valleys and major faults on the earth’s surface.   
 
CAMEROON’S TECTONICS 
Cameroon’s tectonic history is largely responsible for the geologic and structural features 
which make the country prone to natural hazards. Cameroon’s physical features form part 
of the complex history of plate tectonics that led to the fragmentation of the supercontinent 
Gondwana since the Mesozoic Era (Binks and Fairhead, 1992). This rifting of continental 
plates along the margin of the South Atlantic is contemporaneous with intra-continental 
rifting generating both strike-slip and extensional basins within West and Central Africa.  
A set of the strike-slip faults extends from the Gulf of Guinea northeastward through 
Cameroon, southern Chad and the Central African Republic into west-central Sudan 
(Fairhead and Green, 1989).  These extensive faults and shear zones are known in 
Cameroon as the Foumban Shear Zone (FSZ) which extends northeastward into Chad 
where it is known as the Central African Shear Zones (see figure below)  
These faults and shear zones are zones of weaknesses that extend into the earth’s 
interior and have been responsible for volcanic and seismic activity ever since their 
formation. The most active volcanoes in Africa are found in Cameroon and these are a 
product of hot-spot volcanic activity that is exploiting the shear zones due to the dynamic 
nature of the African continental plate (Coulon et al., 1996).  These volcanoes constitute a 
major Y-shaped elongated volcanic mountainous range in the country called the Cameroon 
Volcanic Line (CVL), which is responsible for most of the natural hazards in the country 
(Dumort 1968; Hedberg 1968; Nni 1984). The CVL is an alignment of oceanic and 
continental volcanoes trending averagely N30˚E and stretching for over 1500 km through 
the country (figure 7.1).  The continental sector (Mt. Etinde, Mt. Cameroon, Manegouba, 
Bamboutous, Oku, Rumsiki, Kapsiki through the Adamoua Plateau to the Mandara 
mountains) is prone to landslides, earth tremors and landslides, many of which have caused 
fatalities and damage to property.  
 
FREQUENCY OF NATURAL HAZARDS IN CAMEROON 
Most natural hazards in Cameroon occur in the CVL. This mountain range is prone to 
volcanic eruptions, toxic gas emissions from crater lakes, landslides, earth tremors and 
flash floods, usually with devastating consequences. Volcanic activity and the release of 
poisonous gases are confined to the volcanic mountains and their associated crater lakes.  
Another key site of volcanic activity is Mt Cameroon, the highest peak on the CVL 
(4095m) and second highest mountain in Africa. It is the most active volcano in Africa.  
Mt. Cameroon has a documented recent eruptive history of 13 eruptions of about 15 year’s 
interval for the past 200 years (Zogning, 1988). Within the last century, it has erupted 
seven times - 1909, 1922, 1954, 1959, 1982, 1999 and 2000. These eruptions pose major 
threats to the agrarian economy in the region and the communications infrastructure around 
the mountains. The most recent 1999 (28 March–22 April) and 2000 (28 May–19 June) 
violent eruptions produced lava that destroyed the natural ecological habitats, forests and 
palm plantations around the mountain. The lava also truncated a major highway that links 
some major urban towns in the region and the threat eventually led to the displacement of 
an entire village (Deruelle et al., 2000; Suh et al., 2003).   
Also linked to the CVL and the climate of the country are flash floods and 
landslides which occur on an almost annual basis. Landslides and floods have been linked 
to the steep topographic gradients of the CVL, together with meteorological and seismic 
 events (Lambi; 1989, 1991).  The annual climate of  Cameroon is made up of dry and wet 
seasons, with the latter (usually from May to September) often occurring as intense 
showers and storms often causing huge runoff and gully erosio
 
Tectonic features showing the Cameroon Volcanic Line and major shear zones associated 
with natural hazards in Cameroon. 
 
gradients of the volcanic mountains (Neba, 1999). High rainfall is often worsened by the 
steep slopes of the CVL leading to flash floods and landslides in many areas of the country 
during this period.  The highlands along the CVL, especially between latitudes 4 and
north, where annual rainfall ranges from 2000 to 9000 mm are prone to occasional 
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landslides leading to the destruction of farmlands, houses and roads and occasional deaths 
(Ayonghe et al., 1999). Another factor that exacerbates landslides is intensive 
anthropogenic activities27 associated with population increases and agricultural 
intensification on the fragile slopes of the CVL. 
In recent times, floods and landslides have caused considerable damages to the 
population. In 2001, heavy rains triggered flash floods, mudflows and landslides in the 
coastal city of Limbe that resulted in 24 deaths, rendered over 1500 people homeless and 
left a vast trail of destruction to infrastructure (IFRC, 2001b; Ayonghe et al., 2004). In July 
and August of  2003, following heavy storms, floods and landslides affected several 
villages in the Bamboutous plateau and destroyed 309 houses, killed 46 people and 
displaced more than 1700 others (Par Bleu, 2004; Zogning et al., 2007). It should be noted 
however that most of these hazards often go unrecorded, except those which cause 
appreciable damage to property and loss of lives.   
The tectonic rift structures and fracture zones have been associated with earth 
tremors and earthquakes, indicating that these fracture zones are weak and still able to 
dissipate stress into the adjacent continental areas (Binks and Fairhead, 1992).  Zogning 
(1988) mentions 21 epicenters of earthquake activity in Cameroon between 1952 and 1987 
and describes nine extensive rift axes that control seismic activity in Cameroon. On the 
19th of March 2005, an earthquake measuring 4.4 on the Richter scale hit the Central and 
Littoral Provinces causing damage to physical property and serious panic and confusion to 
the entire population (MINATD/DPC, 2005). On March 28th 1999, an earthquake with 
intensity of VI-VII was felt over a radius of over 100km from Mt Cameroon. This caused 
the destruction of buildings and marked the on-set of the 1999 eruption (Suh et al., 2003).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Houses are dug into hillside, cattle tracts terrace the hillside and poor farming techniques increase 
deforestation and soil erosion and assist the natural factors in destabilising slopes facilitating landslides.  
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APPENDIX 2 
SOME WAYS IN WHICH DISASTER IMPACTS ON EFFORTS TO MEET THE 
MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
 
MDG DIRECT IMPACTS INDIRECT IMPACTS 
1. ERADICATE 
EXTREME 
POVERTY AND 
HUNGER 
 
 Damage to housing, service 
infrastructure, savings, productive 
assets and human losses reduce 
livelihood sustainability. 
 
 Negative macroeconomic impacts 
including severe short-term fiscal 
impacts and wider, longer-term impacts 
on growth, development and poverty 
reduction. 
 Forced sale of productive assets by 
vulnerable households pushes many into 
long-term poverty and increases 
inequality. 
2. ACHIEVE 
UNIVERSAL 
PRIMARY 
EDUCATION 
 Damage to education     
infrastructure. 
 Population displacement interrupts 
schooling. 
 Increased need for child labour for 
household work, especially for girls. 
 Reduced household assets make 
schooling less affordable, girls probably 
affected most 
3. PROMOTE 
GENDER EQUALITY 
AND EMPOWER 
WOMEN 
 
 As men migrate to seek alternative 
work, women/girls bear an increased 
burden of care. 
 Women often bear the brunt of 
distress ‘coping’ strategies , e.g. by 
reducing food intake. 
 Emergency programmes may 
reinforce power structures which 
marginalise women. 
 Domestic and sexual violence may 
rise in the wake of a disaster.25 
 
4. REDUCE CHILD 
MORTALITY 
 
 Children are often most at risk, e.g. 
of drowning in floods. 
 Damage to health and water & 
sanitation infrastructure 
 Injury and illness from disaster 
weakens children’s immune systems. 
 Increased numbers of orphaned, 
abandoned and homeless children. 
 Household asset depletion makes 
clean water, food and medicine less 
affordable. 
 
5. IMPROVE 
MATERNAL 
HEALTH 
 
 Pregnant woman are often at high 
risk from death/injury in disasters 
 Damage to health infrastructure. 
 Injury and illness from disaster can 
weaken women's health. 
 Increased responsibilities and 
workloads create stress for surviving 
mothers. 
 Household asset depletion makes 
clean water, food and medicine less 
affordable. 
 
6. COMBAT 
HIV/AIDS, 
MALARIA AND 
OTHER DISEASES 
 
 Poor health & nutrition following 
disasters weaken immunity. 
 Damage to health infrastructure. 
 Increased respiratory diseases 
associated with damp, dust and air 
pollution linked to disaster. 
 
 Increased risk from communicative 
and vector borne diseases, e.g. malaria 
and diarrheal diseases following floods. 
 Impoverishment and displacement 
following disaster can increase exposure 
to disease, including HIV/AIDS, and 
disrupt health care. 
7. ENSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
SUSTAINABILITY 
 Damage to key environmental 
resources and exacerbation of soil 
erosion or deforestation 
 Damage to water management and 
other urban infrastructure. 
 Slum dwellers/people in temporary 
 Settlements often heavily affected. 
 Disaster-induced migration to urban 
areas and damage to urban infrastructure 
increase the number of slum dwellers 
without access to basic services and 
exacerbate poverty. 
 
8. DEVELOP A 
GLOBAL 
PARTNERSHIP FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
 Impacts on programmes for small 
island developing states from tropical 
storms, tsunamis etc 
 Impacts on commitment to good 
governance, development and poverty 
reduction nationally and internationally. 
ALL MDGS  
 
 
 Reallocation of resources – 
including ODA from development to 
relief and recovery. 
Source: White et al. (2004:20) 
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APPENDIX 3 
SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOOD FRAMEWORKS 
The SLF originated as a result of the 1997 UK government’s white paper on international 
development which committed the UK to the international development target of reducing 
by one-half the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015. The main themes 
include the concepts of vulnerability context, livelihood assets, transforming structures and 
processes, and livelihood strategies as shown in the diagram below.  
 
 The sustainable livelihood framework: Source: Ashley and Carney (1999) 
 
Vulnerability Context 
The central feature of the approach is that it views people as operating in a context of 
vulnerability. The factors that make up the vulnerability context are important because they 
have a direct impact upon people’s assets and the livelihood options that are open to them. 
The framework presents three main categories of vulnerability: trends, shocks and 
seasonality.  
Trends are long-term and usually large scale. They include population trends, 
resource trends (including conflict over resources), economic trends (national and 
international), trends in governance and politics, and technological trends. Seasonality is 
expressed through seasonal shifts in prices, production, food availability, employment 
opportunities and health. Shocks include human health shocks (epidemics), natural shocks 
(e.g. natural hazard-induced disasters), economic shocks (e.g. rapid changes in exchange 
rates), conflict shocks and crop/ livelihood shocks. They can destroy assets directly (e.g. in 
the case of floods and storms), and they can also force people to dispose of assets as part of 
coping strategies. Resilience to external shocks and stresses is an important factor in 
livelihood sustainability. The toxic release of the poisonous gasses that caused the Lake 
Nyos and Monoum disasters fits the shocks vulnerability context in this framework.  
 
Livelihood Assets 
The SLF takes a broad view of people’s strengths/capacities in the form of livelihood 
assets. This is expressed visually as an asset pentagon showing the different types of asset 
and the important inter-relationships between them.  The model breaks capital into five 
categories namely human, social, natural, financial and physical capital as shown in Box 
1.1.  
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When looking at a household, community and other groups, the model can be used to show 
the strengths and weaknesses of different types of asset, their relative importance and the 
linkages between them. This helps in identifying entry points for strengthening livelihood 
security.  Assets can be destroyed and created as a result of the trends, shocks and 
seasonality of the vulnerability context. As will be shown, the victims of the Nyos disaster 
lost almost all the various types of capital and this was exacerbated by their relocation and 
resettlement. 
 
Transforming Structures and Processes 
These are the institutions, organizations, policies and legislation that shape livelihoods. 
They operate at all levels, from the household to the international arena and in all spheres, 
from private to public. Their importance cannot be overemphasized. They determine the 
five different types of capital, livelihood strategies and decision makers’ terms of exchange 
between the different types of capital and economic and other returns from livelihood 
strategies.  They can reduce or worsen the impact of external shocks on vulnerable people. 
Transforming structures are organizations that set and implement policy and legislation, 
deliver service, purchase trade and perform many other functions that affect livelihoods. 
Public sector, private sector and civil society organizations are all included. Transforming 
processes determine the way in which structures and individuals operate and interact. They 
include policies, legislation and other rules that regulate access to assets, markets, and 
culture and power relations in society. Within the context of this research, the transforming 
structures and processes are the various policies, institutions and administrative processes 
that influence disaster management. This is discussed in more detail in chapter 5.  
 
Livelihood Strategies 
Operating within the vulnerability context, using their livelihood assets and under the 
considerable influence of transforming structure and processes, poor people choose and 
implement livelihood strategies. These are often complex and may change rapidly in 
response to the external context. The SLF seeks to understand the many factors influencing 
people’s choice of livelihood strategy and then to reinforce the positive aspects (factors 
that promote choice and flexibility) and mitigate the constraints.  
 
Box 1.1: TYPES OF CAPITAL 
 
Human: skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good health that together enable people to 
pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve their livelihood objectives. At a 
household level human capital is a factor of the amount and quality of labour available; this 
varies according to household size, skill levels, leadership potential and health status 
Social: the social resources upon which people draw in pursuit of livelihood objectives (e.g. 
networks and connections, membership of groups, relationships of trust, reciprocality and 
exchanges) 
Natural: the natural resource stocks from which resource flows and services (e.g. land, 
forests, marine/wild resources, water, protection from storms and erosion) useful for 
livelihoods are derived. 
Physical: the basic infrastructure and producer goods needed to support livelihoods. 
Infrastructure consists of changes to the physical environment that help people to meet their 
basic needs and to be more productive. Infrastructure components include affordable 
transport, secure shelter, adequate water supplies and sanitation, access to information. 
Financial: the financial resources that people use to achieve their livelihood objectives. 
This includes savings and credit, inflows of money other than earned income (e.g. pensions, 
remittances). 
Source: Ashley and Carney (1999) 
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UNDP SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS AND VULNERABILITY 
 
The analytical framework used by the UNDP consists of a livelihood system that 
comprises three distinct processes. This conceptual framework is described by Hoon et al. 
(1997), and can be represented by a triangle as shown in the figure below.  
 
The UNDP Livelihood Framework  Source: Hoon et al. (1999) 
 
In the UNDP’s conceptual framework, the livelihood system is defined by three distinct 
processes that are linked through a tripartite structure.  The three sides of the analytical 
triangle are Human Ecology, Expanded Entitlements and Policy Matrix.  The human 
ecology side refers to the relations between the natural resource base and human society. 
The policy matrix side refers to the relationship between policy and livelihood systems. 
Patterns of entitlement, distributions of assets and livelihood strategies are embedded in a 
policy structure at macro-and micro-level. The expanded entitlement side comprises 
commodities, social support structures and capacity to make use of environmental 
resources. The core of the triangle comprises the coping and adaptive strategies of the 
livelihood group. Each point of the triangle represents a network of interconnected ideas 
and indicators that can be categorized on the basis of processes, structures, values and 
decisions. 
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APPENDIX 4 
SPIRALS OF DEVELOPMENT AND DISASTER RISK 
 
A)  ‘VICIOUS’ SPIRALS OF FAILED DEVELOPMENT AND DISASTER RISK 
A two way link between disasters and development, expressed as ‘vicious spirals’ has also 
been acknowledged (White et al., 2004). Figure 2.4 shows ‘vicious spirals’ of failed 
development and disaster risk. The anticlockwise spiral shows development failures that 
undermine coping strategies and exacerbate hazard exposure. In the clockwise spiral, 
development failures undermine the national capacity to respond to disasters (White et al., 
2004).  
 
 
 ‘Vicious spirals’ of disaster risk and development failures Source: White et al. (2004) 
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B) ‘VIRTUOUS SPIRALS’ OF DEVELOPMENT AND DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION. 
Development processes help to reduce disaster risk in the anti-clockwise circuit so that 
exposure and susceptibility to harm are minimized and losses contained. The clockwise 
loop shows how development provides a basis for strong emergency response, and a 
unique opportunity to reinforce disaster risk reduction in the process of reconstruction.  
 
 
‘Virtuous spirals’ of development and disaster risk reduction. Source: White et al. (2004) 
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APPENDIX 5 
  
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRES FOR CASE STUDY POPULATIONS IN 
ENGLISH 
 
Questionnaire Number  
Place  
Date  
Interviewer  
Household Identifier  
 
A GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC AND VULNERABILITY DATA FOR 
RESPONDENT OR HOUSEHOLD 
1 How long have you lived in this house?............................................................................  
2 Are you the head of the Household?    Yes:    No:    If not what is your relationship 
to head?   
3 Sex:        Male                    Female        
4 Age:  < 20      20-29        30-39            49- 49            50-59         > 60 
5 Number in Household:    Adult: 18-30 yrs_____ 30-40yrs_____Above 40yrs_____ 
      Children: < 10yrs,       10- 18yrs 
6 Type of household: Lone      Couple with Kids       Couple No Kids,      Single parent           
7 Are you employed:   Yes             No     
8 What is your main occupation?......................................................................... 
9 Please indicate the sources of your monthly household income below. 
  
 Income Sources Amount 
 Farming   
 Cattle Rearing  
 Salary or Wages  
 Monies regularly given by relatives in Cameroon   
 Other Remittances from abroad  
 Other sources/activities (Please specify)  
 
10 Does anyone in household have any disability or chronic illness that affects your 
income generating activities?     Yes         No        If yes specify ……………………… 
............................................................................................................................................ 
11 Is the house where you live owned by you?   Yes                Private rental     
    Government provided or camp 
12 Do you have insurance for any of your property?   House             Farm          Cattle          
       Other (Specify).......................................................   None    
 
B  KNOWLEDGE/EXPERIENCE WITH NATURAL HAZARDS  
 
13 What natural event has affected you (directly or indirectly)?  Bush fire           landslide and Soil 
erosion          Floods and heavy rain              Epidemics                Volcanic eruption          
Drought        Gas eruption           None   
                
Event (type and name) When How How did this affect 
you and or what were 
the main effects? 
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14 Has any member of this household died as a result of any of the hazards you named 
above? Yes        No   
15 If Yes, how and where did they 
die……………………………………………………………………… 
16 Were you warned about the event before it happened?  Received no warning:   
       Radio:         Neighbor 
Other……………………………………     
17 How have any of these natural events affected your ability to earn a living? 
............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................ 
18 If applicable, how have they affected your ability to provide for your family? 
............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................ 
19 Which event costed you the most? 
............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................ 
C EXPERIENCE OF 1984/86 GAS DISASTER  
 
20 Were you affected by the Nyos/Monoum gas disaster?  Yes          No    
21 When the Nyos/Monoum disaster occurred did you leave your home?  Yes          No    
22 If you were displaced by the disaster where did you go to and why?  Friends and   
Relatives         Emergency shelter         
Reason………………………………………….... 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
… 
23 Did you get help from  Relatives, friends and neighbors:           Government      
NGOs           What help? 
……………………………………………………………………….. 
24 Are you now fully recovered from the disaster?………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
25 After  the disaster, I have:  Relocated to the disaster site        Staying within the disaster 
zone        Living where I was resettled            Others 
Please give reasons for your choice above? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………  
 
D  FUTURE RISK  
26 What hazard are you mostly afraid of?    Bush fire           landslide and Soil erosion           
        Floods and heavy rain              Epidemics                Volcanic eruption               
       Gas eruption    None  
 
27 How soon do you think there will be another gas eruption from the lake?   Less than 5 years  
About 10 years time         About 20 years time           Not Sure          Other  
 
Please specify…………………………………………………………………………………. 
28  What do you fear most from any subsequent gas emission or eruption?  Loss of Life    
Death or loss of livestock          Sickness         Others   
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Please indicate…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
RESEARCH  QUESTIONNAIRES FOR CASE STUDY POPULATIONS 
TRANSLATED INTO FRENCH  
 
 
SONDAGE REALISE SUR LE THE ME « LES RISQUES ET VULNERABILITE 
LIES AUX CATASTROPPHES NATURELLES:    LEUR IMPLICATION DANS LA 
REDUCTION DES RISQUES ET DES PROGRAMMES DE DEVELOPPEMENT AU 
CAMEROUN » 
 
Numéro du questionnaire  
Lieu du sondage   
Date du sondage  
Enquêteur   
Identificateur du ménage   
 
Données démographiques et de vulnérabilité de l’enquêté ou du ménage 
1-Depuis combien de temps vivez-vous dans cette maison?..........................................  
2- Etes-vous chef de cette famille? Oui            Non      si non, quelles sont vos relations 
avec le chef de famille? 
3- Sexe: masculin                        féminin 
4- Age: moins de 20          20-29              30-39              39-49        49-59       plus de 60  
5- Taille de la famille: adultes: 18-30 ans_______30-40 ans______ plus de 40 ans____ 
Enfants: moins de 10 ans__________ 10-18 ans 
6- Statut de la famille: seul             couple avec enfants       couple sans enfants         Parent 
célibataire  
7- Avez-vous un emploi?   Oui         non 
 
8- Quelle est votre occupation principale?……………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
9- Veuillez indiquer les sources de vos revenus mensuels dans le tableau ci-dessous.  
 
Sources des revenus Montant 
Agriculture  
Elevage  
Salaire   
Argent provenant des familles résidant au Cameroun  
Revenus provenant  des à l’étranger   
Autres sources ou activités (bien vouloir les spécifiées)  
 
10- Un membre de la famille est-il atteint d’une maladie ou d’un handicap entravant vos 
activités génératrices de revenus?   Oui            non     
Bien vouloir spécifier : 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
11- Votre maison est-elle votre propriété?  Oui          si non, est-ce: une maison en location 
Fournie par l’Etat ou un camp: 
12- L’un de vos biens est-il assuré: maison        plantation          bétail        Aucun          
Autres (bien vouloir spécifier):  ……………………………………………………….. 
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………………………………………………………………………………………………                                               
 
B- Connaissances et expériences en matière de catastrophes naturelles  
 
13- Quel type de catastrophes naturelles vous a affecté de façon directe ou indirecte? 
 
Feux de Brousse         Glissement de terrains ou érosion          Inondations et fortes pluies     
Epidémies       Eruption volcanique      Sécheresse               Eruption de gaz         
Aucune  
 
Type et nom de la 
catastrophe 
Quand s’est-elle 
passée ? 
Comment est-elle 
arrivée ? 
Comment vous a-t-
elle affectée et 
quels en sont les 
principaux effets ? 
    
    
    
14- Des membres de la famille sont-ils décédés suite à l’une des catastrophes nommées 
plus haut ? 
Oui         non 
15- Si oui, où et quand sont-ils 
morts ?.............................................................................................................. 
16- Avez-vous été prévenu avant le déclenchement de la catastrophe?  Pas d’avertissement 
Averti par la radio           Par un voisin         
Autres………………………………………………………………………………………
……….................................................................................................................................. 
17- Quelle a la portée de cet événement dans votre capacité à gagner votre vie?  
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
18- Le cas échéant, comment a-t-il affecté votre capacité à survenir aux besoins de votre 
famille? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
19- Quelle catastrophe vous a le plus affecté?....................................................................... 
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
 C- A PROPOS DE L’ ERUPTION DE GAZ DE 1984 
 
20- avez-vous été affecté par l’éruption de gaz du lac Monoum ?    Oui               Non 
21- avez-vous quitté votre maison suite à l’éruption de gaz du lac Monoum ? Oui          non     
22- si cette catastrophe a provoqué votre déplacement, où êtes-vous parti ?    Avec des 
amis et connaissances              campement d’urgence         
Pour quelles raisons ?............................................................................................................. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
23- Avez-vous reçu de l’aide de la part des amis et connaissances ?        Gouvernement 
 ONG            Quel genre d’aide ? …………………………………………………………… 
24- Vous êtes-vous totalement remis de la catastrophe ? ………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
25- Après la catastrophe, j’ai dû : être transféré au lieu de la catastrophe           continuer de 
rester dans la zone du désastre            vivre là où j’ai été déménagé           Autres                              
 Bien vouloir justifier votre choix :  
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
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………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
D – DANS LE FUTUR  
 
26- Quel événement vous effraie le plus?    Feux de Brousse         Glissement de terrains ou 
érosion          Inondations et fortes pluies        Epidémies       Eruption volcanique      
Sécheresse     Eruption de gaz         Aucune          
 
27- Dans combien de temps prévoyez-vous une prochaine éruption de gaz dans le 
lacMonoum:  
moins de 5 ans           dans 10ans               dans 20 ans             pas sûr         Autres 
Veuillez préciser: 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
28- Qu’est-ce qui vous ferai le plus peur dans une prochaine éruption de gaz?  
Pertes en vies humaines            pertes en bétail             maladies            autres  
 
Bien vouloir spécifier :…………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH KEY OFFICIALS IN DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT 
____________________________________________________________________________  
A   INFORMATION TO OBTAIN BEFORE INTERVIEW 
 
PLACE OR LOCATION_________________________________________________________ 
POSITION HELD________________________________________________________ 
INTERVIEW DATE_____________   
WERE ANY DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE INFORMANT PRIOR TO THE INTERVIEW? YES        
NO 
LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
1)______________________________________________________________________           
2) ______________________________________________________________________                         
3) ______________________________________________________________________                        
4) ______________________________________________________________________               
___________  
B   GENERAL QUESTION ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN CAMEROON 
 
1 Do you know of any government laws, or regulations relating to hazard management? 
 
2 What is your own assessment of Cameroon’s overall natural hazard mitigation program or how would 
you rate the success of disaster mitigation or management in Cameroon? 
 
3 Do you use information on Nyos/Monoum hazards in planning decisions? 
 
4 How would you rate the risk for natural hazards in Cameroon? 
 
5 How would you rate the country’s level of vulnerability preparedness and resilience? 
 
C   STRATEGIES/POLICIES/PLANS  
 
6 Are you aware of any disaster mitigation /management plan for the Nyos/Monoum area? 
 
7 Do you think the government is doing enough scientifically to reduce the threat that the lakes pose in the 
area?    
       
8 Is there a management Plan for the displaced or affected victims of the Nyos disaster?  Is the programme 
effective? 
 
9 What do you think are the main constraints or problems with the management of the Lake Nyos victims?  
        
10 Is the affected community incorporated into any disaster mitigation programmes or projects?  What is 
the level of their participation?  
 
11 To What extent is disaster management incorporated into development policies/plans or projects? 
      
D   PAST EXPERIENCE WITH LAKE NYOS AND MONOUM DISASTERS  
12 What were the social and economic impacts of the lake Nyos disaster on your sector? 
 
13 Do you think that the disaster was well managed? 
 
14 What could have been done differently? 
 
15 What prevented these actions from being taken? 
 
16 How can these experiences be used for future planning? 
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RESEARCH INTERVIEWS QUESTIONS FOR DISASTER MANAGERS 
TRANSLATED INTO FRENCH 
 
ENQUÊTES SEMI STRUCTUREES MENEES AVEC LES 
PRINCIPAUX RESPONSABLES  DE LA GESTION DES 
CATASTROPHES 
____________________________________________________________________________  
A.  INFORMATION A OBTENIR AVANT L’ENQUÊTE 
 
LIEU OU 
LOCALITE______________________________________________________________________ 
FONCTION____________________________________________________________________________ 
DATE DE L’ENQUÊTE _____________   
L’ENQUÊTE A –T –IL  FOURNI DES DOCUMENTS AVANT L’E ENQUÊTE?    OUI       NON  
LES QUELS?            
1) ______________________________________________________________________            
2) ______________________________________________________________________                         
3) ______________________________________________________________________                        
 4) ______________________________________________________________________                       
____________________________________________________________________________  
B GENERALITES SUR LA GESTION DES CATASTROPHES AU CAMEROUN 
 
1 Connaissez vous une loi ou un  règlement relative à la gestion des catastrophes? 
 
2 Quelle est votre propre évaluation des programmes de contrôle des catastrophes au Cameroun en 
général, et quelle est votre appréciation des  succès réalisés  dans le cadre de la réduction ou de la gestion 
des catastrophes au Cameroun? 
 
3 Exploitez vous les informations provenant  des catastrophes de Nyos/Monoum dans la prise de décision? 
 
4 Quelle est votre évaluation  des  risques liés aux catastrophes au Cameroun? 
 
5 Quel est, selon vous, le niveau de vulnérabilité, de préparation et de récupération? 
 
C.   STRATEGIES/POLITIQUES/PROGRAMMES  
 
6 A votre connaissance, existe-il un programme de réduction ou de gestion des catastrophes dans les 
localités Nyos/Monoum? 
 
7 Croyez vous que le gouvernement oeuvre assez sur le plan scientifique en vue de la réduction de  la 
menace que représentent ces lacs pour ces localités?    
       
8 Existe-il un programme de gestion pour les déplacées et victimes de la  catastrophe du lac  Nyos?  Ce 
programme est-il efficace? 
 
9 Selon vous, quels sont les principaux obstacles liés à la gestion de victimes du lac Nyos?  
        
10 Les populations touchées sont-elles impliquées dans les programmes ou projets de réduction de 
catastrophe?  Quel est leur niveau de participation?  
 
11 Quel intérêt les politiques, programmes ou projets de développement accordent-ils  à la gestion des 
catastrophes? 
      
D.   ANTECEDENTS LIES AUX CATASTROPHES DE LACS NYOS ET MONOUM  
 
12 Quels étaient les impacts de la catastrophe du lac Nyos sur la situation sociale et économique de votre 
secteur ? 
 
13 Pensez- vous que la catastrophe a été bien gérée? 
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14 Pensez-vous qu’on aurait dû  la gérer autrement? 
 
15 Qu’est-ce qui a entravé la prise de décision? 
 
16 Comment ces antécédents pourraient-ils servir dans l’élaboration des futurs programmes? 
        
 
 
SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH NYOS AND MONOUM 
HOUSEHOLD RESIDENTS 
____________________________________________________________________________  
A   INFORMATION TO OBTAIN BEFORE INTERVIEW 
 
PLACE OR 
LOCATION______________________________________________________________________ 
POSITION 
HELD____________________________________________________________________________ 
INTERVIEW DATE_____________   
WERE ANY DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE INFORMANT PRIOR TO THE INTERVIEW? YES        
NO 
LIST OF DOCUMENTS  
1) ______________________________________________________________________                                
2) ______________________________________________________________________                         
3) ______________________________________________________________________                        
4) ______________________________________________________________________                       
 
A   HISTORY OF WHERE LIVED IN RELATION TO HAZARDS 
1 What impact or effect has relocating to another place after the disasters have on your life?  
 
2 Do you think your life would have been better if you were settled elsewhere or had the opportunity to 
choose were to live after the disaster? 
 
3 What is your overall assessment of the Government’s management of the disaster? 
 
4 Can you explain why you either intend to relocate or not to relocate from where you are presently living?      
 
B  INTRAHOUSEHOLD RISK PERCEPTION 
 
5 Which hazard do you think will have the most serious consequences on your household? 
 
6 What do you think is the greatest threat of another gas eruption to your household?  
 
7 How prepared are you and your household for any subsequent gas eruption? 
 
8 How  confident are you in government officials’ ability to provide accurate information about  
       the risk posed by the lakes in your area? 
 
9 Do you think the government is doing enough to provide you with adequate information that can help 
you and your household plan for any future gas eruption?   
  
10 Are you prepared to follow any advice or orders from the government?  
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APPENDIX 7 
 
INSTITUTIONS/ORGANISATIONS INTERVIEWED AND FROM WHERE 
SECONDARY INFORMATION WAS COLLECTED 
 
 Buabua-Kimbi Lake Nyos Cultural and Development Association 
 Cameroon Post news paper 
 Cameroon  Tribune news paper 
 Cameroon Red Cross 
 Department of Civil Protection 
 Fon’s Palace of Njindoum 
 Helvetas, Bamenda  
 Mininstry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation 
 Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation 
 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
 Ministry of Social Affairs 
 Ministry of Higher Education 
 National Institute of Geological and Mining Research 
 National institute of Cartography 
 North West Provincial Delegations of  Town Planning 
 North West Provincial Delegation of Public Health 
 North West Provincial Delegation of Social Affairs 
 Office of the Divisional Officer for Wum 
 Office of the Divisional Officer for Fungom 
 Office of the Divisional Officer of Noun 
 South West Provincial Delegation of Culture 
 Plan International Bamenda 
 The Herald News paper 
 UNDP regional office in Yaounde  
 Wum rural council 
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APPENDIX 8 
 
SUMMARY OF MAIN RESEARCH TECHNIQUES FOR EACH QUESTION 
 
A) Case study populations, sub-themes of question one, research tasks and techniques 
for question one 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE STUDY 
GROUP/ISSUE 
QUESTION 
THEMES RESEARCH  TASK 
RESEARCH 
TECHNIQUES 
Disaster 
Management (Risk 
Reduction)  in 
Cameroon 
Government structure to 
cater for Disaster 
Management  
 Analysis of Legislative, Institutional 
and Administrative framework of 
disaster management and risk reduction 
in Cameroon  
 Secondary 
information  
 Situation specific 
documents 
Cameroon’s 
vulnerability to Natural 
Hazards 
 Level of Cameroon’s vulnerability to 
natural hazards and the degree of 
preparedness for hazards/ disasters 
 Semi-structured 
Interviews with 
disaster 
managers, 
 Secondary 
information 
Management of the 
Lake Nyos and 
Monoum disasters 
 Determination of the Long and Short 
term management of the both disasters 
involving the social and physical 
management aspects.  
 Semi-structured 
Interviews with 
key informants 
or disaster 
managers, 
 Secondary 
information 
Displaced Nyos 
survivors in camps  
 
Nyos Survivors 
who have returned 
to the disaster zone 
 
Non-displaced 
Njindoum 
residents 
Government assistance 
to survivors  
 Determination of the level of help or 
assistance that have been provided to 
survivors since the disasters occurred 
more than two decades ago 
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Secondary 
information 
Feeling about 
Governments 
management of the 
disasters 
 Perception of Governments 
management of the disasters with focus 
on the social and physical management 
aspects   
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Secondary 
information, 
 Personal 
Observation 
Risk and/or hazard 
preparedness  
 Analysis of survivors’ knowledge of 
hazard/risk preparedness and their level 
of preparedness for subsequent hazards. 
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
Knowledge/information 
and reaction to 
subsequent 
advice/orders about 
hazards. 
 Analysis of hazard/risk information 
dissemination to survivors and how they 
are prepared to react to subsequent 
hazard/disaster/risk advice or orders. 
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
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B) Case study populations, sub-themes of question two, research tasks and techniques 
for question two.   
CASE 
STUDY 
GROUP 
QUESTION THEMES RESEARCH  TASK RESEARCH TECHNIQUES 
Displaced 
Nyos 
Survivors In 
Camps 
Impact of the Lake Nyos 
disaster 
 Analysis of social vulnerability due to 
the effects of the disaster. 
Determination of disaster impact on 
various types of capital.  
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Key informants 
 Nyos disaster 
literature 
Level of engagement in 
livelihood activities 
 To make an analysis of the level of 
recovery more than two decades after 
the disaster 
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Nyos disaster 
literature 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
Financial capability, 
access to social facilities 
and perception of disaster 
management 
 Analysis of social vulnerability related 
to political ecological factors 
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
 Secondary 
literature 
Nyos 
Survivors who 
have returned 
to the disaster 
zone 
Impact of the Lake Nyos 
Disaster 
 Analysis of social vulnerability due to 
the effects of the disaster. 
Determination of disaster impact on 
various types of capital 
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Key informants 
 Nyos disaster 
literature 
Financial ability and Level 
of engagement in 
livelihood activities 
 Analysis of the level of recovery in 
disaster zone  
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
 Personal 
Observation 
Present risks in disaster 
zone.  
 Analysis of survivors physical 
vulnerability to subsequent hazards 
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Personal 
Observation 
 Secondary 
literature 
 key informants 
Non-displaced 
Njindoum 
residents 
Impact of Lake Monoum 
disaster  
 Analysis of  the effect of the disaster on 
survivors  
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Key informants 
Present risk around Lake 
Monoum 
 Analysis of  physical vulnerability in 
area 
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Key informants  
 Secondary 
Literature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
292 
 
 
C) Case study populations, sub-themes of question three, research tasks and techniques 
for question three. 
   
CASE STUDY 
GROUP/ISSUE 
QUESTION 
THEMES RESEARCH  TASK 
RESEARCH 
TECHNIQUES 
Displaced 
Nyos 
survivors 
in camps 
 
and  
 
Non-
displaced 
Njindoum 
residents  
 
Expressed  
Perception 
 
Past experience or 
knowledge of  natural 
hazards or disasters in 
their area 
 How respondents had been 
affected by past hazards   
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
Opinion on present and 
future hazard/risk  
 Respondent’s perception of 
hazard types and their magnitude 
and frequency in the future.  
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
Expected behaviour in 
response to present or 
future risk 
 Survivors’ future response or 
behaviour in relation to their 
perception of hazards/risks in the 
environment.   
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
Revealed 
Perception 
Relocation Behaviour  
following the Lake 
Nyos and Monoum 
disasters 
 Examination of disaster survivors 
livelihoods and living conditions 
in proximity with Lake Nyos and 
Monoum   
 Personal 
Observation 
 Secondary 
information 
 
Nyos 
Survivors 
who have 
returned to 
the 
disaster 
zone 
Expressed 
Perception 
 
Past experience or 
knowledge of 
hazards/disasters in 
their area 
 Determination of the level of help 
or assistance that had been  
provided to survivors  
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
Opinion on present and 
future risk in disaster 
zone  
 Analysis of  how returnees 
perceive the risk in the disaster 
zone 
 Reasons for living in the disaster 
zone   
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
Relationship between 
past disaster impact and 
present behaviour or 
attitude towards  
risk/hazard 
 Analysis of  factors related to past 
disaster impact or living 
conditions prior to the disaster 
that influence risk perception 
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
Revealed 
Perception 
Relocation Behaviour  
following the Lake 
Nyos and Monoum 
disasters 
 Examination of displaced 
survivors relocating to the 
restricted risky disaster zone.  
 Personal 
Observation  
 Secondary 
information 
Disaster 
managers 
Expressed 
Perception 
Cameron’s natural 
hazard mitigation 
program. 
 Understanding of how disaster 
managers perceive the success of 
risk reduction programmes in the 
country 
 Semi-structured 
interviews  
Cameroon’s disaster 
risk assessment 
 Analysis of disaster manager’s 
rating of Cameroon’s proneness to 
natural hazards/disasters 
 Semi-structured 
interviews 
Cameron’s 
vulnerability 
preparedness and 
resilience 
 Analysis of disaster manager’s 
perspective of the state of 
Cameroon’s preparedness to 
mitigate risks in the country 
 Semi-structured 
interviews 
Revealed  
Perception 
How the Disaster 
Management 
Framework of the 
country is structured to 
counter risk 
 Examination of the framework for 
Cameroon’s “natural” disaster risk 
mitigation program (Analysis in 
chapter 5) 
 Government 
Policy 
Documents and 
other publications  
How the Lake Nyos 
and Monoum Disasters 
were managed 
 Examination of the management 
of risks following the Lake Nyos 
and Monoum (LNM) Disasters  
(Analysis in chapter 6) 
 Physical & 
documentary 
evidence of risk 
reduction 
programs after 
the (LNM) 
disasters.  
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D) Case study populations, sub-themes of question four, research tasks and techniques 
for question four. 
CASE STUDY 
GROUP/ISSUE QUESTION THEMES RESEARCH  TASK 
RESEARCH 
TECHNIQUES 
Displaced Nyos 
survivors in 
camps 
 
 
Impact of relocation and 
preferred relocation site  
 Analyse the impact of forceful 
relocation to camps  
 Reasons for their preferred relocation 
sites   
 Semi-
structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
Plans to relocate/not relocate 
from present location in 
camps  
 Investigate how survivors feel about 
their present resettlement sites and 
their future plans vis-à-vis migrating 
and possible migration directions.   
 Semi-
structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
 Secondary 
information  
 
Non-displaced 
Njindoum 
residents  
 
Preferred relocation site if 
forced to be displaced due to 
hazard/disaster 
 Investigate the choice of relocation 
sites when faced with inevitable 
displacements   
 Semi-
structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
Motives for not relocating 
from disaster zone 
 Investigate motives for not relocating 
from dangerous or hazardous sites or 
areas 
 Semi-
structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
 Secondary 
information 
 
Nyos Survivors 
who have returned 
to the disaster 
zone 
 
 
Preferred relocation sites 
and reasons for migrating 
from the resettlement camps 
 Determine the preferred relocation site 
of these people and their reasons for 
leaving the resettlement camps 
 Semi-
structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
Reasons for migrating back 
to the disaster zone  
 Investigate the motives for migrating 
back to the disaster zone and not 
elsewhere   
 Semi-
structured 
Interviews 
 Secondary 
information 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
Impact of migrating back to 
the disaster zone 
 Make an analysis of the changes they 
have encountered after migrating back 
to the disaster zone 
 Semi-
structured 
Interviews 
 Questionnaire 
survey 
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APPENDIX 9 
 
TRANSCRIPT CODING METHOD 
 
CODES MEANING 
U Displaced Ukpwa camp study population 
M Non-displaced lake Monoum or Njindoum study population 
N Returnees to Nyos  study population 
D Disaster Managers 
First two numbers  Interviewee identity e.g. 01, 06, 10, 12 etc 
Capital letters Main Categories in various interview groups e.g. LDM or RL 
Small letters Subcategories for main categories e.g. vic, enf, dis etc. 
U01LDMvic Example of complete coding indicating study group, interviewee identity, main and sub-categories. 
 
 
STUDY POPULATIONS 
 
CODES OF MAIN CATEGORIES FOR STUDY POPULATIONS 
 
MAIN  CATEGORIES CODES 
Impact of disasters to households DI 
Effects or Impact  due to Relocation  RL 
Motive for relocation back to Nyos MR 
Motive for non-relocation from Monoum MR 
Preferred Relocation site PR 
Assessment of Government’s Management of  the Disasters GM 
Intention to Relocation  from present location  RI 
Most dangerous hazard or hazard most afraid of  HA 
Impact of another hazard EH 
Level of Disaster Preparedness DP 
Confidence in Government Information on risk CI 
Government’s Information on Risk GI 
If Government Advice on risk can be taken  GA 
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EXPLANATION OF CODES FOR MAIN CATEGORIES FOR DISASTER 
MANAGERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAIN CATEGORIES CODES 
Awareness of  government laws and regulations on Disaster 
Management  LDM 
Assessment of  Cameroon’s overall natural hazard mitigation 
program AHM 
Use of information on Nyos/Monoum disaster in decision 
making UNM 
Cameroon’s natural hazard risk assessment HRA 
Level of Cameroon’s vulnerability preparedness and resilience VPR 
Awareness of disaster mitigation /management plan for the 
Nyos/Monoum area NMM 
Scientific effort to reduce the threat of the lakes TML 
Management Plan for the displaced or affected victims of the 
Nyos disaster VMP 
Main constraints with the management of the Lake Nyos victims CMV 
Disaster victims participation in disaster mitigation projects VDM 
Extend to which  disaster management is incorporated into 
development policies/plans or projects DMD 
Social and economic impacts of the lake Nyos disaster SEI 
Management of Nyos and Monoum disasters MNM 
How Nyos/Monoum  disaster management could have been 
improved IDM 
Possible constraint to Nyos/Monoum disaster management CDM 
How  Nyos/Monoum disaster experience can be useful  for future 
planning EFP 
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APPENDIX 10 
CODED TRANSCRIPTS FOR STUDY GROUPS 
 
CODED TRANSCRIPTS FOR DISASTER MANAGERS 
 
CODES FOR 
MAIN 
CATEGORIE
S 
MAIN 
CATEGORIES SUB CATEGORIES 
CODED TRANSCRIPTS FOR DISASTER 
MANAGERS 
LDM Awareness of  
government laws 
and regulations 
on Disaster 
Management 
(DM) 
Aware “Aware of existence 
of  laws” 
D01LDM awe; D02LDMawe; D03LDMawe; 
D04LDMawe; D05LDMawe; D06LDMawe; 
D07LDMawe; D08LDMawe; D09LDMawe; 
D10LDMawe; D11LDMawe; D13LDMawe; 
D15LDMawe; D17LDMawe; D18LDMawe 
Unaware “Unaware of 
existence of laws   D20LDMawe;   
Book “booklet on civil 
protection by MTAD” 
D04LDMbook; D10LDM book; D11LDM book; 
D13LDMbook;  
Guidance “information that 
guides DM” 
; D02LDMgid; D03LDMgid; D12LDMgid; 
D16LDMgid;  
AHM Assessment of  
Cameroon’s 
overall Hazard 
Mitigation 
Program 
Poor “ management is not 
good” 
D0AHMpor; D02AHMpor; D11AHMpor; 
D12AHMpor; D20AHMpor; 
Success “ success rate of 
program” 
D03AHM suc; D04 AHM suc; D07AHMsuc; 
D10AHMsuc; D11AHMsuc; D12AHMsuc; 
D13AHMsuc; D17AHMsuc; D17AHMsuc 
Enforcement “ Enforcement 
of policies” 
D01 AHM enf; D02AHMenf; D08AHMenf; 
D11AHMsuc; D14AHMimp 
Investment “ More 
investment into program” D06 AHMinv; D08AHMinv; D10AHMinv;  
Improvement “ program is 
improving” 
D05AHM imp; D06AHMimp; D09AHMimp; 
D10AHMimp; D14AHMimp; D14AHMimp; 
D19AHMimp 
Limitations “ constraints to 
implementation of program” D04AHM lim; D20AHMlim; D10AHMlim 
Victims “government 
assistance to victims” 
D03 AHM vic; D19AHMimp; D11AHMlim; 
D08AHMlim 
UNM Use of 
information on 
Nyos/Monoum 
disaster in 
decision making 
Degassing D05 UNM dgas; D07 UNMdgas; D09UNMgas; 
D10 UNMgas; D12UNM dgas; D13UNM dgas; 
assistance “assistance to 
victims” 
D01UNMass; D01UNMass; D11 UNMass; 
D15UNM ass; D178UNMass;  
council “ role of wum 
cuncil” 
D01UNMcoun; D04 UNM road; D01UNMcoun; 
D16 UNMcoun;  
Preference  “No preference 
to Nyos/monoum  disaster” 
D03UNMpref; D05UNMpref; D17 UNMpref; 
D19 UNMpref; D20 UNMpref 
Road   
HRA Cameroon’s 
Natural Hazard 
Risk assessment 
high “grade NH risk as high” D01 HRA high; D02 HRA high; D03 HRAhigh; 
D04 HRAhigh; D05HRAhigh; D06HRAhigh; 
D07HRAhigh; D08HRAhigh; D09HRAhigh; 
D12HRAhigh; D17HRA high; D19HRA high; 
D20HRA high; 
frequency “ frequency of 
occurrence” 
D01 HRA freq; D01HRAfreq; D05HRAfreq; 
D08HRAfreq; D12HRAfreq; 
moderate “grade risk as 
moderate” 
D10HRAmod; D11HRAmod; D13HRA; D15 
HRA 
VPR Level of  
Cameron’s 
Vulnerability 
preparedness and 
resilience 
low “ grade preparedness 
level as low ” 
D01VPR low; D02VPR low; D20VPRlow 
Scientific “scientific means 
of preparedness” 
D05VPR sci; D06VPRsci; D08VPRsci; 
D11VPRsci; D16VPRsci; D12VPRsci; 
D18VPRsci;  
plan “vulnerability 
preparedness plan” 
D01VPR plan; D02VPRplan; D02VPRplan;  
progress “progress in vul 
reduction” 
D03VPRprog; D06VPRprog’  D07VPRprog; 
D08VPRprog; D10VPRprog; D15VPRprog; 
D17VPRprog;; D19VPRprog;  
high “grade preparedness 
level as high” 
D05VPR high; 
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NMM Awareness of 
disaster 
mitigation 
/management 
plan for the 
Nyos/Monoum 
area 
Resettlement “resettlement 
of victims” 
D03NMMres; D04NMMres;  
Implementation 
“implementation of  
policies” 
D10NMMimp; D19NMMimp;  
Degassing “degassing 
projects” 
D05NMMdgas; D06NMMdgas; D07NMMdgas; 
D08NMMdgas; D09NMMdgas; D10NMMdgas; 
D11NMMdgas; D12NMMdgas; D13NMMdgas; 
D14NMMdgas; D15NMMdgas; D16NMMdgas; 
D20NMMdgas; 
Social concerns “social 
concerns for victims” 
D16NMMsocons; D17NMMsocons; 
D20NMMsocons 
No “ Not aware of any 
management plan” 
D01NMMno;  
yes “aware of management 
plan” 
D03NMMyes; D05NMMyes; D06NMMyes; 
D07NMMyes 
TML Scientific effort 
to reduce the 
threat of the lakes 
Opinion “ perception of 
technical management” 
D01TMLopin;  
equipments “technical 
equipments”  
D04TMLequip; D06TMLequip; D07TMLequip; 
D08 TMLequip; D09 TMLequip; D10TMLequip; 
D11TMLequip; D12TMLequip; D13TMLequip; 
D14TMLequip; D15 TMLequip; D16TMLequip; 
D17TMLequip; D18TMLequip; D19TMLequip; 
Foreign “foreign technical 
assistance” 
D03 TMLforass; D05TMLforass; 
D06TMLforass;  
neglect “ neglect of victims”  D01TMLneg; D08 TMLneg; D15TMLequip;  
VMP Management 
Plan for the 
displaced or 
affected victims 
of the Nyos 
disaster 
Promises “promises made” D03VMPpro; D09VMPres; D15VMPres; 
Resettlement “relocation of 
victims” 
D04VMPres; D05VMPres; D06VMPres; 
D07VMPres; D008VMPres; D13VMPres; 
D16VMPres; D17VMPres; D18VMPres; 
D19VMPres; 
No “Don’t know of any 
plans” 
D01VMPno; D14VMno; D20VMPno; 
problems “problems faced by 
victims” 
D12VMvic 
CMV Main constraints 
or problems with 
the management 
of the Lake Nyos 
victims 
Governance 
“Poor governance” 
D01CMVgov; D05CMVgov;D14CMVgov; 
D16CMV 
Negligence 
“neglect of victims” 
D01CMVneg; D05CMVneg; D08CMVneg;  
Embezzlement 
“Use of victims money” 
D01CMV emb; D15CMVemb;D17CMVemb; 
D20CMVemb:   
Planning 
“Poor planning” 
D06CMVplan; D12CMVplan; D14CMVplan; 
D15CMVplan; D17CMVplan: D19CMVplan:  
D20CMVplan:    
victims “Victims complain” D02CMV vic;  D04CMVvic; D11CMVvic; 
D12CMVvic; D11CMVvic; D14CMVvic; 
D16CMV:   
VDM Disaster victims 
participation in 
disaster 
mitigation 
projects 
Ignorance 
“knowledge of programs” 
D0VDMign; D03VDMign; D14VDMign; 
D19VDMign; D20VDMign: 
Plan 
“future plan for victims” 
D04VDM plan; D06VDMplan; D13VDMplan;  
functional 
“functionality of program” 
D10VDMfunc; D12VDMfunc; D15VDMfunc; 
D16VDMfunc; D17VDMfunc;  
Representatives 
“Community 
representatives” 
D18VDMrep 
Victims “Victims sufferings” D0VDMvic;  
DMD Extend to which  
disaster 
management is 
incorporated into 
development 
policies/plans or 
projects 
Opinion 
“doubt if  DM is 
incorporated into Dev 
planning” 
D01DMDopin; D02DMDopin; D04DMDopin; 
D14DMDopin; D15DMDopin; D20DMD 
Road 
“ transport to Nyos” 
D02DMDroad; D06DMDroad; D07DMDroad;  
Risky  dwellings 
“constructions in risk prone 
areas”  
D11DMD risk; D12DMDrisk;  
Focus “present gov’t D02DMDfoc; D13DMDfoc; D16DMDfoc; 
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interest” D17DMDfoc; D18DMDfoc; D19DMDfoc;  
Enforcement “lack of 
enforcement” 
D02DMDenfor; D12DMDrisk; D14DMDenfor; 
D18DMDenfor; 
Incorporated “ DM 
incorporated into Dev 
planning” 
D03DMDicop; D11DMDicop;  
SEI Social and 
economic 
impacts of the 
lake Nyos 
disaster 
Misery “Misery of Ukpwa 
camp victims” 
D01SEI mis; D03SEImis; D04SEImis; 
D11SEImis; D13SEImis; D18SEI; D20SEImis;  
Projects “ Priority to 
scientific projects” 
D07SEIprio;  
land Use “ land for camp 
construction” 
D11SEIlanuse;  
fishing “fishing in lakes” D12SEIfis;  
Displacement “resettlement 
of victims” 
D18SEIdis 
Poverty D02SEIpov; D15SEIpov;  
Benefits “ Future 
developments” 
D17SEIben;  
MNM Management of 
Nyos and 
Monoum 
Disasters 
Victims “ Treatment of 
victims” 
D02MNMvic; D11MNMvic D12MNMvic;  
opinion “ immediate post 
disaster  management ” 
D06MNMopin; D11MNMopin;  D12MNMopin; 
D13MNMopin; D15MNMopin; D17MNMopin; 
D18MNMopin; D20MNMopin; 
Plans “future plans” D06MNMplan; D17MNMplan;  
technical “technical 
management” 
D08MNM tech; D19MNMtech; 
poor “ Not properly 
managed”  
D01MNMpoor; D02MNMpoor; D20MNMpoor 
well “ properly  managed” D03MNMwell; D04MNMwell; D07MNMwell; 
D11MNMwell; D12MNMwell; D18MNMwell; 
D19MNMwell;  
SDM How 
Nyos/Monoum  
disaster 
management 
could have been 
improved  
Monitoring “constant 
monitoring of victims” 
D01SDMmon; D02SDMmon; D20SDMmon 
Rehabilitation “ Nyos 
rehabilitation program” 
D19SDMrehab;  
livelihood “Socioeconomic 
improvement of victims” 
D05SDMlivli; D12SDMlivli;  
Local scientist “involvement 
of local scientists” 
D05SDMlocsci; D08SDMlocsci;  
Return “knowledge of  
returnees to disaster site” 
D03SDM ret; D04SDMret;   
CDM 
Possible 
constraint to 
Nyos/Monoum 
disaster 
management 
Governance “ governance 
problems” 
D01CDMgov; D02CDMgov; D05CDMgov 
D08CDMgov; D20CDMgov. 
Corruption “corruption and 
embezzlement” 
D02CDMcorrup; D15CDMcorrop 
Experience “lack of past 
experience” 
D06CDM exp 
Poverty “Poor economic 
situation of Cameroon” 
D04CDM poor; D12CDMpoor; D15CDM 
EFP How  
Nyos/Monoum 
disaster 
experience can 
be useful  for 
future planning 
Government “Government 
change” 
D01EFPgov; D02EFP 
attitudes “attitudes of 
managers” 
D01EFPatti; D06EFPatti;  
priorities “ equal proactive 
and reactive measures” 
D18EFPprio; D10EFPprio; D19EFPprio;  
Enforcement “ 
implementation  of policies 
and programs” 
D03EFPenfo; D08EFPenfo; D15EFPenfo;  
victims “ More attention to 
social problems of victims 
D04EFPvic; D02EFPvic; D01EFPvic; 
D05EFPvic; D10EFPvic; D11EFPvic; 
D12EFPvic; D19EFPvic; D20EFP 
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CODED TRANSCRIPTS FOR DISPLACED UKPWA CAMP VICTIMS 
 
CODES FOR 
MAIN 
CATEGORIES 
MAIN 
CATEGORIES 
SUB 
CATEGORIES 
CODED TRANSCRIPTP  FOR  SUB-
CATEGORIES 
RL Effects or 
Impact  due to 
Relocation  
Livelihood “ livelihood loss 
and change” 
U08RLlivhd; U16RL livhd;U15RLlivhd;  
Housing “change of 
housing conditions”  
U02RL hous; U04RLhous; 
U09RLedu;U12RLhous: U23RLhous 
Income “loss of income”  U01RL inc; U02RL hinc; U20RLhinc;  
Family “loss of family and 
lonely”  
U10RLfamly; U11RLfamly;  
Community Cohesion U03RLcomcoh; U04RLcomcoh; U04RLcomcoh;  
Education “education of 
children” 
U01RLedu; U03RLedu; U04RLedu; U04RLedu; 
U09RLedu; U13RLedu;  U19RLedu; U20 RLedu;  
Water “good water” U03RLwat;  
Crime “effect on crime U04RLcri; U13RLcri; U17RLcri; U24RLcri;  
Culture “effect on culture” U04RLcul; U12RLcul; U22RL; U23RLcul;  
Land size “landsize 
available for use”  
U25RLlansiz;  
Inheritance “inheritance of 
property” 
U18RLinher;  
stranger “ feeling like 
stranger” 
U14RLstran;  U15RLstran;  
    
PR Preferred 
Relocation site 
Fertility “ more fertile 
soils” 
U01PRfer; U06PRfer; U07PRfer; U09PRfer; 
U17PRfer; U20PRfer; U22PRfer; U25PRfer; 
Culture “ similar culture” U03 PRcul; U07PRcul; U06PRcul; U09PRcul; 
U14PRcul; U15PRcul; U24PRcul;  
Urban “ live in town or 
Urban area” 
U09PRnyos; U12PRurb; U13PRurb; U21PRurb 
Land size “ size of 
cultivable land” 
U09PRlansiz; U17PRlansiz; U21PRlansiz 
better “life better 
elsewhere” 
U01PRbet;  
indifference “ not sure ” U03PRind; U04PRind; U05PRind; U10PRind;  
Nyos “ returned to Nyos” U06PRnyos; U07PRnyos; U14PRnyos; 
U15PRnyos; U16PRnyos; U18PRnyos; 
U20PRnyos; U22PRnyos; U24PRnyos 
GM Assessment of 
Government’s 
Management of  
the Disasters 
Grade “ grade as fair” U01GMgra;  
Poor “poor management” U02GMpor; U02GMpor; U15 GMpor 
Comparism “ Nyos DM 
compared to others” 
U01GMcom; U19GMcom; U20GMcom; U25GM 
Victims “treatment of 
victims” 
U02GMvic; U03GMvic; U11GMvic;  
U12GMvic; U14 GMvic; U15GMvic; 
U17GMvic; U18GMvic; U19GMvic; U20 
GMvic; U23GMvic; 
Assistance “ government’s 
assistance” 
U02GM ass; U05GMass; U07GMass; 
U08GMass; U09GMass; U10GMass; U12GMass; 
U13GMass ; U21 GMass;  
Opinion “ immediate post 
disaster management”  
U03GM opin; U04GMopin; U06GMopin; 
U10GMopin; U11GMopin; U12GMopin; 
U14GMopin; U18GMopin; U18GMopin; 
U20GMopin; U22GMopin; U25GMopin 
Periodic assistance U10GMperass; U17GMperass;  
NGO “ help from NGOs” U04GMngo 
Corruption “corruption by 
officials” 
U18GMcor;  
RI Intention to 
Relocate  from 
present location  
Education “ educational 
reasons” 
U05RIedu; U06RIedu; U14RIedu; U19RIedu; 
U21RIedu; U22RRIedu;  
Adaptation “adapted to 
present location” 
U01RIadap;  
Age “ Old to relocate” U02RIage; U08RIage; 18RIage; 23RIage; 
24RIage; 
land size “ large land” U20RIlansiz;  
Fertility “ land or soil 
fertility”  
U14RI fer; U20Rifer;  
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Cultural “ cultural reasons” U02RIcul; U04RIcul; U15RIcul; U23RIcul; 
U24RIcul; 
livelihood “ livelihood 
reasons” 
U01RIlivhd; U11RIlivhd; U12RIlivhd; U14 
RIlivhd; U17RIlivhd; U20 RIlivhd; U21RIlivhd;  
Forced “ Move if 
instructed” 
U09RIfor;  
No “ No intention to 
relocate” 
U01RIno; U03RIno; U04RIno ; 
U06RIno;U08RIno; U10RIno;  
Yes “ Willing to relocate” U02RIyes; U11RIyes; U12RIyes; U14RIyes; 
U15RIyes; U17RIyes; U18 RIyes; U19RIyes; 
U20RIprof; U21RIyes; U22RIyes; U23RIyes; 
U24RIyes 
HA Most dangerous 
hazard or hazard 
most afraid of  
Gas “ afraid of gas 
eruption” 
U01HA gas; U02HA gas; U03HA gas; U06HA 
gas; U08HA gas; U09HA gas; U10HA gas; 
U11HA gas; U14HA gas; U17HA gas; 
Lakes “ afraid of  crater 
lakes” 
U12HA olaks; U15HAolaks; 
EH Impact of 
another hazard 
to household 
Death “ Death of people 
and livestock”  
U01EHdets; U02EHdets; U03EHdets; 
U04EHdets; U05EHdets; U06EHdets; 
U08EHdets; U09EHdets; U15EHdets; 
Assistance “ assist in 
preparing” 
U02DPass; U08DPass; U09DPass; U12DPass;   
Local “ local knowledge of 
preparedness” 
U15DPloc; U15DPloc; 
Religion “ religious 
believe” 
U04DPrel;  
Not “ Not prepared” U01DPnot; U01DPnot; U03DPnot; U04DPnot; 
U05DPnot; U06DPnot; U08DPnot; U09DPnot; 
U12 DPnot;   
CI Confidence in 
Government 
Information on 
risk 
Not Confidence  U01CInconf; U02CIncof; U03CIncof; 
U04CIncof; U05CIncof; U06CIncof; U08CIncof; 
U11CIncof; U14CIncof; U15CIncof; U17CIncof; 
U18CIncof; U23CIncof 
Confidence U10CIconf; U16CIcof; U25CIcof 
Suspicious U02CIsus; U02CIsus; U04CIsus; U13CIsus; 
U17CIncof 
Others  
“ Other sources” 
U01CIodsor; U03CInodsor;  
GI Government’s 
Information on 
Risk 
Other “Other  sources” U01GIodsor; U11GIodsor; 
None “inadequate  
Information” 
U01GIninfos; U03GIninfos; U05GIninfos; 
U06GIninfos; U07GIninfos; U11GIninfos; 
U13GIninfos; U14GIninfos; U17GIninfos; 
U20GIninfos;  
GA Willingness to 
follow 
government 
advice  
Conditional “ follow if 
advice is good” 
U01GAcon; U04GAcon; U05GAcon; 
U06GAcon; U07GAcon; U11GAcon; 
U13GAcon; U18GAcon; U21 GAcon;  
Doubt “ doutbt if gov’t 
advice can be good” 
U07GAdobt; U08GAdobt; U17GAdobt;  
Enforcement  U02GAenfor; U04GAenfor; U08GAenfor; 
U12GAenfor; U13GAenfor; U19GAenfor; 
U22GAenfor;  
Others “ advice from other 
sources”  
U07GAodsor; U11GAodsor;  
Yes “ willing to follow 
advice” 
U02GAyes; U03GAyes; U04GAyes; U09GAyes; 
U10GAyes; U11GAyes; U12GAyes; U13GAyes; 
U156GAyes; U18GAyes; U19GAyes; 
U22GAyes; U25GAyes;  
trust “ trust in gov’t” U01GA trust; U02GAtrust; U20GAtrust; 
U23GAtrust; U24GAtrust;  
No “ not follow advice” U08GAno; U14GAno; U15GAno; U17GAno; 
U20GAno; U23GAno; U24GAno 
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CODED TRANSCRIPTS FOR RETURNEES TO DISASTER ZONE STUDY  
 
CODES FOR 
MAIN 
CATEGORIES 
MAIN 
CATEGORIES 
SUB 
CATEGORIES 
CODED TRASCRIPED  SUB-
CATEGORIES 
MR Motive for 
relocation back to 
Nyos 
Cultural “ Native land or 
cultural reasons” 
N01MRcul; N03MRcul; N07MRcul; 
N10MRcul; N11MRcul; N15MRcul 
Fertility “ To farm the fertile 
soils” 
N01MRfer; N02MRfer; N03MRfer; 
N04MRfer; N05MRfer; N06MRfer; 
N07MRfer; N08MRfer; N09MRfer; 
N10MRfer; N11MRfer; N12MRfer; 
N14MRfer; N15MRfer; N16MRfer; 
N17MRfer; N20MRfer 
Poverty N06MRpov; N12MRpor 
Hunger N05MRhun; N11MRhum; N14MRhum;  
Property  N01MRprop; N19MRprop 
Inheritance  N02MRinher; N05MRinher: N06MRinher; 
N14MRinher  
Rearing space N08MRrearsp; N09MRrearsp; N13MRrearsp; 
N18MRrearsp; N19MR 
Independence N18MRind 
sale “problem with sale of 
products” 
N16MRsale 
PR Preferred 
Relocation site 
Fertility “ more fertile soils”  N02PRfer; N04PRfer; N05PRfer; N06PRfer; 
N08PRfer; N09PRfer; N10PRfer; N11PRfer; 
N18Pfer; N21PRfer; N22PRfer; N24PRfer;  
Culture “ similar culture” N02PRcul; N04PRcul; N05PRcul; N06PRcul; 
N07PR cul; N11PRcul; N19PRcul; N21PRfer; 
N22PRfer; N24PRcul 
Road “ poor road condition”  N16PR road ; N21PR road ; N22PR road ; 
N24PR road ; 
Land size “ size of cultivable 
land” 
N02PRlansiz; N05PRlansiz; N10PRlansiz; 
N11PRlansiz; N13PRlansiz; N05PRlansiz; 
N18PRlansiz; N22PRlansiz; 
indifference “ not sure ”  N12PRind;  
GM Assessment of 
Government’s 
Management of  the 
Disasters 
Periodic assistance N01GMperass; N02GMperass; 
N009GMperass; N13GMperass; 
N16GMperass; 
Poor “poor management” N04GM por; N05GMpor;  
Victims “treatment of 
returnees” 
N12GMvic;  
Assistance “ limited 
government’s assistance” 
 N01GMass; N02GMass; N05GMass; 
N07GMass; N09 GMass; N10GMass; 
N05GMass; N13GMass; N14GMass; 
N15GMass; N16GMass; N17GMass; 
N18GMass; N19GMass; 
Promises “failed promises” N17GMpro: N20GMpro;  
Opinion “ immediate post 
disaster management”  
 N04GM opin; N05GMopin; N06GMopin; 
N07GMopin; N09GMopin; N11GMopin; 
N13GMopin;  
Plan “ post disaster planning” N08GMpln 
NGO “ help from NGOs” N10GMngo; N12GMngo; N13GMngo; 
N16GMngo; N19GMngo; N22GMngo; 
N24GMngo 
RI Intention to 
Relocate  from 
present location  
Risk “perception of risk” N07RIriskper 
Cultural “ cultural reasons” N07RIcul;  
Forced “ Move if instructed” N06RIfor; N08RI no; 
No “ No intention to relocate” N01RI no; N03RI no; N04RI no; N06RI no; 
N07RIno; N08RI no; N09RI no; N10RI no; 
N11RI no; N12RI no; N13RI no; N14RI no; 
N17RI no; N18RI no; N19RI no;  
Yes “ Willing to relocate” U02RIyes; U15RIyes; U20RIyes; U21RIyes 
HA Most dangerous 
hazard or hazard 
most afraid of  
Gas “ afraid of gas eruption” N01HA gas; N12HAgas; N13HAgas; 
N14HAgas;  
Lakes “ afraid of  crater 
lakes” 
N02HA olaks; N03HAolaks; N09HAolaks;  
Plant diseases “ afraid of N09HAplndie 
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plant diseases” 
Not “ Not afraid” N01HAnot; N05HAnot; N06HAnot; 
N08HAnot; N11HAnot; N16HAnot; 
N17HAnot; N20HAnot; 
EH Impact of another 
hazard to 
household 
Death “ Death of people and 
livestock”  
N01EHdets; N02EHdets; N03EHdets; 
N04EHdets; N05EHdets; N07EHdets; 
N10EHdets; N12EHdets; N13EHdets; 
N16EHdets; N19EHdets; N21EHdets; 
N23EHdets; 
Displacement N01EHdis; N10EHdets; N12EHdets; 
N13EHdets; N16EHdets; N21EHdets; 
N23EHdets; 
DP Level of Disaster 
Preparedness 
Assistance “ no assistance in 
preparing” 
N11DPass; N15DPass; N20DPass; 
Scientific N02DPsci; N04DPsci; N22DPsci; N23DPsci; 
N12 DPsci 
Local “ local knowledge of 
preparedness” 
N02DPloc; N11DPloc; N22DPloc; N24DPloc; 
Religion “ religious believe” N05DPrel; N07DPrel; N09DPrel; N10DPrel; 
N13DPrel; N16DPrel; N20DPrel; 
Not “ Not prepared” N15DPrel;not;  
CI Confidence in 
Government 
Information on risk 
Not Confident  N06CInconf; N07CIncof; N10CIncof; 
N13CIncof; 
Confidence N01CIconf; N02CIconf; N08CIconf; 
N11CIconf; N14CIconf;  
Suspicious N04CIsus; N06CIsus; N07CIsus; N06CIsus; 
N12CIsus; N17CIsus; N18CIsus; N19CIsus; 
N20CIsus; 
Others  
“ Other sources” 
N11CIodsor; N13CIodsor; N15CIodsor; 
N18CIodsor; 
GI Government’s 
Information on 
Risk 
Scientific N04GIsci; N05GIsci; N09GIsci; N13GIsci; 
N19GIsci 
None “inadequate  
Information” 
N01GIninfos; N02GIninfos; N03GIninfos; 
N04GIninfos; N05GIninfos; N06GIninfos; 
N09GIninfos; N12GIninfos; N13GIninfos; 
N14GIsci; N15GIsci; N16GIsci; N18GIsci;  
Other “Other  sources” U0GIodsor; N19GIodsor;  
GA Willingness to 
follow government 
advice  
Conditional “ follow if advice 
is good” 
N12GAcon; N17GA con; N21GAcon; 
N22GA con; N24GA con; 
Enforcement  N07GAenfor; N11GAenfor; N18GAenfor; 
Yes “ willing to follow 
advice” 
N02GA yes; N03GA yes; N04GA yes; 
N05GA yes; N07GA yes; N11GA yes; 
N14GA yes; N15GA yes; N18GA yes; 
N19GA yes; N20GAyes; 
No “ not follow advice” N01GA no; N06GA no; N10GAno; 
N12GAno; N13GA no; N17GAno; 
 
 
 
CODED TRANSCRIPTS FOR NJINDOUM STUDY POPULATION 
 
 
CODES FOR 
MAIN 
CATEGORIES 
MAIN 
CATEGORIES 
SUB 
CATEGORIES 
CODED TRANSCRIPT SUB-CATEGORIES  
RL If relocated 
when disaster 
happened.  
Town “ temporal relocation 
to  town” 
M01RLtown; M05RLtown; M11RLtown; 
M15RLtown; M16RLtown; M21RLtown; 
M25RLtown; 
Camp “temporal relocation 
to emergency camp”  
M08RLcamp; M10RLcamp; M18RLcamp; 
M23RLcamp;  
relatives “temporal 
relocation to relatives in 
Njindoum”  
M03RLrel; M04RLrel; M09RLrel; M12RLrel; 
M13RLrel; M14RLrel; M24RLrel; 
lakeside “relocated from 
lakeside”  
M09RLlak 
not “ did not leave his 
house when disaster 
M02RLnot; M07RLnot; M17RLnot; M19RLnot; 
M20RLnot; M22RLnot;  
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happened” 
MR Motive for non-
relocation from 
Njindoum. 
Lakeside farm M12MRlakfm;  
cultural M08MRcul; M14MRcul; M16MRcul; 
M17MRcul; M18MRcul; M22MRcul; 
M24MRcul: M25MRcul; 
agriculture “ agriculture or 
livelihood reasons” 
M01MRagri; M02MRagri; M06MRagri; 
M07MRagri; M09MRagri; M11MRagri; 
M13MRagri; M18MRagri; M19MRagri; 
M21MRagri;  
Risk “ not afraid of risk” M04MRrisk;  
GM Assessment of 
Government’s 
Management of  
the Disasters 
Assistance “ limited  M02GMvic; M11GMvic;  
Good “ good management” M07GMgud; M17GMgud; M18GMgud; 
M22GMgud; 
Poor “poor management” M01GMpor; M03GMpoor; M05GMpoor; 
M12GMpoor; M16GMpor; M19GMpor; 
M20GMpor; 
Comparism “ Monoum DM 
compared to others” 
M24GMcom;  
government’s assistance”  M01GMass; M06GMass; M11GMass; 
M14GMass; M15GMass; M17GMass; M20GMass 
Promises “failed promises” M01GMpro: M02GMpro; M03GMpro; 
M05GMpro; M14GMpro; M16GMpro;  
Opinion “ immediate post 
disaster management”  
 N04GM opin; M09GMopin; 
Periodic assistance N01GMperass;  
scientific  M04GM sci 
Plan “ post disaster 
planning” 
M09GMpln; M10GMpln; M15GMpln; 
M17GMpln; 
NGO “ help from NGOs” N10GMngo;  
Corruption “corruption by 
officials” 
M08GMcor; M13GMcor; M15GMcor; 
M16GMcor; M25GMcor; 
RI Intention to 
Relocate  from 
present location  
No “ No intention to 
relocate” 
M01RI no; M02RIno; M03RIno; M04RIno; 
M05RIno; M06RIno; M07RIno; M08RIno; 
M09RIno; M10RIno; M11RIno; M12RIno; 
M13RIno; M15RIno; M16RIno; M19RIno; 
M20RIno; M21RIno; M22RIno; M23RIno; 
M24RIno; M24RIno; 
Risk “perception of risk” M01RIriskper; M04RInoriskper; M08RIriskper; 
M13RIriskper; 
Cultural “ cultural reasons” M01RIcul; M07RIcul; M09RIcul; M11RIcul; 
M15RIcul; M16RIcul; M22RIcul; M24RIcul;  
HA Most dangerous 
hazard or hazard 
most afraid of  
Gas “ afraid of gas 
eruption” 
 M01HA gas; M02HA gas; M03HA gas; M04HA 
gas; M05HA gas; M06HA gas; M07HA gas; 
M08HA gas; M09HA gas; M11HA gas; M12HA 
gas; M16HA gas; M18HA gas; M19HA gas; 
M20HA gas; M21HA gas; M22HA gas; M24HA 
gas; M25HA gas; 
Lakes “ afraid of  crater 
lakes” 
 M10HAolaks; M14HA gas; 
Plant diseases “ afraid of 
plant diseases” 
M22HAplndie 
new “strange  hazard” M13HAnew; M17HA new;   
EH Impact of 
another hazard 
to household 
Death “ Death of people 
and livestock”  
M01EHdets; M02EHdets; M03EHdets; 
M05EHdets; M06EHdets; M07EHdets; 
M08EHdets; M09EHdets; M10EHdets; 
M11EHdets; M12EHdets; M13EHdets; 
M14EHdets; M15EHdets; M16EHdets; 
M18EHdets; M19EHdets; M20EHdets; 
M22EHdets; M23EHdets; 
M24EHdets; M25EHdets; 
Religion M11EHrel 
Displacement M14EHdis; M15EHdis; M17EHdis; M21EHdets; 
M22EHdets; M23EHdets; 
DP Level of 
Disaster 
Preparedness 
lakeside “ relocated from 
lakeside” 
M02DPlak; M12DPlak; M02DPlak; M18DPlak; 
M21 DPlak 
Scientific M01DPsci; M03DPsci;  M04DPsci; M12 DPsci; 
M18 DPsci; M22DPsci; M25 DPsci; 
Religion “ religious 
believe” 
M06DPrel; M08DPrel; M09DPrel; M11DPrel; 
M14 DPrel; M15DPrel; M24DPrel 
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Uncertain M16DPuncer; M19DPuncer; M20DPuncer; 
M23DPuncer;  
Not “ Not prepared” M07DPnot;  
CI Confidence in 
Government 
Information on 
risk 
Not Confident M02CInconf; M05CInconf; M11CInconf; 
M14CIconf; M16CInconf; M17CInconf; 
M18CInconf; M18CInconf; M21CInconf; 
M21CInconf; M24CInconf; 
Confidence M01CIconf; M04CIconf; M06CIconf; 
M10CIconf; M13CIconf; M15CIconf; 
M19CIconf; M20CIconf; M22CIconf; 
M25CIconf; 
Suspicious “ gov’t cannot 
be trusted” 
M02CIsus; M11CIsus;  M19CIsus; M20CIsus; 
M24CIsus; M25CIsus;  
GI Government’s 
Information on 
Risk 
suspicious M18GIsus; 
yes “ adequate information 
is provided” 
M01GIyes; M03GIyes; M04GIyes; M05GIyes; 
M06GIyes; M08GIyes; M08GIyes; M09GIyes; 
M13GIyes; M15GIyes; M18GIyes; M19GIyes; 
M20GIyes; M21GIyes; M22GIyes; M25GIyes; 
None “inadequate  
Information” 
M02GIninfos; M07GIninfos; M11GIyes; 
M16GIyes; M17GIninfos;  
Other “Other  sources” M16GIodsor;  M17GIodsor; M24GIodsor; 
GA Willingness to 
follow 
government 
advice  
Conditional “ follow if 
advice is good” 
M02GAcon; M07GAcon; M12GAcon; 
M13GAcon; M16GAcon; M18GAcon; 
M19GAcon; M20GAcon; M21GAcon; 
M23GAcon; M24GAcon; 
Yes “ willing to follow 
advice” 
 M01GAyes; M03GAyes; M04GAyes; 
M05GAyes; M06GAyes; M08GAyes; 
M09GAyes; M15GAyes; M22GAyes; 
M20GAyes; 
No “ not follow advice”  M11GAno; M17GAno 
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APPENDIX 11 
 
LEGISLATIONS ON DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT IN CAMEROON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Law N°67-LF-9 of 12 June 1967 concerning the general organization of civil defense 
in the country.  
 Presidential Decree N°68-DF-7 of 15 January 1968 concerned the safeguard and the 
protection of civil installations of vital importance in the country.  
 Presidential Instruction N°02/CAB/PRC of 18 January 1968 also emphasized the 
safeguard and protection of important civilian infrastructures in the country. 
 Presidential Instruction N°16/CAB/PRC of 1st September 1972 concerned the 
organisation of rescue efforts in the country.  
  Decree N°74/199 of 14 March 1974 was about operations concerned with the 
exhumation and transfer of corpses. 
  Law N° 86/016 of 06 December 1986 concerning the general reorganization of Civil 
Protection in the country.  
 Presidential Instruction N°005/CAB/PR of 24 August 1987 was on monitoring the 
Nation’s security. 
 Decree N°.96/054 of 12 March 1996 to determine the composition and duties of the 
National Council for Civil Protection. 
 Decree N° 98/031 of 09 March 1998 relating to the organisation of emergency and 
relief plans. 
 Decree N° 98/147 of 17 July 1998 concerning the organization of the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration (MTAD). 
 Decree N°2002/018 of 18 January 2002 ratifying the framework convention for 
emergency aid in civil defense adopted at the Geneva Convention on 22 May 2000. 
 Prime Ministerial decision N° 037/PM of 19 March 2003 creating a National 
Observatory for Risks with principal role to identify the high risk regions in the 
country and to take necessary measures towards disaster prevention and mitigation in 
these areas. 
  Decree N°. 2004/320 of 8 December 2004 that placed Civil Protection as one of the 
three main functions of MINATD. 
 Decree N°2004/009 of 24 April 2004 concerning the reorganization of the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration and Decentralization. 
  Presidential Decree No 2005/124 of 15 march 2005 creating an emergency 
telecommunications service for disaster prevention and mitigation. 
 Decree N°2005/327 of 6 September 2005 on the management of civil aviation security 
crises in Cameroon. 
Source: Author 
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APPENDIX 12 
 
ORGANIGRAM OF THE DCP AND THE AGENCIES THAT COORDINATE 
DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN CAMEROON AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AS 
PRODUCED BY THE GOVERNMENT 
 
According to the government, the DCP in MTAD has three main structures that have been 
designated to perform its functions of coordination, facilitation and operations of DM 
activities within the country.  These are the Coordination and Interventions Unit, managed 
by the Sub-Directorate for Co-ordination of Interventions under the authority of an 
Assistant Director, a Research and Prevention Unit and a structure responsible for 
facilitation which collaborates with all local, national and international agencies involved 
in risk prevention (figure 5.2). These include the National Civil Defence Council 
(NCDC)28, the National Risks Observatory (NRO)29, National Disaster Prevention and 
Management Programme (NDPMP)30, UNDP, UNICEF, and WHO.   
 
 
 Organisational chart of the Department of Civil Protection Adapted from Nana (2005) 
 
The four main organisations that facilitate the management of disasters in the country at 
the national level with direct supervision from the presidency are shown in figure 5.3. 
                                                 
28
 The National Civil Defence Council (NCDC) is a consultative body that works alongside the Secretary-
General of the Presidency of the Republic. 
29
 The National Risk Observatory (NRO) is responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and spreading 
information on risks. 
30
 The National Disaster Prevention and Management Programme (NDPMP) is a dialogue organ set up in 
partnership with the UNDP with the aim of reinforcing the government’s managerial, logistical and material 
means in terms of disaster planning, prevention and management.  
 
 DEPARTMENT 
OF CIVIL 
PROTECTION 
SUB DEPARTMENT 
FOR COORDINATION 
AND  
INTERVENTIONS 
RESEARCH AND 
PREVENTION 
UNIT 
THREE 
RESEARCH 
ASSISTANTS 
ASSISTANCE 
AND 
INTERVENTIONS 
UNIT 
CO-
ORDINATION 
SERVICE 
EVALUATION 
AND CONTROL 
BUREAU 
INTERVENTION 
CIVIL ORGANS 
AND ADHOC 
COMMISSIONS 
BUREAU 
INTERVENTION
ASSISTANCE 
ORGANISATION 
BUREAU 
INTERVENTIONS 
MONITORING 
AND ASSISTANCE 
MANAGEMENT 
BUREAU 
INTERVENTIONS 
307 
 
Under the control of the DCP, the operational structures which are both national and 
international intervene within their areas of expertise to manage disasters. They include the 
National Fires Service (NFS), the Emergency Medical Services (EMS), the National 
Institute of Geological and Mining Research (NIGMR), the National Institute of 
Cartography (NIC) and the Cameroon Red Cross (CRC) (figure 5.4). These agencies fall 
within different Government Ministries and departments. However, all the government 
ministries that collaborate with the DCP are not mentioned in the document published by 
MTAD on CP in the country.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Facilitation Structures. Source: Adapted from Nana (2005) 
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Figure 5.4: Principal emergency and disaster management intervention agencies.    
       Source: Adapted from Nana (2005) 
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APPENDIX 13 
 
FOREIGN AND LOCAL AID DONATED TO THE NYOS DISASTER 
SURVIVORS. 
 
 Foreign relief aid for Nyos Disaster 
FOREIGN COUNTRIES & 
INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE 
MATERIAL AND HUMAN 
ASSISTANCE 
United States 5,000,000 CFA Half a million worth of equipments, 
drugs, tents, gas detectors etc. 
Gabon 100,000,000 CFA  Trucks for rescue operations 
Canada 50,000,000 CFA  
Britain 5,000,000 CFA 
Holland 37,750,000 CFA 
Israel  Five Doctors and fifteen nurses 
European Economic Community 150,000,000 CFA Drugs and Blankets 
Soviet Union   
France  Doctors and Scientist, 20,000 tonnes of 
baggage and drugs. 
Spain   A tonne of drugs, 200.000 blankets, tents, 
boots and dresses.  
West Germany  30.000 tonnes of humanitarian aid 
including camps, blankets and other 
rescue equipments 
China 10,000,000,000 CFA  
Japan 100,000,000F CFA 
  
  
Source: Adapted from Cameroon Tribune (Wednesday 12th September, 1986:3)  
 
Local Relief Aid for Nyos Disaster 
LOCAL COMPANIES 
AND ORGANISATIONS 
FINANCIAL AID MATERIAL AID 
Milky Way Company  10 tonnes of milk 
Camsuco  7 tonnes of sugar 
Guinness Cameroon  Malta worth 1.2 million frs 
Canon Yaounde 308850  
SNAC 5000000 
National Relief Commission in 
Menchum and Donga Mantung divisions 
 School equipments worth 17 million 
FCFA.  
SCAC Transport International 1000000  
Fougereolle Company 1000000 
SNEA Reglement Secours 50000000 
Ebobo and C.I.E Company 1000000 
CIE Commercial Agricole  250000 
SOCACOP 250000 
Societe  Anonyme E.K.  2000000 
Sangmalima Council 500000 
Bamenda Family Meeting 200000 
Mr. Olivier Cacoub 3000000 
Cameroon Brazillian Community 910000  
AMACAM 1000000 
Islamic Cultural Association 500.000 
Brasseries du Cameroun 15000000 
Rotary Club 2000000 
Dumez Cam Industrie 3000.000 
CIFOA    S.A  1500000 
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SOCUCAM 2000000 
Commerce Service Transit 5000000 
Thomson CSF DRT/RTC  250000 
Ecam Placages  1091000 
Lom Djerem CPDM Section 521000 
UNALOR  30000000 
Bank of Central African States 10000000 
Razel Cameroon 3000000 
Professional Womens Club 500000 
Paribas Cameroon Bank 15000000 
Aluminium Pehiney 5000000 
Banque de Zaire 36396250 
Fonds Specieux in Libreville 100000000 
YCPDM Nkondongo IV  44500 
Federation of Evangelical Churches  346500 
Eglise Presbyterian Ndongolo Parish 116910 
Niger community in Cameroon 200000 
IBM France company 3000000 
Rhode and Shwarz 3280000 
Staff in Cameroon Embassy in Saudi 
Arabia 
515850 
Caprice et Forme Company 100000 
National Order of Cameroon Pharmacists 10000000 
Bouygues Boubert  100000 
Scanwater Engineering 1000000 
Syndicate of Producers and Exporters of 
Timber 
250000 
Banque Unie Credit 1000000 
Mr Moulayesse B. 1000000 
Source: Adapted from Cameroon Tribune (Wednesday 12th September, 1986: 3)  
 
Material and Foodstuffs donated to Nyos Disaster Victims 
SELECTED SEMI-PROCESSED/IMPORTED FOODS 
Milk 1.679  cartons 
Palm Oil (drums) 43 cartons of 25 liters  
Finoline vegetable Oil 171 drums of 25 liters 
Finoline vegetable oil 125 cartons 
Rice 7,343 bags of 220 tons 
Salt 10 tons 
Fish (dried imported) 10 tons 
Biscuits 522 cartons 
Flour 7 cartons + 200 bags 
Sardines 2,583 cartons 
Sugar 140 cartons + 123 bags 
Semolina 500 sacks 
Repas de flacon 16,809 pieces 
Beans 50 bags 
Diamaor Oil (1 lit bottles) 1,588 cartons 
Nido Milk 64 cartons 
Corned beef 637 tins 
Tin food (other types) 1,752 tins etc 
SELECTED LOCAL UNPROCESSED FOODSTUFFS 
Plantain  
Bananas  
Corn  
Yams  
Tapioca  
Eggs  
Fresh vegetables  
Fruits  
Life animals etc  
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EQUIPMENTS 
Tents  
Variety of households utensils  
Toilet materials  
Cloths  
Building Materials  
7 Vehicles  
Adapted from Ngwa (1992) 
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APPENDIX 14 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Government policy on integrating natural hazard/disaster risk reduction with 
development   planning in the country 
 
1. The Government’s main approach to DM and DRR in the country should 
emphasise the need to incorporate natural hazard/disaster mitigation within the 
development planning process of the country.  
2. How the government intends to integrate the different disaster mitigation 
instruments within the development process should be clearly spelled out in 
policy documents.  
3. How the government’s  inter-sectoral and inter-agency cooperation for DRR 
and DM at the international, national and local levels will fit with the  overall 
development planning process of the country should also be mentioned 
4. Experiences and lessons learned in the management of the Lake Nyos and 
Monoum disasters should be used in the management or prevention of similar 
hazards/disasters in the country.  
5. Priority in contemporary DM in Cameroon should be based on potential risk, 
frequency and intensity of hazards rather than the administrative area or 
geographical location in the country. 
6. The government should mainstream DRR into the social and physical 
development process in Cameroon based on contemporary DRR challenges in 
the context of sustainable development.  
 
B. Legislative and institutional framework of disaster management in the country 
1. Government policy on DM should focus more on proactive measures that 
should address all the phases in the DM cycle.  
2. The role of NGOs and the private sector in DRR should be explicit in 
government DM policy.  
3. Government legislation and policy on DM in the country should address natural 
hazards and disasters separately from technological and human induced 
hazards. This is because “natural” disasters occur on a different scale, 
frequency, geographical locations and often requires different contingency 
planning than the other disasters.  
4. Government policy aimed for the protection of internally displaced people 
should be clearly spelled out as outlined in the guiding principles on internal 
displacement by the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of 
Humanitarian affairs. Such policies need to safeguard the rights of the disaster 
affected community to basic social amenities and living conditions in a healthy 
environment. 
5. Government policy on resettlement should spell out that relocated communities 
should be resettled in a manner that their cultural and religious assets, social 
networks and social ties will be preserved.  
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C. Administrative process of disaster management 
1. The government should decentralize responsibilities and resources for DRR to 
relevant provincial/regional or local authorities to avoid administrative 
bottlenecks. 
2.  There should be a stronger horizontal collaboration between the DCP and the 
other bodies or agencies which facilitate DRR in the country.  The DCP should 
also encourage and facilitate strong interagency collaboration.  
3. The organizational structure under the MTAD should be revised to clarify the 
working relationships and operational procedures with the other ministries and 
agencies that provide supportive services to the DCP. 
4. All information and academic materials on government policy or training on 
disasters in the country should be distributed to the relevant departments in the 
entire territory.  
5. There should be a monitoring and evaluation process to track the progress of 
DM programs.  
6. A robust contingency planning for natural hazards, which the country is prone 
to should be put in place.   
7. A comprehensive risk, vulnerability and hazard assessment of the physical 
environment of the country should be done and a hazard risk map produced.  
8. Disaster Management and Risk Reduction program should focus on the socio-
economic as well as the technical aspects. 
9. The responsibilities of disaster managers and DM committees at the national, 
provincial and local levels should be well defined to avoid duplication of 
functions.   
10. Government pledges and promises to compensate disaster victims and survivors 
should be respected. 
11. Government promises, plans and programs to implement infrastructural, social 
and economic development projects in disaster affected communities should be 
respected. 
12. Partisan politics should be kept out of DM programs.   
13. Good governance and the tackling of corruption and embezzlement of material 
and financial resources allocated for disaster survivors should be prevented. 
14. Attention should be taken to ensure that disaster victims, disaster survivors, 
beneficiaries and vulnerable populations are incorporated into the DM planning 
and decision making. 
15. Because poverty is intimately associated with vulnerability to disasters, the 
government should implement development programs that reduce poverty. 
16. The government should enforce decisions taken to prevent people from settling 
in very dangerous and risk areas or from engaging in livelihood activities that 
are risky to their lives. 
17. The government should create incentives that will make vulnerable populations 
to comply with decisions taken to mitigate risks to natural hazards.  
 
D. Knowledge, skills  and expertise in the country’s disaster management staff 
1. The Government should train or recruit staff knowledgeable in disaster 
management to work alongside the government administrators at the national, 
provincial/regional and local levels in the country.  
2. Disaster Managers at the local and provincial levels should be sufficiently and 
frequently trained to establish and sustain institutional effectiveness like their 
colleagues at the national level.  
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E. Information, Communication and Education 
1. A good communication process should be established between the various 
sectors involved in DM and the beneficiaries or populations at risk. 
2. A good road network should link all areas identified as high risk zones.  
3. People living in high risk zones should be well informed, educated and 
motivated towards a culture of disaster prevention and resilience in their 
environment. Every effort should be made to dispel societal believes that can 
give a wrong perception of risk, which can impact negatively on disaster 
preparedness and resilience. 
4. A higher degree of interaction and integration of disaster affected communities 
with formal and informal institutions and organisations at the local, national and 
international levels should be encouraged.  
 
 
F. Natural disaster research and academic engagement with the international community 
1. The government should integrate social science disaster research into the 
government research agenda on natural disasters.  
2. The government should create a research institute which focuses on the socio-
economic and cultural aspects of “natural” disasters to complement the current 
one (Institute of Geological and Mining Research) that focuses on scientific and 
technical aspects of hazards/disasters.  
3. Disaster studies should be incorporated into the educational curriculum from 
the primary to the University levels.  
The government should encourage social disaster research in the Country’s Universities 
and enable academics as well as policy makers participate and share knowledge on 
disasters at international conferences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
